



Final Report

SERVICES, RETURN, AND SECURITY IN FOUR COUNTIES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

A SURVEY COMMISSIONED BY AAH-I AND IPCS
AND CONDUCTED BY BICC

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BICC was commissioned to undertake a study on issues relating to Return and Reintegration (RR) of actors displaced by the fighting in Sudan and to provide action-oriented data on issues relating to RR as a basis for suggestions to improve the RR program in Southern Sudan.

Data from the study was collected by a mix of desk surveys and two weeks of intensive fieldwork in four counties in Southern Sudan: Yei River, West Juba, Maridi and Mundri. The field study was preceded by a four-day training course for enumerators, twenty four of whom participated in the survey in four teams. A preparatory day was also dedicated to presenting the study of non-governmental organization (NGO) partners in Equatoria, and to incorporating their suggestions into the study questionnaires.

Two general findings stand out. (1) The need to move conceptually from aid to development, including activities at the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and at NGO levels, and to *concretize* the development process. (2) The need to change Southern Sudanese perceptions of dependency syndrome and of ethnic suspicion. The main detailed findings of the study are:

The Government of Southern Sudan's **reliance on voluntary activities by international NGOs (INGOs) to supply services is creating an unhealthy culture of dependency**. NGOs often focus on relief rather than development, increasing this dependency.

Public services are not applied in a uniform manner, due to a lack of capacity and security causing resentment of returnees.

Returnees face a number of conflicting perceptions oscillating between feelings of respect and brotherhood to feelings of suspicion and animosity from those who have stayed behind. Ex-combatants in particular are viewed with misgivings.

Whilst there is economic growth in Southern Sudan and many economic opportunities, **security implications as well as a lack of infrastructure combine to hinder major development**.

Conflict resolution training or awareness-raising is not necessarily a priority for most NGO/GOs.

Limited provision is made for women associated with fighting forces (WAFF) and **children** associated with fighting (CAFF) and there are **few specialized programs for any of the special groups** (WAFFs, CAFFs, orphans, widows, disabled, elderly, child soldiers).

There has been a major reduction in the public visibility of firearms, however the **acquisition of firearms by the general public from security agents in Southern Sudan remains endemic** and there is a stable black-market for small arms sales, rentals and ammunition.

Abuses of power by the military in Southern Sudan appear to be common, and SSR in the country is absolutely critical for successful reintegration.

The NGO sector in Southern Sudan is going to have to think carefully about the steps ahead, and some concrete suggestions are included in the table.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Pius Muriithi and Oliver Michael in Sudan for making the research as successful as it was, and Natalie Majcenovic, Ruth Vollmer, and Wim Zwijnenburg at BICC for allowing themselves to be dragooned to assist in data input, and Heike Webb for technical editing and quality control. Above all, however, we would like to thank our many anonymous respondents, and the enumerators who made this survey possible.

Authors' names are in alphabetical order.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 1

AIMS, ACTIVITIES, AND OUTCOMES	1
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT	1

BACKGROUND AND ENVIRONMENT 2

POPULATION GROUPS	2
SETTLEMENT PATTERNS: HOUSEHOLDS	2
TRIBE-CLAN/PAYAM-BOMA (VILLAGE)	3
MAKING A LIVING	3
RELIGION AND CHURCHES	4
EXTERNAL FACTORS: THE NORTH AND WAR	5
NON-MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS	6
DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN	6

DEFINING THE ACTORS 8

RETURNEES	9
KEY FINDINGS	9
RETURNEE RECEPTION	10
RETURNEE SECURITY	10
RETURNEE ACCESS TO SERVICES	11
PERCEPTIONS ABOUT RETURNEES	12
SERVICE PROVIDERS: KEY STAKEHOLDERS	13
KEY FINDINGS	13
NGOs AND RETURNEES	14
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND RETURNEES	16
KEY FINDINGS	18

ECONOMIC, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 19

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION	19
SECURITY	20
CORRUPTION	20
ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS	21
ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE	22
SERVICES	23
JOB MARKET	24

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES	25
SALW AND LIVELIHOODS	28
KEY FINDINGS	29
<u>THE ISSUE OF SECURITY</u>	<u>29</u>
PERSONAL SECURITY	30
KEY FINDINGS	33
THE FORMAL STATE SECURITY ORGANS	34
SECURITY PERCEPTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE	36
SELF-HELP: FIREARMS AMONG CIVILIANS	37
KEY FINDINGS	39
<u>PSYCHOSOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS OF WAR</u>	<u>40</u>
KEY FINDINGS	40
<u>ADDRESSING CONFLICT NON-VIOLENTLY</u>	<u>41</u>
STATUTORY AND TRADITIONAL MEANS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	43
KEY FINDINGS	45
<u>REINTEGRATION BEST PRACTICE</u>	<u>46</u>
TARGET GROUPS	46
SPECIAL GROUPS (WAFFs, CAFFs, DISABLED)	46
EX-COMBATANTS	47
KEY ISSUES	47
THE AIMS	47
PROCESS AND PROGRAM	48
KEY ISSUES	49
REINTEGRATION METHODS	49
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN	49
REINSERTION	49
REINTEGRATION	50
DEVELOPMENT	50
PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS	51
KEY ISSUES	51
<u>MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	<u>52</u>
<u>REFERENCES</u>	<u>59</u>
<u>APPENDIX</u>	<u>63</u>

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Community problems that need most attention (in percent)	23
Table 2: Getting services	24
Table 3: Job market perceptions	24
Table 4: Effects of guns on civilian activities (figures in percent)	28
Table 5: Changes in personal security (figures in percent)	31
Table 6: Perceptions of safety while walking (figures in percent)	32
Table 7: Decline in anxiety on three select topics (figures in percent)	33
Table 8: Trust in various security providers (figures in percent)	36
Table 9: Ease of acquiring weapons and ammunition (figures in percent)	38
Table 10: Personal protection (figures in percent)	39
Table 11: Main Recommendations	53

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

This report was commissioned by Aktion Afrika Hilfe-International (AAH-I), an international NGO working in Southern Sudan, and the Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS) a Southern Sudanese NGO based in Yei, Central Equatoria State, Southern Sudan. Both organizations have been engaged in work in which the issue of *returnees*—IDPs, returning refugees, returning ex-combatants and civilians associated with the fighting forces—is expected to have a heavy impact on economic and other forms of development in the area. In addition to spontaneous (and often undocumented return, see Phelan and Wood, 2006; IDMC, 2007), the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has announced the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD&R) of some 25,000 ex-combatants, some at least of whom are expected to return to Equatoria.¹

AIMS, ACTIVITIES, AND OUTCOMES

The aims of this report are to:

- Provide action-oriented data on issues relating to Return and Reintegration (RR) in the project areas;
- Evaluate the applicability of state-of-the-art RR best practices from elsewhere to the situation in Sudan;
- Provide suggestions on the design of potential relevant RR practices suitable for the project areas;
- Provide professional input into the design of materials for information, education and training appropriate for communities in the project areas relevant to the RR design.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The first chapters of this report each address a cluster of issues detailed in the TOR of the project. In the final two chapters, we provide a summary of international best practice on reintegration and return, and applicable recommendations in the form of a choice table. An Appendix detailing the methods used to collect and analyze the data is included as well.

¹ "Equatoria" refers to the three states that make up the southernmost area of Southern Sudan roughly bounded by Uganda, the DRC, and Central African Republic to the southwest, and Kenya and Ethiopia to the southeast. The three states are respectively Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria. The fieldwork took place in Central and Western Equatoria states.

BACKGROUND AND ENVIRONMENT

The two states included in the survey—Western (area approx. 80,000 km²) and Central Equatoria (23,000 km²)—include the capital of Southern Sudan, Juba, as well as the major towns of Yei (C. Equatoria), and Maridi and Mundri (W. Equatoria), which, with their hinterlands are included in the survey. The environment varies from hot sparse scrubland in the north (Mundri and Juba areas), to lush tropical brush in the south (Maridi and Yei). As in all Sudan, distances are great, and the road infrastructure is abysmal. Dirt roads, roughly graded, connect the major cities. A major highway (in purpose, not quality) runs from the Ugandan border at Bokobo through Kaya town, to Yei, and thence to Juba. Similar roads connect the other areas in the survey.

The area is very fertile (Equatoria has been, in recent history, a net exporter of food): cassava, maize, sorghum, beans, peanuts, bananas and sesame have been traditional crops, mangos, pineapple, jackfruit are recent successful introductions. The north is somewhat more arid and has traditionally been an area of cattle herding with some mixed agriculture. There are, apparently, some mineral resources which due to the unsettled security situation have not been exploited. Timber is also common. Native mahogany is becoming scarce due to illegal and exploitative logging. Teak, introduced in the past century, has great potential, though is rarely allowed the opportunity to mature. Other forest products include charcoal and shea nut (*vitellaria paradoxa*).

POPULATION GROUPS

The population² is varied in terms of language and tribal membership. The southern parts of Equatoria are largely populated by Kakwa, Bari, Morobo, Zande, and other language groups. Most of these have sedentary lifestyles. The majority makes their living through farming activities in burnt-bush *swidden* (areas of felled trees and bush that are burned to provide clearings and fertilization for crops). Towards the north and west, there is a heavier concentration of pastoralists, who live largely on the products of cattle mixed with some sorghum farming. The sedentary horticulturalist/pastoral herder lifestyles are to a great degree incompatible, and one of the causes of continuing insecurity in the region.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS: HOUSEHOLDS

Traditional residential patterns predominate, whether in the towns or in the rural areas. Most of the population reside in a compound, composed of an enclosed, well-maintained yard with thatch-roofed *tukul* (huts) about three meters to the side scattered throughout. The minimal compound is composed of a *tukul* for the married couple (polygynous families will have a *tukul* for each

² Population numbers are unknown. A census, delayed since 2007, is expected to take place some time in 2008.

wife), one *tukul* each for adolescent male and female children, and a granary. Several agnatic relatives—a man and his brothers or uncles—may live in the same compound or in close proximity. This pattern is to be found in the towns as well. In practice, we could not make a rural/urban distinction based on structures and residential patterns, and selected two characteristics as particularly critical: density of households (in towns household compounds touch their neighbors, in rural areas they are dispersed sometimes at a distance of several hundred meters) and proximity to a market. In rural areas fields are close to the household. For urban residents tending fields may involve some travel.

TRIBE-CLAN/PAYAM-BOMA (VILLAGE)

Southern Sudan is administratively divided into ten states. Each of these states is divided in turn into a number of counties. The size of these varies, and their boundaries are still in flux given that administrative changes are still taking place. Each county is divided into a number of *payam*, and each of those into an average of six to eight *boma* or villages. The lower administrative echelons are more or less coterminous with traditional distinctions of clan and chiefdom. That is, a given clan (a group of people related lineally to some remote ancestor) will normally inhabit a particular *boma*, and the boundaries of a *payam* are generally coterminous with the area of authority of a chief of a particular linguistic group. The chiefs play a role in local administration, particularly at the lower levels of *boma* and *payam*, though they are supervised by, and their authority circumscribed by GOSS appointees: the *payam* secretary and the county commissioner.

People refer to themselves sometimes as being members of tribes. This is shorthand for a *linguistic group* that lays claim to a particular homeland. However, these claims must be kept in proportion: many such 'tribes' interpenetrate one another, a phenomenon particularly notable in the towns (whose lands are technically not 'tribal' but 'gazetted' that is, they can be sold and bought commercially). Moreover, immigrants can reside on tribal lands provided they have received permission from (and paid a fee to) the local chief.

MAKING A LIVING

Most of the population engages in some form of agriculturally-related activities to make a living. As is common in most poor societies, individuals usually engage in a number of activities, adopting a series of strategies of survival. The basis of economic security tends, therefore, to be the production of basic food necessities, sometimes combined with cash cropping. The most common crop tends to be cassava, which not only provides carbohydrates in the form of a

root crop³ which can be left in the ground until consumption, but also in the form of young greens which form an important element in the diet. Goats are raised by virtually every compound, as are chickens and ducks (for meat and eggs). Bananas are also an important crop.

Cassava flour, maize, peanuts (groundnuts), and bananas are sold in small quantities by women at the side of the road and provide a small amount of cash. Women also collect shea nuts from the bush, whose oil can be used for making soap, though this requires processing. Men engage in a number of cash-cropping or collecting activities. These include charcoal, which is sold in bags to urban residents, dried and smoked fish, rushes for mats and straw for thatching, making burnt-mud brick, and joinery of beds, stools, tables, and other household furniture.

Urban occupations can be divided into small manufacturing (blacksmithing, often from scrap, welding, carpentry), services (petrol supply, water carrying, hairdressing, milling, transportation), retail sales (in the form of shop keeping or petty trade) and white collar jobs for government organizations or NGOs. Manufacturing is a small element in the overall economy. The major cash business is working for the government or NGOs. Retail trade is common. Petty trading (where the trader does not have a stock of goods) is common in both rural and urban areas, with a trader selling a handful of bananas or some honey. Shops generally have relatively small stocks of goods, though a comparison of Yei (which is on the major trade route from Uganda) and Maridi shows differences in quantities of goods and their variety. Services are fairly minimal. Hairdressing is a common service. The transportation system, including local transport by motorcycle in the towns, and inter-urban transport by bus, truck, and four-wheel drive cars is a major source of both employment and business, though the high startup costs and amortization (given the roads, heavy trucks and other vehicles have a short life-cycle), make this route available to few.

Most people state that more training or a better education would improve their lot. Each of the areas we studied had several boarding schools and local schools for children, and some towns, such as Yei and Juba, have facilities for adult education. However, much education is acquired either by a simple apprenticeship system, or by working with a senior relative who shows one the ropes.

RELIGION AND CHURCHES

Religion plays an important part in the life of Southern Sudan residents. Most people participate in some form of Christian church activities, and churches are to be found in all *payam* we have surveyed. In Central Equatoria the two major denominations are Catholic and Anglican whereas Anglican churches

³ Cassava requires treatment—grating, washing, and drying—to be edible, and this consideration must be added to economic utility calculations.

seem to be absent in Western Equatoria. Various evangelical sects are making inroads into the traditional churches grounds. There are very few Muslims in the southern areas of the two states concerned (a few mosques remain, which do not appear to be active). Juba town, and possibly Western Juba county seem to have several active mosques.

Churches are important not only because they provide a unifying factor in people's lives, and supply them with emotional and psychological support, but also because they are foci of communication and good sources for information about community feelings. At the individual level, too, religion is important for Southern Sudanese: many meetings start and end with a prayer, and church office-holding is an important personal achievement.

EXTERNAL FACTORS: THE NORTH AND WAR

Three critical external factors have a heavy impact on the lives of Southern Sudanese. The single most salient factor is the Government of Sudan (GOS) and its intentions about Southern Sudan. The use of proxy fighting groups was a prominent feature, with the GOS making full use of irregular raiders, and paid-for armed groups to prosecute a war, often targeting civilians. The fear is of a repeat of this kind of activity in the run-up to the referendum to be held in 2011 to decide the future of relations between North and South.

One of these other armed groups is still critically important for the lives of Southern Sudan residents today. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group based on a Ugandan core has been fighting a terror war against the people and government of Uganda for decades. The LRA has currently withdrawn to Garambe National Park in the DRC, some thirty kilometers from Maridi. The LRA (and its imitators) has been alleged to be supported covertly by GOS as a counterweight to Ugandan support to the GOSS. They have raided fairly recently into Maridi, and have also been implicated in deaths and robberies (up to early 2007) in Juba and Yei counties.

A final external factor of great importance is what the Sudanese call 'the international community' an ill-defined concept encompassing all non-Sudanese interests that play a part in Sudan. At the international level this includes the United Nations, as well as such states as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Canada, Norway and others that have a manifest and stated interest in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and in a peaceful Sudan. At the Sudanese level—where Southern Sudanese actually interact with these players—the international community stands for the various NGOs operating in Southern Sudan, the agents of the various foreign governments whether diplomats or development agencies, the various agencies of the United Nations, ranging from UN observer missions through UNICEF, UNDP, WHO and other agencies, and international NGOs (INGOs) operating in Southern Sudan. The latter are particularly crucial. Given the lack of management and financial capacity, INGOs serve, in effect, as government service providers in Southern Sudan. They support and maintain such public health services as are

available, they build roads (sometimes for their own purposes), help develop curricula for schools, provide water services and so on. Their activities are formally coordinated by the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. In practice, many INGOs operate without coordinating their activities, and duplication, as well as gaps in services provided are common.

NON-MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS

After some five decades of war, most residents of Southern Sudan are suspicious of GOS. Not one individual we talked to in Southern Sudan expressed the desire, or even acquiescence to the idea, that GOS should govern in Southern Sudan. Most respondents, whether being formally interviewed or in casual conversation were insistent that Southern Sudan should not be governed in any way from Khartoum.

The animosity against the North is almost matched by internal distrust among Southern Sudanese. While interaction and even intermarriage are common, tribal (linguistic) affiliations and competition are also expressed quite often. As is widespread throughout Africa (Evans-Pritchard, 1969; Gluckman, 1966; Middleton, 1963) this is commonly expressed in the form of accusations about witchcraft and poisoning. We have often been told that visiting strangers at other *payam* is discouraged for fear of poisoning. The greatest degree of animosity in Maridi and Yei counties is expressed towards the Dinka who are considered unruly, unnecessarily aggressive, clannish and violent.

Southern Sudanese also display a significant fear of the future. This is evidenced both by expressed anxieties concerning the run up to 2011—the date mandated by the CPA for a referendum on the future of Southern Sudan—and by a significant lack of investment in future activities. Several informants indicated that Southern Sudanese are contemptuous of attempts to do well economically through one's own efforts. These informants ascribed this phenomenon to 'Southern Sudanese character'. It seems more likely that the decades of war have brought about a situation similar to the one described by Turnbull (1972) and Tainter (2006) for the Ik, a Ugandan people who had suffered major political and economic turmoil.

DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN

Large numbers, estimated in the low millions (Phelan and Wood, 2006), of Southern Sudanese were displaced during the war. Some displacements were local, with people moving in with relatives in perceived areas of safety for brief periods of time. Large numbers of people, however, fled to two major presumed refuges: Khartoum and the North, and southwards to Uganda, the DRC, and Kenya. Since the ceasefire in 2004 or thereabouts, numbers have been trickling back on their own initiative. Since the signing of the CPA in early 2007, this return has increased. The demand for return is aided by a number of factors:

- Conditions in Khartoum have been made difficult for Southerners by Khartoum policies, including forced religious ordinances and economic discrimination;
- A number of international bodies, including NGOs have offered help to returnees;
- The host governments of Kenya and Uganda have acted to circumscribe the rights of Sudanese residents in order to force them back to Sudan.

Against these motivations one needs to keep in mind the attractiveness of life in neighboring countries (or Khartoum) as refugees. Notwithstanding poverty and political and legal difficulties, there are opportunities for schooling, medical services are more available, and social mobility is a possibility. Refugees in camps have been supported by UNHCR and other donors, though this support is ending. Moreover, having lived away from Southern Sudan for decades (and a new generation has been born that has never been to Southern Sudan), there are obvious differences of language and culture acquired over the years. This creates a resistance to return, or a delay in complete return for many.

The net result of these factors is that many returnees adopt a strategy of 'a leg in both camps'; certain members of the family—often a man and one of several wives—will return to Sudan and resume life there. The rich and powerful, in particular, are able to maintain a foothold in metropolitan areas such as Nairobi and Kampala. At the same time, children undergoing schooling remain in the host country under the supervision of another wife or a female relative. It is assumed (and is sometimes the case) that those who have received the benefit of better schooling in neighboring countries, will return in due time to pursue a career in Sudan, where there are major opportunities for white collar employment.

Those individuals associated with the fighting forces—women (WAFFs), children (CAFFs), and ex-combatants (XCs)—have also returned to their places of origin as they have disassociated themselves from the armed forces. The 'self-demobilization' of armed individuals has been an issue in Southern Sudan since 2004 at least (Ashkenazi, 2005). The SPLA had, until 2007, adopted a policy of ambiguity about Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DD&R). It has in the past (until the formal signing of the CPA) largely denied the possibility of demobilizing any troops. In practice, the desire of many soldiers to return home, and the financial pressure of supporting so many troops has led to a practical compromise, in which many troops were granted 'permanent home leave', being expected to stand ready to return to service if hostilities were to be resumed

A final factor in return must also be mentioned. During the brief survey conducted in Yei and its environs in 2005 and in later visits in 2006, local residents who had not fled the area were virtually unanimous in declaiming the formula that the returnees "...are our brothers, and they have our support when they return." Nevertheless, there were some indicators that this statement must

be treated with caution. Some respondents noted in asides that the returnees were arrogant, bad mannered, and that returnee women were disrespectful and sometimes HIV carriers. This indicates that a certain ambivalence exists about the returnees and their role in the New Sudan.

DEFINING THE ACTORS

In this Chapter of the report we shall present data on the principal actors involved in the process of return. The Chapter is divided into four sub-headings. In the first we describe the *returnees*, a mixed category of those returning to Southern Sudan encompassing:

- **Refugees:** Those who fled during the war years to neighboring countries, largely (in our sample) Uganda and DRC;
- **IDPs:** Those who moved from their homes to what they considered safer locations within Sudan, including other areas of Southern Sudan and places in the North such as Khartoum;
- **Ex-combatants** (XCs): Former fighters from the SPLA, Other Armed Groups (OAGs), and, in some rare cases, the Sudan Defence Forces (SDF);⁴
- **Women** Associated with Fighting Forces (WAFF) and **Children** Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF): Those who functioned, willingly or not, as auxiliaries for the various fighting forces, including service as spies, couriers, cooks, sex slaves, and cattle herders.

In the second heading, we discuss so-called *stayees*; those members of the local population who did not flee during the fighting nor join the fighting forces, but remained *in situ* during the war years. Here we were largely concerned with the matrix within which the returnees would need to function, if they were to be integrated and act together with other members of society. Data on returnees and stayees is based largely on a selection of data collected from over five hundred questionnaires.

Another section of this Chapter deals with the various actors' *perceptions*. We were concerned here largely with perceptions of stayees about returnees, and with perceptions returnees had of their reception in Southern Sudan.

The third heading describes what we have called *key stakeholders* in the process of Return and Reintegration. These are the major agencies and organizations—local NGOs, GOs, and International NGOs—who might be expected to provide services for returnees and stayees alike. Data for this section emerges largely from a series of interviews conducted in each of the relevant counties.

⁴ We had been informed that some individuals had been fighting for the SDF, but never had one identified in practice.

RETURNEES

In the absence of a reliable census it is extremely difficult to estimate the number of people who have returned to Southern Sudan in the time since the ceasefire (circa 2004) or the signing of the CPA (2007). Some estimates include up to four million IDPs (though this number includes individuals from other conflicts in Sudan, e.g. Darfur, cf. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007).

Returnees are arriving from several places to which they initially fled. In Sudan as a whole, many IDPs return from Juba and Khartoum. This makes sense as both cities provide a myriad of resources for employment, housing and shelter. People also left to these cities because they have family members there. Coming from outside of Sudan, refugees have returned from Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Uganda is a regional hub of higher education and professional development. In addition to opportunities for employment and better education, Uganda also boasts ample food resources and better economic infrastructure.

Key Findings

In our survey sample, 92 respondents identified themselves as returnees. The majority (72 percent) left during the 1990s and fled southward to Uganda (47 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (23 percent). The remainder were displaced locally and fled mainly to Juba (18 percent) and other Southern States. Only one respondent fled to Khartoum. The vast majority returned in the years following the signing of the CPA in 2007 (67 percent). Over one-half of the respondents returned on their own initiative, while the remainder was assisted by international bodies such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Few reported forced returns. As expected, the main impetus for return was identified as the end of conflict and signing of the CPA. Others identified their love of country (20 percent) and family (10 percent) as the main reason for their return, though these respondents mainly returned in the years following the signing of the CPA. Over 70 percent of these respondents returned to their place of origin, identified as the place of their own birth or the birth of their grandparents. The remainder chose to relocate to a new neighborhood for two general reasons: better access to education and services and the lack of conflict between its inhabitants. 58 percent of respondents noted that their *boma* had improved since they last lived there, 24 percent said it was the same, and 18 percent said it had deteriorated.

Returnee Reception

Over 75 percent of returnees were well received by the community upon their return. Most reported a positive change in their relationship with other members of the *boma* and neighborhood. This positive change is mainly credited to the fact that returnees bring new skills into the community. For example, one respondent believes he now receives more respect from members of his community due to the skills he acquired while away, which he uses to help develop the community. Returnees were asked to select from a list of seven skills they believe they could bring back into the community to help benefit its people.⁵ The most popular response was skills related to hygiene and health (67 percent), followed by business skills (57 percent), food supply skills (55 percent), production (47 percent), conflict resolution and community mobilization skills (46 percent), political skills (21 percent), and other technical skills such as road improvement, carpentry, and tailoring.

Still, a number of respondents noted a negative change in their relationship with other members of their *boma* and/or neighborhood. A decrease in hospitality was identified as a key change in the community. One respondent attributed this decrease to the fact that everyone—returnees and stayees—is having difficulties surviving. The war brought devastation to whole communities, few of which have seen progress and development since the signing of the CPA. Assets were lost during the war, resources are now scarce and there is increasing competition for productive land. Other responses supported these trends by pointing to a lack of cooperation, general resentment toward returnees, and competition for land within their communities.

Returnee Security

Returnee perceptions of security are also generally positive. Close to 70 percent of respondents feel very safe walking alone in their compound during day time. At night, more than one-half feel very safe walking alone in their compound, but close to 20 percent feel very unsafe. This number suggests that security problems exist in the community, but do not significantly impede normal daily activity. Respondents also evaluated their initial contacts with nearby *bomas* and neighborhoods as mainly positive and cooperative. Initial contacts were identified as useful in sharing important advice about life in the community, as well as information about the peace agreement. This is also supported by the fact that 50 percent of respondents feel very safe walking alone in another village, while 25 percent feel fairly safe. Meanwhile, one-quarter of the respondents described their initial contact with neighboring *bomas*/neighborhoods as hostile, difficult, uncooperative or judgmental. Accordingly, 21 percent of respondents reported feeling very unsafe walking alone in another village, something that may be attributed to the general suspicion towards strangers often exhibited in Southern Sudan.

⁵ The list was discussed and affirmed by a panel of respondents and key stakeholders.

Only a small majority of respondents (55 percent) have not encountered prejudice by community members since their return. Among the rest that have encountered prejudice, three common areas of prejudice were highlighted:

- 1) Accusations that returnees bring HIV/AIDS into the community. A number of myths on HIV/AIDS exist and need to be addressed in order to ensure smooth integration;
- 2) Returnees are cowards for having fled during the war. This perception has implications for the level of cooperation and integration between returnees and stayees in the community;
- 3) Returnees are stealing all the jobs or displacing stayees from their current employment. Returnees appear to encounter jealousy and resentment for having returned with education and skills, for which they are accused of being too proud.

Almost 60 percent of respondents do not believe they will encounter security problems in the future because of their status as a returnee. Of the 40 percent that are concerned, robbery was identified as key problem due to the scarcity of resources, land, and overpopulation in urban centers. Existing prejudices towards refugees and revenge for past events against returning ex-combatants were also noted as possible security problems in the future. Several respondents also pointed to threats and acts of robbery perpetrated against them by the SPLA, which raises questions as to the role of the SPLA and their impact on community security.

Returnee Access to Services

Access to services was measured according to three criteria: distance to services, safety in reaching/using services, and quality of services. The services measured include the following:

- Education
- Health
- Market
- Transport
- Entertainment
- Security
- Judicial
- Water
- Agricultural

Overall, returnees' access to services is poor. Health services, safe drinking water and education were highlighted as key areas of concern. While the majority of respondents live within one hour of these services, safety appears to be a problem in accessing facilities, which is blamed in part on the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance along the roads and footpaths to these facilities. Safety proves to be the biggest problem in accessing safe drinking water and agricultural services in particular. The quality of services is also generally low: 60 percent of respondents reported poor quality of health

facilities and a lack of qualified doctors; 43 percent report poor quality of drinking water; and 40 percent reported poor quality of education facilities, including a lack of infrastructure, school materials and qualified teachers. One respondent pointed to the lack of adult education as an important gap that should be addressed.

Perceptions about Returnees

Of the 126 respondents that identified themselves as stayees, almost one-half (46 percent) believe returnees make life harder for people in their community. A recurring reason is competition for land and water in particular, and resources and employment in general. Respondents also voiced concern about the introduction of HIV/AIDS and new diseases by returnees. Of particular concern is that perceptions toward returnees that are ex-combatants were far more negative than toward civilian returnees, which has implications for the success and sustainability of the DD&R process. Ex-combatants are perceived to bring weapons, violence and crime into the community, either through their own behavior or by attracting revenge for their actions during the war.

In detail, respondents believe returnees make services or employment harder in the following areas:

- Water (87 percent)
- Health clinics (85 percent)
- Employment (82 percent)
- Education (71 percent)
- Public services (66 percent)
- White collar jobs (65 percent)
- Transport (55 percent)
- Communication services (51 percent)
- Crop cultivation (50 percent)
- Street food sales (50 percent)

Petty trade was the only area where the majority of respondents (40 percent) believed returnees made life easier.

Somewhat paradoxically, there was overwhelming agreement (83 percent) that returnees bring benefits to the community. More than half of stayee respondents who answered this question in the affirmative pointed to the introduction of new skills as the key benefit of returnees, while 37 percent believe their presence helps improve services and development in the community. This perception refers to the influx of development agencies and organizations into returnee centers who bring with them new infrastructure, resources, services and jobs. The sustainability of these benefits, however, is doubtful and may have negative consequences if attention is not shifted toward building capacity for local ownership. Respondents also referred to the upcoming/current census across Sudan and the fact that returnees help increase the population of Southern Sudan, which has important resource distribution and power-sharing implications between the North and South as the

country heads toward national elections in 2009 and the referendum on secession in 2011.

Perceptions about the *negative* aspects of returnees echoed the findings in the returnee surveys on the issue of prejudice. 50 percent of respondents believe that returnees are too proud, while 43 percent believe they lack respect for elders, and another 42 percent believe they lack respect for tradition/culture. Only a thin majority of respondents are not worried that returnees will bring AIDS into the community—47 percent believe returnees will spread the disease. A variety of reasons are given for this, but most commonly the claim that returnees are returning from countries where AIDS is already high.

With regard to security, 47 percent of respondents are concerned that returnees and returning soldiers might bring new violence to their community. The main concern appears to be against returning soldiers in particular and fear that these individuals will return to the community with their guns and military mindsets. This finding suggests an overall lack of trust toward soldiers, which poses a challenge to the success of the DD&R process and reintegration in particular.

SERVICE PROVIDERS: KEY STAKEHOLDERS

In the absence of government service providers, the Southern Sudanese population must rely on a mix of services provided by INGOs and NGOs, directed somewhat haphazardly by GOSS administrators. Two major activities are central: provision of health services, including actual health delivery and training, and provision of education, including adult skills and children. A third component—security—is a bit of a mixed bag, supplied (insofar as it is) by a mixture of GOSS action (civil police, military police, and SPLA), UN Civil Police and Observers, and local initiatives. Churches tend to play a major role, partly as direct channels for service provision, but more significantly as loci of communication across and between communities and categories of the population. That having been said, all of these actors have their own agendas which can, and do, come into conflict.

Key Findings

- 1) There is an (unhealthy, in our opinion) **reliance on voluntary activities** by INGOs to supply services, which on the face of things, ought to be supplied by the government: education, water.
- 2) The provision of services by voluntary organizations means that **coordination is haphazard**: some areas and locations have coverage of several services, others are barely covered at all.
- 3) The **general orientation** of some NGOs and the partial orientation of most of them **is towards relief** which means that **little if attention is paid to development**.

- 4) Given that return is expected to bring several million people back to Southern Sudan, provision of services by NGOs is non-sustainable.
- 5) Security is a key issue. It limits and restricts the ability to provide services, causes crowding in service facilities in some areas (e.g. Kagiri *payam*), and is a major hindrance to development.
- 6) While the palpable need of individuals and communities for services is a strong motivator, we have the uncomfortable feeling that funds are being squandered in small efforts, rather than in a coordinated, effective thrust towards self-reliance and development.

We interviewed representatives from over 30 Government Organizations (GOs) and NGOs in the areas of the survey. The picture they present is a varied one, with many successes. The *overall* picture, however, is a grim one. Among the NGOs, health and education (including adult education, literacy, and women's empowerment) are the major areas of activity. One organization is concerned largely with assisting returnees. Only one organization—a QUANGO (Quasi-NGO: government semi-autonomous agency) is concerned strictly with development. Very few of those interviewed were able to pinpoint clearly the objectives of their work. General goals were clear, e.g. 'educating adults' but there were few criteria which would indicate success or failure. Similarly, almost none of the NGOs had developed formal measures to test whether their 'clients' (those to whom they provided services) were satisfied with the activities or their results.

NGOs and Returnees

Respondent organizations were asked about factors that would support reintegration and barriers to reintegration. A few elements predominate:

- 1) Land tenure issues;
- 2) Security;
- 3) Inter-ethnic violence;
- 4) Lack of schools;
- 5) Lack of health facilities;
- 6) Absence of jobs and economic opportunity;
- 7) Understanding the CPA and the implications of peace.

The first three are clearly issues that are beyond the ability of NGOs (but not GOs) to solve. Land tenure is the result of the intersection of traditional land systems, modern law, and the absence of legal enforcement in Southern Sudan. Security affects NGOs almost as much as the residents, and GOSS claims a monopoly on enforcing it. Inter-ethnic violence, largely due to the repeated and poorly-dealt with incursions by cattle herders into traditional farmer areas, has not proven enforceable, certainly not by NGOs, and not even by local government (chiefs or County Commissioners).

Schools and schooling are a major issue. As noted, schools in Uganda and Kenya (for those who can afford them) are a major attractant. Many bright

Southern Sudanese of our acquaintance are either intending to go, or have gone for schooling in Uganda. Nevertheless, the demand for schooling is so high that pupils will travel fifty or one hundred kilometers to attend a school. Unsurprisingly, most schools are to be found in the towns. This results in overcrowding, as rural families send children to stay with relatives in town, swelling the student population.

Adult education—literacy, self-reliance, and vocational training—are also important. Several NGOs concentrate on these issues. The problem, as it so often is, is a lack of sustained and comprehensive coverage. In some areas an NGO will concentrate on training women, in another a different NGO will work with the disabled. The end result is a patchwork of different outcomes and training types, all useful when considered individually, but lacking any coherence.

The poor state of the health system is a major barrier not only to reintegration, but to development in Southern Sudan as a whole. The formal system involves a hierarchical structure of health units (at the *boma* level), a health center at each *payam* center, and a hospital at the county level. With the exception of the hospital, these are staffed by paramedics of fairly low abilities and training. In practice, many health units do not even operate. Medicines are scarce and expensive. Deaths occur due to the inability of the lower-level units to diagnose and deal with problems effectively. Given that the national health ministry does not have effective control or capacity to deal with the health problems of the country, and that the NGOs are fulfilling many health ministry roles, problems are bound to occur, as are serious gaps in health provision.

Managing the employment sector and developing economic opportunities are also outside the scope of most NGOs. In effect, however, NGOs are a major employment sector in Southern Sudan. They employ most white collar Southern Sudanese (to the point that the government, which pays lower salaries, finds it difficult to compete for employees) as well as drivers, cooks, cleaners, etc. This does not, however, solve the employment problems of most Southern Sudanese. As noted, the private sector is almost completely absent in manufacturing, very low in services, and concentrates mainly on retail trade and transportation. This in turn means lower job mobility and fewer job opportunities. A QUANGO interviewed is concerned solely with the development of natural resource industry: the promotion of *lulu* (shea nut) products. This does provide income to women (in areas where this initiative is operative), but with an almost complete lack of marketing infrastructure, the income from this activity is, overall, low.

A final issue identified by NGOs is a country-wide program for explaining the provision and implications of the CPA to the populace. The CPA is written in English, which few people speak well, and even fewer read. Some efforts have been made to distribute tapes of the CPA, including commentary, but these have been done in Bari, a large language group, but one not shared by all Southern Sudanese.

In conclusion, two factors stand out when looking at the complete NGO picture that emerges from our interviews:

Wide dispersal of NGO efforts. This is a derivative both of the huge spectrum of needs in Southern Sudan, and of the nature of the NGOs themselves. Since they operate on a voluntary basis, it is they who decide where to put their efforts and what to engage in. The result is that services available are patchy and non-systematic. For the individual returnee it is a tossup, which services will be available in the area chosen to settle in, and which not.

Uneven mix of relief and development. Most NGOs engage in a mix of both: unsurprisingly in view of the immediate needs of both returnees and the rest of the population. Paradoxically, however, relief tends to *hinder* development. Food relief brought from the outside, by the United Nations and other agencies is not sourced locally, and thus does not encourage better farming techniques and more marketing activity. Provision of relief also seems to bolster an attitude of dependence by many Southern Sudanese.

There are another two factors which emerge from our observations:

Almost complete absence of a self-help ethic. A large majority of both GO and NGO respondents inserted the following into the conversation "... what is the international community going to do to help us?" The dependency syndrome, perhaps brought about by decades of war, is pervasive in Southern Sudan. NGOs provide services, but rarely act to ensure local ownership and decision-making (with all it entails, including responsibility for failure). A critical component of development is self-reliance: an attitude which is so missing in Southern Sudan that one local informant said, "I intend to increase my crop cultivation, but in order to do so, will have to import laborers from Uganda to clear the fields. *Sudanese will never do that kind of work.* [emphasis ours]"

Incapacity and misdirected development efforts. A clear-eyed economic survey of Southern Sudan would demonstrate that the economic capacity of the country is high. Even disregarding the (contested) oil revenues, the country has a plethora of agricultural and other resources. A major reason for the need for aid (and, possibly, of the dependency syndrome) is the twofold problem of lack of income (farmers and other producers cannot sell beyond a very limited range) and high prices for manufactured goods. Both problems share a common cause: the absence of proper transportation facilities. Plans (apparently) exist to provide proper, metalled, all-weather roads. Until such roads materialize, development in Southern Sudan, as well as security (dependent, among other things, on being able to bring force to bear where necessary) is going to be extremely difficult.

Government Organizations and Returnees

The SPLA signed up to the CPA with the idea of settling a decades-long armed dispute on terms that would ensure a successful and prosperous country. Included in this assumption was the need to repatriate the millions of refugees

and IDPs, as well as to demobilize tens of thousands of fighters. Unfortunately, preconditions for ensuring this process pass smoothly may not have been thought out carefully enough. Close to twenty GOs, which range from traditional chiefs, through *boma* and *payam* administrators, to security personnel, responded to the survey.

The single most critical finding is that the higher up the government hierarchy we went, the more sanguine were the responses. This may derive from natural caution, or perhaps suspicion of foreign inquisitiveness. It does indicate, however, that the GOSS needs to understand that a greater degree of transparency is a necessity, not a choice. Two issues and the variance in position between upper and lower echelons of government respondents are critical.

The issue of security. Certainly, it is clear at the lower echelons that security is a major issue. Most critical (at present, for private individuals) is the gradually growing incursions of cattle herders into traditional agriculturalist lands. This is accompanied by raids, violent attacks, and destruction of property. Some respondents were positive in insisting that the herders were supported and abetted by members of the SPLA, and that civil government bodies were unable to cope.

The issue of return. None of the official bodies we spoke to acknowledged overtly that there were problems with reintegration, or with the returnee situation. It was only subsequent questions that elucidated concerns, again, largely at the lower echelons (e.g. field operatives and *boma* levels). This implies either an unnecessary sunny approach to some serious problems, or else lack of information flow. In either case, this may be the source of serious problems in the future.

Critically, we feel that a systematic effort needs to be undertaken by the GOSS to solve the problems of security on the one hand, and of development on the other. The issue of security is closely related to the issue of reform of the security forces and control of the corruption (in the form of nepotism and protection) that is hindering **internal** security. There is much evidence that we have gathered from unconnected sources that the security forces act with impunity: officers abuse the legal process, military units occupy land illegally, and uniformed personnel engage in illegal extraction activities. Unless such activities are uprooted, the trust people have in the GOSS is going to erode, return is going to stall, and development will not happen. Security Sector Reform (SSR) should be put as a top priority for GOSS **to ensure its own survival as a viable government**. Otherwise, its tenuous grip on the country is likely to slip from its grasp.

Development occurs at a number of levels simultaneously (Gakmar, 2002). **It is unreasonable to expect the GOSS to be responsible for all development** in the country. Nevertheless, **it bears responsibility for two overarching issues: major infrastructure**, and **providing a policy lead** (and necessary coordination, supervision, and assessment) of development issues. In terms of infrastructure, so long as there is no proper road network, prices will continue to be high, producers (at the moment, agricultural producers) will have no motivation to produce, and people (including returnees) will necessarily remain poor. Other issues such as security will also be negatively affected. Lack of a development vision (one that is clearly understood and known not only by senior officials, but by the majority of the populace) and the developmental implications of the CPA, with clear goals and milestones, means that even NGO support will remain patchy, uncoordinated, and focused on relief rather than self-reliance and development.

KEY FINDINGS

Return is not an unmixed blessing for Sudan. This is perhaps the single most important finding of our survey. Sudanese will have to confront the fact that the issue of return and reintegration is going to be painful for all sides, and that **everyone** is going to have to work very hard to make the process a success.

A number of detailed issues arise from our survey.

- 1) **Changing perceptions about the returnees** is going to be a critical feature in success or failure. The fact that everyone admits that returnees 'are like brothers' on the one hand, and yet negative perceptions hover around 50 percent of the responses means that the issue of return is, in effect, in the balance.
- 2) **Critical infrastructural issues** are a second area of great importance. Here the results are mixed as well. Stayees complain that returnees are making life harder (to some degree) but perceptive individuals also recognize that a major motivator for NGOs to come to Sudan is the presence of returnees.
- 3) **Ex-combatants are the most feared group of returnees**. This finding also rests on two contradictory aspects: on the one hand, people fear ex-combatants for their aggression and the possible trouble they may trail behind them, on the other hand, people acknowledge that the fighting men and women are the cause for Southern Sudan's current autonomy and possibly future independence.
- 4) None of the actors involved in RR—the GOSS, international bodies (United Nations and NGOs), stayees, and returnees—seem to be clear on the goals to be achieved, or on the means to achieve them. What is worse, evidence on the ground seems to indicate a **great deal of ambivalence by all parties** underlying their efforts. This results in scattered efforts and unclear aims and objectives.

ECONOMIC, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

In this Chapter we address the core question of what is the situation insofar as making a living is concerned. We have not distinguished here between returnees and stayees. The principle upon which this report, and the survey was based, is the assumption that discriminating between returnees and stayees in the provision of services is a recipe for disaster, given that there are potential and actual grievances that could drive these populations apart. In the sections that follow we are interested primarily in the economic aspect of such factors as well as administration and services.

The first three issues—communication and transportation, security, and corruption—have a major effect on the entire population in their everyday lives. Many of our respondents, whether they commented on these issues formally or not, soon enough raised one or another of these issues, sometimes quite vehemently. Each one of these issues dealt with in this Chapter has different forms and ways of impacting on people's lives. Critically, for this Chapter, they all have major economic impacts.

COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, and due to decades of intentional neglect by GOS, Southern Sudan is one of the less developed parts of Africa. Distances between major settlements are very great. There are a number of consequences of that statement. It is useful, however, to first address the issue of **communication**.

In the past three years, great strides have been made in Southern Sudan in providing telecommunication facilities. In Juba, though hampered by suspected problems of corruption, there are now cell phone networks, as there are in other major cities. Cell phones are critical in Africa for communicating between social networks, as well as for economic reasons. However, coverage is restricted to some towns. Other telecommunication is provided by satellite phone, which is expensive. Several new radio stations in both FM and AM bands, and television coverage in Juba have been established. Nevertheless, telecommunication coverage is far from complete.

More critical, however, is physical **travel**. All manufactured goods must be imported. As a consequence, the state of roads is critical for the economic well-being of the country. The other side of the coin is equally important: though Equatoria has been a net exporter of agricultural products in the past, this can only be replicated on a modern economic scale if farmers can send their goods to market. Given the poor state of the roads—in September 2007 there was a total of about 300 meters of paved road in Southern Sudan, all other roads being graded tracks—this is uneconomical at best, physically impossible at worse. Inasmuch as most of the Southern Sudan population is rural, or at least relies partly on agricultural activities for income and survival, this means that rural economic development is close to impossible. For

example, the trip from Juba to Yei (approx. 120 km) takes three to four hours in the dry season, sometimes double that in the wet. Yei to Maridi (180 km) is six to seven hours in the dry season, ten hours to a full day in the rainy season. All vehicles have a very restricted life expectancy, and broken down trucks are common phenomena on all roads. The problem of road transportation is exacerbated by security issues.

SECURITY

Though security in Southern Sudan has improved in recent years, it is far from a secure place. The security improvements are obvious, using three simple tests: firearm discharges, firearm visibility, and night traffic. In towns we have stayed in, the number of firearm discharges per night has declined to between three to four per week and one per week (this in contrast to 2005 when there were an average of two to three discharges/night). The number of visible firearms in the street has also declined: in 2005, we observed some four to five a day on average. This time we observed a few firearms in the possession of Military Police patrols and no others were visible. As the next Chapter will show, this does not mean there are no guns, merely that they are not prominent. Finally, some of the towns now boast street lighting, and there is an increase in night traffic of pedestrians, and, indeed in night life.

The anecdotal evidence demonstrates that security can, and has improved. Nevertheless, insecurity is a pervasive issue in Southern Sudan. The Lords Resistance Army (LRA), now in the process of GOSS-sanctioned talks with the Ugandan government is still a menace; soldiers often act with impunity; pastoralist youth attack and displace farmers. Many roads are not considered safe to travel from a combination of robbers and haphazard mine threats. There are still reports of bush rape, where women engaged in collecting activities in unsettled areas are attacked. All of these combine to have a negative effect on the possibilities of economic development and opportunity.

CORRUPTION

Corruption is pervasive in Southern Sudan. It takes two basic forms: **financial corruption**, where office holders, most notably former military chiefs, enhance their income from public coffers and development contracts; and **nepotism/favoritism**, where office-holders allow, sometimes encourage, relatives or clan mates to flout the law for mutual benefit.

Corruption at the government level is beyond the scope of this report: we did not find evidence of any specific, verifiable instances that had an impact on the report, though anecdotal reports and hints by informants seem to indicate this is a pervasive problem. However, the second form—nepotism in favor of clan mates—does have a major impact, and does enter into the substance of this report. Already in 2005, we were made aware that there were serious problems with control over SPLA commanders. Many of these had what

amounts to 'private armies' who were intent on providing the commanders with financial leverage. This consisted of forcefully gaining control of public resources, including protected resources.⁶ A common process has been recounted several times by locals in Maridi and elsewhere. Since 2005, groups of armed pastoralists (from different tribes) have moved into the lands of sedentary tribal groups in Maridi County displacing the local farmers, who have had to move elsewhere, nearer their relatives. The displaced persons' houses have been burned, their livestock slaughtered or sequestered, and their fields given over to cattle grazing. These incoming groups are armed. In 2006, we were told, a meeting was held between the elders of both groups, and an agreement was made that the pastoralists vacate the occupied territories. This has not happened yet "... because the pastoralists say the cattle are the property of Commander X. They are also armed, and have threatened the County Commissioner, who only has a few unarmed policemen, with their weapons, and with the Commander's name," as one local chief put it. In other instances we have heard of intimidation of judges by SPLA commanders, as well as support for child kidnappings.⁷

ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS

Southern Sudan suffers from a **lack of administrative resources**, particularly at the *boma*, *payam* and County levels. Inefficient tax collection practices, a lack of service creativity and an overall culture of dependency on international NGOs have led to scant progress at improving community services from economic resources.

Critically, the GOSS has not been successful in ensuring that NGOs operate according to an overall development plan. NGO activities are coordinated by a body called the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (SRRC), which has county branches throughout Sudan. This body is expected to coordinate the activities of NGOs with government policy. It also serves as a forum for NGOs to raise mutual issues with the government. We **found**, however, **no indication that the SRRC operates within the frame of a coherent and known long-term plan**. Coordination in some counties is excellent, but it is the result of *ad hoc* localized personal relationships.

Tax collection has, in some cases improved. However, given the absence of knowledge about economic activities that the government displays, absence of a census, and unreliable tax collecting, the tax base is extremely narrow, and seen (by some informants at least) as a form of extortion by government officials, rather than part of a normal legal process.

⁶ In one observed incident, a young lieutenant in the SPLA entered a store selling power tools and electric generators, and asked for a chain saw. When quizzed about his intentions, he replied that he needed it to cut down mahogany trees in a designated national park area.

⁷ Children are, apparently, often kidnapped to serve as servants and cattle guards.

ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE

The economic infrastructure of Southern Sudan suffers from several **weaknesses** that need to be overcome. As mentioned above, rectifying the problem of transporting goods across the country is of critical importance. Public awareness of **the need to drastically improve roads** ranks highest among community problems that need most attention. The problem of communication has already been discussed above. In addition to the need for more cell phone service providers, there are **limited resources for public access to internet services**. Increasing the **availability of land for agriculture** remains a major concern of the general public. **Land for housing** is of equal concern: the return has created an overheated market in rentable properties, which, in Juba at least, has brought housing prices well beyond the reach of the average family (stayees or returnees). **Basic educational opportunities** for normal citizens of Southern Sudan are also in great need. This produces a cascade of effects for the economy as personal finance, accounting, record-keeping, marketing, and overall organizational skills all suffer from a lack of basic skills in reading, writing and arithmetic. NGOs have endeavored to establish adult literacy programs but a large cross-section of individuals both young and old remain without the opportunity to go to school.

Perceptions of the most serious economic problems in Southern Sudan fall under several categories. This research specified 13 issues that cover the following:

- Unemployment;
- Few opportunities for young people;
- Lack of transport;
- Poor health facilities;
- Poor education system;
- Corruption (favoritism, nepotism);
- Unqualified leaders;
- Lack of transparency;
- Lack of economic opportunities;
- Crime;
- Gun problems;
- Armed group attacks;
- Explosives or unexploded devices.

Certain recurrent issues clearly rise to the surface when examined at different levels of society. This reflects a consensus economic viewpoint among citizens in Southern Sudan that priorities should be focused on several key issues. We identified three prominent 'clusters' of responses. Individuals were asked what they believed to be the most serious problems affecting Sudan. **The most prominent cluster of problems included a poor education system** (19 percent of respondents put this as a major problem), **unemployment** (18 percent) and **poor health facilities** (17 percent). A **second cluster of responses** put **corruption** (favoritism/nepotism) (11 percent), **lack of transport** (9 percent) and **unqualified leaders** (7 percent). **Gun problems** (6 percent of respondents put this first),

armed group attacks (5 percent), and few opportunities for young people (4 percent). Finally, a few respondents ranked lack of economic opportunities (2 percent), crimes (2 percent) and explosives or unexploded ordinance (UXO) (2 percent) as the most prevalent problems.

SERVICES

Services in Southern Sudan suffer from several shortcomings, yet it was shown that individuals feel access to services is generally improving. As mentioned above, the education and teaching facilities across the four targeted counties were all viewed to be in vast need of restoration and repair. Citizens saw education as the primary problem in need of attention. Health care facilities and services are also problematic. Respondents remarked that few doctors exist for those who are in need of adequate health care. A repeated concern (though one that is in contention with the overall ideology of return that respondents also express) is that, as people are returning back to their original bomas and neighborhoods, the number of returnees will deepen the problem of getting access to basic health care.

Access to potable water was also a major concern of the general population. This concerned service providers as well, most notably those dealing with public health and hygiene.

In addition to the availability of services, many civil society actors felt that armed group attacks and looting of public resources have a major impact on the availability of services. One-third of our NGO respondents have had one or more experiences where armed groups have attacked or looted public resources. However, the majority of the population has not reported instances of looting, either because it has not affected them personally, or because the looting has specifically targeted NGOs.

Community problems continue to exist, and are evident from the responses of the populace. When asked about what community problems (as distinct from personal concerns or problems) need most attention, education, health care and water availability rank amongst the highest.

Table 1: Community problems that need most attention (in percent)

Education system	13
Roads	12
Health care	12
Unemployment	11
Water availability	10
Sanitation	6
Crime	5
Transport	5
Electricity	5
Availability and misuse of weapons	4
Land for housing	4

Land for agriculture	4
Facilities for young people	3
Environmental problems	3
Street lighting	2

When asked to compare access to basic services from last year to this year, individuals responded as follows:

Table 2: Getting services

Getting services (schools, medical, water) 2007, in percent		
Very difficult	Not difficult and not easy	Very easy
62	29	9
Getting services (schools, medical, water) 2008, in percent		
Very difficult	Not difficult and not easy	Very easy
48	22	30

This tends to indicate that, for the average individual, life has become somewhat easier over the last year.

JOB MARKET

This study also examines perceptions of the overall job market in light of individuals returning back home after the civil war. We examined income-generating activities, business opportunities and average income. Some fears that returnees will get better jobs because they have been better educated during their time in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been expressed. Yet people believe that it is **less difficult to find jobs this year** in comparison to previous years (see Table 3: Job market perceptions).

Table 3: Job market perceptions

Too many people coming to use land and taking jobs. 2007, in percent		
True	neither true nor false	False
51	25	24
Too many people coming to use land and taking jobs. 2008, in percent		
True	neither true nor false	False
34	27	39

BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES

Business opportunities are rich in Southern Sudan. There are few sources of income that people employ but a vast amount of opportunities have been untapped or underutilized. This section reviews the prominent income generating activities of Southern Sudan. Specifically, we asked about average incomes and sources of income generation from among 14 different economic activities suggested by a panel of native Southern Sudanese. In addition, potential goods and resources that could be further developed are suggested. It was found that **while many economic sectors are active, there is a vast amount of activities that have yet to be exploited.**

Crop cultivation makes up a **significant portion** of Southern Sudanese income. This research shows that average individuals earn 98.00SDG (Sudanese Pound)⁸ per week and 204.00SDG per month from goods that are produced through agriculture. The main items that are bought and sold include cassava, beans, rice, *simsim* (sesame), maize, millet, *dura* (sorghum), tomatoes and nuts. There are concerns from community leaders that current agricultural technology and practices are outdated. **Improved agricultural training and technology would lead to greater business opportunities.** Some such training is being provided, partly by government extension services, partly by NGOs.

Many people also rely on **selling products that come from poultry and eggs.** Those who do so in Southern Sudan report they earn an average of 48.00SDG per week and 96.00SDG monthly. The large part of **income** is generated **from raising chicks, selling chickens, and selling eggs.** In order to broaden business opportunities, more technical training for chicken-raising should be researched and made available.

Income generation from **cattle products** is an important factor in the Southern Sudan economy. The main business that is generated from this sector is in the form of **milk and of meat sales.** Here, however, there is an added political dimension, which needs to be considered. Until the 1970s, pastoralists were rare in the southern reaches of Equatoria (then Bahr-al-Ghazal and Equatoria) states due to rinderpest, a cattle disease. Since the introduction of rinderpest vaccinations, **pastoralists have been able to spread south** with their cattle, **encroaching on traditional agriculturalist lands.** Thus, increasing cattle breeding in Southern Sudan may **bring about undesirable, and unforeseen political consequences.**

Bush products are heavily utilized by virtually everyone in Southern Sudan. People earn an average of 20.00SDG per week and roughly 43.00SDG monthly. The main resources, which people use to generate income are bush rat, soap (from shea nuts), pots, fruits, wild fruits, dried meat, honey and timber. Here too we can identify both positive and negative consequences. Improvement in marketing routes could bring greater cash flows into the area. Notably,

⁸ At the time of study, the exchange rate was two Sudanese Pounds to one US Dollar. There was little difference between official and market exchange rates.

vegetable farms, shea nut collection, and bananas are largely the province of women, and thus **women stand to benefit substantially from increased trade** in these products. Honey, fish, **hunting and timber** are largely the province of men. The two latter items **are particularly critical**. Illegal logging, and hunting of protected animals is already a feature of life in Southern Sudan, often engaged in by, for example, SPLA commanders. Thus this potential **needs to be carefully harnessed and controlled**.

Many people are occupied with **small retail services**. This sector is comprised of selling mixed goods, brick laying, selling carpentry tools, milling food items (cassava, maize), and selling burnt bricks. Those who engage in these activities make an average of 91.00SDG per week and 290.00SDG per month. Business opportunities for small industry come from better technical training, better marketing skills and knowledge of savings strategies that can help to provide better tools and facilities.

Petty trade figures prominently in the Southern Sudanese economy. Traders earn on average, 30.00SDG per week and 95.00SDG monthly from petty trade. Individuals sell ground nuts, sugar, bananas, maize, kerosene, soap, hoes, prepared foodstuff, beer, soda, oil, fish and tomatoes in small lots. Many of the vendors are women, and these small sales (a few banana hands or a small pile of tomatoes from their garden) are an **important economic contribution**. Shopkeepers⁹ are to be found along the roads, and in concentrations in towns, though they were reluctant to divulge the volume of trade.

Individuals who run **small shops** in Southern Sudan are essential to economic growth. Of those who currently own or maintain a shop, weekly income averaged 145.00SDG. On a monthly basis, individuals earn 284.00SDG. Shops are mostly involved in retailing, selling mixed goods, and selling stationary. **Business opportunities** for shops **can be improved by effective marketing** through the radio, developing flyers to pass out to the community and **better accounting and inventory practices**.

Several individuals in Southern Sudan earn good money by **making street food**. The sample population for this research earned an average of 26.00SDG on a weekly basis and 56.00SDG monthly. People earn money by making dried fish, selling cooked eggs or cooked meat, making salad and selling general foodstuffs.

Handicrafts generate significant business as well. Average weekly incomes were found to be about 56.00SDG. The main products are hand soap, bar soap, cowls, pots, handkerchiefs, chairs and bamboo for fencing and mats. The range of goods is narrow, and could be widened, given higher incomes which are dependent, in turn on general economic improvements. Here too, a significant element is that **many of the manufactured items**—soap pots,

⁹ We made a distinction in the survey between 'petty traders', individuals who lacked a stock, and sold opportunistically on a daily basis (men usually selling industrial goods in small lots, women selling garden produce) from an improvised stand, and 'storekeepers' owning a stock of goods, and selling from a permanent structure.

handkerchiefs—**are made by women**, which means that this area of activity may have **strong potential for providing income to women and widows**.

Specialized **artisanal activities** are a mainstay of life in Southern Sudan. Modeling bricks, making furniture, metal work and masonry are all business activities that constitute a strong arm of the economy. Average weekly income in this economic sector is high by Southern Sudan standards: 454.00SDG a week. On a monthly basis, individuals reported making 1200.00SDG.

A significant number of people are involved in **providing personal services**—washing clothes, hairdressing, repairing machines. On average, people make about 13.00SDG weekly and 60.00SDG monthly. Here too, there is an element of change. Compared to four and even two years ago, towns like Yei show a growth in these small enterprises. This seems to indicate that **this area of activity has potential for returnees, both as customers and as providers**. Critically, startup costs for such businesses vary with the sector concerned, though there is great internal segmentation: a barber can set up with little more than clippers and a razor, or build/buy/rent full premises.

There is a large market for **day labor** as several sources indicate that many day laborers are brought to Sudan from other countries such as Uganda and the DRC. Day laborers earn a weekly average of 32.00SDG and 130.00SDG per month. Day labor activities include fetching water (by handcart, and, more recently, truck), casual work, agricultural labor, and molding blocks. Paradoxically, for an underdeveloped economy, and indeed, **worrisome, is the phenomenon of imported labor** described earlier in this report. Given the dearth of jobs in Southern Sudan, we found instances in which Southern Sudanese employers were offering jobs to non-Sudanese (Congolese and Ugandans) at day-labor rates, **because no Sudanese could be found who would have wanted to do this work**.

The **transportation sector**—long- and short-range transport—is **critical for Southern Sudan's development** (see the comments in Chapter 1 concerning roads). Buses, trucks and cars are used for long-distance inter-urban transport. Motorbikes and four-wheel drive vehicles serve as intra-urban taxis in larger towns. Weekly incomes averaged around 160.00SDG for urban drivers. There are additional business opportunities in long-range road transport. Given the high demand for transportation, this is a developing sector. Critically, the costs are high due to high start-up costs, amortization (one informant noted that a truck rarely lasts more than a year), poor servicing, and high costs of fuel and parts: all due largely to the poor state of the roads.

Production tools (hoes, anvils, blades, ploughshares) are vital to agriculture and small industry in Southern Sudan. Those who responded that they specialize in production tools, earned on average 50.00SDG per week and 80.00SDG on a monthly basis. Southern Sudan relies on agriculture and the demand for tools is relatively constant. The **advent of organized agricultural extension services may increase demand for newer and more modern agricultural implements and machinery**.

SALW AND LIVELIHOODS

Small arms have played a significant role in defining how people in Southern Sudan are able to provide for their families. The reality of violence inflicted against individuals as they seek to carry on their daily activities negatively affects the livelihoods of households. If individuals fear for their lives while trying to carry on their daily activities, many resources that could be utilized for overall well-being are lost. In Southern Sudan, this reality extends to farmers, pastoralists, individuals and the family.

We found that a majority of people in Southern Sudan still believe that people with guns stop them from carrying-on agricultural activities. A slightly greater number of respondents felt that people with guns stop them from going into the bush to collect vital resources. As mentioned above, it is often that people have to sometimes travel long distances in order to find work, gather resources or seek better economic opportunities. The mode of traveling usually ranges from bikes, through walking, to motorized transport: motorcycles or cars. When asked whether people with guns stop individuals from going from one place to another, a majority of respondents replied in the affirmative. Otherwise, there was no indication that people with guns stop the general population from getting goods they need. This also extends to sending children to school. In general, parents do not believe that armed individuals stop them from sending their children to school. (See Table 4: Effects of guns on civilian activities). Nevertheless, on the balance, the implication is that **guns specifically, and the security situation in general, has a hampering effect on the economy.**

Table 4: Effects of guns on civilian activities (figures in percent)

Do people with guns stop you from: Working in your fields (y/n)	
Yes	No
60	40
Do people with guns stop you from: Going into the bush (y/n)	
Yes	No
70	30
Do people with guns stop you from: Traveling from one area to another (y/n)	
Yes	No
72	28
Do people with guns stop you from: Getting goods that you need (y/n)	
Yes	No
45	55
Do people with guns stop you from: Sending your children to school (y/n)	
Yes	No
26	74

Key Findings

All sectors of Southern Sudan's economy have been improving gradually, when seen over a perspective of several years. The principle term, however, is 'gradually'. Three major findings stick out:

- 1) There is a **widespread set of opportunities** in Southern Sudan in almost all conceivable economic sectors. Many of these niches have not been taken up, or are not exploited by job-holders or entrepreneurs for reasons that need to be elucidated.
- 2) There are two strong **material factors which inhibit the ability** of the average Sudanese **to improve** economically: **security** and **poor road structure**.
 - **Security** hampers people from activities in the rural areas more than in urban ones.
 - **Poor road structure** and the heavy costs associated with it, cause high prices, and distort market price mechanisms.
- 3) There are a number of **non-material factors** which **inhibit** the economy of Southern Sudan. These include, in our estimate:
 - **Lack of confidence in the future** (which may inhibit saving and investment).
 - **Ethnic tensions** and lack of confidence in members of different kin/language groups.
 - **A perception among Sudanese themselves that Sudanese will not do certain jobs**, thus hindering economic development.

THE ISSUE OF SECURITY

The security of individuals, regions and the whole of Southern Sudan have witnessed both significant improvements and persistent challenges. The physical presence of weapons in the public sphere has largely decreased. However, specific locations remain vulnerable to armed group attacks. Overall security has improved but significant steps are needed to insure that present trends prevail. Aside from fears of the resurgence of war in the run-up to the referendum in 2011 and the resumption of LRA activities, the most serious internal security threat to individuals and property are armed gangs who prey largely on rural households.

In examining the issue of security, we tried a number of avenues of research. First, it must be clear that security is often a difficult area to research due to the nature of the subject. This is compounded in Southern Sudan by two factors: fear of the future, most notably the run-up to, and the period after the referendum of 2011, and the post-conflict fears and suspicions common in the country. The data on which this Chapter is based thus relies on a number of sources. These include the formal questionnaire in which we interviewed both individuals and institutions. It also relies on first-hand observations (both field researchers have military backgrounds), casual conversations with informants 'on the street', and published literature.

Personal security was examined by eliciting responses having to do with theft, kidnapping, weapons assault, threats, murder and rape. Individuals were asked whether or not the situation across all of these topics has changed for better or worse in comparison to one year ago. We also examined perceptions of security in towns and *bomas* in comparison to neighboring municipalities. Property theft and personal crime were studied by differentiating whether an individual has been subject to each in a non-violent manner, violent manner or by firearms. The same approach was taken when examining the differences between domestic and public violence. Feelings about food security, personal security, and whether or not people feared a new war with the north or a civil war amongst southerners were all compared to feelings one year ago. Personal safety was further addressed by comparing feelings of security within one's own *boma* and while visiting neighboring *bomas*. Apprehension of firearm injury was another topic surveyed. Finally, we also asked whether people feel safer or less safe by possessing a firearm. The resultant picture is an incomplete mosaic, which, nevertheless, focuses on the key issue of the relationship of security to return and reintegration.

Two methodological warnings are in order. The first is that we were not concentrating strictly on the issue of SALW. A study by the Small Arms Survey (SAS, 2006a) has demonstrated (among other things) how difficult the study of SALW possession in Southern Sudan is. We rely partly on their findings to validate our own. On the basis of experience, we strongly believe that reliable and valid data on SALW could only be acquired by careful and lengthy participant observation, something not possible for this study. Second, most of our data is from a restricted set of four counties in Southern Sudan, so that generalizing onto other areas in the country must be done with extreme caution. Our study encompasses both urban and 'rural'¹⁰ areas. Both are predominantly occupied by agriculturalists, not herders. Thus the findings in other areas will be different. Significantly, studies of the effects of SALW done in e.g. Dinka or Nuer areas (cf Hutchison, 1996) would not be valid for our studied areas.

PERSONAL SECURITY

Personal security has improved in a majority of categories across all four counties. Most respondents believe that cases of theft this year have dramatically declined in comparison to last year. Claims of kidnapping have also declined. When speaking of weapons assault, individuals feel that they have witnessed or heard about far fewer cases this year than in previous years. The number of those who have experienced threats has also declined considerably. Those who know about people being murdered or have witnessed such crimes in the past have remarked that murder is low in

¹⁰ As noted earlier, the rural-urban measure we have used is that of compound density and distance to services.

comparison to last year or previous years. This year occurrences of rape are also considerably lower (see Table 5: Changes in personal security).

Table 5: Changes in personal security (figures in percent)

Personal Security	High	Intermediate	Low
Theft last year	50	33	17
Theft this year	28	25	46
Kidnapping last year	25	32	42
Kidnapping this year	35	17	47
Weapons assault last year	40	33	27
Weapons assault this year	29	18	53
Threats last year	44	28	28
Threats this year	31	24	45
Murder last year	33	37	29
Murder this year	34	20	46
Rape last year	32	25	42
Rape this year	32	13	55

Note: "High", "Intermediate", "Low" columns refer to the percentage of respondents.

This does not mean that people feel safe. A majority of individuals responded affirmatively when asked whether anyone from their house was killed or wounded from violence after 2003. **Fear of being injured by small arms is still prevalent in most communities.** People have strong beliefs that either they or someone close to them might be injured by SALW in the near future. This fear is to be found equally among stayees and returnees (cf. pp. 12-13). In addition, most people believe that they will be subject to some form of non-violent or violent property theft. This extends to property theft by threat of firearms as well. With respect to domestic violence, firearms and assault with a weapon¹¹ play a minimal factor. Instead, there is a **strong belief that unarmed domestic violence is prevalent.** Regarding violence in the public domain, there is clear evidence of fear of armed assault (firearms and other weapons) when people consider whether or not they will be attacked.

The question of feeling safe when walking alone in one’s compound during the day and night was explored, irrespective of being a stayee or returnee. This question was also connected to walking into another village or neighborhood. The majority of people responded that they feel “fairly safe” when walking alone in their own compounds at night. A slightly smaller percentage of individuals remarked that they feel “very safe.” Those who said they feel “very unsafe” at night were in the lowest percentage. With respect to walking around in one’s own compound during the day, the majority of respondents said they felt “very safe.” A slightly smaller population remarked that they feel “fairly safe” and the lowest percentage felt “very unsafe.” When considering walking alone to another village or neighborhood, the majority of people feel “very

¹¹ Weapons other than firearms our panel suggested included spears, bows and arrows, *panga* (bush knife).

unsafe.” The second largest population feels “very safe” and the rest believe they are “fairly safe.” This means that police protection within villages is perceived to be fairly adequate by normal residents. The findings are also validated by observing interactions among Southern Sudanese, where fear of unprovoked poisoning and witchcraft attacks are considered common potential hazards when visiting strangers. Critically, there are strong indications that fear of strangers is very common, though we can only speculate on the behavioral and economic implications.

When asked whether or not people felt their villages or *bomas* were safer, the same or more dangerous than other villages, an equal amount of people responded that their villages were either similar to or more dangerous than villages or *bomas* elsewhere. Some people—among both stayees and returnees—felt unsafe when walking to other neighborhoods and villages. This implies that even the roads (as distinct from settlements) are not considered neutral zones (see Table 6: Perceptions of safety while walking). The effect of being a returnee on perceptions of safety (see pp. 13-14 above) appears to be negligible.

Table 6: Perceptions of safety while walking (figures in percent)

Safety Issues	Very safe	Fairly safe	Very unsafe
How safe walking alone in your compound at night?	34	42	24
How safe would you feel walking alone in your compound in the daytime?	50	35	13
How safe would you feel walking alone in another village/neighborhood?	30	26	34

The overall findings on the question of compound and inter-compound safety imply two things. First, physical security, in the form of better policing of rural and urban areas (in the sense used here throughout) is a problem that needs to be improved. Second, the *attitudes* of Southern Sudanese, and the inherent suspicion of strangers need to be addressed on a nationwide basis.

The panel of Southern Sudanese we used to validate the questionnaire suggested that three issues—food security, war with the North, and an intra-South war—topped people’s concerns. The findings of the survey on these three areas of anxiety show a consistent decline in anxiety compared to last year. Across every issue, people feel that their lives are easier compared to one year ago (see Table 7: Decline in anxiety on three select topics).

Table 7: Decline in anxiety on three select topics (figures in percent)

Issues	Very difficult	Not difficult	Easy
Enough food for my family (last year).	63	24	12
Enough food for my family (this year).	56	22	22
A new war with the North (last year).	22	32	46
A new war with the North (this year).	14	20	66
A war amongst southerners (last year).	33	29	38
A war amongst southerners (this year).	28	16	56

Key Findings

- 1) Unsurprisingly, guns and security are related. Southern Sudan’s citizens are **not well-served in the area of security**, and as a consequence, must ensure the possibility of providing their own security. In the absence of security provided by the state (most notably in rural areas), and with the prevalence of threats against individuals, trying to remove, rather than control firearms is unethical.
- 2) **SALW appear to be highly prevalent**, though we were unable to count numbers or identify a coherent pattern. It is necessary however to distinguish between two different modes of SALW usage. In one, prevalent largely among agriculturalists, SALW are kept as a means of defending the home against very real threats ranging from the LRA to human predators. In the other, common largely among cattle herders, SALW are used as a means of raiding for more cattle, driving off other raiders, or driving off agriculturalists to increase grazing lands.
- 3) **Patterns of crime also vary**. In urban areas (notably Juba and the main roads) there are occasional outbursts of armed banditry. In areas populated mainly by herders, crime takes the form of inter- (and sometimes, intra-) ethnic fights over grazing areas, and cattle raiding. In rural areas populated largely by agriculturalists, most armed crime is domestic (often wives killed by husbands), and agriculturalists are often the subject of forced expulsion by cattle herders.
- 4) Overall, **the feelings of security have increased, and anxieties about violence have decreased**. This is one of the best and most hopeful signs we have seen in Sudan. Note that this does not indicate an *objective* decline in violence, but rather the state of peoples’ perceptions, which may be even more important.
- 5) We believe that **Security Sector Reform (SSR) is absolutely critical, in fact, a prerequisite, for successful reintegration**. Specifically this means (a) regular salary payment; (b) construction of facilities; (c) regular training in legal duties and obligations of security services; (d) uncompromising control of corrupt practices notably protection by high commanders of malefactors.

THE FORMAL STATE SECURITY ORGANS

State, county and local security organs are charged with maintaining and improving current security trends. The SPLA has made major reforms to its operations, organization, funding and training methods but the transition to peace after the signing of the CPA presents several challenges. The SPLA still requires professional organization with respect to DD&R practices, appropriations of civilian lands for military use and weapons registration among several other issues. Local police forces maintain an adequate presence to ensure lawful order, but professionalism, drunkenness while on duty, missing communication assets, leadership capabilities and an inadequate relationship between the police and judicial sectors serve to undermine efforts at law enforcement. It is vitally important to examine overall public trust of each agency in order to judge whether or not current operations are effective in the eyes of the public.

The GOSS has a plethora of state security organs at its disposal. These result from the demands of the CPA. The major organ is of course the SPLA, the organization that bore the major brunt of the fight against the Sudan Defence Forces (SDF) and its proxy armies and gangs. Some of these armed groups are still nascent or extant (cf. SAS, 2006b). The SPLA is currently busy transforming itself into a modern army. Anecdotally, this transformation is evident in two ways: soldiers now appear as soldiers, with uniforms, footwear and greater discipline; and we rarely saw armed soldiers in the towns, and never off-duty, though residents still expressed a fear of armed soldiers carrying weapons in public places. Soldiers perform regular patrols, and unit training is evident. Inasmuch as the LRA are currently (at the time of study) restricting themselves from raiding systematically into Sudan, it is difficult to tell how well the SPLA structure works in practice in the field. Given that both Maridi and Yei have brigade-sized garrisons (though the strength of a brigade in practice is unknown), their record *during* the worst LRA attacks did not impress the populace nor contribute greatly to their sense of security.

Overall, the SPLA maintains strong public trust. However, forcible appropriations of lands gazetted for civilian use by SPLA soldiers have been stated as one of several problems that are experienced in Southern Sudan. Many soldiers still do not receive salaries, which places stress on commitments to military duty, and, due to the low standards of discipline in the past has been the cause for rioting. This occurred e.g. in Yei in 2007. There have been various unverified accounts that armed attacks on civilians have been taking place in Yei County. These have been said to be organized by ex-soldiers as retribution for the incapability of the SPLA to pay military salaries.

At least at the upper echelons of the command structure, problems remain that have an impact on the issues on this report. Most significantly, there are repeated reports from unconnected sources that SPLA commanders collude with cattle herders—indeed, maybe cattle owners themselves—to prey on the lands of settled farmers. Senior commanders in the SPLA are believed by many

respondents to be responsible for the arming and protection of these marauding bands of cattle herders.

The police are the formal regulators of law-keeping within the borders of the country. They are, on the whole, badly equipped and badly trained. Ongoing one-month training efforts are underway. However, like the SPLA, their pay is often in arrears. Critical improvements in infrastructure—police stations, barracks, and restraint facilities—have been delayed or cancelled. A typical police post consists of tent or *tukul*, with a few bored policemen sleeping in what shade is offered. More importantly, not being either armed or trained, and numerically at a disadvantage, they rarely venture to enforce the law against armed raiders. Given that the average County Commissioner has some six policemen at his immediate disposal as a mobile force (with a few more scattered in police posts around the county), with no communication, and little physical mobility, it is unsurprising that the law is often a matter of private force. To add to the problem, we had plentiful evidence that judges and chiefs (who perform judicial functions) have been intimidated by armed men, most notably by SPLA commanders. In the absence of a regular, well-trained and armed police force, they have of necessity surrendered to the intimidation.

The prison services, like the police, are badly paid in arrears, and must fulfill their function with inadequate infrastructure. Prison facilities are primitive, though improving gradually. We have evidence that at least one prison facility is attempting to improve both the lives of inmates and its own position by training prisoners in agriculture and bricklaying, and using this workforce to improve conditions. Returnees come into contact with the prison authorities for infractions of which domestic violence is, apparently, the major cause.

The GOSS has established a Wildlife Protection Service (WPS) to protect natural resources. We were unable to ascertain the degree of effectiveness of that force for protecting natural resources. Our impression is, however, that the WPS is viewed more as an auxiliary military force, to be used as necessary, rather than for its ostensible function. A few informants noted that natural resource plundering, most notably uncontrolled cutting of wild mahogany is still taking place, though we were unable to ascertain this assertion.

The CPA mandates the creation of a hybrid North-South military force. This force is expected to become the nucleus of a new, unified Sudanese army, if the referendum in 2011 reaffirms the unity of Sudan. These Joint Integrated Units (JIU) are usually battalion-sized forces scattered throughout Southern Sudan. Overall, JIU retain the *leasť* trust among our respondents, who view them with suspicion. In point of fact, at least one respondent from JIU noted informally that they view themselves as being a part of the SPLA, rather than of a unified Sudanese military structure. Unsurprisingly, as a recent study shows (SAS, 2008), the JIU functions very poorly if at all. A political creation based on hope, very few people in Southern Sudan believe it contributes to security. Judging by the degree of official neglect it 'enjoys' neither do the governments concerned.

We asked respondents to rank the degree of trust they had in the various security services. Police forces are well regarded but the issues mentioned above serve to undercut positive law enforcement activities. Wildlife protection services have little to no public trust due to poor professionalism and widespread accounts of corruption. *Boma* authorities receive outstanding public support as providers of security. Prison services have also preserved public trust. The justice system is somewhat trusted due to several accounts of magistrates reversing lawful police arrests for political purposes. Lastly, the military police, UN police and community police all maintain good public standing (see Table 8: Trust in various security providers). Major causes of mistrust are poor organization, accounts of corruption and poor professionalism.

The formal state security organs have improved over the past three years, both visibly and in essence. However, they are still not providing the populace, let alone returnees, with the security they so badly need. The fact that the army is quite often the source of security problems for individuals and even state organs, is something that must be addressed as quickly as possible, to ensure that people in Southern Sudan feel comfortable and safe, and are able to go about the business of providing for themselves and the country’s future.

Table 8: Trust in various security providers (figures in percent)

Security organization	Trust Very Much	Trust Somewhat	No Trust
Trust the Boma authorities	63	20	17
Trust the Community Police	61	22	16
Trust the SPLA	53	24	23
Trust the Police	49	33	18
Trust the UN Police	49	28	23
Trust the Military police	42	19	39
Trust the Prison services	38	28	34
Trust the Police justice system	35	38	27
Trust the JIU	27	32	41
Trust the Wildlife protection	27	31	42

SECURITY PERCEPTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The majority of GOs and NGOs identified their services as targeting returnees, whether in the form of healthcare, small business, education and vocational training. This includes members of the local police office in Onduruba *payam*, who also highlighted their role in responding to family disputes, marriage cases and taking part in traditional court. The prison service identified its main activity as the provision of health care services for returnees, since it houses the local

health center. Only the SPLA and JIU identified their role with the provision of security.

In dealing with security issues, survey responses show that the SPLA, and not the police, is perceived as the main security provider in the community. The police refer security incidents to the SPLA; the SSRRC, *boma* and *payam* administrators refer to the police; and other GOs and NGOs either refer to the local authorities or the SRRC office. This shows an unclear chain of communication for dealing with, and responding to security incidents. It may well also reflect a reality: that even though the police are charged with security according to the CPA, in practice, they have a very low capacity to fulfill their legitimate role. The key threat identified by the respondents is rebel activity from the LRA. Crime does not appear to be a problem, but domestic violence was identified as prevalent.

NGOs appear to rely on local authorities such as the SRRC, chiefs, administrators and County Commissioners to judge whether the surrounding area is safe from local security threats. Some rely on observation and patrols through communities, paying particular attention to market activity, while others still turn to the police and SPLA for information. *Payam* and *boma* authorities refer to the police, while the police responded they have no way of judging whether the surrounding area is safe: unsurprising, inasmuch as even with the best will in the world, they do not have the material capacity—communications, transport or weapons—nor the training to effectively deal with the issue. The SPLA and JIU monitor the situation through patrols and meetings with local authorities.

In summary, the picture of the official security providers is a confusing one. Security agencies do not fulfill their mandated (by the CPA) roles. Security is thus, in effect, up for grabs. Different areas in Southern Sudan are likely to have different mechanisms for identifying and dealing with security threats. Overall, this is a highly unsatisfactory and disturbing picture, which is likely to have knock-on effects on the process of Return and Reintegration.

SELF-HELP: FIREARMS AMONG CIVILIANS

Unsurprisingly, judging from the previous section, the majority of families in Southern Sudan feel that possessing firearms makes them safer (SAS, 2006a). Secrecy about weapon possession is still pervasive in all of the areas covered by this research. Largely this is due to fears of forcible weapons collection, which have taken place in other areas in Southern Sudan. Moreover, accounts of armed attacks and tacit apprehension about security in the run-up to the referendum of 2011 have all fed into motivations to privately retain weapons and keep them hidden. Nevertheless, in general, our respondents seemed to indicate that fewer people now carry arms in comparison to last year.

This section reviews firearms among civilians in several ways. The *perceived* number of those who possess weapons in neighborhoods is compared from 2007 to 2008. The difficulty in acquiring weapons and ammunition by purchase and rental is compared from 2007 to 2008. Subsequently, we look at

perceptions of weapons visibility in neighborhoods. Ideas regarding numbers of firearms in communities are covered as well. A summary of public opinions that state where one can purchase and rent weapons, the associated costs and the types of weapons people have carried/do carry themselves is given.

There has been a drastic reduction from 2007 to 2008 in the amounts of weapons that are perceived to exist in neighborhoods. The majority of respondents believed that in 2007, there were a lot of weapons in neighborhoods, and that the number had dropped substantially in 2008. Firearms were observed by people on the streets and at night clubs and bars, at markets, in the home, at funerals, during celebrations and in the workplace in declining numbers. When asked to describe the number of firearms in their community, the majority of respondents remarked that only a few firearms exist in their communities. This contrasts markedly with the responses to SAS (2006a). We are also not convinced that this is a reality, and the numbers are probably far higher than implied.

We also asked people’s views on how difficult it is to purchase or rent weapons and buy ammunition when comparing 2007 to 2008. Very little change in difficulty was noted when weapons purchase was considered. This means that while weapons have been less observable in the community, market availability is not the factor driving consumer behavior. The difficulty in renting weapons remains also relatively unchanged. Only ammunition is found to be more difficult to acquire in 2008 (see Table 9: Ease of acquiring weapons and ammunition), though here, too, we have unsubstantiated contrary evidence.

Table 9: Ease of acquiring weapons and ammunition (figures in percent)

Acquiring weapons	Easy	Moderate	Difficult
How difficult to acquire weapons last year	37	19	44
How difficult to acquire weapons this year	36	17	47
How difficult to rent weapons last year	43	13	44
How difficult to rent weapons this year	40	15	44
How difficult to acquire ammunition last year	48	18	34
How difficult to acquire ammunition this year	46	10	44

Where are weapons coming from? The majority of respondents said they can acquire weapons from several sources. Specifically, people noted that weapons are available from individuals, soldiers, wildlife protection services personnel, dealers on the black market and police. Costs vary from 3500SDG to 35SDG. Weapons are also available for exchange with cattle (and see Hutchinson, 1996). Many respondents commented that people can also rent weapons from soldiers and police. Rental costs vary from 500SDG to 50SDG depending on the circumstances. Ammunition was said to be available from the same individuals who sell weapons. Costs for ammunition range from 300SDG to 1SDG depending on type, amount and age. One informant noted

that a pile of ammunition that could be covered with two hands (we estimate some 30-50 rounds) could be bought in the market for 1SDG (about US \$0.50).

We also looked at changes in weapons carrying patterns. The results show that most individuals carried bows, knives/*pangas*, spears and sticks when they traveled in the past. Firearms were common, but traditional weapons maintained an edge. This year, knives/*pangas*, bows, sticks and spears are still mostly carried. Firearm carrying has significantly declined: a result confirmed by our own observations over time. Table 10: Personal protection, shows these changes.

Table 10: Personal protection (figures in percent)

Travel Protection	Stick	Spear	Knife/ Panga	Bow	Gun	Other Weapon
When you traveled in the past, what did you carry?	20	20	21	23	14	2
When you travel now, what do you carry?	23	16	25	23	11	2
What do you usually carry?	19	21	20	22	14	3

Key Findings

- 1) There has been a **sweeping reduction in public visibility of firearms** among the target areas of this research. This may be the direct result of perceptions that the security environment in Southern Sudan is much safer.
- 2) The **ease of acquiring firearms has remained relatively unchanged** from 2007 to 2008. Relative stability in the black market for small arms sales, rentals and ammunition has not affected weapons possession patterns. Other factors play a larger role in weapons possession patterns such as ethnicity, travel distances and activities.
- 3) **Acquisition of small arms by the general public** from security agents in Southern Sudan **remains endemic**. Major SSR reform initiatives that target corruption within the security services and weapons stocks management have yet to be effectively employed. Stockpile management programs and internal accounting within the security services need to be implemented to stop the phenomenon.
- 4) While firearms are used for some travel protection, a majority of individuals use traditional weapons in order to protect themselves. This reveals that **most people** in the areas of this research **do not believe firearms are necessary for personal safety**.

PSYCHOSOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS OF WAR

Local governments and development partners have developed implementation plans for widows and orphans who are products of the war within the framework of GOSS guidelines. Unsurprisingly, the formal support for victims of war is limited in Southern Sudan. On the formal side, a GOSS agency is responsible for widows and orphans of war. Given the enormous demands on GOSS budget, its lack of trained manpower, and its lack of capacity, it is unsurprising to find that help to widows and orphans from the recipients' perspective, is more promise than reality.

Key Findings

- 1) There is **little provision** for the **most vulnerable victims of war** in Southern Sudan. Most Government organizations surveyed either did not run any schemes or were unaware of schemes operating in their jurisdiction. However, there is anecdotal evidence that schemes to help orphans and widows have run in the past. Some of the interviewees recalled programs operating in the past but stated that they had been discontinued.
- 2) There are **some government schemes** to help those affected by war (e.g. a Prison Service initiative in Juba County). It would appear that with obvious constraints on resources the priorities of government organizations run more to security and the provision of basic services.
- 3) The **majority of help comes from the non-governmental sector**. NGOs provide services ranging from the provision of food, healthcare and education to the Oxfam Great Britain service that provides a goat restocking service for widows and widowers.
- 4) **Budgetary constraints have curtailed the effectiveness of some programs**. The answers given also highlight the fact that because NGO resources are stretched they must focus on one or two affected groups, this has the potential to marginalize certain groups who require assistance. Very few organizations are able to make a sustained commitment to helping widows, orphans and the disabled. Most are only able to commit resources to one or maximum two of these groups.
- 5) Programs often **only address basic physical requirements**, e.g. paid labor, education, etc. The jobs offered by programs by their nature may also exclude those who are mentally and physically disabled. The job market is not developed enough as of yet to effectively incorporate the mentally and physically disabled.
- 6) There appears to be **little or no provision for** any type of **psychological help** for WAFFs and CAFFs or other affected groups.

ADDRESSING CONFLICT NON-VIOLENTLY

The prospect for non-violent settlement of disputes does not appear to be good. This is a qualified statement that must be understood within the framework of Southern Sudan's cultures and history. Sahlins (1961) has argued that the Nuer (and the culturally- and linguistically-related Dinka) have worked an acceptable level of violence into societal control: control that is manifestly *not* exhibited towards others. For most sedentary cultivators, in contrast, non-violent conflicts are the norm, since conflicts can be resolved by moving elsewhere, and since mediation by elders and chiefs is a normative practice. Nevertheless, violence, particularly domestic violence, and the fear of violence generated by outsiders, is a constant threat.

Repeated anecdotal evidence provided, often spontaneously, by interviewees indicates two features of violent conflict resolution in Southern Sudan that are extremely informative. Many interviewees noted that ethnic differences were the cause of violence. This however must be tempered carefully. Most of our interviewees were from sedentary farming groups. Virtually all of those who spoke about violence blamed the 'cattle herders' in effect, members of the Dinka, Nuer, Toposa, Murle and other cattle herding groups. Anecdotal evidence (again) seems to indicate that indeed, for several reasons, violence within and between these groups is almost endemic. One category of informants only—women—also noted that *domestic* violence was very high, often leading to death even in agriculturalist communities. Two other data points are significant as well: it is notable that a large proportion of the prison population in Southern Sudan are women, jailed for infidelity (one would assume that if people were jailed for infidelity, there would be men and women prisoners in equal numbers); and that causes for violence in Southern Sudan are often framed in the idiom of 'women and cattle'. Both of these 'objects', are the cause of repeated *violent* conflicts, at least in the eyes of our informants.

A number of organizations included in this survey, and others that have not been (because they work outside the survey area) engage in support in two relevant activities: training community members in non-violent conflict, and working on women's rights and participation. It seems that these two areas are closely related. In the one case, *within the response area* at least, agriculturalists feel they are the *victims* of violence as a group. Within the same area, one category of individuals—men—tend to also be *perpetrators* of violence against female members of their community.

While external evidence from NGOs indicates that domestic violence is a common, a minority of respondents expressed that fear, perhaps due to cultural ideas about permitted domestic violence. Domestic violence is far higher than desirable (and is probably under-reported). 32 percent of respondents feared domestic violence in general. 36 percent of respondents felt vulnerable to domestic attack by firearms. 63 percent feared domestic violence by other

means (that is, sticks, knives).¹² Around fifty percent of respondents fear violence of one form or another (an aggregate of domestic and public violence).

In prescribing how to deal with the issue, two critical points need to be kept in mind:

- Only a few of the NGOs and GOs working in Southern Sudan have in place programs for non-violent conflict resolution that are (a) localized; (b) sustained over time; (c) widespread over the country.
- Tackling the causes of violence in the country should go well beyond teaching neighbors or community members how to resolve conflicts peacefully. Violent solutions to problems permeate the society, from the relations between governments of Southern and North Sudan, through the activities of armed groups (including the SPLA), to ethnic differences in resorting to violent solutions.

As one informant pointed out to one of us "...there is no point in me giving up my gun, if, after I do so, someone from the ... tribe across the river will come and steal my cattle or drive me off my land..." The fear of other communities and their violent behaviors is pervasive, must be dealt with, and is sometimes justified by the behavior of particular social categories (e.g. young men engaged in cattle herding). There is a difficult feedback mechanism here: it is difficult to train people in non-violent conflict resolution, when many conflicts are solved (in the favor of the aggressor) using violence.

The above illustrates the idea that non-violent conflict settlement (or management) must take a number of dimensions into account:

- **Intra- and inter-ethnic issues.** These arise from differences in lifestyle, perspective and culture. The traditionally dominant Dinka are not a homogenous group and often compete for cattle and grazing land [i.e. 10 March 2008 attack/cattle raid by Agar Dinka from Lakes State on Luac Jang Dinka]. As the population of Southern Sudan continues to increase from the return of refugees and IDPs, there is rising competition for land, clean water and other resources that are under increasing pressure from difficult environmental conditions.
- **The issue of impunity.** Access to and the reach of Government services in rural areas is significantly limited. The GOSS lacks the capacity to administer effectively and the police and judiciary services are often non-existent. Where they do exist, these institutions are unreliable in responding to incidences of violence and crime, and are accused of corruption. Violence and crime committed by individuals often goes unpunished, or punishment for these crimes is taken into community hands.

¹² For various reasons it has proven difficult to disaggregate male and female responses, something which is still in process.

- **Gender issues.** The interaction between men and women and their roles in conflict escalation and de-escalation. Domestic violence is pervasive across Southern Sudan. It is not generally discussed openly, but requires targeting the attitudes and behavior of men and women together.
- **Cultural issues such as revenge.** What often begins as violence between two individuals quickly escalates into inter-group violence if these two individuals are of different ethnic, religious, community or political persuasions.

STATUTORY AND TRADITIONAL MEANS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Southern Sudan has both statutory and traditional methods of addressing conflict nonviolently. In theory, statutory methods apply to and interact with all levels of society; but in practice, they are either inaccessible to rural communities, or at best inconsistently applied. By contrast, traditional mechanisms are often more legitimate and effective since they are locally owned and accountable. These mechanisms are often the only means of providing security and justice at the community level.

Traditional mechanisms of non-violent conflict resolution include mediation, dialogue, reconciliation and compensation for crimes committed. The focus is not on retribution, but rather reconciliation and the restoration of peace/calm within communities. These mechanisms have been institutionalized in a number of ways, most notably through community peace committees. These committees consist of elders, women, youth, chiefs, *boma* and *payam* administrators, churches, community organizations who are chosen through a process of selection. Their role is to investigate and respond to local disputes before they escalate; to mediate between conflicting parties; to report on and alert the community to security threats, and to liaise with relevant county authorities. If local peace committees are unable to prevent or mitigate violent conflict, security authorities are alerted and/or cases referred to traditional courts. Failing a resolution at this level, the State system is appealed to for further support and reconciliation (Unger and Wils, 2007). As a result of the civil war, these structures and mechanisms of community conflict resolution have been significantly undermined and manipulated, but their revival could be critical to deterring violence. With this understanding, local and international organizations such as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), Pact Sudan, and World Vision have helped strengthen or establish local peace committees and other 'people-to-people' peacebuilding efforts.

Recognizing that these mechanisms exist within Southern Sudan, the survey aimed to capture the capacity of government and NGOs to promote and/or support non-violent conflict resolution in the survey areas. More specifically, this capacity was assessed according to the existence of organizations that engage in security and peacebuilding activities and their interest and ability to promote/support nonviolent conflict resolution at the community level.

More than half of the organizations surveyed—namely NGOs—claim they have programs for public awareness of non-violent conflict resolution, though few offered concrete examples. Oxfam offers peacebuilding workshops for local peace committees, while Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) holds workshops on the related and important issue of violence against women. Aside from them, none of the other organizations engage in peacebuilding or conflict resolution efforts in a sustainable fashion. This is due in part to a lack of interest and commitment to these issues, in part to a lack of capacity and resources. For example, the New Sudan Women’s Association noted that conflict resolution programs are available but are not implemented due to a lack of funds, transportation and communication that is critical to bringing relevant actors together. Notable amongst the GOs, the prison service has a sensitization program for communities on how to deal with cattle raiding incidents. If implemented consistently and across a wide range, this program has positive implications for dealing non-violently with inter- and intra-ethnic issues, as well as the issue of revenge.

Paradoxically, *individuals* are aware of peacebuilding activities: over 70 percent confirmed knowledge of organizations in their area that support and engage in conflict resolution activities. The IPCS was mentioned most frequently (notably by the SPLA and JIU), while the NSCC and Oxfam were the second most identified organizations. The most effective peacebuilding methodologies/mechanisms were identified as community dialogue, education and sensitization. Vocational training was also high on the list for the potential it provides to generate income within the community, while social programs such as drama, games and sport were also emphasized for their entertainment value.

Most of the surveyed organizations also provide some form of training, which suggests that the survey areas have some local training capacity. Training programs appear to be for hard skills such as driving and agricultural subsistence for soldiers, and vocational skills for civilians (carpentry, tailoring, etc.). Among the organizations surveyed, 34 percent say they offer technical training for women. Notable amongst them is training offered to widows by the prison services to work as prison guards/jailers. Civil society trainers are pulled from the IPCS, Kampala or Nairobi, or from someone within the local community, but the limited frequency with which this question was responded suggests that qualified trainers are hard to find locally.

All of the above amounts to low capacity to promote and support non-violent conflict resolution in the survey areas. While some peacebuilding programs exist—namely amongst NGOs—conflict resolution training or awareness-raising is not necessarily a priority. Existing programs can nevertheless be built upon and expanded if resources and capacity is made available. For example, training-of-trainers workshops within the surveyed GOs and NGOs could be provided on skills such as rapid conflict assessment, conflict mediation and baseline surveys, and support given for this training to serve in the establishment or strengthening of local structures for conflict resolution. State or GOSS representatives should be lobbied/encouraged to provide regular support for these activities so that the problem is not perceived as the responsibility of NGOs and international organizations.¹³ Involving government actors may also facilitate/promote better interaction between traditional and statutory mechanisms for resolving conflict non-violently.

Key Findings

- 1) The **causes, patterns, and frequencies of violence vary by ethnic group, gender, and probably location.**
- 2) Some of the **violence** is **physical**, and motivated by concrete considerations (cattle, land, women), some is '**notional**', motivated (if it takes place) by concepts/ideology (witchcraft, poisoning, strangers).
- 3) **Inter-household violence** inside communities **is low if one accepts domestic violence**, which many respondents felt was the normal way of things.
- 4) **Inter-community violence**—active, in the form of raids sparked by cattle raising, or passive in the form of fears of poisoning and witchcraft in stranger communities—**seems to be endemic.**
- 5) **A successful non-violent conflict resolution program** would need to **cover all relevant audiences** (men and women of all communities that come into contact violently or peacefully), in **a sustained fashion** (the program must expose a majority of people repeatedly), and **address both concrete motivations and notional ones.**
- 6) Training capacities do exist, but seem to lack coherence and direction, and do not fully address non-violent conflict issues systematically.
- 7) **Non-violent approaches** to conflict resolution **will not work, unless all those involved feel secure.**

¹³ Often, the effectiveness of NGO peacebuilding activities allows the government to distance itself from this responsibility. See SAS, 2007 for a good example with regard to pastoral conflict.

REINTEGRATION BEST PRACTICE

Reintegration, though it is a world industry, and has been practiced for over a decade, still lacks a useful theoretical perspective from which operative suggestions can be derived (Nilsson, 2005). The problem in reintegration programs is quite often that the process is seen as almost totally program- and institution-oriented (e.g. Edloe, 2007), even though some have objected to that orientation (Ashkenazi, 2006). In this Chapter we shall attempt to review some of the best practices for *reintegration* (rather than the totality of DD&R). Essentially, best practice can be codified as:

- Who is the target group?
 - What is the aim to be achieved?
 - What methods are to be used to achieve the aim?
- (from Nilsson, 2005, p. 24)

TARGET GROUPS

It must be kept in mind that in most DD&R programs, the target group consists of only a sub-set of the ones we are concerned with here. In the literature, such target groups are largely concerned with ex-combatants and auxiliaries (WAFFs, CAFFs). Lesser consideration is given to the reintegration of other returnees. In our case, we are concerned with a broader spectrum of returnees. In discussing best practice, therefore, we must deal first with commonalities, and then with specific differences between different categories of returnees. The situation in Southern Sudan is complicated by the fact that an unknown number of returnees is going to join an unknown number of what we have called stayees (those who were not displaced by war).

It may be useful to think of a return process in terms of 'carrying capacity': the relationship between the 'host' population (the stayees) and their economic, social, and political capital, and the returning population and their economic, social, and political capital. As a general rule, the more congruent these two are, the more likely the melding between the groups. This implies that a careful profiling of the different categories of returnees is critical for the success of a reintegration program.

Special Groups (WAFFs, CAFFs, Disabled)

We were unable to clearly identify or interview WAFFs and CAFFs in this study, either because individuals do not want to be so identified, or because there are genuinely none within the surveyed population. Critically, however, there are large numbers of widows, orphans, and disabled. These victims of war are common in Southern Sudan. Our NGO survey identified two organizations dealing with them and providing support. Otherwise, though there is an authority within GOSS, we found that most individuals in this category are basically ignored. A few local initiatives are taken, but there is little concrete activity.

Ex-combatants

The identification of ex-combatants is complicated by the secrecy with which, until recently, the SPLA cloaked any mention of demobilization. As it currently stands, the SPLA intends to demobilize some 25,00-40,000 troops from its ranks (personal communication from SSDDRC). This does not include either the 'self-demobilized' or those who had been released after the ceasefire to their homes on 'long-term leave'.

Ex-combatants are genuinely feared in the survey area for two things: a) their assumed potential for violence, which concerns many respondents; b) that they may have made enemies who might track them and unleash violence on the host communities.

Both issues indicate that Southern Sudanese have little reason to rely on the government to ensure their security. And, even though most people nominally support the liberation struggle, they are, at the same time, apprehensive about the real costs of the form the struggle took.

Key issues

- 1) It seems **difficult to disaggregate the problems of special groups from the general problems** of the population.
- 2) There is **little recourse for members of special groups for dealing with their specific problems**.
- 3) **Ex-combatants**, however they are viewed normatively as national heroes, **are also slightly feared and suspect**.

THE AIMS

An absolutely critical component is **determining the aims of reintegration programs**. Critically, these can be described in two different modes: focusing on the returnees, or focusing on the program. As Ball and Van der Goor (2006) note, and most other authors agree, reintegration is essentially a social process. It is thus critical to involve, to the degree possible, both the returnees themselves, and the communities into which they are returning. Three other contingencies need to be kept in mind (Coletta, 2005):

- 1) There must be the **political will** to carry reintegration through;
- 2) There must be **careful preparation** including opportunity mapping and preparation of reintegration agencies; and
- 3) There must be **transparent and accountable practices**.

We believe that two additional contingencies need to be kept in mind:

- 1) **Reintegration** processes must be seen to be equitable and **fair** (they must benefit *all* sections of the population); and
- 2) The processes must do **no harm** (cf. CDA, 2004).

Process and Program

It is absolutely critical to be able to identify, and clearly distinguish between the *process* of reintegration and reintegration *programs*. The process of reintegration is a long one whose length varies with the individual (age, gender, environment, skills, personality all play a part). Reintegration programs are self limiting by reason of funds or determination of the service provider. The single most important lesson here is that **the *process of reintegration does not end when reintegration programs do***. Some returnees will reintegrate well before a program ends. Some will not after all programs have been withdrawn. It therefore becomes critical to carefully define what is meant by 'reintegration'.

Defining when someone is 'reintegrated' has not been well dealt with in the literature. Virtually all literature surveyed defines reintegration in the form of a process, rather than an end. An Africa-relevant definition, based on UNHCR, 2004 has been proposed by UNOWA (2005). Reintegration is defined as

... a process through which ex combatants and their relatives are reintegrated into normal peaceful life. A viable reintegration is achieved when the necessary political, legal, economic and social conditions for a decent life in peace and dignity of ex-combatants are attained (UNOWA, 2005, p. 2).

In practice, the consensus seems to be that reintegration requires setting targets for functioning within a society in several measurable areas (Ashkenazi, 2006):

- 1) **Economic.** Is the reintegrated person functioning as a civilian, legal entity at the same levels and patterns of income and expenditure as members of the host community?
- 2) **Political.** Is the reintegrated individual able to function as an active (being elected, becoming a political office holder) and passive political entity (able to vote, able to voice an opinion) without any other restrictions than are imposed on the rest of the population?
- 3) **Legal.** Does the reintegrated individual have the same access to justice as any other individual and can he/she expect outcomes that are the same as other members of the community?
- 4) **Social.** Is the reintegrated individual able to construct social networks, affinal (marital) and kin ties in the same way as other members of the community?
- 5) **Security.** Does the reintegrated individual enjoy the same level of security as all other members of the community?

Critically, each of these questions is *measurable* and, to the degree that there is no discernible difference between returnees and stayees, the reintegration has succeeded. At the communal or collective level, the **less able a survey is to distinguish between returnee and stayee populations using the criteria above, the more reintegration has been a success.**

This definition of reintegration establishes the nature of reintegration *programs* and provides them with their objectives. As a basic rule, programs, which have a clearly defined objective that supports one or more of the target areas for reintegration within a defined time-frame are reintegration programs. Thus programs need to be analyzed in terms of what their actual 'products' are, rather than their claims to support reintegration.

Key Issues

- 1) Reintegration requires a careful analysis of locally valid, measurable targets in the following areas: economic, social, political, legal, security.
- 2) Reintegration programs need to support those targets, ideally, as many targets as possible.

REINTEGRATION METHODS

Methods for reintegration have repeatedly been restated in the relevant literature (see Gleichmann et al., 2004; Ball et al., 2006). Critically, reintegration blends with two other clusters of processes *all of which are dependent on one another*.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Return

At the 'input' end is a stage of return (for civilian IDPs and refugees) and of disarmament and demobilization (for ex-combatants). The civilian and the military processes are similar in that for each individual there must be (a) a decision to engage in the process (including pro-and con-motivations), (b) a procedure (in the military case this has usually been the formal process of Disarmament and Demobilization, in the civilian case this varies from self-initiated and practiced, to assisted relocation). The two elements of this stage must be clearly understood, because they are associated to (c) the expectations the returnee has from the process. Best practice here requires that ***expectations must be realistic, and no promises must be made to returnees that cannot, or will not, be fulfilled.***

Reinsertion

The state of reinsertion is the initial stage in which the returnee (military or civilian) has no local economic resources (income from a job, harvest) and is reliant on others (an agency engaged in reintegration and return, savings, relatives, remittances). Two critical questions need to be asked, and one warning needs to be voiced:

- 1) Is the level of support sufficient to maintain a reasonable lifestyle, providing food, shelter, security, health and education services to returnee and family?

- 2) How long should reinsertion support last? Arbitrary periods have been used or suggested (two weeks, one month, three months). The critical issue here is: what are the sources of potential income? In a purely agricultural economy, the reinsertion period (that is, during which a returnee receives support) should depend on when the first harvest is expected. In a wage economy, the calculation should be based on the period during which the returnee can get a job plus one month (to account for payment in arrears).

The warning derives from the tendency of those in charge of reintegration to put a great deal of effort into the process of reinsertion (presumably because it is easier to handle, and can be measured in programmatic terms: so many kilograms of food provided to so many returnees in so much time). However, in practice *reinsertion is merely the first step*. If it is not followed by a process of reintegration, many of the returnees, notably ex-combatants, may well return to living by the gun.

Reintegration

The reintegration phase proper is the period during which the individual has not yet achieved parity with other residents of the community in the areas of economics, politics, legal, society and security. Insofar as a returnee is progressing in these areas in a positive way, reintegration can be said to be taking place. Since each of the elements of this process proceeds at a different pace, and since these are complex social processes, the reintegration phase may be extremely lengthy, its length is difficult to predict and the completion of reintegration is a variable that depends on how 'parity' is defined and tested.

There is an extremely close link between reintegration and development. The single most crucial element in reintegration is economic: the foundation upon which other elements depend. In purely economic terms, an economy cannot absorb newcomers (immigrants, or, in this case, returnees) unless it is expanding. It is thus absolutely crucial *to couple the process of reintegration with the development* of new sources of economic well-being, better security and justice, and political and social participation.

Development

From the return and reintegration perspective, development means the provision of new job and business opportunities, and new services at the very minimum. Thus while development is *not* an acknowledged reintegration goal, it is crucial to it. Reintegration bridges the gap between a post-conflict situation and a developed society. Reintegration is thus also *dependent* upon development. From a program sense, therefore, programs that provide development are *also* reintegration programs, if only at a first remove: where they operate, they create extra jobs/opportunities/services which are crucial for reintegration as well. Significantly, development can be measured

empirically (see UNDPI, 2007), and development agencies can test their achievements against these measures.

PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

The requirements of reintegration-related (including reinsertion, reintegration, and development) programs are contingent on the analysis in the section above.

- **Measuring** a program's **output**, **evaluating** its **performance**, and **measuring** its impact **in relation to the MDGs** (or other empirical measures) **are closely related but must be kept operatively separate**.
- Many reintegration manuals (e.g. Gleichman et al, 2004; UNHCR, 2004) pay little more than lip service to the idea that the **impact of a program is crucial** and **rather focus on outputs**: useful for impressing donors, valuable as an evaluative tool, and **critically important, but insufficient**.
- Every **program must be evaluated**, that is, the efficiency (internal operations) and efficacy (external outputs) must be scrutinized.
- The **impact** can be **measured in relation to the influence** the program has had **on the reintegration measures** described above.

Key Issues

- 1) Reintegration is measurable by comparing the situation of returnees to stayees in five crucial areas: economics, politics, legal, social, and security.
- 2) Reintegration programs are means to accomplish that parity.
- 3) Measuring a program's impact requires that the five measurable areas outlined above which constitute reintegration are identifiably influenced by the program's activities.
- 4) Reintegration is a *process* served by *programs*. Its timing is between DD/return and an acceptable, empirically defined level of service provision. Thus the time for reintegration is *contingent*.
- 5) Reintegration *programs* are not the reintegration process: they serve it. Thus the timing of a good program is contingent upon achieving a given impact, not an arbitrary time limit.

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

This Chapter is arranged in the form of a benefits table. We have tried here to make suggestions as to how certain key issues, concentrated from the key issues in each chapter, could be dealt with. The table is divided into five columns. Similar key issues from different chapters may be merged, and we have reworded them all to fit into the table. Suggestions are based on our distillation of best practice and informed knowledge from similar cases in Sudan and elsewhere. The costs of action are our estimates of the amount of effort (sometimes in monetary terms, more often in terms of time, personnel, or whatever measure seems valid). 'Potential results of action' represents what we think will happen. 'Potential results of inaction' represents what we think could happen if the remediation effort is not undertaken.

Table 11: Main Recommendations

	Key issue	Suggestions for action for AAH-I/IPCS	Costs	Potential results of action	Potential results of inaction
1.	None of the actors involved in RR seem to be clear on the objectives to be achieved, or on the means to achieve them.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Define the objectives of activity empirically. 2. General agreement on objectives with other NGOs/GOs. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Working time. 2. Getting multiple actors to agree. <p>(Note: May require coordination meeting.)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Overall steering mechanism. 2. Empirical evaluation criteria. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continued confusion. 2. Difficulties to coordinate activities. 3. Increasing difficulties in approaching donors. 4. No exit strategy.
2.	Planning and implementation of reintegration must be constantly monitored using empirical indicators.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create a monitoring system in areas worked in. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishing and maintaining a monitoring mechanism. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. More focused efforts. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Difficulties convincing donors of impact. 2. Likelihood of program drift.
3.	Reintegration requires a careful analysis of locally valid, measurable objectives in the following areas: economic, social, political, legal, security .	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish locally valid empirical measures using data from this report and other sources. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Working time. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Service providers will be able to focus their efforts separately but within an overarching framework. 2. Communities will be able to provide data and to understand benefits and provide feedback in detail. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lack of focus in providing services.

4.	Reintegration is measurable by comparing the situation of returnees to stayees in these five crucial areas: economic, social, political, legal, security .	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop empirical locally valid measures. 2. Establish a regular (every three months?) system of measuring in each criterion. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Working time. 2. Field time. 3. Travel costs to and within the field. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Differentiation between returnees and stayees in the five areas will provide a clear lens into what problems most confound each group. This will provide the basis for effective policy interventions. 2. Clear indication of program goals achieved. 3. More effective policy interventions. 4. Better information for donors. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Absence of empirical standards will waste funds, time and effort. 2. Communities and individuals may respond negatively to absence of clarity.
5.	Measuring a program's impact requires that the five measurable areas outlined above which constitute reintegration are identifiably influenced by the program's activities.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Program objectives must be designed to empirically fit into these measurable areas. 2. Timing of programs should be sequenced. 3. Timing of programs should be contingent on a given impact, not an arbitrary impact. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Clear empirical objectives will have to be stated for all current and future programs. 2. Programs will require regular monitoring. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Partners will be able to specialize in complimentary programs. 2. There will be defined exit strategies for specific programs. 3. New programs can build on previous successes. 4. Counties that have not received support or services will be clearly identified. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. There will be no way to tell whether a program has had any impact. 2. New programs will be unable to build on previous successes. 3. Duplication of effort between different service deliverers will be inevitable.

6.	<p>The process of reintegration is <i>strongly dependent on development</i>. (If faced with a choice, development of roads and critical services should take precedence. Reintegration is a function of development.)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IPCS/AAH-I should orient all their activities away from aid and towards development, and encourage other partners to do the same. 2. AAH-I and IPCS should lobby the government and assist in lobbying major donors to develop road networks. 3. AAH-I and IPCS should also provide advice to local government on development priorities. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Greater political efforts required of AAH/IPCS at the national and international levels. 2. Desirable: a detailed analysis of economic potential at the micro- and macro-levels in South Sudan. 3. Cost of shifting programs away from aid and towards development (administrative, financial, restructuring, staff, etc.) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Results of action are expected to be creation of more jobs, improvement in agricultural production and motivation. 2. Better long term reintegration. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Difficulties in creating appropriate conditions for reintegration. 2. Absence of security. 3. Higher prices. 4. Food supply problems.
7.	<p>Uneven mix of relief and development.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Find partners and build networks for development. 2. Regular briefings on each others' efforts can help to identify neglected areas and communities. 3. Create awareness on the difference between aid and development and agree with partners and donors on the need for a shift toward development. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political costs. 2. Heavy investment in lobbying and in convincing partners heavily involved in aid to shift their objectives toward development. 3. Capacity-building for local ownership. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Areas where effective development activities can be targeted will further emerge. 2. Increased local capacity and ownership in key areas such as agriculture, water, sanitation, livestock and small enterprise. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cultures of dependency will continue in key development sectors. This will invariably lead to a lack of economic activity, inter-sectoral stagnancy and little to no improvement in the lives of everyday citizens.

8.	NGO efforts are dispersed and not focused.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hold community, county, regional and countrywide NGO forums. 2. Specific activities, action plans and recommendations should be programmed at each level for analysis at the next highest level. This multi-tiered approach gives the NGO community a comprehensive action program which covers those sectors that are in need of most attention. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Holding and organizing meetings, including the costs of bringing stakeholders together. 2. Developing an action plan. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A clear and comprehensive map of NGO activities at every level will emerge. 2. Development sectors that are in need of more enhanced efforts will emerge. 3. Sectors that have been overlooked will also emerge. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NGO activities will remain parochial at best. 2. Certain development sectors will continue to suffer from poor management and lack of a clear vision. This will adversely affect vital areas of society that need attention where it has not been received.
9.	A culture of dependency hinders self-help .	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Include capacity-building measures in AAH-I programs, aiming at handing over the project to the communities. 2. Develop realistic and measurable goals that target independent and creative ownership of governance and economic activities. 3. Establish a popular movement or program focusing on self help. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Developing a universal set of principles for community ownership of programs. 2. Engaging in a long-term broad based campaign to publicize the benefits of self reliance over dependency. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enable the people of South Sudan to take responsibility for their future. 2. Increase effectiveness of donor driven programs by addition of a self help and ownership component. 3. Greater autonomy for Southern Sudanese. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Continued underdevelopment. 2. No long term impact of donor or NGO efforts. 3. Continued dependency. 4. Likelihood of donor fatigue. 5. Loss of skills, progress and benefits due to the eventual pull-out of international NGOs and aid agencies.

10.	Changing perceptions about the returnees is going to be a critical feature in success or failure.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create fora for communication and meetings between returnees and stayees. (This should include community meetings, NGO forums, bulletin boards, easy to understand government/civil society publications and survey data.) 2. Establishing regular fora for community to express and deal with mutual grievances. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regular community visits. 2. Translation of documents into local languages. 3. Greater investment in document translation and in use of IPCS sign-boards and IEC groups. 4. Common forum for returnees and stayees. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Greater community cohesion. 2. Easier and quicker reintegration. 3. Lessening of intra-community tensions. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Potential nonviolent/violent conflicts could erupt as a result of real or perceived grievances by returnees and stayees. 2. Important knowledge that could be shared regarding educational economic and technical issues will be lost.
11.	Ex-combatants are slightly feared and suspect.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop a comprehensive county specific program that brings ex-combatants and non-combatants together. (Joint technical training programs, sporting events, media fora, etc.) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Program costs. 2. Costs of developing meetings and other events. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lessening of tensions between ex-combatants and host communities. 2. Greater awareness of issues and concerns of both sides. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ex-combatants will become alienated from the population. 2. Potential for increased violence by dissatisfied ex-combatants. 3. No social cohesion.

12.	Security Sector Reform (SSR) is needed to ensure security and a feeling of security for returnees and stayees.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political lobbying to ensure SSR. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Heavy political involvement. 2. Possible exposure to GOSS anger and restricted access to information. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased security for residents. 2. More efficient access to and delivery of security services. 3. Increased resolution of conflicts non-violently. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No change in current security trajectory. 2. Continuing impunity. 3. Continuing corruption in the security services. 4. Lack of public trust in security providers.
13.	It seems difficult to disaggregate the problems of special groups from the general problems of the population.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create awareness within all AAH/IPCS programs of the specific needs of special groups. 2. Coordinate with specialist NGOs to supplement AAH/IPCS programs with activities for special groups. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Develop internal awareness training on special group problems for NGO/CSO staff. 2. Lobbying and coordinating with agencies that provide services for special groups. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Special groups will be integrated within all AAH/IPCS programs. 2. AAH/IPCS will be able to refer special groups programs encountered to its specialist partners. <p>(Note: It is likely that as South Sudan becomes more developed, the problems of special groups will acquire more specificity at which time this policy should be addressed again)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The needs of special groups will remain unrecognized. 2. Care for those who have real problems will continue to be ignored.

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APPENDIX

METHOD AND RESEARCH PROCESS

The methods used to elicit data that would be useful for the study objectives was chosen after great deliberation. A number of non-methodological, yet pertinent issues needed to be considered carefully. The data in this report derives therefore from a number of sources.

- 6) A survey questionnaire directed at individuals in South Sudan;
- 7) A survey of GOs and NGOs in the area;
- 8) Intermittent participant observation over a period of almost four years;
- 9) Published and unpublished literature.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Short time: Due to contractual requirements, field time was limited to two weeks, which included training local surveyors.

General illiteracy: Most of the surveyed population was expected to be illiterate, and thus forms would need to be filled in by the surveyors.

Suspicion and hostility: We were made aware that many potential respondents were likely to be actively hostile towards surveyors for various reasons (though the majority were expected to be supportive).

Difficult physical conditions and travel: Travel in South Sudan is extremely difficult. Thus we limited expectations and consequent coverage.

Developing the Method

Once factored in, the method adopted consisted of a fine medium between desirable and doable. The process of developing a survey toolkit was therefore split into two. Three forms were developed by BICC staff at their offices. These consisted of a detailed questionnaire to be applied to individuals; major interview points to be asked of stakeholders; and a format for focus group discussion, should that form be a useful or needed activity.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was developed initially at BICC. The questions were intended to address a range of issues, including observable and issues relating to feelings and emotional content. The choice of questions and their format was based partly on long-time experience in Sudan, and partly on adapting published questionnaires.

The questionnaire and the questions were validated during a week-long training session in South Sudan. Trainee surveyors were asked to discuss each question in class for its potential effects, benefits, and difficulties. Many questions were

eliminated. A few were added, and other modified extensively. The process required additional work by BICC staff in the evenings, as we modified and formatted questions 'on the fly.'

Stakeholder Interview

The stakeholder interview schedule was designed initially at BICC. We assumed that most questions should be open-ended, to allow for expanded responses by organizational personnel. The interview schedule was heavily modified and questions validated during a one day meeting of stakeholders, who provided input into the format and content.

Participant observation

BICC personnel intermittently carried this out over a period of four years. Throughout this period, a number of BICC personnel have been involved in training and research at various social levels within South Sudan. These notes and insights contributed measurably to the report. In addition, the survey principles (M. Ashkenazi and P. Rush) carried out non-systematic observations during the study process. E. Isikozlu and L. Stone who were engaged in S. Sudan on a different project provided additional information.

Literature

Before and subsequent to the field trip, a team of BICC staff surveyed the most pertinent literature, which has been woven into the recommendations and process of the study.

Process of Research

The research took place in three phases:

Phase 1: Preliminary preparations

Preliminary preparations took place at BICC. It consisted of two elements. The first was a survey of best-practices on Reintegration and Return, in which such processes worldwide were reviewed, and useful lessons, applicable to South Sudan were extracted. In parallel, a questionnaire schedule for fieldwork in Sudan was drawn up. This consisted of reviewing similar research efforts in the region, and creating a series of six structured interviews, a format for interviewing key stakeholders, and a format for focus groups.

Phase 2: Field activities

The BICC research team of two individuals arrived in South Sudan on 22 February. The first week's activities consisted of training 30 local Sudanese in interview and survey techniques. One day of that week was dedicated to discussing the activities with key stakeholders. Parts of both the course and the seminar day were dedicated to going over the relevant questionnaires and checking their validity with locals.

Stakeholders' meeting. This one-day meeting, to be arranged and administered by the contracting agency, and moderated and facilitated by the consultancy will bring together key stakeholders involved in the DD&RR process in the study area. Objectives of this meeting will be:

- To introduce the stakeholders to the study, its objectives, and its expected benefits;
- Enlist stakeholder support to provide data for the study;
- Familiarize the stakeholders with the study instruments, notably research instrument (b.) above.

Training field collectors: The consultancy will conduct a four-day, interactive, concentrated training session on data collection for AAH-I/IPCS field personnel (and possibly others) **who will return to their field sites and collect data for the study.** The outcome of the training will be:

- A cadre of personnel able to monitor and develop programs in line with the study report;
- A cadre of personnel who will provide data for the report to an agreed-upon standard;
- An improvement in the depth and width of the data-collecting process.

Following the training workshop and stakeholder's meeting, teams of interviewers were dispersed to four counties of South Sudan: Maridi and Mundri counties in Western Equatoria, and Yei and Western Juba counties in Central Equatoria. The teams of around six enumerators each, collected some 520 questionnaires from individuals in both urbanized and rural surroundings. In addition, numerous local service providers, both NGO and GO were interviewed.

Phase 3: Analysis and writing

Subsequently, the BICC team returned to office, and started a process of coding the questionnaires, analyzing the results, and writing the report presented here.