China’s Media and Public Diplomacy: illustrations from South Africa

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1. Introduction

China’s presence in Africa is the outcome of an ever-evolving engagement, culminated from its own developing foreign policy as well as a response to the dynamics at play internationally and on the continent. One particular overarching interest, especially since the late 2000’s, is China’s explicit interest in public diplomacy (that is influencing public attitudes on foreign policy decisions) when engaging strategic regions of the world. There currently exists a range of public diplomacy instruments that have been utilised to shape China’s image in Africa. Noting there is a wide gap in perceptions when contrasted with the rapidly increasing economic relations and regular contact between policymakers. Such instruments include the establishment of Confucius Institutes abroad, scholarships, and academic and think-tank exchanges. The China economic growth and development narrative also adds to a favourable image amongst African leaders, who are facing their own development crossroads. All such aspects provide a picture of China’s point view and approach towards the world.

A recent feature of this public diplomacy is China’s media engagement in Africa, necessitated by the information age and the need for active communication; as well as the realisation that the China narrative was being told through the lens of third party voices and would thus not take responsibility in portraying the real China.

At the same time, it is the continental and national dynamics themselves that are concurrently unfolding along with China’s outreach and that will affect how its engagements are translated and received.

This paper will provide a background into China’s developing public diplomacy through its media engagement in Africa. Moreover it will start to raise thinking points on the complexities of translating overarching strategies into context specific situations, in this case South Africa, which raises broader possible factors that affect linear impact. They include:
a) The bilateral relationship and the landscape that China is operating within.
b) The type of engagement the South African context warrants; and
c) The complex formation of South African perceptions on China.

In this way it is demonstrated how seeking to influence target audiences is a haphazard process that is determined by a range of engagements and that along the macro foreign engagement (in this case China media in Africa) is the parallel impact of domestic-driven circumstances.

2. China's media engagement in Africa: from infrastructure to public diplomacy

_Media engagement_

Communication and outreach abroad is as much about establishing links as well as a communication of a country’s own intentions and internal circumstances. This is true for China’s early media engagement in Africa. In the 1950’s-70’s media ties supported China’s ambition to establish diplomatic relations with newly independent African states and ideological support was sought from Africa under the context of the Cold War, while in the 1980’s and 1990’s China sought to repair its international image, reinforce its formal political ties and engage important regions in the world as it opened to the world.4

Moreover as relations evolved, so has the nature of China’s media engagement on the continent to include an increasingly multifaceted approach. The progression of China media engagement on the continent can be witnessed along the formalized platform of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).5 Between the official launch of the forum in 2000 and the second in 2006, there was a wide range of media engagements that focused predominantly on media infrastructure (for example in 2000, Xinhua provided satellite equipment for a television station in Uganda; in 2004 China assisted Gabon in building its national broadcast station).6

By the 2006 FOCAC Beijing Summit, the China-Africa relationship significantly expanded as high-level exchanges included Africa tours by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Premier and President. 7 Beijing also published the _China's African Policy_
document on China’s role in Africa, where media co-operation was explicitly outlined:

*China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchanges and cooperation between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.*

As a result, China’s media engagement incorporated a range of exchanges with African journalists such as the Sino-African Cooperation Forum (SACF) in 2006 and the training course for French speaking African journalists at China Media University in 2007. This included the emphasis of journalism approaches and media philosophies, apart from infrastructural support.

Three years later at the 2009 FOCAC Summit held in Sharm el Sheikh (Egypt), both previously mentioned media engagements were formalized by the pledge to involve Chinese communication enterprises in building African communication infrastructure; as well as reinforcing exchanges between officials and media workers. An example was the exchange between South African and Chinese journalists, where the latter group visited the South African National Editor’s Forum (SANEF) in 2008; and the following year, the South African’s (along with other African senior writers) visited China in 2009.

By 2012, media relations reaffirmed the high importance of people-to-people contact on the agenda. For instance during FOCAC V (2012), Beijing proposed a ‘China-Africa Press Exchange Centre’ in recognition that few journalists based in China are of African origin. The hope was to establish a centre where African journalists can stay, observe and report on China. Similarly during the 2013 seminar on China-Africa Media Cooperation in Kenya, the Chinese ambassador reiterated a warm welcome to African media setting up offices in China.

*Increased interest in content provision and foreign public engagement*

Parallel to the formalised China-Africa media links, is China’s interest in public diplomacy (that is influencing public attitudes on foreign policy decisions). For Joseph Nye successful public diplomacy is synonymous with soft power, the ability to obtain outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. Both recognise the
successful influence of publics begin with the communication of values, culture and ideology.\textsuperscript{15} China’s interest in institutionalising soft influence through media has been necessitated by response to national and global developments.

On a national level, the experience of the 2008 Beijing Olympics precipitated the need to consolidate diverging domestic and global perspectives on China. China sought to use its hosting of the Olympics – and the worldwide attention – to portray its positive rise.\textsuperscript{16} Yet concurrently, and much to Beijing’s surprise, foreign activists used the maximized media attention on China to criticize its links with Sudan and its passive stance on the Darfur crisis since it had begun in 2004.\textsuperscript{17} Media headlines also pointed to China’s internal ethnic tensions at the time.\textsuperscript{18}

More specifically is the concern over prevailing ‘China in Africa’ narratives told by third party newsmakers characterising China’s engagement as “grabbing land, extracting resources and neo-colonialism [force] in Africa”.\textsuperscript{19} Thereby necessitating the need to address possible cultural differences and miscommunication points.

While the importance of mind over force has historically featured in Chinese political culture\textsuperscript{20}, it is the global information age that has altered the conditions of influence. Power is increasingly intangible and the role of media (and communication technologies) in public diplomacy is increasingly acute.\textsuperscript{21} A simple broadcast can reach across geographical barriers, into the most intimate physical spaces of the audience. Media are not only easing the job of public diplomacy, they have also become globally recognised as influential institutions as well. Moreover if information is power, than the world’s population is increasingly accessing that power.\textsuperscript{22}

It is against this backdrop that China sent its state media players abroad in 2009 to provide its own narrative of China and the world.\textsuperscript{23} By 2011 it was stated that Chinese media that targeted overseas audiences would receive more investments (over the next decade), in order to ‘present a true picture of China to the World’.\textsuperscript{24} The heightened interest in providing China’s view via content and programming, as well as the establishment of local bureaus, was extended to the African continent. 2012 was the point at which China’s media presence in Africa became was most visible. For example, in January 2012, CCTV Africa’s broadcast centre was launched in Kenya (a base where other international news players are present) with the intent to provide African news and perspectives.\textsuperscript{25} As noted by CCTV’s president, Mr Liang
Xia Tao, the purpose in Nairobi is to expand ‘English and Chinese broadcasts with footage from the continent to China, Africa and the rest of the world’. The centre also complements networks in other central locations in London, Washington DC, and Moscow that together add to a wider China narrative in the world. Moreover in December 2012, the China Daily Africa edition was launched; a weekly paper that publishes on China-Africa ties (with a different theme each edition) with contributions from Chinese, African and international commentators. By hiring and including views of local journalists and personalities as well as international commentary, these media players are adopting subtle strategies commonly practised by global media players. Such drives express China’s interest in competing as a global news player. In fact during October 2013, CCTV hosted a forum with its partners to discuss promoting its brand and competitiveness in the world. There also appears to be recognition of global communication trends and the imperative of ‘communicating with’ versus ‘broadcasting to’, for example CCTV Africa established its own Twitter account (@cctvnewsAfrica).

3. From the Global to the Local Level: the South African case

What the China media drive in Africa reveals is the interest in utilising media instruments as strategic communication tools. By including a public diplomacy element within the realms of the global news media market is also naturally, the blurred boundary between what constitutes government and commercial imperatives – both seeking audience attention.

Of course public communication for the interest of foreign policy is not unique to China. For instance, the international news media’s inaccurate reports on France’s policy initiatives prompted the French government to start its own 24-hour news service. In December 2006, France24 was launched to convey French values and perspectives in French, English and Arabic. Other governments have also made inroads in the global news market: Iran’s international English news channel, Russia Today (RT), Euronews (a consortium of public service broadcasters) and government-funded media channels such as Televisoradel Surin Venezuela. Last but not least is the Qatar-based Al Jazeera, a symbol of the Middle East’s rise and a leading contender to major news services. In contrast to the financial difficulties
that traditional news players have faced since the 2008 economic crisis and in turn curbing their activities.\textsuperscript{31} These developments are becoming so prevalent that in 2010 Hillary Clinton remarked, the new diplomatic battlefront is the progressively ‘crowded field of state-financed satellite television news’, in recognition that much of the US media drive was dominated by commercial imperative.\textsuperscript{32} Resonating the fact that global politics is also largely based on a contest over credibility. \textsuperscript{33} Indeed the emerging trend of government interest in reaching out to publics raises important questions. ‘Soft’ influence is traditionally perceived as reliant on the inherent attractiveness of people and culture. Indeed the increased emerging country government motivation and capital can bring dispersed publics closer; yet they can only act as catalysts.\textsuperscript{34} Rather there are parallel trends and intervening factors that affect how communication is translated at a country-specific level. Therefore by exploring the South African case, it becomes apparent that China’s media and overall engagement is more nuanced than monolithic.

\textit{a. Context: The China-South Africa Relationship}

China-South Africa relations have progressively deepened since the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1998 and have operated as a comprehensive strategic partnership since 2010. The relationship is considered unique when considering the range that it includes, like willingness to cooperate at a continental level (i.e. socio-economic development and peace and security issues) and coordination of positions on multilateral platforms (specifically the UN Security Council, FOCAC, BRICS, G20 and generally pushing for a more favourable international political and economic environment).\textsuperscript{35} South Africa currently (2012-2018) sits as the African co-chair on the FOCAC and will host the upcoming sixth FOCAC ministerial (some speculate the possibility of a summit) around mid-2015.\textsuperscript{36} More importantly for the purposes of this paper, is the bilateral links. Trade has steadily risen to a point where China has consecutively remained South Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009.\textsuperscript{37} While there have also been concerns over the trade imbalance between South Africa and its primary trade partners (such as China), South Africa is also one of China’s main FDI recipients. This suggests that China’s investments do not only target resource driven African economies but
diversified economies as well.\textsuperscript{38} At the same time South African firms enjoy a degree of success in China and are a regional force to reckon with, playing in direct competition with Chinese investments on the continent.\textsuperscript{39} Apart from the burgeoning diplomatic and economic links is the less uniform interaction at the public level (what Park and Alden describe as the ‘downstairs’ element).\textsuperscript{40} In fact South Africa is home to the largest (as well as mixed) population of Chinese migration on the continent and strong labour unions and vocal civil society that have been critical towards government action and the impact of the relationship.\textsuperscript{41} Still it appears both governments are realising the need to increase the interaction and understanding between their people.

A large part of the direction of this relationship (and influence on China’s approach) is the very fact that South Africa is characterised as a ‘mature’ market with relatively strong institutional frameworks. What this suggests is that China’s media engagements and wider public diplomacy interests could also be affected by such a complex landscape; and in turn to be successful, its approach has to be far less monolithic and more nuanced.

\textit{b. Unravelling a complex media engagement}

China’s media presence in South Africa appears to serve multiple purposes ranging from public diplomacy instruments (as noted previously); companies that provide products and services as well as entities seeking investments.
Table illustrating recent (2013-2014) examples of China Media engagements in the South African

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Engagement</th>
<th>Chinese media Entity</th>
<th>Summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment</strong></td>
<td>StarTimes</td>
<td>The struggling South African pay-tv operator (owned by the local On Digital Media), TopTV, underwent a business rescue plan due to financial difficulties. As a result the Chinese broadcaster StarTimes acquired a 20% stake (the maximum percentage permissible under South African broadcasting laws) in TopTV, now rebranded as Starsat. The transaction provides the Chinese company a foothold into one of Africa’s most sophisticated pay-tv markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
<td>China Daily</td>
<td>The drive to provide content on the China-Africa relationship and perspectives is extended to the South African public on 28 June 2013. China Daily Africa edition is believed to use the same distribution networks as the Financial Times (who announced they will stop their local print-run in South Africa). It will print about 5000 copies for the South African market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment</strong></td>
<td>Unknown Chinese consortium</td>
<td>The Sekunjalo Consortium purchased Independent News and Media (the largest owner of South Africa’s English-language newspapers) - from Irish majority shareholding. It is said a Chinese Consortium has part funded the purchase. Moreover there is possibility of a further investment of 20% by the Chinese Consortium to ensure there is enough capital to reinvigorate existing newspaper titles, for a digital strategy and an African growth strategy. There was speculation of ownership by CCTV, CADFUND and/or China Development Bank – but still no official announcement has been made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Products/Services and Technology</strong></td>
<td>Huawei</td>
<td>Huawei launches its Africa-only smartphone and its flagship smartphone the P6 to compete with Samsung and Apple. The company also started providing services to mobile customers by launching its first call centre in South Africa, signalling its focus on local customers. The company also operates as a commercial partner, collaborating with mobile and fixed-line operators as well as establishing South Africa’s first telecoms Research and Development centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Products/Services</strong></td>
<td>Tencent</td>
<td>Tencent China’s largest Internet company (with the support of its 35% stakeholder and South African grown, Naspers) launches WeChat in South Africa. WeChat, described as a mobile social communications application and not a social network; and was launched with TV commercials featuring international football star Lionel Messi and advertised over radio advertisements and through competitions on radio stations.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The general presence of China’s media houses responsible for public diplomacy is not as prevalent to the South African public eye as one might think. In reality the CCTV channels (CCTV-4 the Chinese language channel and CCTV News, where CCTV Africa is broadcasted) are accessible through subscription to the Digital Satellite Television service (DSTV), South Africa’s primary Satellite TV service provider.\textsuperscript{47} However due to the cost of subscriptions (for example DSTV’s Premium service of 130 channels costs about $64 a month) it means that the main viewers are from upper-income households and even then, access does not equate to viewership of all the channels.\textsuperscript{48} Meanwhile China Daily’s Africa edition launched its print and distribution operations in Johannesburg during mid-2013, contributing 5300 of the 20,000 Africa edition’s weekly copies distributed in total.\textsuperscript{49} Still to date distribution has yet to be widely accessible, noting the dissemination of the weekly is targeted towards embassies, think tanks, universities, financial institutions and international organisations\textsuperscript{50}

Such media players are likely aware of their limited presence in South Africa, as they have actively opted to establish their bases in other strategic locations like Kenya, where other global media players’ and institutions’ head offices are located.\textsuperscript{51} For instance CCTV Africa’s broadcast centre was set-up in Nairobi, Kenya in early 2012 and China Daily’s Africa edition launched in Kenya as well in November 2012. Instead Chinese media in South Africa appear to be represented through bureaus that feed into larger programing (i.e. CCTV Africa receives content from its bureau in South Africa) rather than run their own dedicated programming.\textsuperscript{52} Moreover there are differences between Chinese media that operate for English speaking and global audiences (like China Daily or CCTV News channel); the Chinese media representatives (like People’s Daily or Xinhua) who are present in South Africa to report back to audiences in China or the newspapers that serve the local Chinese community (like Africa Times). It is also unknown whether such Chinese media players actually interact or share similar objectives. Thus success of a media player is also relative to the role their employees perceive they are playing.

Another factor that affects China driven content in South Africa is the fact that the media market is already established and highly challenging for new entrants. There are four main media groups that already dominate the local media industry - they are\textsuperscript{53}. 
• Nasionale Pers – widely known as Naspers;
• Independent News and Media (previously owned by the Irish Independent Group and sold to the local Sekunjalo Consortium);
• Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers; and lastly
• Avusa/Times Media Group.

As a result, it is a very difficult market to penetrate. There have been attempts to challenge the concentration in media ownership, such as the Nigerian owned daily newspaper, *This Day*, that tried to target South African businessmen and policymakers; but the paper lasted a year before closing.\(^5^4\) Above ownership concentration is the general challenge in entering the South African market that has relatively established institutional structures and laws that are strict towards foreign investment in the media sector.\(^5^5\) The South African media market can also be described as a relatively liberal news market,\(^5^6\) necessitating commercial versus official engagement in order to gain audience attention. Already the DSTV platform (also available to subscribers across sub-Saharan Africa) is home to a range of competing news channels including CCTV, BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera and South African outlets (like eNews Africa Channel/ENCA and SABC News24). Moreover these channels are increasingly including programming that deals with the African point of view.\(^5^7\) Thus the African perspective is no longer lacking its own voice, it is *whose* narrative that becomes the narrative of choice that matters.

Such a market seems to be favourable towards setting trends (i.e. CNN is notable for starting the 24-hour news trend and Al Jazeera for incorporating citizen reporting via social media), than reacting to negative publicity. However it is the rapid uptake of communications technology and thus a levelling playing field between users and agenda setters that requires not only ‘broadcasting to’ audiences, but also ‘speaking with’ audiences. In South Africa newspaper sales are decreasing but other platforms have increased audiences over time, particularly radio and TV channels.\(^5^8\) While Internet and communication technologies usage remains at its developing phases in South Africa, the increasing low cost of communication technology could translate to future potential.\(^5^9\) This was reflected by the *Financial Times*’ business decision to stop printing its newspaper in South Africa and opting for a model driven by new technology; recognising the short term cost effectiveness of doing so and foreseeing
the eventual migration of consumers to digital forms. This means Chinese media engagements will need to include their voices across different media platforms in order to shape the narrative on China-Africa.

Overall China is engaging in a complex South Africa, whose content providers are diversified but the number of players is not.

A caveat for public diplomacy should be raised here. It is unclear whether publics of a targeted country necessarily distinguish between a state’s intended communication and their interaction with other entities (but not necessarily related to) that state. Public diplomacy is not only derived from orchestrated drives (i.e. state media) – nor is it merely propaganda - but is also informed by the un-orchestrated (private and non-government) engagements. Moreover it is possible that state interests also interlink with commercial drives and vice versa. In other words, the process of informing perceptions is not the result of a singular engagement but rather a culmination of a set of engagements.

For Joshua Kurlantzick, China and emerging players have indeed articulated a broader idea of soft power because their attractiveness further includes investment, development aid and business. In particular nations who desire China’s aid, trade, and recognition, are also relatively susceptible to its influence. In addition a study by Jura and Kaluzynska found that the image of China as a potential investor was an attractive feature.

If 2012 was the year of launching a concerted effort to get China’s point of view across to Africans, it seems 2013 (as reflected in the above table) is the year of media investments and targeting South Africa as a destination of consumers. For example, Chinese players have attempted to counter the challenging South African media landscape by:

- Entering into joint ventures (such as the social media app, WeChat, driven by Naspers but owned by China’s Tencent);
- by acquiring stakes in South African companies (such as the Star Times’ stake in TopTV/Starsat; and the Sekunjalo Consortium purchase of Independent News and Media - the latter being more controversial); and
- engage South African as consumers/partners (i.e. Huawei selling of mobile handsets and assisting on telecommunications infrastructure).
A general approach for China entering the competitive South African market, is to partner with local entities as is the case in the media market where partnerships exist with two of the main media players (i.e. Naspers and Sekunjalo/Indepent News and Media). Overall it appears China tends to take a commercial route in its media engagement in South Africa.

It would be overly general to believe media acquisitions and services share the same objectives as China’s public diplomacy drive through media. Still commercial media drives contribute to public experiences and engagement with national brands and thus echo Kurlantzick’s view that economy can play as soft influence. Subtle commercial engagements are successful in that they appear independent from government drives, which have clear national interest concerns.

The commercial and subtle public diplomacy drives are fluid and can both help achieve specific objectives by creating favourable environments. They could also counteract each other. Favourable views towards China due to its commercial edge in general, are still a developing space. To place into perspective, trade still dominates China’s economic engagement in South Africa, while actual investment remains modest. China is indeed investing in such a diversified economy; still its actual investments remain undiversified. Perhaps the recent investment announcements that includes media and property (such as Zendai Property Group) signal for more things to come. The specific case of StarTimes’ rescuing South Africa’s TopTV (DSTV’s only competitor) is an example of an attempt to attract middle-income South Africans and the possible provision of more Chinese programming.

While the scope of the paper does not allow for deeper analysis of China’s telecommunications engagement on the continent, such engagements have potential in providing subtle communication of China’s intentions and image. The very fact that China is willing to transfer technology and assist in building the continents media and communication access, plays interesting contrast to allegations that China is opposed to African media freedom (by providing technology that restricts media access).

The exploration of China’s media engagements in South Africa reveal that China’s communication interests span beyond public diplomacy, yet together these engagements also in effect, communicate something about China.
c. The perceptions factor

While the best journalism and media business model should always win, another factor is the issue of preconceptions and perceptions that affect how China’s initiatives are received. The media are only one part of several contact points that are informing perceptions. When television sets and mobile phones are switched off, physical contact between Chinese and Africans will come into play.

In general there are three main African perspectives on China in Africa; they can be broadly categorised into:

- Friendship and mutual benefit emphasised by government officials.
- The welcoming of new economic opportunities (through Chinese investment and trade).
- Emphasis on the environmental, social and economic impacts of Chinese influence by civil society (including the general public and trade unions).

Perceptions will remain varied and complex as those who view China-Africa relations positively are also likely to experience points of tensions in their relationship with China, and vice versa. There are also determinants such as background, demographic, place in society and the nature of the issue. These nuances begin to establish not just what individuals think but also why they think the way they do.

In the case of South Africa, it appears that South African public understanding of the complexities of China are still limited, perceptions appear largely driven by emotive and selective (i.e. economic) issues.

A window into some local perceptions was revealed during March 2014 when the South Africa and China education ministries signed an implementation plan following a collaboration agreement signed during President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Africa the previous year. The agreement, at a policy and institutional level, aimed for collaboration in areas like science and technology and mathematics. Moreover it included the introduction of the Chinese language in selected South African schools, extending access beyond the Confucius Institutes (that are generally aimed at university level). Following this announcement was a public discussion on a South African commercial talk radio station, Power FM. The caller comments raised the concern of prioritising Chinese language over development of local languages (and some concerns about the department of basic education’s general priorities); raised
questions over China’s *real* intentions and even whether the learning of Chinese is reciprocated by China by encouraging the learning of African local languages. At the same time a basic education department representative reiterated that Chinese classes would not be compulsory but optional in selected schools. One South African parent, who called to inform her children went to a local Chinese school, was even asked to comment on China’s strict education system - indicating there are wider concerns of cultural difference beyond language considerations. This case reiterates some disconnect between government-motivated initiatives and public understanding behind these initiatives.

Moreover the close and frequent collaboration between policymakers on both sides – and lack of public communication - means there is risk in public view over China’s position as one that is synonymous with governments. This was evident during the Sekunjalo Independent Media consortium purchase of Independent News and Media. Described as a ‘private and commercial transaction’, there is nevertheless 25% ownership by the ruling African National Congress and 20% by ‘Chinese state instruments’ (with little public knowledge on who these entities are) that have raised alarm and speculation on what the government related ownership means for the independence of local media. Indeed such a purchase of one of the country’s largest media player’s awakened deep emotional sentiments, noting the relatively recent experience of apartheid censorship that has made South Africans extremely sensitive to any infringement of their rights to freedom of expression.

Besides questions over China’s role in such a purchase, are other examples of public criticism specifically directed at the perceived non-transparency of government. This includes the contestation over the Protection of the State Information Bill (first introduced in 2010) that proposed the classification of official documents and thus threatening public rights to access information. Moreover was allegation of government’s close-knit ties with the wealthy Gupta family (who migrated to South Africa from India in 1993). For instance were allegations over government spending on advertising in the Gupta-owned newspaper, the New Age, a paper that is perceived to report favourably on government; and support funding towards the paper’s ‘business breakfast briefings’.

Apart from the perceived close relations at the elite level, are studies that reveal a predominantly economic focus and interest in the China-South Africa relationship.
For instance a 2013 public opinions survey showed that respondent opted China (53%) as the country that should be South Africa’s largest trading partner, ahead of other partners such as the EU or the US. Indeed South African stakeholders are increasing aware of global economic and political dynamics and the need to engage China pragmatically, as both partner and market – suggesting there is a conscious reaching out towards China as there is towards South Africa. This is also apparent when taking note that South Africa’s engagement and presence in China is predominantly of an investment nature – and not specifically of a public diplomacy slant. For instance the South African President, Jacob Zuma’s, first official visit to Beijing (in 2010) was accompanied by over 300 business representatives. The traditional notions of soft influence such as values, culture and people are still lacking in the relationship. Such limited mutual understanding can potentially affect other aspects of relations, like trade, as reflected by Chinese firms who have commented that the perception of their products as inferior quality has been a defining challenge in the South African market. Albeit both governments have started to reach out more actively to respective populations, having launched initiatives like a range of events dubbed the ‘South Africa Year in China’ in April 2014 (only the second country after Russia) and a ‘China Year in South Africa’ in 2015. Yet like the Confucius Institutes set-up in Africa that are still learning to operate in different local environments, these initiatives are also still at a developing phase.

Perhaps another defining factor is time, as noted, more favourable reporting on China and the FOCAC process is a direct result of direct access to sources. Such government drives have been identified as important means of establishing initial links but it is a complex process to catalyse relations beyond policy circles. What remain untapped are spaces where meaning and understanding of the relationship are actively negotiated, such as public driven spaces. There is potential in spaces like the CCTV Africa broadcast hub where Chinese and African reporters’ daily livelihoods are tied to a mutual cause and where they negotiate the work environment on a daily basis. The large but complex Chinese diaspora in South Africa (350 000 as of 2012) also provides opportunity for deeper interaction. It is the physical spaces where relations (based on individuals than a mythical national
entity) and public diplomacy (based on finding common ground or values than mere reactive response) develop beyond pragmatic interest.

4. Conclusion

China has sent its state media on a global drive to advance its influence in the world, signalling an addition to its outward engagements that previously focused on trade, investment and diplomatic activities. In particular, China’s media engagement in Africa provides insight into China’s larger public diplomacy strategy. However, the question remains whether China’s media is making the impact intended. Beijing has only recently adopted its soft influence policies and institutionalised them in the form of global media agencies. As it continues on this path, Beijing will be faced with implications from trends rising globally and on the continent – but more specifically in this paper, are the individual country contexts that drive the direction of China-Africa interface. Such an example highlighted is the case of South Africa.

Illustrations from South Africa reinforce the idea that public diplomacy instruments (like media) - viewed as creating enabling environment for business or political deals - are also impacted by the very engagements they claim to enhance. Beyond public communication as intended engagements, are also messages translated through the unintended avenues. This is because the South African media market is both relatively competitive and established, thus affecting how China is able to engage in such a market (such as requiring a more nuanced-commercial edge).

The local factor also necessitates thinking about the complex role of perceptions that transcends specific engagements and draws on multiple interaction points. China’s public diplomacy is affected by the fact that its engagements are porous and mutually affect one another. Moreover it is important to note that attractiveness is a difficult trait to measure and thus perceived as subjective. Therefore the issue of perceptions prompts deeper thinking about the context that affects soft influence, moving from what publics think to why they think of China in certain ways.

Such a localised standpoint stands in complex contrast to the overarching and seemingly uniform China media engagement at the FOCAC level where less is known about private interests and the local potential to affect public diplomacy engagements. Such complexities reveal the need to translate varied communication
across different landscapes – requiring unique combinations of government drive, practical engagement, creativity from society and the natural course of time.

Lastly, this paper reinforces the idea that China and (each of its individual) Africa relations are not isolated phenomenon but exists in parallel with other trends (or intervening factors). If we were to solely seek the good, we would find it and if we were to seek the bad we would find it too. What needs to be understood further then, is how one unique trend or relationship stands in relation to others.

(Total word count, including endnotes, 8074 words)
ENDNOTES

1 Yu-Shan Wu is a full-time researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). This paper is an updated version (that includes a South African case-study) presented at the panel ‘Upgrading Sino-African relations: dynamics, directions and measures’ at the China-Africa Think Tank Forum in October 2013, Beijing.

2 According to the Edward R. Murrow School of Public Diplomacy: public diplomacy generally “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies”. It looks at aspects of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy. This includes: government cultivating public opinions abroad; interactions between private groups and their interests; communication on foreign affairs and the processes of inter-cultural contact. For more see:
   http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy.


6 See previous footnote.


10 Interview with Hopewell Radebe, former secretary general of the South African National Editor’s Forum (SANEF) who participated in these exchanges, 16 April 2014.


12 Seminar by a representative from the Department of African Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, August 2012.


17 An Example was Mia Farrow’s 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed ‘Genocide Olympics’ criticising China’s profiting from the Darfur crisis (http://www.miafarrow.org/ed_032807.html).


20 The soft power concept is not new to China: Confucianism (551–479 BC) opposed the enforcing of values on others; the founder of Mohism (470–390 BC), Mo Zi was against offensive force, and similarly, mind over force was the foundation of strategist Sun Tzu’s Art of War.


23 Including: China Central Television (CCTV), Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI) and China Daily.


25 For CCTV Africa’s official site: http://ctv.cn/tv/cctvafrica/01/index.shtml


27 News players commonly portray an ‘international’ image of their outlet by hiring a range of voices and nationalities, thereby contributing to the ‘credibility’ of the outlet.


31 One example is the 2013 closure of the Greek broadcaster, Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT), whose three TV channels and radio stations helped link and inform the global Greek diaspora.


36 Same as above, p.16


44 For more detail visit: http://m.mg.co.za/index.php?view=article&urlid=2013-09-03-gupta-family-bid-for-independent-stake-fails&views=1&mobi=true&KEY=q6e9o348touctbe395gcchkeq1#.UihF2zZmiSo;


Gorfinkel L, Joffe S, Van Staden, C and Y Wu. ‘CCTV’s global outreach: Examining the audiences of China’s new voice on Africa’ in Media Internatnaional Australia, No 151, May 2014, pp.84.

same as above.

Information disseminated by a China Daily representative, South Africa, 5 August 2013.

Same as above.

Interview with Asia correspondent for eNews Channel Africa (ENCA) based in Beijing, China, 10 November 2011.

They operate in formal settings such as offices as well as informal settings (i.e. a journalist and their equipment).

Lloyd, L. ‘South Africa’s Media 20 Years After Apartheid’, a report for the Center for International Media Assistance, 17 July 2013, p. 16.

Same as above.


For example: in November 2012 Al Jazeera English launched the South2North programme, which is hosted by a South African media personality (Redi Tlhabi) and is broadcasted from Johannesburg. The show looks at the ‘African perspective on current international affairs’ (the programme does not seem to be running any longer in 2014). See: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/South2North/. Also available on television are CNN’s African Voices, BBC’s Focus on Africa, CCTV’s Africa Live, Talk Africa and Faces of Africa.

Lloyd, L. ‘South Africa’s Media 20 Years After Apartheid’ in a report by Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) (report), 17 July 2013, pp. 1-42.


67 For example a large percentage of China’s investment into South Africa derives from a single transaction that is the 2007 acquisition by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China that saw a 20% ($5.5 billion) equity stake in one of South Africa’s largest banks, Standard Bank.
68 Gorfinkel L, Joffe S, Van Staden, C and Y Wu. ‘CCTV’s global outreach: Examining the audiences of China’s new voice on Africa’ in Media International Australia, No 151, May 2014, pp.85.
75 The discussion took place during the ‘POWER Breakfast’ show between 6-9am CAT, 4 March 2014.
77 Lloyd L, ‘South Africa’s Media 20 Years After Apartheid’, Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), Report, 17 July 2013, p.22.
78 For more on the specific campaign against the bill see the website for Right2Know: http://www.r2k.org.za/secretary-bill.
82 Derived through interviews with key individuals in the trade union, mining and manufacturing sectors during January-June 2014.
87 One example is the Journalism Department (at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa) who has a China-Africa Reporting Project and selects a group of Chinese working journalists to attend their annual Power Reporting African Investigative Journalism Conference in Johannesburg organised in collaboration with the Forum for African Investigative Reporters. After the conference, the Chinese journalists are provided with logistical and financial support to report on a China-Africa issue in an African country of their choice with the resulting story published in Chinese media.