Angola 1999/ 2000

Key Development Issues and National Research Capacity

Inge Tvedten
with
Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås

R 2000: 2
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Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
1. Introduction

The following is the first report on Angola under the Country Report Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Nordic Consulting Group (NCG). In line with the contract the report consists of a Part I synthesizing and assessing basic information regarding economic, political and social developments in the country, and a Part II focussing on topics related to Norwegian development aid to be specified by NORAD.

The focus of the current report was discussed in a meeting between the consultant and Vigdis Varn (NORAD), Gunnar Holm (MFA) and Bjørg Leite (Norwegian Ambassador to Angola) held at NORAD 31.08.99, and further elaborated in the ToR dated 05.11.99 (Appendix 1). It was agreed that Part I of the study should be kept relatively brief, with personnel at MFA/NORAD who are not in a position to follow events closely as primary target group. Special emphasis should be given to issues high on the agenda in the national and international debate on Angola. We have chosen to focus on the current politico-military situation with UNITA suffering apparently decisive defeats, and the options for using Angola's vast oil income for economic and social development in a situation of relative peace.

As regards Part II, it was initially requested by NORAD that this should give an overview over government structures and the system of public administration in Angola. The limited capacity of the latter is considered a major bottleneck for the implementation of development aid in the country. At the initiation of the project, however, it became clear that substantial work had recently been done in this area through the Programa de Reforma Administrativo do Governo de Angola (MAPESS 1999) and the Human Development Report on Angola for 1998 (UNDP 1998). However, a need was expressed by government ministries as well as the Norwegian Embassy for an overview over the existing social-science capacity in Angola. It was argued that the lack of updated and relevant information about socio-economic conditions in the country will be a major constraints in the planning and implementation of development policies and programs in a situation of relative peace (see Chapter 2.2.). Consequently Part II contains a general overview of the system of public administration in Angola, with a particular emphasis on the state of the social sciences and prospects for their constructive contribution to development.

Angola is little known in Norway, despite the growing importance of the country for Norwegian development aid and private enterprise particularly related to the oil sector. As an additional component and special service to MFA/NORAD personnel working with the country, it was therefore agreed that CMI shall set up and maintain a web-site on Angola including i) an overview over institutions and people working with Angola in Norway, ii) links to the most relevant information on Angola on the internet and iii) a brief bibliography on relevant information related to Angola's history,
economic conditions and political situation. The page will be updated regularly.

Fieldwork for this study was carried out in the period between 21 November and 2 December 1999. I would like to thank the staff at the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda for their excellent support and willingness to share points of view during the fieldwork. The analysis and assessments made are those of the consultants, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of MFA/NORAD.
2. Political and Economic Conditions

Since its independence from the Portuguese in 1975, Angola has struggled with discrepancies between political ideology and practice and between economic potential and actual performance. The last decade a democratic constitution has been overshadowed by an increasing centralization of power in the hands of the president. And a huge economic potential has been overshadowed by a virtual standstill in all economic sectors except the oil industry. Both the political and economic situation has been decisively influenced by a near-continuous war-situation, first primarily as a theater for the Cold War and since 1990 as a civil war between the MPLA government and UNITA albeit with regional ramifications.

The primary victims of both the political and economic developments have been the Angolan population. With reference to key priorities in Norwegian aid policies stating that all development cooperation must help to combat poverty (NORAD 1999:10), Table 1 lists the most recent data on the socio-economic conditions on the country. The situation for the majority of the population in Angola is one of extreme poverty, vulnerability and despair, with an estimated 70 percent of the population living below the defined poverty-line. As opposed to practically all other countries in the sub-Saharan region, moreover, most indicators have shown a negative trend the past years. Perhaps the most dramatic expressions of the situation is the under-five mortality rate implying that 274 out of 1000 children die before they are 5 years old, and the low rate of enrolment in primary school of 29 percent implying a problematic future for the large majority of those surviving their first five years.

Table 1: Basic Social Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI Ranking (out of 174 countries)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (USD)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth (years)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality rate (per 100.000 live births)</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children 1 year vaccinated (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infants with low birth weight (%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children with malnutrition /underweight (%)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to safe water (%)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to adequate sanitation (%)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment basic education (%)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils reaching fifth grade (%)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate (%)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hodges (forthcoming 2000); UNDP 1999a, b.

2.1 Recent Politico-Military Developments

Important political milestones leading up to the current politico-military situation to be described below are:

- The Bicesse-agreement from 1990, which marked the end of a prolonged and intensive war involving national as well as international actors.
- A period of relative peace between 1990 and 1992, leading to important changes towards political democratization and economic liberalization.
- Elections in September 1992, with victory for MPLA in the parliamentary election and for Eduardo dos Santos in the presidential election.
- Breakdown of the process of peace and democratization in the end of 1992, when UNITA and Jonas Savimbi took Angola back to war after electoral defeat.
- A period of intensive war between 1992 and 1994, leading to severe casualties and control of large areas of the country under UNITA.
- The Lusaka Accord in November 1994, involving plans for demilitarization and enhanced political influence for UNITA.
- Continued inability of the international community through the UN to put force behind agreements it has initiated, and a subsequent escalation of war from late 1998.
- A deteriorating political legitimacy of the MPLA-government, with increased centralization of power around the president and increased high-level corruption. The government refuses further negotiations with Jonas Savimbi, and embarks upon a total-onslaught strategy.
- A deteriorating international legitimacy for Unita, as Jonas Savimbi is increasingly blamed for the continued war-situation and central western powers become increasingly involved in the Angolan oil boom. International sanctions against Unita become more effective.

Since the end of 1998, the combined effects of the militarization of government policies and isolation of Unita has led to a situation where the war seems to be in a decisive phase. Government forces took over Unita strongholds in the central highland (Andulo and Bailundo) in the autumn of 1999, with an estimated 80 percent of Unita’s military power being destroyed. A number of top Unita officials also defected. Fighting is currently taking place along the eastern and southern borders of Angola, with towns and villages that have been controlled by Unita for years (including Jamba and Calai) being taken over by government forces.
The outcome of this development will to a large extent depend on the fate of Jonas Savimbi. Most observers believe that Savimbi is very important for Unita, and that the movement will change significantly when he is not in power. There are currently strong rumors in Luanda that Savimbi already is captured or dead,⁴ and signs of increasing contention between individuals and factions in the movement. In any case, however, Savimbi and Unita have received severe blows which will make it difficult regain the military power they have had with control of up to 70 percent of Angolan territory. Spread fighting with isolated groups will probably still take place for many years to come, but the majority of Unita officials will see the political option as their best stake with a military defeat. The Lusaka Agreement from November 1994 gave Unita considerable political concessions.

Parallel with the recent military developments, the government has distanced itself more and more from the democratic ideals in the constitution. This implies that it is far from certain that absence of war will lead to significant political changes. The fact that many powerholders have acquired vested interests in a continued war, or at least a continued chaotic political situation, is perhaps the most disturbing development the past few years.

Increasing power seems to be vested with President Eduardo dos Santos, exceeding the already strong presidential power vested in the constitution. The president is formally head of state and head of the armed forces. He also controls the government (which is formally accountable to the Parliament) through his power to appoint and remove ministers, and the Council of Ministers is kept out of major decisions. The weak position of the Council of Ministers was clearly demonstrated in early 1999, when the President dispensed of the office of the Prime Minister altogether.

Parliament’s ability to provide real checks and balances is also limited. The weakness and limited presence of the major opposition party Unita is important, being split into two factions headed by Jorge Valentim and Abel Chivukuvuku respectively and with a number of the 70 seats won by members loyal to the military faction headed by Savimbi not being filled. In addition, the parliament is also weakened by inefficient parliamentary procedures, inadequate resources and poor access to information. Finally, the financial dependence on the government by the opposition parties and most deputies represents a fundamental problem for their independence.

The system of political decentralization envisaged in the Constitution has suffered from the failure to sustain and consolidate the peace process. The system has three tiers of administration with 18 provinces, 163 municipalities and 532 communes. Throughout the period from 1992 the issue of local government has effectively been shelved, and local government structure are extremely inefficient if they exist at all. The exception seems to be the

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⁴ If captured, the government is faced with a dilemma. If they kill Savimbi, he may become a martyr in parts of the population. If they make him stand trial for treason, the attention may become unpleasant also for the Government. Some suggest that the best solution will be to send him abroad with enough money to lead a decent life, in line with what has been done with some other despotic African leaders.
provincial governors, who are appointed by the head of state and have a considerable influence in their regions.

Real political power seems to be built around an intricate system of patronage and clientism. There are numerous speculations about who are represented in the inner circle around the President, commonly known as “Miudos de Futungo” after the residence where he stays (see e.g. Africa Analysis 1998, Global Witness 1999). They come from government, the military, as well as the business community. Common for most of them is that they seem entangled in a web where they obtain various kinds of resources, opportunities and benefits by virtue of the inadequate transparency and accountability in the political system.

The constitutional reforms of 1991-1992 lifted the previous restrictions on civil society. However, civil society is not sufficiently strong to represent an efficient political force in its own right. Non-governmental organizations are large in number but generally weak both financially and in terms of human resources, labor unions are generally passive as political voices even though there are noticeable exceptions, and the media have to relate to a tight system of control even though the number of media outlets (particularly weekly newspapers) has increased. One force that has a potential political role to play is the church, and Angolan churches have taken a number of peace-initiatives particularly the past 1-2 years, including the Movimento Pro Paz and the “Angola Group for the Promotion of a Culture of Peace (GAP). However, also the churches seem entangled in the current power structures, and the Catholic and Protestant churches do not have traditions for close cooperation.

2.1.1 Neo-Patrimonialism or Stalled Democracy?

Having given a relatively negative picture of the current state of the system of governance in Angola, the question still remains whether the situation represents a permanent “neo-patrimonial regime”, or a “stalled transition” to democracy that may be put back on track once the military situation improves.

It is initially important to keep in mind that Angola does have a democratic constitution, and an elected government. The constitution and its amendments cater for a democratic state, and the civil society responded positively to new opportunities in the early 1990s. There was an upsurge in the number and type of voluntary associations, the press became much more active and critical, and the church was given a freer position. There were also signs of constructive cooperation between MPLA and UNITA, particularly at the regional and local levels (UNDP 1995).

As regards the elections, more than 90 percent of the eligible voters took part and the elections were declared free and fair by international observers. The results gave MPLA the victory in the parliamentary as well as the presidential election, but UNITA received a fairly large share of the votes (Table 2). A large opposition party has proven important in other new democracies.
Table 2. Election Results, September 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Members of Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jose Eduardo dos Santos</td>
<td>49.57</td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas Savimbi</td>
<td>40.07</td>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Neto</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holden Roberto</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tvedten 1997

It should finally be kept in mind that the Lusaka Accord from November 1994 gave considerable concessions to Unita. On the condition of demilitarization of the movement, the government accepted a stronger role for Unita in government (with a total of 4 ministerial and 7 vice-ministerial posts) and a number of other positions in the public sector. According to most observers, the Accord represents a good point of departure for the extent of power-sharing it is reasonable to expect from an elected government.

Having argued that there is a democratic foundation, there is little doubt that the developments since 1992 represent a severe setback as regards the options for a democratic and accountable system of government. The democratic institutions have not functioned properly, and according to a number of observers (see e.g. UNDP 1999a, EIU 1999, Global Witness 1999, NDI 1999) the MPLA and the government have become less democratic and more corrupt in the sense of “abusing public roles or resources for private benefit” (Amundsen 1999). UNITA on its part continues to be under strong autocratic control by Jonas Savimbi, and with a “political wing” being divided into several factions. At the same time, none of the smaller political parties have managed to position themselves as real political alternatives. Equally important, many Angolans have lost faith in a democratic form of government.

We will argue that it will be difficult to establish a truly democratic form of government without external pressure. The vested interests among key political actors in a continued situation of political unrest seem too strong, and the danger of losing acquired riches with a transparent and accountable system too big, for this to happen. It also seems unlikely that the government will risk elections in the near future with the current deep economic crisis for the large majority of the population.

In a longer-term perspective, internal pressure for a democratic and accountable government may come from civil institutions and organizations, as well as from popular uprising from an increasingly frustrated population. There is tradition in Angola for interest groups and individuals pressing for political change, from early colonial history, via the struggle for independence, to sporadic strikes and uprisings particularly in Luanda. For the time being, however, the Angolan police and security forces are likely to maintain effective control and it will be difficult to find sufficient space for pressure from below.
External pressure for political change in Angola has traditionally come from the super-powers United States and Soviet Union, supporting each side in the prolonged conflict as part of their agendas during the Cold War. With Soviet Union having disintegrated and western powers like the United States, Great Britain and France having put Africa down on their political priority lists, however, strong pressure for political change is unlikely to come from these countries. Their economic interests in the country also complicates their more general political agendas related to issues like democratization and human rights (see below).

Peace-keeping operations under the United Nations have a dismal record in Angola, with failed attempts at interventions to promote peace and democracy and little if any credibility among the two main political contenders MPLA and UNITA. The UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) left the country in March 1999. It is unlikely that the UN will attempt such an endeavor again, even though they are currently negotiating a return to Angola with an observer status.

Regional powers have been involved in the Angolan situation both through political and military support. With the internal problems and limited resources in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Namibia, however, the options for pressure are limited. Angola’s relations with South Africa have remained strained. While the country may apply some pressure as a regional superpower, it has little economic clout in Angola to put behind such pressure.

Aid conditionality is the classic mechanism for applying pressure in Africa, but also here Angola is in a special situation. Aid is relatively insignificant in economic terms representing only 9.9 percent of GDP, and with Angola’s oil resources the government has even been in a position not to yield from pressure from the World Bank and IMF.

This leaves the option of economic sanctions. Oil income is the basis not only for government income, but also for private riches enjoyed by the Angolan elite. At the same time Angola depends on foreign oil companies for technologies to develop the resources particularly in ultra-deep waters. Economic embargoes have recently been applied in the case of diamonds and Unita, and there are of course also examples of oil-related embargoes being use by the West to attain political goals such as Iraq, Iran and Libya.

External political pressures and embargoes raises a number of questions, not least when applied towards democratically elected governments such Angola’s. We will return to this in Section 2.4 (“Norwegian Dilemmas”). First we will assess recent economic trends in Angola, to have a better understanding of the economic option for peace and recovery.
2.2 Recent Economic Developments

Important milestones, of relevance for understanding the current economic situation, include:

- The discovery of oil outside the coast of Cabinda in 1955, and industrial investments by the Portuguese towards independence in 1975 in an attempt to hold on to the colony.
- Nationalization and a centralized planning economy following independence, leading to a virtual standstill in all economic sectors except the oil sector.
- The national oil company Sonangol is established in 1976, and a national petroleum law is enacted in 1978.
- The off-shore area outside northern Angola is divided into 13 blocks in 1979, with the US company Chevron becoming the major operator.
- Deteriorating economic conditions during the 1980s, with agricultural production in crisis due to the war and the parallel economy (candonga) becoming the main source of income for the majority of the population.
- The first program intended to begin the transition from central planning to a market economy (SEF) established in 1987, but with little success.
- Oil and gas get an increasingly dominant position in the economy from the beginning of the 1990s, as diamond production suffers from war and Unita control of diamond producing areas.
- Yet another economic reform program (PES) initiated in 1994 with focus on devaluation, fiscal stabilization and parallel exchange rates, still with little success.
- Oil boom and increased debts hand in hand from the mid-1990s, with the international interest in off-shore production reaching Klondike proportions towards the end of the decade. 17 new deepwater blocks are being awarded.

The combination of war, economic mismanagement and the extreme dependence on oil has contributed to a distorted economy, where all other sectors are at a virtual standstill including the vital agricultural sector (but excluding the informal sector making it possible for the majority of the population to survive). The limited domestic production, continued war and corruption have also instigated a huge national debt, with Angola in reality having mortgaged its own oil production for many years to come. Key macro-economic indicators are given in Table 3.
Attempts have recently been made to rectify the economy, after the stream of unsuccessful economic development programs throughout the 1990s. The appointment of the former director of Sonangol to Minister of Finance, and another Sonangol senior official to Governor of the Bank of Angola in early 1999, have improved the capacity and coordination between the key actors in the Angolan economy. Successful measures were taken in May 1999 to close the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates that have crippled the economy, and negotiations for restructuring programs with the World Bank and IMF have been re-established after periods of no contact. Despite positive developments, however, the inadequate transparency and accountability remains a fundamental problem and has hindered formal agreements with the two international financial institutions.

Table 3. Macro-economic Indicators, 1993-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (USD mn)</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>5,059</td>
<td>6,615</td>
<td>7,612</td>
<td>6,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP Growth (%)</td>
<td>-23.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-sector</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil sector</td>
<td>-31.4</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (USD)</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports fob</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>3,017</td>
<td>3,723</td>
<td>5,095</td>
<td>5,008</td>
<td>3,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports fob</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>2,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt (USD mn)</td>
<td>10,158</td>
<td>10,818</td>
<td>11,675</td>
<td>8,499</td>
<td>9,269</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt service ratio (%) of exports</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term debt arrears (USD bn)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall budget deficit (% of GDP)</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (%)</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>3,784</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The inadequate transparency first and foremost relates to the dominant oil-sector (see Table 4 and 5).

Table 4 Breakdown of Angolan GDP per Sector (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M manufacturing</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and water</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and commerce</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tradable services</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import duties</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Witness 1999

Angola’s proven oil deposits have risen to some 6.5 billion barrels. At the current rate of production resources will last for 22-23 years, but these figures are likely to be adjusted upwards in the years to come. The agreements with
foreign companies, through Joint Ventures (JVs) and Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs), are generally considered to be beneficial for Angola. In addition, the Klondike sentiment and competition among foreign companies has made it possible to obtain additional benefits through e.g. sign-on bonuses. Reports indicate that the international oil industry is planning to invest over USD 18 bn. in Angola the next four years.

Having said this, a substantial proportion of the oil revenue (estimated at 40% by IMF) never finds its way to the state budgets. Through various mechanisms, large sums of money bypass the Treasury and are used for debt servicing, direct payment to cover costs for the war and (again according to a number of observers) high-level corruption.

Table 5. Forecast Government Receipts from Oil Industry, 2000-2005 (USD Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>20001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil production ('000 bpd)</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,167</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross revenues at $12</td>
<td>3,928</td>
<td>4,654</td>
<td>5,113</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>4,686</td>
<td>4,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross revenues at $18</td>
<td>5,891</td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td>7,670</td>
<td>7,816</td>
<td>7,029</td>
<td>6,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated gmt. Receipts at $12</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated gmt. Receipts at $18</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>2,443</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>2,201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Witness 1999

Very little investment takes place in other sectors of the Angolan economy despite the huge economic potential. This potential is first and foremost related to mineral resources, but also to renewable natural resources. Angola has some of the most productive fishing resources in Africa that can become very important if properly managed. Estimated current production is 170.00 mt, with a TAC of 262.500 mt. Perhaps most importantly, the country has a wide range of climatic zones and soil-types that makes the agricultural potential enormous. Only an estimated 3 percent is currently being cultivated.

The apparent chaotic state of affairs of the Angolan economy raises the question of whether the oil income can be used for economic and social development in a situation of relative peace.

2.2.1 Can the Dutch Disease be Cured?

Angola suffers from all aspects of the so-called “resource curse”. The country has a vastly overvalued exchange rate, the public sector deficit and the current account deficit have both hovered around 20 percent of GDP during the 1990s, and the country suffers from high inflation and a huge foreign debt. This chaotic macroeconomic state of affairs is not uncommon among oil-
exporting countries in the developing world, but it is not a necessary outcome of oil-led growth. Rather, the windfall oil revenue creates opportunities for excesses, and the government together with the small elite with access to revenue and international credits have fallen prey to the temptations that follow huge financial inflows.

Managing an oil-led development is difficult because financial resources are volatile and outpace the absorption capacity of the economy during the booming years of oil-led growth. If the entire oil revenue is spent domestically on various government programs and higher wages than would have been possible without these revenues, it is difficult to adjust to declining oil prices. The country typically runs into government budget and current account deficits and accumulation of internal and external debt. The initial programs and investments tend to collapse, and resources are consequently wasted.

Angola already has experienced Dutch disease-related problems. In order to avoid that they become a development problem in future, Angola needs to follow a prudent macroeconomic policy:

- The government should narrow the budget deficit and in the long run aim for budget surpluses in years of oil prices above the long-term trend;
- The exchange rate should not be allowed to appreciate too much in order to keep the non-oil economy competitive;
- Mineral revenue should be invested in productive capacity as long as the social return to such investments is acceptable. Rehabilitation of infrastructure and investment in human capital probably yields the highest social returns in Angola at this stage of development.

The third point on the list relates to the absorption capacity of the economy. Productive capacity is built through investment in human capital (education and health), infrastructure and business' investment in productive assets. The rate of return of each of these assets depends on the availability of each of the other. Therefore, social and infrastructure investment programs need to be carefully balanced to the need and capacity of the economy.

Botswana has a similar resource base as Angola, e.g. a mineral-led development path, and has followed the rules of macroeconomic management stated above. The Botswana government has had a budget surplus for almost every year since the early 1980s. The windfall mineral revenues have been managed by setting up two funds, one revenue stabilizing fund for smoothing government expenditure in the face of short-term fluctuations in mineral revenue, and one public debt service fund. The latter has accumulated reserves over time, which have been invested abroad.

In spite of Botswana's prudent macroeconomic management, social programs and industrial policy measures the country still has a substantial poverty problem and there has been little diversification of the economy. A staggering 38 percent of the population is below the poverty line. Besides, the Botswana government has expanded too much and is at present undergoing reforms in order to become smaller and more efficient. Botswana's experience clearly
shows that sound macroeconomic policy is necessary, but certainly not sufficient to create social and economic development. It also demonstrates that the existence of abundant financial resources may create incentive problems and undermine entrepreneurship.

In Angola oil revenue has largely been spent on the war. The war itself and neglect of social sectors and infrastructure have left the country in a situation of appalling social conditions and devastated economic, social and physical infrastructure. A comprehensive recovery program is therefore necessary in order to get the economy going once the war has come to an end.

Mozambique is seen as a model for post-war rehabilitation and economic reform. Its recovery program has focused on private sector expansion, agriculture, human capital development and infrastructure rehabilitation. Furthermore, Mozambique has strongly emphasized primary education and health services. The program has resulted in rapid economic growth (6 percent annual growth on average during the 1990s and 8 percent after 1994), significant improvements in social indicators, and an investment boom involving both local and foreign investors. The boom is, however, fuelled by foreign inflows of aid and investment. The country has at present an equally large current account deficit and budget deficit as has Angola, and the currency has appreciated sharply. Mozambique thus runs the danger of contracting the Dutch disease from foreign transfers.

A similar recovery program in Angola will probably sustain the present current account and government deficits. This is because although some of the close to 40 percent of public expenditure that has been spent on defense and security can be reallocated to investment and social sector developments, the resources available for such expenditure are not as extensive as one might think. Almost all oil revenue that accrues to Sonangol in the foreseeable future is already bonded and hence committed to external debt servicing. A large part of Angola's oil revenues in the future has in other words already been spent.

The experiences of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique suggest that the Dutch disease is inevitable in the face of large foreign currency inflows. Nevertheless, Angola suffers from worse ills than the Dutch disease and needs to create a basic platform for social and economic development. This requires a recovery program, which inevitably will sustain deficits on both the current account and the government budget. Nevertheless, the two deficits need to be set on a declining trend immediately in order to avoid a new setback as soon as the oil price starts to decline. Given its high present level, it very probably will in near future.

Mozambique's policy mix of public expenditure programs on primary education and health and rehabilitation of infrastructure in the major crop growing areas, combined with market liberalization and encouraging the private sector to participate in infrastructure developments in the major industrial areas appears to be promising. If undertaken on an appropriate scale for Angola, incentives and opportunities for productive activities could
be sufficient to generate income and government revenue making it possible for social and economic development to be sustained while the government budget and current account deficits narrow.

Recommended readings: General sources on the Angolan economy include McCormick 1994, EIU’s annual and quarterly reports and Nordås et al. 1999. NDI 1999 puts focus on the issue of corruption. As regards the oil sector, useful web-pages include www.gasandoil.com, www.mbendi.co.za and www.eia.doe.go

2.3 Development Aid

Development aid to Angola has traditionally been limited both in real terms and in relation to Angola’s own economy as measured by GDP. Also Norway was late in entering agreements of cooperation with Angola. The aid flow to Angola increased considerably from the beginning of the 1990s with the termination of the Cold War, but it is still relatively limited compared to aid flows to other countries in the region. The Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme from 1995 is still an important point of reference for development aid in Angola, and the Round Table Mechanism is an important way to mobilize assistance from the international community (RoA 1995, UN 1999).

Table 6: Net Official Development Assistance 1996-1998 (USD million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>IDA (WB)</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>132.7</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>294.4</td>
<td>227.0</td>
<td>214.5</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>178.7</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>120.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD, forthcoming 2000

The most recently available OECD data, which excludes non-government organizations, put net development assistance to Angola at USD 335.2 mn in 1998 (ORCD, forthcoming 2000). Of this, bilateral ODA is 63.8 percent and multilateral aid is 36.2 percent. This represents aid per capita of approximately USD 28, which is below the average for the Southern African region (aid per capita to Mozambique is USD 66.8). According to the OECD, the United States, Portugal, and Norway are currently the largest bilateral donors in Angola, while the European Union, the World Food Programme and IDA (the World Bank) are the largest multilateral donors (Table 6).

3 In the last half of the 1980s, Swedish aid represented around 70 percent of total bilateral assistance to the country.
Norwegian aid represented a total of NOK 174.5 million in 1998, including assistance through non-government organizations (Table 7). Norway has continued to concentrate its efforts around humanitarian assistance and the sectors of energy, education and fisheries, and Norwegian non-governmental organizations remain important channels for implementation of the aid efforts. With the establishment of a Norwegian embassy in Angola and a well qualified (albeit small) staff, Norway is in the process of becoming an important actor on the development scene in Angola.

Table 7: Norwegian Development Aid to Angola by Budget Item (NOK mn)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-term development cooperation</td>
<td>91 855</td>
<td>79 454</td>
<td>96 907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended cooperation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1 837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non government organizations</td>
<td>13 737</td>
<td>10 408</td>
<td>11 666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts and consultants</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial and commercial financing facilities</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>43 169</td>
<td>8 935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-bilateral assistance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and human resource development</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>55 926</td>
<td>39 859</td>
<td>54 389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, reconciliation and democracy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt relief</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installment on loans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfund</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162 893</td>
<td>173 182</td>
<td>174 566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NORAD 1999a

In general terms, however, there is a strong sense of fatigue among international donors. This is particularly the case with countries and multilateral institutions having worked in Angola for a long time. Sweden and the UNDP are good examples. The difficult working conditions and the problems of implementing longer-term development projects are important reasons. In addition, there is still no real effort to coordinate international development assistance by Angolan authorities. The Secretariat of State established for this purpose under the Ministry of Planning does not function, and the government seems content to leave emergency assistance and the social sectors to the international community. UNDP and UCAH have been given coordinating roles for development aid and emergency assistance respectively, but none of them function optimally.

Having said this, a situation of relative peace is likely to enhance the aid flow to Angola considerably. Countries with economic interests in Angola (such as the United States and France) will allocate funds as part of their general policy, and traditional donor countries are likely to intensify efforts with reference to the extreme poverty in the country.

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4 Considerable parts of Norway’s humanitarian assistance is in fact allocated to peace, reconciliation and democracy, but this is inadequately captured in NORAD’s statistics.
Recommended readings: Statistical data on development assistance to Angola is available in OECD forthcoming 2000, UNDP 1999a,b and NORAD 1999. SIDA publishes half-year reports (ASDI 1999). The EU has recently published a critical review of their aid to Angola (Sanches 1999). And Ball and Campbell (1998) give a review of humanitarian coordination in the country.

2.4 Norwegian Dilemmas

The situation in Angola at the turn of the millennium raises a number of questions about Norwegian involvement in development assistance as well as in the private (mainly oil) industry. On the one hand Angola has a government with low political accountability, a poor human rights record, and an economy heavily affected by mismanagement and corruption. And on the other the country has a population which is among the poorest and most vulnerable in the world.

Table 8. Government Expenditure by Function 1994-1997 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Public Services</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense and Public Order</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which recorded</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace process</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security, welfare and housing</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic affairs and services</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest (commitment basis)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (residual)</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global Witness 1999

The problematic nature of the current situation is perhaps best illustrated by the distribution of public expenditures (see Table 8). Allocations to defense and public order reached more than 36 percent in 1997, at the same time as allocations to education and health stood at a mere 8 percent. This is considerably lower than other countries in the Southern African region.

Throughout the 1990s the Government has, with considerable right, defended its allocations with reference to the fact that it is a democratically elected government finding itself in a war situation against a rebel movement. It should also be acknowledged by the international community that UNITA is very much a product of the West, having received political and economic support from before independence up to the very end of the peace-process in 1992.
Having said this, the recent emphasis in Norwegian aid policy on concentrating support to countries with transparent and accountable governments and favorable human rights records (NORAD 1999b) will inevitably instigate debates about the cooperation with Angola in a post-war situation. Such a situation will also raise debates about the involvement of Norwegian (state-owned) oil companies in the country. In addition to the general human rights context, the lack of transparency in the industry will bring the conduct of the oil companies themselves under scrutiny.

Within a period of 3-5 years after a situation of relative peace, policy-changes towards a more accountable government and allocation of national resources to the social sectors should be expected. More concrete implications of the post-war situation for Norway’s relations with Angola must of course be drawn on the basis of a thorough assessment by MFA/NORAD and discussions with Angolan authorities. In any case, however, a situation where Norwegian development aid is used to substitute the government’s own efforts towards poverty alleviation, and where Norwegian oil companies contribute towards an oil income used for continued repressive policies, should be avoided.

For the time being, Norway should intensify its efforts for constructive dialogue with Angolan authorities by strengthening its presence and increase allocations particularly to transitional assistance preparing for a situation of relative peace. Norwegian oil companies on their part should enhance their efforts to contribute towards transparency and accountability within the oil sector.
3. A Public Sector in Crisis

The emphasis on public administration in Norwegian development aid (NORAD 1999b) is based on the premise that a competent civil service is essential for creating the conditions necessary for a positive social development. The state should, according to NORAD, play a decisive role in distributing resources, ensuring that the population has access to basic social services and safeguarding human rights (see also World Bank 1997).

Most independent observers agree that public sector organizations in Southern Africa perform badly (Therkilsen, forthcoming 2000). For most citizens the provision of education, health care, road maintenance, law and order, agricultural extension and other services have deteriorated. The roots of these problems are contested. Some point to the importance of the marginalization of Africa in the global economy, contributing to the extreme resource scarcity of public sector operations and their poor performance. Others single out poor macro-economic policies as a major cause of fiscal instability, deteriorating economic growth and increased inflation, all contributing to declining state capacity. And finally, the problems of the public sector in Africa are increasingly regarded as institutional and caused by inappropriate governance arrangements (Olouwu 1999, Mutahaba et al. 1993).

All these factors are relevant when assessing the system of public administration in Angola, with the additional problem of a near-permanent state of war that has made many public institutions un-reachable for government. The civil service in Angola is currently considered to be in a particularly dismal state also compared to other countries in the Southern African region, with low performance and a limited or negative impact on key development areas.

The Angolan public administration was highly centralized already under the Portuguese colonial rule. Independence brought a sharp reduction in the number of qualified civil servants, at the same time as state structures were given expanded political and economic responsibilities within the centralized state. During the last decade, with democratization and liberalization on the agenda, the public administration has become even less efficient. Centralization of power around the presidency, erosion of economic resources and continued low levels of competence and capacity among its staff have all contributed towards a public sector in crisis.

In the following we will first give an outline of the system of public administration in Angola, and the main constraints under which it works. Under the assumption that relevant information on socio-economic conditions will be vital to improve the capacity of the public sector to contribute to development, we will then make an assessment of the social sciences in Angola and their capacity to carry out relevant socio-economic research.
3.1 The System of Public Administration

The system of public administration in Angola is concerned with the execution of decisions made by the political bodies in the country. In Chapter 2.1 we accounted for the constitutional distribution of power, and the actual situation giving considerable influence to the President in the day-to-day management of state affairs, limited power the government and individual ministries, and a marginal role for the regional and local levels of government. In addition, public companies suffer from inadequate resources.

The main components of the system of government and public administration are:

- The Presidency (Head of State, de facto head of government. Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Appoints provincial governors).
- The Council of Ministers (Formally accountable to both the head of state and the national assembly, de facto accountable to head of state. Formally headed by the prime minister, de facto headed by the head of state).
- Ministries (Currently altogether 28 ministries and secretariats of state, with around 90 ministerial and vice ministerial posts. Divided into departments and directorates).
- Provincial Government (18 provinces and provincial governments. Governors appointed by the Head of State. No elected provincial bodies).
- Municipal Government (163 municípios, headed by municipal administrators who are appointed by regional governors. No elected municipal bodies).
- Communal Government (532 comunas headed by communal administrators. No elected communal bodies).
- Traditional authorities (Sobas are formally not part of the system of public administration, but receive salaries from the government. Play an important role in the absence of government institutions).
• Public companies (Organs with their own legal status and administrative and financial autonomy. Operate to achieve the objectives of state plans. There are approximately 250 state owned enterprises in Angola).

Looking more closely at the characteristics of Angola’s system of public administration, public institutions are normally divided into six different areas by function (see Table 9). In terms of sectorial distribution, 57 percent of the total number of civil servants are allocated to the social sector, primarily health and education. The political-institutional sector has 16 percent of the workforce, the economic sector 16 percent, infrastructure 6 percent and security sectors 4 percent.

Table 9 Types and Functions Main Organs of Public Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of institution</th>
<th>No. of Employees</th>
<th>Institutions with largest number of employees</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>Presidency, National assembly, Courts</td>
<td>Guarantee representation of the state and legislative activity, regulation of interests and protection of citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>15,455</td>
<td>M in. of Interior, M in. of Defense</td>
<td>Maintaining internal order and territorial integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-institutional</td>
<td>28,067</td>
<td>M in. of Terr. Adm., M in. of Justice, M in. of Finance</td>
<td>Support of state management, economic management, public finance, planning etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>130,830</td>
<td>M in. of Education, M in. of Health, M in. of Social Assistance</td>
<td>General social services, increase level of education and health, assist less-favored strata of the population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>12,846</td>
<td>M in. of Agriculture, M in. of Trade, M in. of Fisheries</td>
<td>Support to economic growth through industrial expansion, trade and agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>6,683</td>
<td>M in. of Public Works and Housing, M in. of Transport, Works and Telecom.</td>
<td>Expand basic infrastructure such as roads, water, electricity, transport and communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP 1998

A key characteristic of the public administration is its size. Between 1990 and 1998, total civil service employment rose by 49 per cent from 131,178 to 195,786. The figure represents 5 percent of the total workforce, and a ratio of population per civil servant of 63. This is low in the Southern African context (but not compared to the OECD, where the equivalent figure is 14). In Mozambique, for example, each civil servant serves 165 citizens.

84 percent of all government employees are employed at the level of provincial or local government (Table 10). These are the levels of government with the poorest access to economic resources, and many public institutions at the provincial and local levels have been at a virtual standstill for years. An

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5 The figure does not include the estimated 90,000 troops in the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).
important exception is the region of Luanda, which currently has 32 percent of the total number of employees in provincial and local government.

**Table 10. Public Employees by Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>11,574</td>
<td>2,536</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>Kwanza Sul</td>
<td>667,699</td>
<td>9,506</td>
<td>4.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>1,595,924</td>
<td>20,007</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>2,027,687</td>
<td>63,032</td>
<td>32.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>814,984</td>
<td>8,360</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>Lunda Norte</td>
<td>171,829</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>193,713</td>
<td>10,810</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>Lunda Sul</td>
<td>22,918</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cunene</td>
<td>599,744</td>
<td>13,563</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>Malange</td>
<td>793,894</td>
<td>7,597</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>1,601,890</td>
<td>17,092</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>460,068</td>
<td>5,807</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>940,056</td>
<td>17,092</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>144,411</td>
<td>6,744</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwando</td>
<td>173,350</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>Lige</td>
<td>981,664</td>
<td>8,093</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwango Norte</td>
<td>600,688</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>137,735</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 2000 (forthcoming)

Administrative and support staff each represent 38 percent of the total number of civil servants in Angola, with professional staff representing 26 percent. Since 1990 there has been a marked increase in the number of administrative and support staff, at the expense of professional staff (Table 11).

**Table 11. Distribution of Human Resources by Category of Post and Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Post</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Professionals</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level professionals</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative staff</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support staff</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 2000 (forthcoming)

The level of education among civil servants is very low. Only 3% of government employees have university education, and only 16 percent have education at upper secondary or technical levels (ensino medio). Almost 30 percent have four years or less of primary education, which normally will imply that they are functionally illiterate (Table 12).

**Table 12. Distribution of Human Resources by Level of Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 4 years</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years (I nível ensino de base)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years (II nível ensino de base)</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 years (III nível ensino de base)</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical college (ensino médio)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary school (pré universitário)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University qualifications</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mapess 1999 / Hodges 2000 (forthcoming)
Salaries are fluctuating and extremely low (Table 13). There was a steep decline in salary levels in the middle of the 1990s due to excessive inflation. Civil service salaries and benefits accounted for only 8 percent of total recorded government expenditure at their lowest point in 1996-97, rising to 12 percent in 1998. In 1998 the average civil service salary was calculated at less than half of the price of the minimum basket of goods and services for an urban household of eight persons.

**Table 13: Minimum Salary (USD per month)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior professionals</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level professionals</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-level professionals</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looking beyond figures and numbers, there is little doubt that the civil service is in a severe crisis. Particularly at the regional and local levels many public institutions have not functioned at all, either because of the war situation or because of lack of capital and human resources. 86 percent of the employees in the public sector argue that poor working conditions have a major effect on their productivity.

Where the government institutions are functioning, the work is severely affected by an administrative culture characterized by a hierarchical and centralized system. There is hardly any administrative and fiscal decentralization of decision-making, and within ministries there is little delegation of responsibility and a general fear of making decisions.

In relation to the public, the inefficiency has led to a general perception of the sector not being there for the public good. The low pay and moral among employees has also contributed to a system of bribes and corruption, where people often have to pay for services that in the outset should be free of charge. Around 70 percent of the civil servants see nothing wrong in accepting “presents” (gasosa) for their services.

The situation described is valid for most public institutions, including those most relevant for Norwegian development aid. As mentioned the unit established to coordinate development cooperation under the Ministry of Planning does not function, implying that donors have to relate directly to the ministry or ministries relevant for their activities.

The Ministry of Education is generally considered to be in the most problematic situation, with an oversized staff and poor administrative routines. The Ministry does have a special section for international cooperation, but this is largely detached from the other departments and
sections. The problems are acknowledged by people in leading positions in that ministry. The Norwegian Refugee Council, the Norwegian organization with the most direct relation to the Ministry of Education, argues that the cooperation is problematic and seem to avoid direct relations as much as possible.

The Ministry of Petroleum is generally considered to be among the most competent and effective in the country, with a number of well-qualified people. Nevertheless, while the top management is competent and capable the implementation of decisions is negatively affected by more limited capacity at the middle and lower levels. This seems particularly to affect less “vital” areas not directly related to production, such as the development of laws and regulations for safety and the environment in which Norwegian aid has been involved.

The Ministry of Fisheries is in the outset important and attractive for civil servants. For the lower levels the direct access to fish is lucrative, and for people at higher levels their role in relation to allocation of fishing licenses and the extensive privatization in the sector has been important. Despite a high degree of stability among the staff, however, there are serious problems with decision-making and efficiency. The Institute of Marine Research in Norway has encountered considerable problems in implementing a program related to fisheries research.

Norwegian NGOs working in Angola (primarily Norwegian Peoples’ Aid and the Norwegian Refugee Council) have experience from working with regional and local government. While the resources both in financial and human terms are more limited than in the central administration, the smaller size and closer cooperation between employees at this level seem to make some of these institutions function relatively well.

The poor state of affairs of the public administration has resulted in a proliferation of private solutions, particularly in the areas of education and health but also in areas like security. These options are primarily open to the better-off strata of the population, leading to a divided society between a small minority who can buy services and a large majority who either do not have access to services or have to pay for the inferior services offered by the State.

For the international donors, the weak public administration has generally had two main implications. On the one hand, cooperation is often entered directly with NGOs and other civil society institutions, even in cases where the State would be a natural partner. On the other hand, special structures are often erected within the ministries in order to secure a more effective cooperation. These “islands” are supplied with superior equipment, higher salaries and other special benefits to the people involved.
3.1.1 A System Beyond Repair?

The poor state of the system of public administration in Angola is related to factors external to the system itself. These must be solved before significant improvements in the performance of the public sector can be expected.

One basic condition is the need to curb inflation and transfer sufficient funds to make the level of income for civil servants adequate. This will reduce absenteeism as well as the need to supplement income by taking tips or bribes (gasosas).

A second condition is the need for administrative and fiscal decentralization to the various levels of government that makes it possible to make decisions and carry them out, thereby rendering work more meaningful both for elected officials and civil servants.

A third condition is the need to implement the Local Government Act and elect representative bodies also at the regional and local levels, which will make local government and public administration more accountable to the population they are to serve.

Even with a more conducive political and economic context, however, the challenges remain formidable. The low level of education, the poor working conditions, the lack of tradition for internal delegation of responsibilities, and the weak sense of public duty or service among officials will have to be rectified.

Changes in these areas will demand increasing resources and (most likely) a reduction in the number of government employees, but also institutional development efforts in a broader sense. Training will be a key component.

In many ways the system of public administration may seem beyond repair, but there are positive experiences to build on. One is the extent and speed of reform carried out during the era of liberalization in the beginning of the 1990s. The ensuing openness and enhanced performance in public sector organizations implies that the system has the potential for change given the right external conditions and policy inputs.

A second positive experience to build on is that some of the “islands” in the system having been given additional resources have improved their performance. This again shows the potential with improved conditions. To avoid the problems following from isolated individually based interventions, key ministries and departments should initially be selected for interventions involving staff at all levels of the organization.

The main responsibility for reform rests with the government, but institutional development should also be an important part of development cooperation programs. The relatively negative experiences from the all-encompassing Programme of Institutional Reform and Administrative Modernization (PRIMA) imply that more pilot-like interventions should first be initiated. The experiences with twinning arrangements (i.e. broad-based cooperation
between sister-institutions in the South and North) are relatively positive (Tvedten et al. 1998).

Realistically it will take years before the public sector can supply the Angolan population with the goods and services they are entitled to. In addition, the role of the public sector in relation to the private sector and civil society is also likely to undergo significant changes when the process of economic and political liberalization continues (World Bank 1997). There is no doubt, however, that a functioning public sector is a precondition for development and poverty alleviation in Angola.
4. Planning for Development in a Void

With the profound external and internal problems currently affecting the performance of the public sector in Angola, the issue of access to information for planning and implementation of government policies may seem a bit redundant. With the main bottlenecks being contextual and systemic, information per se will not solve any problems. Again assuming that the political and economic conditions will improve, however, proper knowledge about the Angolan society will be essential for the success of future development policies. Moreover, building up relevant social science competence and capacity will take time.6

There is a serious lack of information about very basic socio-economic conditions in Angola, even though some institutions like the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) have done impressive work with the limited resources they possess. After years of war and unrest there have been dramatic changes in demographic structures, economic adaptation, political affiliation, social organization, and cultural perceptions. Information is also inadequate as regards civil organizations and popular associations in rural and urban areas, that will play a central role in Angola’s future development.

At the same time, socio-economic research in Angola has been limited for a number of reasons. The most obvious one is the security situation, which has left most parts of the country un-researchable. In addition the government has not actively encouraged research of this type, at least partly for fear of what it may reveal. And finally, the options for carrying out socio-economic research under the current financial conditions has been limited for the researchers themselves.

To take a closer look at the state of affairs of the social sciences in Angola, the field has historically had a relatively low status and played a marginal role. This has primarily to do with the weak Portuguese tradition for social science research in the colonies,7 and the strong emphasis on industrialization after independence giving precedence to disciplines like engineering.

The marginal position is underlined by the fact that there is no social science faculty at the main university in Angola (Universidade Agostinho Neto), and the social sciences also play a marginal role in other institutions of higher learning including the recently established Catholic University (Universidade

6 According to the new Encyclopædia Britannica the social sciences can be defined as “any discipline or branch of science that deals with the social and cultural aspects of human behavior”. It generally include economics, political science, sociology and related sciences. In the case of Angola, the most important social sciences have been political science, sociology, history, anthropology, demography and public administration. Economics is often considered a separate discipline, and have a stronger standing in Angola than other social sciences particularly in the public sector. The discipline will be treated as a special case in this report.

7 This does not necessarily mean that research was not carried out, but that most of it was done with the purpose of defending the colonial cause which tended to weaken its quality qua research (see e.g. Areia and Figueiras 1984)
Católica de Angola). Social science subjects have been taught in primary school (ensino de base), but the books in history and geography are very general in scope. The situation is somewhat better at secondary level (ensino médio), with more social science disciplines and better qualified teachers.

Having said this, there is a core of well-educated and competent social scientists in the country. Many of them have their education from abroad (primarily former Eastern Europe, Portugal and Brazil, but also from other western universities.) In the early 1990s the number of Angolan social scientists studying or working abroad was estimated at 30 percent of the total number of academics working in this field within Angola. It is likely that there still is a number of well-qualified Angolan social scientists currently studying or working abroad.

The exact number of social scientists in Angola is difficult to ascertain. The Association of Anthropologists and Sociologists in Angola (AASA) presents a list of 46 social scientists active in the fields of anthropology (9), history (14), sociology (11), demography (3) and economics (9) (Pacheco 1997). However, the number is probably considerably higher if counting people with a social science background who currently work in other fields. In line with this, the UNDP took an initiative in 1998 to make a roster of social scientists (including economists) interested in working for the UN and received 150 responses.

The social scientists in Angola can be broadly divided into two main categories: One category works within the university system, under very difficult conditions and with very limited resources. The other category is made up of people who have left the state institutions, and work for national NGOs, international organizations or as private consultants. Most of these have to pursue several income earning opportunities (many of which are not related to social science research) in order to make ends meet.

Common for both categories is a limited experience with applied research (defined as “the use of social science ideas and methods for policy-oriented or practical purposes”). The first category work in academic institutions with limited tradition for such an approach, while those working as consultants tend to have too little time and too limited resources. The few more comprehensive applied research projects done the past decade (see e.g. Hunt 1991, Hurlich 1991, UNDP 1995, Oxfam 1998, Wold 1999) are typically headed by foreign consultants, they are quantitative in nature, and they tend to focus on Luanda or other more easily accessible urban areas.

The ministries and development organizations using Angolan social scientists commonly complain that the reports produced are “interesting, but not very useful”. The inadequate skills in writing applied research reports is related to

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8 Those interested filled in questionnaires about educational background, experience etc., but the data have never been systematized.
9 Important exceptions are the UNDP-reports on Human Development in Angola (1997, 1998, 1999) supported by Norway, where Angolan social scientists have played important and constructive roles.
the lack of training in how to write this type of document, but also to the limited experience most Angolan social scientists have with government ministries and donor organizations and hence their limited knowledge of the priorities these organizations have.

Before looking into the ways the social sciences in Angola can become more relevant for development policies and practices, we will give a brief sketch of the most important institutions training and employing social scientists in Angola.

**4.1 Institutions of Higher Learning**

**4.1.1 Universidade Agostinho Neto**

Universidade Agostinho Neto (UAN) was originally established by the Portuguese in 1962. It took its current name in 1985, in honor of its first Vice-Chancellor and Angola’s first President Agostinho Neto.

Formally the University consists of six faculties (i.e. the faculties of science, agriculture, law, economics, engineering and medicine) and a higher institute of educational science (Instituto Superior de Ciências de Educação, ISCED). In addition, the university formally includes several research centers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 14. Agostinho Neto University (formal structure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculdade de Ciências</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculdade Ciências Agrárias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculdade de Direito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculdade de Economia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculdade de Engenharia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculdade de Medicina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED, Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED, Bengula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED, Lubango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED, Huambo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Luanda is the main site of the Agostinho Neto University, but there are also university centers in Lubango and Benguela. In 1998 the University had registered a total of 528 academic staff (docentes, professores), 123 support staff and 7916 students (UAN 1998). The faculties, their departments, number of staff and number of students are listed in Table 14.

In addition to the faculties and the teachers training institutes, the university formally includes six research centers. These are: i) Centro Nacional de Investigação Científica (CNIC); ii) Centro de Estudos e Investigação em População (CEIP); iii) Cátedra UNESCO em Engenharia Química e Ambiental; iv) Laboratória de Exploração e Produção da SONANGOL; v) Centro Nacional de Recursos Fitogenéticos; and vi) Grupo de Trabalho de SABONET Angola.

The university also has a number of formal agreements with foreign research institutions, primarily with universities in Portugal (11) and Brazil (7), but also with universities in Italy (1), France (1) and Spain (2).

In reality, the Faculties, Centers and Agreements of Cooperation at the Agostinho Neto University function very poorly. According to the last annual report of the university from 1997 (UAN 1998), only the Faculdade de Ciências Agrícolas, the Departamento Jurídico-Político and the Instituto Superior de Ciências da Educação in Huambo do not function at all. However, practically all other institutions have a very low level of activities. According to the “1997 – 2001 Plan of Action” (UAN 1998) published by the university itself, the main problems are:

- Unclear organizational structures
- Lack of qualified (post-graduate) teaching staff
- Low level of payment that makes it impossible to survive on university salaries
- Students with poor educational background
- Part-time students who have to work in order to survive
- Very poor facilities both in terms of building standards and equipment

There is little doubt that the Agostinho Neto University is in a deep crisis, and it is not very likely that it will get access to sufficient financial and human resources to re-establish itself as a functioning university within the foreseeable future. As in the public sector in general, however, there are “islands” that function relatively well thanks to access to special resources and/or dedicated staff.

Regarding social sciences in particular, there is as mentioned no separate Faculty of Social Science if disregarding the Faculty of Economics. An initiative to establish such a faculty was taken by the former Rector of the University, but since she left in mid-1999 this has not been followed up. Social sciences are mainly taught as minor courses at the Faculty of Engineering and Faculty of Economics. The Centro Nacional de Investigação Científica (CNIC)

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10 The branch in Huambo is destroyed and has not functioned for several years.
was established to initiate and coordinate research also in the social sciences, but does not function.

The institution at UAN currently most directly involved in social science research is the Centro de Estudos e Investigação em População (CEIP). It employs five demographers and sociologists, and is funded by UNFPA. In addition to minor research projects, the Center runs a course in demography followed by around 15 students from different faculties. Despite the resources, however, the Center suffers from most of the problems listed above.

The institution of higher learning with the strongest general social science component is the Instituto Superior de Ciências de Educação (ISCED). ISCED in Luanda has a separate department of social science, and offers 4-year courses in history and sociology. With this course, students obtain a licenciatura in education, with specialization in history or sociology. The courses have well-qualified teachers, and also draw on social scientists who are not permanently employed by ISCED.

Again, however, the institution suffers from the problematic context both in Angola and within the University system. It is difficult if not impossible to devote sufficient time to academic work both for teachers and students, and the drop-out rate is relatively high. As a teachers training college, moreover, there is limited space for social science research per se.

4.1.2 Universidade Católica de Angola

The initiative for establishing a private Catholic university was taken by the Angolan Catholic Church in the mid-1990s. The university was formally established in 1997, and the first students were accepted in the fall of 1998. The university has been supported economically by the US-based Citizens Energy Corporation, and several oil-companies including Mobil, Engen, Saga and Sonangol. The funding is channeled through the Angola Educational Assistance Fund.

With superior remuneration and working conditions, the Catholic University (UCAN) has been able to attract a number of well qualified teachers. Several of these were formerly employed at the Agostinho Neto University. The 458 students currently enrolled pay a tuition fee of USD 250 per month, and have to cover expenses for room, board, books etc. themselves. The University offers a one year preparatory course due to the poor educational background of the large majority of students.

UCAN runs courses in law (Ciências Jurídicas), economics (Curso de Economia), public administration (Curso de Gestão) and computer science (Engenharia Informática). All courses take five years, and lead to a licenciatura (M.A. equivalent). There is an interest in expanding the courses to other disciplines including the social sciences, but no specific plans exist. As seen from Table 15, showing the curriculum for the preparatory course, social science disciplines do not currently have a prominent position at UCAN.
Table 15. Curriculum Preparatory Course, Law and Economics/Public Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester 1</th>
<th>Semester 2</th>
<th>Semester 1</th>
<th>Semester 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction Law</td>
<td>Informatics</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>Informatics</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>Economic Geography</td>
<td>Introduction Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>M et hodology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Universidade Católica de Angola

The Catholic University is in a very early phase of its existence, and emphasis seems to be given to gain experience from the courses currently offered before expanding academically and geographically. In addition, being a private university and having spent considerable funds on the physical upgrading of its premises in Luanda the economic basis for expansion is uncertain.

4.1.3 Other Institutions of Higher Learning

In addition to the two universities described above, two other institutions of higher learning are in a planning phase. One is the Universidade Luciada, and the other is the Universidade Nova de Angola. There are apparently also plans for establishing an institution of higher learning under the umbrella of the Fundo de Eduardo dos Santos (FES). With the limited economic and human resources existing, creating new universities at this stage does not seem to be a wise policy.

4.1.4 Applied Research Organizations

As emphasized in the introduction to this section, probably the majority of social scientists in Angola are currently employed by NGOs, aid organizations, private consulting companies or as private consultants.

The government institution employing the largest number of social scientists (6-8) is the Central Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, INE), which is part of the Ministry of Planning. The two most important Angolan NGOs employing social scientist are Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA) and Angolan Action for Development (AAD). Common for these institutions is that they are primarily occupied with shorter-term consultancies, and have limited options for training and longer-term research. They are also heavily dependent on foreign donors.

Several Angolan social scientists are also employed by aid organizations on a permanent or part-time basis. These include UN organizations (such as UNDP and UNICEF), international NGOs like OIKOS and Development Workshop, and special institutions like the UN-related Human Rights Division. Also people working in these institutions are primarily working with shorter-term consultancies.
In addition to people working for institutions, there are some who have established private consulting companies. Most of these are small with limited capacity, including Consulteste. There is currently an initiative to establish a larger institution with the preliminary name Angola Investigação Social, with a core group of 15 social scientists and plans for a system of affiliation of others.

4.2 A Role for the Social Sciences?

We have argued above that social scientists have an important role to play in the future development of Angola. Information about and analysis of socio-economic conditions will be vital for the planning and implementation of development policies and interventions. What follows is a outline of possible policies and interventions to enhance the status and role of the social sciences in the country. Actual interventions will have to be prepared in much more detail, and involve Angolan social scientists to a much larger extent, than what has been possible within the framework of this report.

We have shown that the status and role of social sciences currently is weak. Social science disciplines do not have a prominent position at the institutions of higher learning, and social scientists work under very difficult conditions. The relatively few that are in a position to work as social scientists on a full-time basis (primarily employed by NGOs or development organizations) are normally overloaded with work of a type that leaves few options for research and generation of new knowledge.

4.2.1 Training and Research

To enhance the status and role of social science in Angola, efforts have to be made with respect to training, basic research as well as applied research. Basic training and basic research is of course vital for the development of the social sciences in Angola, but do not in itself solve the need for relevant and applicable information. Interventions to support training in applied work should therefore be done simultaneously.

First of all there is a need to establish a separate Faculty of Social Science in Angola. Given the current lack of resources this should be done on a modest scale, but it is necessary to gather the scattered teaching and research now taking place in order to make it more effective and visible. With the disciplinary traditions existing, departments of history and sociology/anthropology seem most relevant. The Faculty should be established within the confines of the Agostinho Neto University. Having said this, cooperation should be encouraged with the Catholic University which seems promising particularly in economics.

With the long period of decay of institutions of higher learning in Angola, relations with academic institutions in other countries will be vital. The current agreements of cooperation do not function properly primarily because they are not filled with real professional content. Relations need to be reciprocal to work. Guest researchers from abroad and scholarships for
Angolan academics to study in other countries should still be important, but more efforts should be made to embark upon joint research projects.

Combining academic and applied work is an increasingly common feature of African universities. On the one hand, the universities depend on additional sources of funding through work for government, the private sector and aid-organizations. Being involved in applied consultancy work, moreover, also gives academic institutions more direct contact with the society they are to serve. There are a number of examples of successful applied research units within universities in the Southern African region (Tvedten et al. 1999).

Given the number of Angola’s more senior social scientists employed and active outside the university sector, it will finally be necessary to improve relations between the university and these individuals at least in an initial phase. Many do teach on a part-time basis already, and relations should be built both around teaching and applied work.

4.2.2 The Role of Aid Organizations

With the current political and economic situation in Angola, it is likely to take time before Angola’s ministries and other government institutions will be active users of social science expertise. NGOs and aid-organizations should therefore play an important role in an initial phase. By actively using social scientists in their projects, they can also contribute to a broader acceptance of the need to generate solid socio-economic information about the Angolan society.

A basic problem for the bilateral and multi-lateral organization is the dearth of information about the social scientists in Angola and their qualifications. Initiatives should therefore initially be taken to develop a roster of social scientists, including their education, institutional affiliation, and work experience. The information obtained by the UNDP mentioned above should be a good point of departure. Similar rosters in other countries in the region often include regulations about conditions of employment in order to have a unified system.

With adequate information about the social scientists in the country, care should be taken to involve Angolans in research to the maximum extent possible. As a rule of thumb, work should be given to Angolan institutions and researchers when the necessary competence and capacity exist. When employing foreign consultants, these should always work with Angolan colleagues even if the main purpose is training. It is particularly important to involve Angolan researchers in all phases of the project cycle (i.e. planning, implementation, data-processing, writing and evaluation) and not only during field-work which very often is the case (Tvedten et al. 1999).

Institutional cooperation is an increasingly important part of efforts to further develop academic institutions in the South (Tvedten et al 1998.). In line with this, there are a number of collaborative agreements between universities and
independent research institutions in Norwegian development cooperation.\textsuperscript{11} In the case of Angola it seems particularly pertinent to establish links with Mozambique. In addition to sharing language and cultural background, the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) has been in a similar poor state of affairs as the Agostinho Neto University but is now in the process of rebuilding itself. It also has experience in establishing applied consultancy units within the university structures (Tvedten et al. 1999).

Improved research capacity is of little use if the issue of distribution of research results through articles, reports, seminars etc. is not taken sufficiently into consideration. In Angola more academically oriented research outputs have few potential outlets. More practically oriented research material (often commissioned by international aid organizations), tend to end up in shelves and cupboards.\textsuperscript{12} Aid organizations are normally not very good at distributing reports, evaluations etc., either because of neglect or unwillingness to share critical assessments of their own activities.

There are primarily two alternative types of initiatives to improve the accessibility of social science research in Angola. One is to give support to the development of new (or further developing existing) more academically oriented publications, possibly by paying social scientists small fees to produce articles and by covering costs for editing and printing. The other is to contribute to the development of systems making applied reports more easily accessible. The responsibility should preferably be located in Angolan institutions (the university, an NGO, the national library). If necessary in a transitional period, however, an aid organization should assume the responsibility to act as a central for other institutions that would have to commit themselves to supply all relevant literature.

In conclusion, with improved options for a situation of relative peace there will be a strong need for building up knowledge about the socio-economic conditions in post-conflict Angola. The current situation for the social sciences is very difficult, with a marginal academic role and limited options for constructive participation in policy formulation. To further develop the basis that is there and secure future recruitment, immediate interventions are necessary. The primary responsibility for enhancing the status and role of higher education in general and the social sciences in particular rests with the government. However, in a transition period the aid organizations have an important role to play.

We will end this section by forwarding the idea of a larger-scale national research project involving Angolan and foreign social scientists from various disciplines. A concerted effort of this type, with the objective of identifying key constraints for the alleviation of poverty, will represent a vital source of information for government and development institutions and an important catalyst for the development of social science research in Angola.

\textsuperscript{11} Cooperation of this type is envisaged to become part of the re-established Norwegian Peace Corps

\textsuperscript{12} Important exceptions are the Human Development Reports on Angola which have been given an accessible format.
Recent advances in research around “household livelihood strategies” makes it possible to combine micro- and macro studies in a systematic way and to develop comparative data from different regions in the country with relatively limited resources (Rakodi 1999, Moser 1998, Carney 1998). The focus is on household access to capital assets, and the effects of external variables on household livelihood strategies. Key capital assets include i) natural capital; physical/produced capital; financial capital; human capital, social capital and political capital. Key external variables include macro-economic fiscal and monetary policies; fiscal and public expenditure meso-policies; and particular circumstances of regional/local economies, settlements and households. By linking these approaches, one gets a systematic understanding of the most important internal and external factors influencing the livelihood strategies of Angola's poor and vulnerable population.
5. Literature and Web-Sites

5.1 Selected Literature on Angola


Minter, William (1990). Account from Angola. UNITA as Described by Ex-Participants and Foreign Visitors. Amsterdam: AWEEPA.


5.2 Web-Sites on Angola

http://www.africanews.org/angola
http://www.anc.org.za/angola
http://angola.org/reference
http://ebonet.net/noticias
http://inoticias.pt
http://news.bbc

5.3 General Literature


Annex 1. Terms of Reference

Terms of reference for landkompetanse på Angola

1. Bakgrunn

Det vises til kontrakt signert 24.03/22.04.99 mellom Direktoratet for Utviklingshjelp (NORAD) og Chr. Michelsens Institutt (CMI) vedrørende ekstern landkompetanse på Angola. Som landansvarlig (team leader) for Angola har CMI oppnevnt forsker Inge Tvedten. Det vises til årlig planleggingsmøte avholdt i NORAD 31.08.99 hvor partene ble enige om følgende oppgaver for 1999:

2. Arbeidsoppgaver

2.1 Konsulenten utarbeider en ressursside om Angola, med UD/NORAD og andre potensielle brukere som målgruppe. Siden skal inneholde: i) en oversikt over ressurspersoner som på ulike måter arbeider med Angola i Norge, ii) linker til relevant Angola-informasjon på nettet, iii) kortfattet bibliografi over relevant informasjon knyttet til historie, politikk, økonomi og samfunn.

2.2 Konsulenten skal utarbeide en årlig rapport om utviklingen i Angola for 1999.

Rapportens faste del skal inneholde:

Rapportens fleksible del skal inneholde:
- en generell oversikt over angolansk forvaltning, med spesiell referanse til de viktigste sektorer for norsk bistand (fisk, olje/energi, utdanning). Tilgangen til informasjon er begrenset og nærmere analyser av enkeltskenter vil eventuelt bli gjennomført som tilleggsopdrag.

3. Feltarbeidet

Feltarbeidet i Angola vil bli gjennomført i perioden mellom 12.11.99 og 12.12.99 og vil vare 1-2 uker. Feltarbeidet har to hovedmål:

- å oppdatere konsulenten om generelle utviklingstrekker i Angola slik at han skal være best mulig rustet til å oppfylle sine forpliktelser i forhold til brukere i NORAD/UD.

- å samle relevant informasjon i tilknytning til oppdraget under den årlige rapportens fleksible del.

Oslo, 5.11.99

Tore F. Gjøs
Seksjonssjef
Terms of Reference Country Report, Part I

1. Background

NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledge the need for assistance from external resources in the form of reviews of economic, social, political and cultural conditions in selected countries of principal co-operation to augment Norwegian country specific knowledge. This country report is intended to be one such devise for increased knowledge.

2. Objectives

The objectives of this kind of report is to complement NORAD’s and the Embassies’ knowledge about the selected countries of principal co-operation by increasing the understanding of economic and social conditions in the selected countries of principal co-operation and thereby increasing the competence to deal with economic, institutional and social problems.

As the amount of information and documentation from competent local and international organisations and agencies is huge, the need for external topical competence is to synthesise, analyse and evaluate the available information, to analyse general developmental trends, and possibly to participate in planning processes. Furthermore, in order to acquire an overall perspective of the present situation in these countries, it is also important to address other issues such as historical, cultural, sociological and political aspects.

3. Scope of work

To generate information to establish the necessary background knowledge, the work shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, presenting and assessing the following:

1. Economic and institutional indicators:
   - the selected countries’ present economic performance by looking at macro-economic trends, strengths and weaknesses;
   - possible bottlenecks to development of the economic sector;
   - current trends in national plans, policies and strategies to improve economic performance;
   - ongoing administrative reforms (Civil Service Reforms, Public Expenditure Reforms) and assess the domestic capacity, the resources available and the political will to undertake administrative reforms;
   - trends in public expenditures and income;
   - trends in bilateral and international agencies’ on-going and planned assistance to the country.
2. Social, political and cultural indicators

- the development in social indicators;
- to briefly describe obstacles to an effective implementation of development programmes;
- political will to reform the political system and to consolidate democracy, human rights and equality and to alleviate poverty.

The work shall be carried out through:

- desk studies;
- discussions with the authorities, local NGOs, and local researchers as well as bilateral and international development agencies;
- field visits to relevant business communities, libraries, universities and research communities.

4. Reporting

The reports are mainly for use by NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a tool to increase the quality and the effectiveness of the Norwegian development assistance to selected countries.

A draft report shall be presented NORAD for comments not later than two weeks after departure from the country to which NORAD shall submit comments within two weeks. A final report shall be presented to NORAD not later than two weeks after comments have been received from NORAD.

An oral presentation of the draft report shall be undertaken both to inform NORAD about the work process and to facilitate a discussion of the draft report to provide comments to the draft.

The report shall be written in English. NORAD shall receive 6 copies of the final report.
Annex 2. People Met

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>De Carvalho, Paulo</td>
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<td>CONSULTESTE. Pesquisa de Opinião Mercado e Consultoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ekker, Harald</td>
<td>Second Secretary</td>
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<td>Fransson, Kjerstin</td>
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<td>Rocha, Teresa</td>
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<td>Teixeira, Alfredo G.</td>
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<td>Representante em Angola</td>
<td>OIKOS. Cooperação e Desenvolvimento</td>
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</table>

* Telephone interview
Recent Reports

R 1999: 3  FIELDSTAD, Odd-Helge and Joseph Semboja
(Price NOK 90 + postage)

R 1999: 4  SUMAILA, Ussif Rashid et al.

R 1999: 5  TVEDTEN, Inge and Selma Nangulah

R 1999: 6  OFSTAD, Arve (ed.)

R 1999: 7  HODGE, James and Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås
Liberalization of trade in product services - the impact on developing countries. Bergen, 1999, 26 pp. (Price NOK 50 + postage)

R 1999: 8  GAIRDNER, David
The role of truth commissions in political transition in Chile and El Salvador. Bergen, 1999, 72 pp. (Price NOK 90 + postage)

R 2000: 1  SØREIDE, Tina

R 2000: 2  TVEDTEN, Inge with Hildegunn Kyvkk Nordås

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Summary

This is the first report on Angola under the Country Advisor Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and the Nordic Consulting Group (NCG). The report consists of two parts. Part I comprises an assessment and a synthesis of basic information regarding economic, political and social developments in the country. It devotes particular attention to the current politico-military situation in which UNITA seems to be suffering decisive military defeat, and the options for using Angolas vast oil income for economic and social development in a situation where relative peace appear promising. Part II gives an overview over the system of tertiary education and existing social science capacity in Angola. It is argued that the lack of updated and relevant information about socio-economic conditions in the country will be a major constraint in the planning and implementation of development policies and programmes.