

Palestinian Islamist movements: An annotated bibliography

Sindre Bangstad

R 2002: 21



Chr. Michelsen Institute *Development Studies and Human Rights*

CMI Reports

This series can be ordered from:

Chr. Michelsen Institute

P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen,

N-5892 Bergen, Norway

Tel: + 47 55 57 40 00

Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66

E-mail: cmi@cmi.no

www.cmi.no

Price: NOK 50

ISSN 0805-505X

ISBN 82-8062-041-9

This report is also available at:

www.cmi.no/public/pub2002

Indexing terms

Islam

Bibliographies

Palestine

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	V
ACRONYMS	VI
1. INTRODUCTION	1
PRINCIPLES OF SELECTION IN THIS BIBLIOGRAPHY	1
INTRODUCTION	1
DEFINING ISLAMISM/POLITICAL ISLAM.....	2
PALESTINIAN ISLAMISM: THE ORGANISATIONS	3
ANALYSING ISLAMISM IN PALESTINE: THE MAIN ISSUES	5
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS	6
2. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY	7
WORKS UNAVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF WRITING	31
3. LIST OF REFERENCES	32

Acknowledgements

This select annotated bibliography on Islamist movements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories has been funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) under the Chr. Michelsen Institute's agreement with the Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, Mu'watin. In the course of the work on this bibliography, I have been assisted by Are S. Knudsen (CMI) and the institute's librarians. I am indebted to Richard Moorsom for proof-reading of the manuscript. A field trip to Amsterdam in the Netherlands, Cairo in Egypt and Beirut in Lebanon during November-December 2002 provided an opportunity to meet with academics with competence in the field of political Islam in the Middle East and Palestine. I am grateful for their sharing of insights with me. However, responsibility for the points of view and the conclusions in the introduction to this bibliography rests entirely with the author. Please note that the use of transliterated Arabic terms in this bibliography has been kept to a minimum.

Acronyms

DoP	Declaration of Principles
Hamas	The Islamic Resistance Movement
IUC	Islamic University of Gaza
MP	Palestinian Model Parliament for Women and Legislation
PA	Palestinian Authority. See also under PNA.
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PNA	Palestinian National Authority. See also under PA.
PNC	Palestinian National Council
UNC/UNLU	Unified National Committee/ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising

1. Introduction

Principles of selection in this bibliography

The literature on political Islam in the Occupied Territories is extensive. Unfortunately, much of this literature is only available in Arabic or Hebrew, and hence inaccessible to the average Western reader. This bibliography presents an overview of selected material in English relating to the phenomenon of Islamist movements in the Occupied Territories. It is comprehensive, but not complete. The bibliography contains 60 abstracted works, and references to 10 additional works that have been unavailable at the time of writing. I have excluded material that does not significantly add to our knowledge of the phenomenon. For various reasons, some titles have been unavailable to the author of this bibliography at the time of compiling it. These are listed at the end of the bibliography. PhD dissertations on the topic, of which there appears to be a substantial number, have for instance not been included.

The intersection of military and academic interests in the field of political Islam is often articulated in rather stereotypical studies of Palestinian political Islam based on secondary sources. I see the academic task as a descriptive rather than a normative one, and would therefore concur in Hroub's view that the phenomena of the Palestinian Islamist movement require to be understood (Hroub 2000: 3). It is to be hoped that the use of multiple sources may contribute to a more multidimensional understanding of Palestinian Islamism. In the abstracts, I have chosen to emphasise parts of the specific work cited that suggest motives for the emergence of a Palestinian political Islam.

Introduction

The outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza in December 1987 signalled a challenge to the Palestinian secular nationalist leadership in exile on two fronts: firstly, by an indigenous leadership of young activists in Fatah; and secondly, by local activists with an Islamic orientation. There is general consensus that activists from Islamic Jihad (*Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami*) prepared the ground for the spontaneous revolt that came to be known as the *Intifada* by mounting a military campaign in Gaza in the months prior to the outbreak of the uprising. A few days into the Intifada, a group called the Islamic Resistance Movement, later known by its acronym Hamas (*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*), was launched. Islamic Jihad and Hamas had a common ancestry. Islamic Jihad and Hamas were established by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Occupied Territories. Islamic Jihad was established in 1981 as a splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas Hamas was established in 1987 by Muslim Brotherhood leaders from Gaza.

The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, an offspring of Hassan al-Banna's Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) in Egypt, had been present in Palestine since the 1930s. Former members of the Brotherhood were central in

the establishment of the Fatah faction of the secular-nationalist PLO in the 1960s.

During the Six-Day War in 1967, Israeli military forces occupied Gaza and the West Bank. Opposition to the occupation mainly came from Palestinian nationalists. In the shadow of the occupation, the Palestinian Islamist movement increased its support among Palestinians through a growing number of mosques, educational institutions and charitable associations.

The Israeli civil and military administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territories turned a blind eye to this development, since it undermined support in the Palestinian population for the nationalists. Israeli authorities saw the Muslim Brotherhood as less menacing than the secular forces of Palestinian nationalism, since the former did not engage in any violent resistance against the occupation. In fact, among Palestinians the Muslim Brotherhood was in the 1960s and 70s discredited due to their non-commitment to armed resistance.

The tables have now turned. Popular discontent with the lack of progress in the quest for an independent Palestinian state, with a corrupt and autocratic Palestinian Authority, and with expanding Israeli settlements led to the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 (Shikaki 2002). More than the other political factions in Palestinian society, the Islamists have capitalised on the breakdown of the Oslo process. Opinion polls have indicated widespread support for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians among the Palestinian population.

Defining Islamism/Political Islam

Even if it has become commonplace to describe certain contemporary movements in the Muslim world as expressions of political Islam or Islamism, precise definitions of the phenomena are rarely found in the academic literature. It seems that the Israeli Middle East expert Martin Kramer was the first academic to use the term political Islam in a treatise written in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979 (Kramer 1980). Kramer applied the term to any advocate of an Islamic order in the Muslim world, and therefore mistakenly lumped together a variety of movements, such as Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, and the Khomeini regime under the rubric of political Islam. If one sticks to a minimalist definition of political Islam, in which it is taken to mean “the religion of Islam as applied to a militant, political purpose” (Karamé 1996: 199), Kramer’s usage may ring true. Later analysts however seem to have been more restrictive in the application of the term (Ayubi 1991, Burgat 2003). The term political Islam is often used interchangeably with terms like *Islamism* and/or *Islamic fundamentalism*. Roy (1994: ix) defines Islamism as “a contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology”. The term Islamism may be preferable to the term political Islam, since the latter term seems to imply a division between politics and religion in the Islamic tradition, which has never existed.

Esposito (1995: 250) emphasises the importance of local context in accounting for the variations of political Islam, and points to “recurrent themes” in political Islam. These recurrent themes are: “the belief that existing political, economic and social systems [have] failed; a disenchantment with and at times rejection of the West; a quest for identity and greater authenticity; and

the conviction that Islam provides a self-sufficient ideology for state and society, a valid alternative to secular nationalism, socialism and capitalism.” The aim of most, if not all, movements within political Islam or Islamism, is the establishment of an Islamic state in which Islamic Law, *shari’a*, is applied to every field of society (cfr. Utvik 1993). This has often brought these movements into conflict with secular regimes in the Middle East.

Within political Islam or Islamism, there is a variety of perspectives on how this change may be effected. Referring to movements within political Islam, Kepel (1989) distinguishes between “Islamisation from below” and “Islamisation from above”. In the former version, the establishment of an Islamic state is assumed to be the end result of a gradual process of Islamic revival among the citizens, whereas in the latter version, an overthrow of the existing regime is the means through which the Islamic state is imposed. The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt has been central to many Islamist movements in the Middle East. “Islamisation from below” can be traced back to Hasan al-Banna, whereas “Islamisation from above” can be traced back to Sayyid Qutb. Both were members of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, but they operated under quite different socio-political circumstances.

In the Occupied Territories, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami’ (The Islamic Liberation Party, see below) historically gravitated towards “Islamisation from below”, whilst Islamic Jihad focused on “Islamisation from above” by means of revolution. Hamas has come to embody both approaches.

Palestinian Islamists generally appear to constitute an exceptional case in the literature on political Islamic movements in the Middle East. The violence perpetrated by Palestinian Islamist movements has not been directed primarily at secular authorities in their own societies. There is no Palestinian state, only a provisional authority, hence this stands to reason. The relationship between the Islamists in Palestine and the Palestinian Authority has however been strained, and has led to temporary eruptions of internecine violence. The dominant narrative, which structures much of the Western academic scholarship on political Islam in the Middle East, is at present one in which Islamist movements are perceived as being on the wane throughout the region (cf. Roy (1994), Kepel (2002)). Roy’s and Kepel’s analyses hinge on a selective application of elements central to Islamism. Their analyses may be too static and state-centric. For sure, Islamist movements in the Middle East have generally failed in assuming state power, establishing an Islamic state and imposing *shari’a*. But as a consequence, their strategies and goals have in many cases changed.

In many Middle Eastern countries, social services are heavily dominated by Islamists. This ensures popular support for Islamists. This is also the case in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, where Hamas has provided a modicum of social security for underprivileged Palestinians (Hroub 2000: 236-238).

Palestinian Islamism: The organisations

For the purposes of this bibliography and in the context of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, when I refer to Islamism in its organisational form, I am referring to the following movements:

- (1) The Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas. Hamas was established as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in December 1987. Despite active involvement in the Intifada, Hamas leaders had contacts with the Israeli civilian administration until early 1989. The Israeli authorities' perception of Hamas changed as a result of Hamas' involvement in the murder of two Israeli soldiers in April 1989. Hamas was prohibited, and membership declared illegal by the Israeli authorities in December 1989. Hamas' military wing, the *Kata'ib al-Shahid 'Izz ed-Din al-Qassam* (Brigades of the Martyr 'Izz ed-Din al-Qassam), was founded in 1991. The Qassam Brigades carried out a series of armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers and assassinations of alleged Palestinian collaborators between 1989 and 1994. Several hundred members of Hamas were expelled to Israeli-occupied South Lebanon in 1992. In response to the Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre in Hebron in February 1994, the Qassam Brigades launched their first suicide bomb attack targeting Israeli civilians on 6 April 1994 in Afula, Israel, and have since continued such attacks. Hamas has consistently opposed the Oslo Accords and the Declaration of Principles on the grounds that the organisation is opposed to recognition of the state of Israel within the territory of the historical Palestine. Hamas seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine in which shari'a is implemented.
- (2) Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad consists of four different groups that emerged in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the early 1980s. The largest group, the Shiqaqi-Awda Faction, was founded in 1979 by Fathi Shiqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda. By 1981 it had established a presence in Gaza. The Islamic Jihad groups are heavily influenced by the Iranian revolution, and broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood due to the reluctance of the latter to engage in military resistance against Israeli occupation. Islamic Jihad seeks to impose an Islamic state through armed revolution aimed at ending the Israeli occupation. The militants in Islamic Jihad conducted a military campaign in the Gaza strip prior to the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, took part in the uprising from the first phase, and suffered severe losses due to Israeli reprisals against its leading cadres. The external leadership of the Shiqaqi-Awda Faction is based in Damascus, Syria. Islamic Jihad is opposed to the Oslo Accords and the DoP. It has limited popular support. The two armed wings of the Islamic Jihad (*Kata'ib Sayf al-Islam al-Quwah al-Islamiyya al-Mujahidah* and *Saraya al-Quds*) have been responsible for a series of suicide attacks against Israelis since 1994.
- (3) The Islamic Liberation Party (*Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami*). Founded in 1953 by Sheikh Taqi ad-Din an-Nabahani, a former Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood member from the West Bank town of Tulkaram. The organisation has never managed to attract mass support in Palestinian society. It has its strongest base in conservative sectors of Palestinian society, most significantly in Hebron on the West Bank. The party advances the idea of a pan-Arab Islamic state (a single Arabic state united under Islam), is opposed both to the establishment of a Palestinian entity and to the Oslo Accords and the Declaration of Principles, but has never engaged in armed

resistance against Israeli occupation. The motivation for this appears to be that the party regards the emergence of a caliphate as the essential precondition for engaging in military resistance against 'infidel' forces. The party is active in several European, African and Asian countries.

A fourth Palestinian Islamist group, *Hizb al-Khalas al-Watani al-Islami* (or *Khalas*), which emerged in 1995 and is based in Gaza, has to our knowledge not been the subject of any academic studies so far, and has therefore been excluded from this bibliography except for one reference. The same applies to small groups such as *al-Salafiyyun*, *al-Jam'iyya al-Islam'iyya* and *al-Jam'iyya al-Salah al-Islamiyya*.

Analysing Islamism in Palestine: The main issues

The so-called "war on terror" has implied that the violent acts perpetrated by Islamist movements are increasingly seen as reflections of an inherently violent ideology, rather than as contingent and contextual responses to particular situations. Parties to the conflict opposed to Israeli and US influence in the region are to an increasing extent defined as terrorists. Groups and individuals defined as terrorists are placed outside of the sphere in which human rights apply, and their human rights are violated through extra-judicial assassinations, torture and detention without trial.

When analysing the social composition of Islamist groups in the Occupied Territories, the authors often seem to reproduce the central tenets of Saad Eddin Ebrahim's analysis of the social background of 'Islamic activists' in Egypt. In his classic article from 1980, *Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups*, Ebrahim found that these activists were predominantly urban, educated and middle-class to lower-middle-class individuals. In a later contribution to the literature, Ebrahim indicated that in terms of the social composition of activist Islamic groups, there had been a shift towards rural, uneducated and poor individuals in the course of the 1980s (Ebrahim 1995). In the case of Palestinian Islamist groups, there is reason to believe that their social composition is as complex an issue as that of Egyptian Islamic activism. Since there have been relatively few micro-level studies of Palestinian Islamist movements thus far (but see Jensen 1998), one does not have sufficient information about this to draw definite conclusions.

However, it should be noted that grass-roots support for the proponents of political Islam in the Occupied Palestinian Territories goes beyond the deeply religious. Hroub (2000: 5) asserts that fluctuations in the balance of power among Palestinian groups and in their share of public support are contingent on how well they embody the state of resistance. In other words, the extensive support for political Islamic movements within Palestinian society in times of confrontation with the Israeli state does not necessarily tell us anything significant about the general level of support for the ideology of political Islam within the Palestinian population.

Nor should the support for Islamism among the Palestinians be regarded as an index of Palestinian religiosity (cf. Norton 1995). The ideology of Islamism as applied to the Palestinian situation is not stable, but in constant flux. The flow of persons between secular-nationalist and Islamist movements is

documented in the available literature (cf. Rekhess 1990: 196-97), and indicates that ideology may be of lesser importance to supporters and activists. The challenge for the Palestinian Islamists in the course of the Oslo process was to reconcile their utopian aims with the political realities. The internal debate within Hamas in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords testifies to the potential for moderation and temporary compromise if and when a political settlement acceptable to the Palestinian populace is reached. Palestinian Islamists' acts of terror against Israeli civilians reveal a highly rational calculus based on the notion of retaliation. For Palestinian Islamists, violence may indeed seem to be politics through other means. The shift towards suicide bombings against Israeli civilians occurred after the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in Hebron in 1994, and suicide bombings have intensified whenever Palestinian Islamists have been assassinated by Israeli security forces.

This fact dispels the notion prevalent in much current writing on Islamism, in which it is argued that violence is inherent in Islamist ideology. Many of the works included in this bibliography contend that the Palestinian Islamists' main interest is in protecting their social and religious institutions. The PA's crackdown on this infrastructure in the period between 1996 and 1999, and in particular after the signing of the Wye Accords in 1998, proved that this was impossible. The Wye Accords obliged the PA to act against the Palestinian Islamists in order to guarantee the security of Israelis, and thereby created fractures within PLO/Fatah. Younger Fatah leaders, such as the imprisoned Marwan Barghouti, were sympathetic to co-operation with the Islamists. It therefore stands to reason that the Wye Accords may have contributed significantly to the drift towards the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000.

General observations

In the course of the work on this bibliography, it has become clear that the study of Islamism or political Islam in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is dominated by a small segment of academics with similar backgrounds and characteristics. To an overwhelming extent, the researchers are male, have Israeli or U.S citizenship, and come from a background in terrorism and/or security studies (also cf. Milton-Edwards 2002).

In a highly charged political field, in which normative orientations often take the place of reasoned analysis, this surely has implications for perceptions and findings. The literature on Islamism in Palestine is revealing of the priorities of academics in the field: references to Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' are scarce, whereas there is a vast number of references to Hamas. It seems plausible that this reflects the biases of a field in which the organisation that is perceived as having the greatest potential for violence is accorded most scholarly attention. This reinforces preconceived notions of what Islamism is all about. Secondly, the studies referenced in this bibliography are almost exclusively based on textual and/or oral sources, rather than participant observation. Discourse is given priority over practice. Norton (1995) criticises the tendency to focus on the statements of the ideologues and spokesmen of Islamist movements, rather than their supporters. The studies included in this bibliography in general constitute no exception in this regard.

2. Annotated bibliography

Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). "HAMAS: a Historical and Political Background." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22(4): 5-19.

The author argues that the Islamic movement in the Occupied Territories only evolved as a popular force of significance during the first Intifada. Prior to this, it had been discredited through evading armed confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces. Abu-Amr claims that the basis of the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood was disillusionment with the nationalists in the Palestinian population. He points to a deterioration in Hamas' relations with Saudi Arabia and other sources of funding in the Gulf states after the Gulf War in 1991, and refers to claims that Iran has provided military training for Hamas activists in Iran and Lebanon, as well as direct financial support to Hamas. Abu-Amr suggests that Hamas will gain from PLO failures in the future.

Keywords: Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, PLO

Abu-Amr, Z. (1993). *Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism and Democracy. Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. E. Kaufman, S. B. Abed and R. L. Rothstein (eds). Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

In this essay, the views of Palestinian Islamists on pluralism and democracy are presented. The author introduces a distinction between Islamist movements in Arab countries and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. For the latter, the struggle for national liberation provides the immediate context for their deliberations on the issue of Islamic rule. Consequently, Abu-Amr claims that Palestinian Islamists have "no authentic positions or articulations of their own" on the issues of pluralism and democracy. Their bottom line is that democracy is a Western concept. But political pluralism will on the other hand be accepted by Palestinian Islamists in the absence of an Islamic state, since it serves their interests. Local elections are under the prevailing circumstances also acceptable, since it will reveal the strength of the Islamists vis-à-vis the PLO, according to the former. Under Islamic rule, however, no political parties with non-Islamic ideologies will be tolerated. Abu-Amr sees the discourse on democracy and multiparty elections among Palestinian Islamists as mere tactical manoeuvring.

Keywords: Islamists, pluralism, Hamas, Islamic Jihad

Abu-Amr, Z. (1994). *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*. Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press.

The author distinguishes between an Islamic and a nationalist trend in Palestinian society. These trends are mutually opposed both politically and ideologically. He emphasises as an important factor the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was not subjected to the same treatment as PLO-Fatah prior to the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, since the movement at this point did not advocate violent resistance. The Israeli authorities assumed that the growth of Islamic groups and a spread of their influence would weaken the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza. The first Intifada erupted without a conscious decision

from any organised group. Abu-Amr claims that the supporters of Islamic Jihad come mainly from refugee camps and poor neighbourhoods in Gaza. He regards Islamic Jihad as more militant, and more reluctant to compromise with Israel than the Muslim Brotherhood.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PLO

Abu-Amr, Z. (1997). Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and the Origins of Hamas. *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*. R. S. Appleby (ed). Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press: 225-256.

This essay, a contribution to a collection of essays on Islamist leaders in the Middle East, profiles Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the ideological leader of Hamas. Yasin comes from what was a relatively wealthy family in pre-1948 Palestine. As a refugee in Gaza after the war of 1948, Yasin grew up in poverty. In post-war Gaza, only the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists were politically active. Quadriplegic after an accident at the age of 16, and unable to afford higher education, Yasin became a committed member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu-Amr suggests that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza after the 1967 war, and the weakening of secular Arab nationalism that this defeat implied, provided a context for the rise of the Palestinian Islamic Movement. As a preacher in Gaza, Yasin turned the mosque into a centre of learning and a place for political organisation, according to Abu-Amr. Further influence for Yasin was provided through the Muslim Brotherhood's control of the *waqf* organisation in Gaza. The *waqf* organisation controls 10 percent of all real estate in Gaza. Yasin's influence also grew out of his role as a leader to whom Gazans turned for mediation and arbitration in civil disputes under the first intifada. Abu-Amr regards Yasin's endorsement of multiparty systems as a mere tactical move, and concludes that what Yasin has provided is situational leadership, i.e. a leadership that responds to the requirements of its own environment.

Keywords: Yasin, Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas

Al- Ayid, K. (1999). "The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview with Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28(4): 61-73.

In this translated interview, the secretary general of Islamic Jihad, Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah, who assumed this post after the assassination of Fathi Shiqaqi by Mossad agents in 1995, presents Islamic Jihad's views on the conflict with the state of Israel, and describes the origins of the Islamic Jihad movement. Shallah confirms that armed resistance against Israeli occupation is first in the order of priorities for Islamic Jihad, and that Islamic Jihad's position is that peace in the region requires the physical removal of Israel, rather than negotiations and compromise. Furthermore, the ideological and financial importance of the Iranian revolution to Islamic Jihad is addressed.

Keywords: Keywords: Shallah, Islamic Jihad, Iranian revolution

Al-Jarbawi, A. (1994). "The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Oslo Accord." *The Muslim World* LXXXIV(1-2): 127-154.

The article presents the position of Hamas and other Palestinian Islamist movements on the Oslo Accords and the DoP of 1994. It is revealed that there

have been ambivalent positions on the issue of negotiations with Israel even within the Islamic Jihad. With regard to Hamas, the author suggests that the DoP forced Hamas onto the defensive, and brought about a challenge to the harmony between the movement's principles and its practical approaches to politics. With reference to Hamas' stance on the Oslo Accords and the DoP, Al-Jarbawi argues that it is difficult to alter a political position when this position is based on religious principles. However, he demonstrates that Hamas has pursued a policy of open options in response to the Oslo Accords, by both opposing the accords and entertaining the possibility of working within the framework of the accords. This points to the existence of elements within Hamas that differ in terms of perspectives, means, agendas and policies. The policy of open options would allow Hamas to benefit whatever the outcome of the peace process.

Keywords: Islamists, the Oslo Accord, Hamas, Islamic Jihad

Andoni, L. (1997). "Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide Bombers." *Journal of Palestine Studies* **26**(4): 33-45.

This article narrates the story of two Palestinian militants from Al-Shati'i refugee camp and the Shaykh Ridwan District in Gaza who were killed in attacks on Israeli soldiers in Tel Aviv and Netzarim in 1994. The author emphasises their common itineraries as Fatah-aligned activists during the first Intifada who gradually became disillusioned with the peace process. Eventually, Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attacks in which they were killed. The article includes a detailed description of the socio-economic circumstances of residents in Gaza, and of the harassment inflicted on Gazans by Israeli forces.

Keywords: Suicide bombers, Islamic Jihad, Gaza

Barghouti, I. (1991). "Religion and Politics among the Students of Najah National University." *Middle Eastern Studies* **27**(2): 203-218.

This article draws on survey data from a socio-political study of university students in the West Bank prior to 1987. Najah National University in Nablus is the largest Palestinian university, and has both secular and religious faculties. It was historically a nationalist-dominated university. According to the author, the aim of the article is to determine the correlation between the degree of religious observance and socio-political positions among student respondents. As measured in terms of religious observance, Barghouti finds that male students are less religious than female students, that students from Gaza are more religious than students from the West Bank, and that students from merchant families are less religious than those from worker families. Furthermore, the author finds that religious observance is still negatively related to political activism. Based on printed material issued by the various political factions at the university campus, he suggests that for the Islamists among Najah's students issues of personal morality appear to be more important than the Israeli occupation. The author indicates that students are the most active segment of the Palestinian population in resisting the Israeli occupation since they are free from the constraints imposed by regular contact with the Israeli economy.

Keywords: Najah University, Palestinian students, Muslim Brotherhood

Barghouti, I. (1995). The Islamists in Jordan and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. *The Islamist Dilemma: the Political Role of Islamist Movements*. L. Guazzone (ed). London, Ithaca Press: 129-160.

Provides an outline of the Islamist movement in Palestine and in Jordan by presenting the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoot Hamas, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' Islamic Liberation Party and Islamic Jihad. It is noted that the interest taken in the Palestinian question by Hamas represents a qualitative shift in the Muslim Brotherhood's position on the Palestinian national problem. The author claims that the Palestinian Islamist movement is dominated by intellectuals and has a weak support base among Palestinian workers. He points out that the movement in general is stronger in areas traditionally considered conservative, such as Gaza, Hebron and Nablus, but weaker in Bethlehem, Ramallah and Jerusalem. An explication of the Palestinian Islamists' stance on the Gulf War in 1991 is also offered.

Keywords: Islamists, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami'

Darwish, B. K. (1996). "Arafat and the Islamists: Conflict or Cooperation?" *Current History*(January 1996): 28-32.

The author suggests that Hamas has tried to sketch out a position of compromise with regard to the PNA. She claims that Arafat's authoritarianism in the post-Oslo era was a result of the conditions under which the PNA was born, and of the requirements imposed by Israel on the PNA. Kodmani sees full recognition of the Islamist movement as a responsible opposition movement by the PNA as the only solution for the latter to avoid full confrontation with Hamas.

Keywords: PNA, Hamas, Arafat, Fatah

Farouki, S. T. (2000). "Islamists and the Threat of *Jihad*: Hizb al-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews." *Middle Eastern Studies* **36**(4): 21-46.

This article analyses the political rhetoric and practice of Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' and its London-based offshoot al-Muhajiroun with regard to the state of Israel. The author demonstrates that even if Hezb al-Tahrir was established in the context of post-1948 Palestine, Palestine has never been the predominant focus of this elitist group. Hezb al-Tahrir sees the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 as an attempt by the Christian West to avenge the Muslim reconquest of Jerusalem in 1187. The politics of the Muslim world is understood in terms of a perpetual competition for influence between the UK and the USA. The party condemns the peace process, and claims that Muslims are obliged to liberate territories that historically have belonged to the domain of Islam. While the group maintains that holy war, *jihad*, is an individual obligation on all Muslims whose land has been occupied, it posits the existence of a caliphal state as a precondition for launching jihad. Hezb al-Tahrir has therefore never taken part in armed resistance to Israeli occupation. The author concludes that it is not always possible to assume militancy on the basis of Islamists' threats of jihad.

Keywords: Islamism, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', Jihad

Gaess, R. (1998). "Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab." *Middle East Policy* 6(1): 116-120.

In this interview, conducted in November 1997, Ismail Abu Shanab, a founder member and a leader of Hamas in Gaza, states Hamas' views on the PA and on Israel. Shanab also served as the first chairman of Khalas, the Islamic party founded in 1996. He belongs to the moderate faction of Hamas, and was among those who entertained the idea of Hamas taking part in the Palestinian elections of 1996. He emphasises that there is a division of roles rather than a division of thought between Khalas and Hamas. Khalas' aim, according to Shanab, is to present an Islamic viewpoint on internal political issues under PA rule, rather than to resist the Israeli occupation, as Hamas does. In this interview, he repeats the demand for an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967 as a precondition for a ceasefire. Shanab claims that Hamas is not out to destroy Israel, and refers to peace in separate states, i. e. a two-state solution. Shanab threatens "another explosion directed at our enemies" if Israeli pressure on the Palestinians continues.

Keywords: Khalas, Hamas, PA

Hajjar, L. (1993). "The Islamist Movements in the Occupied Territories: An Interview with Iyad Barghouti." *Middle East Report*(183): 9-12.

In this interview Iyad Bargouthi, a professor in sociology at the al-Najah University in Nablus, explains his understanding of the phenomenon of the Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. He notes that Hamas has a lot of popularity among young Palestinians, but states that he does not think that this has much to do with religion. Much of the support for Islamist groups, he contends, is in effect a critique of other Palestinian groups rather than support for Islamist politics. Barghouti claims that there is no real debate among people who identify with Hamas about women's rights and roles, democratisation and the role of Islam in national politics. These issues are sidelined by the struggle against Israel and competition with the PLO.

He regards the funding available to religious institutions as an important source of popularity for the Islamist movements.

Keywords: Islamism, Hamas

Hammami, R. (1997). From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women's Movement, and National Identity in the Intifada. *Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report*. J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris: 194-210.

The author uses an incident from the first intifada in 1987 as the starting point for an analysis of the changing views on the roles of Palestinian women that evolved in the course of the intifada.

In 1989, young boys in Gaza started to vent their anger against local women who were not wearing headscarves. In the months that followed, many Palestinian women donned headscarves for fear of such boys. In this manner, an issue previously consigned to the religious arena had turned into a nationalist one. Hammami takes issue with analysts such as Edward Said, who were inclined to see the first Intifada as enabling a social and political liberation of Palestinian women. Whereas the Islamist movement had tried to impose the wearing of headscarves on educated, urban, and petit bourgeois women (who in

general were less likely to wear them) in the 1970s, by 1989 the wearing of headscarves had turned into a signifier of women's commitment to the liberation of Palestine. The author implies that the PA on the ground continues to compete with Hamas by invoking a discourse of social morality that constrains the freedom of Palestinian women.

Keywords: Islamists, Palestinian women, Intifada

Hassan, N. (2001). "An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the "Human Bombs"." *The New Yorker* 77(36): 36-41.

Based on 250 interviews with militants in the Islamist movements in Palestine between 1996 and 1999, their families and instructors, the author provides an exploration into the background of suicide bombers or 'martyrs', and details the phases of suicide missions. She notes that the suicide bombers, who in age ranged from 18 to 38 years, did not conform to the profile of suicidal persons. None appeared to be desperately poor, uneducated or depressed. Over 50 per cent were refugees from present Israel. In their communities, they were regarded as model youths, and most were bearded and deeply religious. Hassan claims that martyrdom in the form of suicide missions was first advocated by Islamic Jihad's Fathi Shiqaqi in 1988. By the early 1990s, Hamas' 'engineer' Yahyya Ayyash (assassinated by the Israelis in 1996) had recommended its use by Hamas too. For both, such operations were designed to inflict damage on Israeli society on a much larger scale than had been possible in the course of the first Intifada. According to Hassan, the costs of a suicide operation are extremely low, on average about \$150. Militants in both Hamas and Islamic Jihad claim that the number of volunteers for suicide operations by far exceeds the number of people who eventually become suicide bombers. In the selection of suicide bombers volunteers that are under 18 (the age requirement has since been lowered), are sole providers or are married are generally turned down. The ability to pass as an Israeli is also taken into account when selecting candidates for suicide operations.

Keywords: Suicide bombers, Islamic Jihad, Hamas

Hatina, M. (1997). "Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Movement." *Orient* 38(1): 107-120.

The article explores the Iranian support of Palestinian Islamic movements, such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas. At the outset, it is pointed out that the historical split between Sunnis and Shiites curtailed the export of the Iranian Islamic revolution. In the case of the Islamic Jihad organisations, the author finds that these organisations expressed ideological and political loyalty to the Iranian revolution. Islamic Jihad downplayed the significance of inter-denominational differences between Shiites and Sunnis. Islamic Jihad has leaned heavily on material support from and operational co-ordination with Hizbu'llah, the pro-Iranian Shiite group in Lebanon.

Hamas, on the other hand, has proceeded cautiously in its relations with Iran so as not to compromise its support among the Sunni Palestinians or its financial support from Sunni Arab Islamist movements. Central leaders in Hamas have advocated that fostering good relations with the latter has priority in comparison with relations with Iran.

Keywords: Iran, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizbu'llah

Hatina, M. (1999). " Hamas and the Oslo Accords: Religious Dogma in a Changing Political Reality." *Mediterranean Politics* 4(3): 37-55.

In this article, the author claims that Hamas has managed to adapt to the new realities in the Occupied Territories created by the Oslo Accords without significantly moderating its ideological outlook. According to Hatina, Hamas was created in an attempt to bridge the gaps within the Muslim Brotherhood between the older generation of leaders and a much more confrontational and better educated younger generation, and in order to compete with the PLO for the leadership of Palestinians. In the post-Oslo phase, the external leadership of Hamas, which in general held a more extreme line on relations with the PA and on the armed struggle with Israel, gained power at the expense of the internal leadership. However, the author opines that the frictions within Hamas post-Oslo pertained more to a choice of tactical means than to an actual change in the vision of an Islamic Palestinian state. Hence, the accommodation with the PA did not reflect ideological motivation, but rather political realism. The author concludes that the weight of Hamas within Palestinian society will depend on the degree of success of Palestinian nationalism on issues such as social welfare and Palestinian independence.

Keywords: The Oslo Accords, Hamas, PA

Hatina, M. (2001). *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: the Islamic Jihad Movement*. Tel Aviv, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.

In the most comprehensive survey of the Islamic Jihad movement to date, the author analyses the background to Islamic Jihad, its discourse, and significant events in its military confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces. The Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Occupied Territories is a conglomerate of factions sharing a common ideological ground, namely the emphasis on the liberation of Palestine through armed *jihad*. According to Hatina, the most important faction, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, led by Fathi Shiqaqi and Abdul Aziz Awda, emerged in Gaza in the early 1980s. It grew out of the discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood's reluctance at that time to engage in military resistance against the Israeli occupation. The political discourse of Islamic Jihad blends nationalism and Islamism. The liberation of Palestine is however prior to an Islamisation of Palestinian society in the order of priorities of Islamic Jihad. Ideologically, Islamic Jihad draws on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Sayyid Qutb), Islamic militant groups in Egypt (Mohammed Al-Faraj) and the Islamic revolution in Iran. During the first Intifada, Fatah supported Islamic Jihad groups in an unofficial operational alliance, in order to undermine popular support for Hamas. When Shiqaqi and Awda were expelled to Lebanon by Israel in 1988, the influence of Iran and Hizbu'llah on Islamic Jihad increased. As was the case in Hamas, the internal leadership of Islamic Jihad advocated accommodation with the Palestinian Authority, but the external leadership in Lebanon and Syria opposed this.

Islamic Jihad has been consistently opposed to the Oslo Accords, and the author emphasises that in contradistinction to Hamas and PLO-Fatah, the centre of gravity in Islamic Jihad lies outside the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Hatina appears to regard Islamic Jihad as a typical Islamist

phenomenon, in the sense that it is largely composed of educated and urban young people with a sense of alienation.

Keywords: Islamic Jihad, Hamas, PA, Iran, Hizbu'llah

Hijazi, H. (1995). "Hamas: waiting for Nationalism to Self-Destruct: An Interview with Mahmud Zahar." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24(3): 81-88.

In this interview, Mahmud Zahhar, Hamas' spokesman in Gaza, outlines Hamas' views on the Palestinian elections in 1995, on secular nationalism in the Arab world, as well as on relations with the PA.

He justifies Hamas' decision not to take part in the elections to the PLC and to the office of president by pointing to overall Israeli control over the peace process, which the movement finds unacceptable. Zahhar emphasises that civil war in Palestinian society constitutes a red line which Hamas will not cross at any price, and argues that with time, the "contradictions" of the PA will be revealed. Due to these inherent contradictions, Zahhar argues that Hamas need not be confrontational towards the PA. He predicts that the internal conflict between segments in Fatah and the PA will erupt sooner or later.

Keywords: Zahhar, Hamas, Khalas, elections, PA

Hroub, K. (2000). *Hamas: political thought and practice*. Washington, D.C, Institute for Palestine Studies.

In this book, based on interviews with prominent Hamas leaders and on analyses of Hamas' official statements, the author presents Hamas as "a response to the cruel circumstances of life under occupation". Hroub purports to present Hamas as Palestinians view it, that is, as a "multi-dimensional" political movement. Hroub suggests that Hamas' grass-roots support goes beyond the deeply religious, and that Hamas' share of public support is contingent on how well it embodies the state of resistance. The emergence of Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the 1980s is seen as crucial to the shift towards armed struggle in the Muslim Brotherhood. Hroub criticises authors who suggest that Hamas were latecomers to the first intifada in 1987, and claims that Hamas was established a few days into the uprising.

He claims that Hamas' conflict with the state of Israel is based on acts of aggression by the latter, and not on differences in religious ideology between these parties. Hamas' vacillation on the Oslo Accords often masked simple confusion. Hroub concludes that if a settlement with Israel acceptable to most Palestinians were reached, Hamas' vision of an Islamic Palestinian State would be defeated.

Keywords: Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, PA, Oslo Accords

Human Rights Watch (2002). *Erased in a Moment: Suicide bombing attacks on Israeli civilians*. New York, Washington, London & Brussels, Human Rights Watch: 172.

This Human Rights Watch report covers suicide bombings against Israeli civilians in the period between 20 September 2000 and 31 August 2002. It includes sections on the background to and involvement of Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. The report reveals that in terms of inflicting Israeli civilian casualties, Hamas has been the most destructive of the militant Palestinian groups. In the period under

review, 168 Israelis, including 153 civilians, were killed in suicide bombing attacks for which Hamas claimed responsibility. This constitutes 64 % of all Israelis killed in suicide bombing attacks in the period. Hamas has claimed responsibility for 37 % of all suicide bombing attacks in the period. The report also reveals that a relatively higher number of victims are Israeli military personnel in the case of suicide bombing attacks claimed by Islamic Jihad. The report concludes that the repeated attacks on Israeli civilians by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada meet the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity. According to the report, the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad appear to be criminal offenders under international humanitarian law for having encouraged and endorsed suicide attacks against Israeli civilians.

Keywords: Suicide bombing attacks, international humanitarian laws, Hamas, Islamic Jihad

Inbar, E. (1997). Islamic Extremism and the Peace Process. *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East*. E. Inbar and B. Maddy-Weitzman (eds). London, Frank Cass: 199-215.

This is an analysis of the capabilities of Islamists (or "Islamic extremists") in the Middle East to derail the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians after Oslo. Inbar claims that the ultimate goal of Palestinian Islamists concerning Israel is politicide, i.e. the obliteration of a political entity. Palestinian Islamists are therefore adamantly opposed to the peace process, and represent a significant threat since they appear to have a low sensitivity to cost. In the view of this author, Palestinian terrorism ought not to be considered a major problem for Israel, as it does not threaten the state's basic existence. In his perception, Islamism will not disappear as a result of economic and social engineering by the largely secular elites of Middle Eastern countries.

Keywords: Islamists, peace process

Jensen, M. I. (1998). Islamism and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip. *Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities*. A. Mousalli (ed). Reading, Ithaca Press: 197-220.

In this essay, the author takes his lead from A.R. Norton's observation that scholarship on the phenomenon on Islamism has been overly textual, to the detriment of sociological analyses. Jensen provides an overview of the history of the Islamic social institutions in the Gaza Strip, as well as a sociological profile of the male members of an Islamic sports club in Gaza. He notes that "moderate Islamists" (i.e. Hamas) believe that the reform of the individual is a prerequisite for the transformation of society, and argues that Hamas has never abandoned this conviction, even whilst giving priority to the armed resistance against Israeli occupation. According to the author, Islamic NGOs in the Gaza Strip operate in the fields of education and social and health care. In explaining the increased levels of support for the Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jensen points to the failure of Palestinian nationalism to fulfil the aspirations of Palestinians, indirect Israeli assistance in order to weaken the PLO, the massive support for Islamists from the Gulf states after 1973, and the role of Hezbu'llah in Lebanon in providing an example of an Islamist movement that was able to end Israeli occupation. He indicates that

sports are seen as an important element in attracting Palestinians towards Islamic institutions by Hamas' leaders. The male members of an Islamic sports club in Gaza interviewed by the author emphasise that they have different and higher moral aims than the members of Fatah-dominated clubs in the area. However, none of them appear to dress like Islamists either on or off the sports pitch. Non-religious circumstances are significant in the choice of sports club. Jensen finds that no schooling or indoctrination took place in the club, and asserts that young Islamists in Gaza therefore do not fit the stereotype of dangerous terrorists.

Keywords: Hamas, civil society, sports

Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, University of California Press.

Chapter 4 of this book contains excerpts of interviews with Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader in Gaza, and sheikh Ahmed Yasin. Both Rantisi and Yasin indicate that they conceptualise the conflict with Israel as a war on religious terms. They emphasise that Palestinians have been the victims, rather than the aggressors, in this conflict. They defend suicide operations as means through which ordinary Israelis may be made aware of the suffering of the Palestinians. Rantisi points to the Israeli attacks on demonstrating Palestinians outside the Al-Aqsa mosque in 1990 and to the Hebron massacre in 1994 as motivations behind the shift towards 'martyrdom operations' or suicide bombings in Hamas.

Keywords: Hamas, suicide bombings, Yasin

Karmon, E. (2000). "Hamas' Terrorism Strategy: operational Limitations and Political Constraints." *Meria* 4(1): 1-13.

In this article it is argued that the decline in terrorist activities against Israel by Palestinian Islamists in the period 1996 to 1999 was due to the counter-terrorist strategy of the PA and Israel and to Jordanian moves against the external leadership of Hamas in 1999. The author suggests that the declarations of Hamas' political leaders in the course of 1999 evidence an interest in perpetrating terrorist attacks from the side of Hamas.

Keywords: Hamas, PA, terrorism

Kepel, G. (2002). *Jihad: The trail of Political Islam*. London & New York, I.B Tauris Publishers.

Two of the chapters in this extensive survey of political Islam in the Middle East deal with Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The author claims that Hamas was created within a few days of the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. He regards Hamas as an attempt by the dominant devout middle-class in the Muslim Brotherhood to avoid losing the Palestinian underclass youth, the *shebab*, to rival movements such as Fatah or Islamic Jihad. Kepel suggests that the military wing of Hamas, which he describes as largely independent, recruits its members from the urban poor. According to Kepel, this class is largely supportive of violent tactics and a no-compromise stance towards Israel, whereas the historically dominant devout middle-class in Hamas was eager to take part in the establishment of a new

political power centre under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. In line with the central argument of his book, Kepel asserts that radicals with poor backgrounds were dissociated from the moderate middle-class in the post-Oslo phase. However, the Al-Aqsa intifada, and the resulting Israeli repression, again tipped the balance in favour of Hamas and its radicals.

Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Intifada

Klein, M. (1996). "Competing Brothers: the Web of HAMAS-PLO Relations." *Terrorism and Political Violence* **8**(2): 111-132.

In exploring the relations between Hamas and the PLO in the period between 1988 and 1995, the author finds that the Oslo Accords, and in particular the DoP, significantly altered the nature of Hamas-PLO relations. In this process Hamas was forced to confront the discrepancies between the movement's ideology and its praxis. As a result of the political advances of the PLO, Hamas' tactical pragmatism increased. Hamas was opposed to any peace accords with Israel, since this would necessitate recognition of the legitimacy of the state of Israel, which at the outset had been deemed as *kufir* or heresy in Hamas ideology. In spite of this, pragmatists within the movement argued in favour of partial integration into the structures of the Palestinian Authority. However, the pragmatic line met with opposition from the external leadership of Hamas, which preferred the military option. Hamas established communication channels with the PLO in order to prevent the outbreak of a Palestinian civil war. The author concludes, however, that the tacit understanding between Hamas and the PLO was close to breaking point by 1996.

Keywords: Hamas, PLO, PA

Klein, M. (1997). "Quo Vadis? Palestinian Authority Building Dilemmas Since 1993." *Middle Eastern Studies* **33**(2): 384-404.

Although primarily dealing with divisions and conflicts of interest within the PLO, this article also addresses the relationship between the PA, established in 1994 as a result of the DoP) and Hamas. As president of the PA, Yasir Arafat encouraged the pragmatists in Hamas to participate in elections to PLC, and by refusing to take steps against Izz ed-Din al-Qassem units that had perpetrated acts of violence from PA-controlled territory. Hamas' partners in the Damascus-based Palestinian Forces Alliance reacted negatively to the rapprochement that developed between Hamas and the PA. The author concludes that the power of the PLO leadership may not be sufficient if the PA fails to improve the quality of life for the Palestinians.

Keywords: Hamas, PA

Kristiansen, W. (1999). "Challenge and Counterchallenges: Hamas' Response to Oslo." *Journal of Palestine Studies* **28**(3): 19-36.

The author offers an overview of Hamas' challenges to the Palestinian Authority and to Israel in the post-Oslo era. Her contention is that Hamas' opposition to the Oslo Accords has been the basis of the support it has built up. Kristianasen notes the emergence of a more moderate generation of Hamas leaders in Gaza in the mid-1990s. In Gaza, Hamas was faced with a strong PA presence and had to opt for pragmatism in order to secure its hold over

mosques and social institutions. The Hamas leaders outside the Occupied Territories (in Damascus and Amman) were in general less inclined to compromise with the PA. The author sees the Wye Accords of 1998 as an attempt by the USA and Israel to eliminate Hamas. Hamas will however remain an important player on the Palestinian arena because of the small returns that the Oslo Accords have yielded for the Palestinians.

Keywords: Hamas, Oslo Accords, Wye Accords

Legrain, J.-F. (1990). The Islamic Movement and the Intifada. *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*. J. R. Nassar and R. Heacock (eds). New York & Westport, Connecticut, Praeger: 176-189.

Observing that Islamism has a common matrix but is articulated in ways which vary between different local contexts, the author details Islamic Jihad and Hamas' involvement in the first Intifada 1987-1993. Legrain notes that there appears to be a general consensus to the effect that a military wing of Islamic Jihad, the Jihad Brigades, played an essential role in the process that led to the outbreak of the uprising. On the basis of selected publications by Palestinian Islamists, he contends that persons close to Islamic Jihad may have been among the founders of Hamas in 1988. Furthermore, he points out that the progressive co-ordination that took place between Hamas and the UNLU, the PLO-aligned leadership of the Intifada, masked crucial political differences. He predicts that the only guarantee for victory for the PLO over the Palestinian Islamists lies in the attainment of political results through diplomatic initiatives.

Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Intifada

Legrain, J.-F. (1991). A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism. *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*. J. Piscatori (ed). Chicago, Illinois, American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 70-87.

This article analyses the communiqués issued by Hamas on the Gulf War in 1991, and suggests motives behind Hamas' positioning at the time. Contrary to the PLO/Fatah, which wholeheartedly embraced the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and thereby compromised their support from the Gulf states, Hamas opted for a compromise of sorts. It condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but also the presence of Western military forces in the Gulf. Hamas communiqués in the period under review were however primarily focused on the resistance to Israeli occupation. Hamas was unwilling to risk sanctions from its Gulf donors, but also had an eye to the post-war situation. The author concludes that by its response to the Gulf War Hamas proved to be more adept than the PLO at reading the signs of the times.

Keywords: The Gulf War, Hamas, PLO, Iraq, Kuwait

Legrain, J.-F. (1994). Palestinian Islamisms: Patriotism as a Condition of Their Expansion. *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: the Dynamic Character of Movements*. M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby (eds). Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press. **IV**: 413-427.

In this analysis of the development of Palestinian Islamisms, the author applies two concepts borrowed from the work of Kepel (1990), namely "Islamisation from below" and "Islamisation from above". The former focuses on the Islamisation of society through establishing and organising Islamised

spaces in society, whereas the latter tends to prioritise the violent overthrow of the 'un-Islamic' state. Legrain regards the Islamic Jihad movements as representatives of "Islamisation from above", and the Muslim Brotherhood as a representative of "Islamisation from below". He takes issue with the notion that Palestinian Islamists represent the most disadvantaged strata of Palestinian society. Legrain claims that it was the activities of Islamic Jihad in Gaza in 1987 which stimulated the outbreak of the first Intifada. Hence, Israeli military reprisals struck Islamic Jihad harder than Hamas, since Hamas did not opt for military confrontation with Israeli forces before February 1988. This essay suggests that Hamas came out of the Gulf War in 1991 in a stronger position than the PLO, due to the fact that Hamas had maintained a relative silence on the War, for fear of financial repercussions. Legrain concludes that the particulars of the Palestinian situation reverse the chronological sequence of Kepel's "Islamisation from below". Kepel assumes that "Islamisation from below" follows a "failed" "Islamisation from above", as was the case in Iran, but Legrain demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood took up arms against Israel through Hamas precisely in order to be able to pursue an "Islamisation from below".

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Islamisation

Legrain, J.-F. (1997). HAMAS: Legitimate heir of Palestinian nationalism? *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?* J. L. Esposito (ed). Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997: 159-178.

The author asserts that Palestinian nationalism in the form of the PLO had an exceptional durability in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in comparison to other areas in the Middle East due to the exceptional circumstances of being under Israeli occupation. The success of Hamas reveals that the Islamist movement can no longer be seen as an epi-phenomenon. According to Legrain, the sine qua non of Hamas' success in assuming the heritage of the PLO has been its merger of political and military policies, of Islamism and nationalism. He launches a two-stage theory of the establishment of Hamas. In mid-December 1987 prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Gaza decided on their own initiative to establish Hamas. Hamas was then recognised as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in February 1988, at a meeting in Amman. The increase in Hamas' power since the signing of the Oslo Accords, Legrain suggests, should be seen in the context of Israeli refusals to honour the agreements, through deferrals of deadlines, continued targeted assassinations, dramatic increases in the number of settlers and so forth. The main challenge of Hamas has been to manage its internal diversity, centred on the conflicting priorities of the old guard of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, whose first priority has always been the Islamisation of Palestinian society, and the young guard, for whom the immediate liberation of Palestine and administrative power are more important considerations. Legrain predicts that popular perceptions of PNA illegitimacy are bound to intensify since no Israeli concession on the question of Palestine can be expected anytime soon.

Keywords: Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, PNA

Litvak, M. (1993). "Palestinian Leadership in the Territories During the Intifada, 1987-1992." *Orient* 34(2): 199-220.

This article provides a sociological profile of the nationalist (UNLU) and Islamist (Hamas) leaderships during the first Intifada. The author regards Hamas as the most significant manifestation of a shift towards the dominance of an internal leadership of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. Unlike the PLO-affiliated organisations, Hamas' leadership and power base was at the time in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Hamas stressed that the duty of the Palestinian diaspora was to support but not to command their brethren in the Occupied Territories. Of the ten founding members of Hamas recorded by Litvak, three were clergymen and three were high school teachers. The Islamic University of Gaza employed four out of ten founding members. The author also finds that an important characteristic of senior Hamas leaders, particularly in Gaza, is that they have refugee backgrounds. This marked a contrast with the pro-PLO leadership of UNLU, which to a larger extent than Hamas represented the traditional elites of Palestinian society. Litvak predicts that a success in the peace process will marginalise Hamas, whereas failure might imply that Hamas becomes the leading force in Palestinian politics.

Keywords: Hamas, UNLU, Intifada

Litvak, M. (1998). "The Islamisation of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the Case of Hamas." *Middle Eastern Studies* 34(1): 148-163.

This article is a textual analysis of Hamas ideology, as expressed in the Hamas Charter of 1988, various handbills issued by Hamas, and in the official organ of Hamas, *Filastin al-Muslimin*. The author regards Hamas as the expression of an Islamisation of the conflict, inasmuch as Hamas ideology portrays the conflict as a battle between two rival religions. Furthermore, he claims that Hamas ideology (in contradistinction to Palestinian secular nationalist ideology) draws no distinction between Jews and Zionists. Central to Hamas ideology is the belief that Palestine is *waqf*, which implies that it belongs to the entire Muslim nation, *umma*, eternally. Litvak demonstrates that this view has no legal basis in *shari'a* or Islamic Law, and hence, that it must be considered an "invention of tradition". Hamas ideology regards the state of Israel as an instrument in the Western onslaught on Islamic civilisation. Negotiations and peaceful solutions are discarded, since they imply concessions on *waqf*. However, Litvak points out that the Oslo Accords forced Hamas to reconcile the discrepancies between ideology and reality. To this end, sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the ideological leader of Hamas, introduced the distinction between a full-fledged peace, *sulh*, and a temporary armistice, *hudna*. The latter came to be regarded as permissible as a temporary measure in order for the Muslims of Palestine to recover their strength, but only for a stipulated period of ten years, and on condition that Israel withdraw back to the pre-1967 borders.

Keywords: Hamas, ideology, Oslo Accords

Meijer, R. (1997). *From al-da'wa to al-hizbiyya: Mainstream Islamic Movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in the 1990s*. Amsterdam, Research Center for International Political Economy and Foreign Policy Analysis (RECIPE), University of Amsterdam: 31.

In a comparative survey of mainstream Islamic movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine, the author applies a distinction between the concepts of *al-da'wa* and *al-hizbiyya*. Hizbiyya refers to the acceptance of multiparty systems and elections as a tactic, whereas da'wa refers to proselytising and grassroots mobilisation outside the framework of a party-political system, which historically has been the main strategy of Islamic movements in order to assume state power. Meijer notes that there was a general shift among Islamists in the region towards hizbiyya in the 1990s. In the case of Hamas, however, he finds that the choice was not one of hizbiyya or da'wa, but rather between hizbiyya and *jihad*. The negotiations between the PNA and Hamas in Cairo in December 1995 strengthened the hardliners within Hamas, and led to a renewal of the commitment to armed resistance against the Israeli occupation. The author concludes that Hamas thereby refused to accept hizbiyya as a viable strategy for gaining power, and resisted incorporation into a political process.

Keywords: Hamas, da'wa, hizbiyya, jihad

Milton-Edwards, B. (1992). "The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: a Comparison of Ideas and Techniques." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* **19**(1): 48-53.

This article explores the application of the religious concept of *jihad* by Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Jihad is literally taken to mean a defensive act against aggressive oppressors occupying Muslim territory. The author points to the centrality of the liberation of Jerusalem in Hamas' ideology, but emphasises that the positing of the liberation of Palestine as an end product of jihad distinguishes Hamas from its Islamist counterparts outside the Occupied Palestinian Territories. She indicates that the concept of jihad was not current in the thinking of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood up until the first Intifada in 1987. Much more central to the ideology promoted by, for instance, sheikh Yasin was education, *tarbiya*, and *da'wa*, preaching. To the Islamic Jihad movement, however, the concept of jihad had always been a central tenet of its ideology. The author concludes that the future of the two groups is inextricably linked to the concept of jihad.

Keywords: Jihad, Hamas, Islamic Jihad

Milton-Edwards, B. (1996). *Islamic Politics in Palestine*. London & New York, Tauris Academic Studies.

The author sets out to debunk the 'myth' that the Islamic movement in Palestine is essentially fundamentalist and 'terrorist' and that politically active Muslims in the Occupied Palestinian Territories belong to one monolithic group. Milton-Edwards analyses the background to the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami'.

The organisational strength of the Muslim Brotherhood revolved around its extension of social and educational services, particularly in Gaza, in the 1970s. The assumption of control over the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) is singled out as a particularly significant event in the development of the Islamist movement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Islamic Jihad in Gaza emerged as a result of a dispute relating to the Muslim Brotherhood's stance towards the Israeli occupation and the Iranian revolution at IUG. The author asserts that the building of mosques under the auspices of the *Mujamma'*

(sheikh Yasin's centre in Gaza) was supported financially by Israel. The Mujamma' was however caught out by the strength of feeling in the first few weeks of the first intifada, and in response formed Hamas as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in February 1988. Milton-Edwards regards Hamas as the most important player in the political Islam movement at the moment. Hamas 'Palestinianises' Islamic issues, but the author notes that the argument that the liberation of Palestine is the first step towards the establishment of an abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) irrespective of borders is notably absent from Hamas' ideological literature. She suggests that Hamas' ideology should be seen as a synthesis with nationalism. The author concludes that it is unlikely that political Islam in the Occupied Palestinian Territories can be eradicated through military means.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', political Islam

Milton-Edwards, B. (1996). "Political Islam in Palestine in an Environment of Peace?" *Third World Quarterly* 17(2): 199-225.

In an attempt to answer the question as to whether the post-Oslo environment in the Palestinian Occupied Territories has exacerbated "the religious nature of the conflict" between Israelis and Palestinians, the author analyses the positions of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' on the Oslo peace process. She points out that the PLO and Israel excluded Palestinian Islamists from a process that was undemocratic and non-consultative. The Declaration of Principles, DoP, offered few attractions for the Islamists. In a Palestinian society in which Muslim identity is often fused with the nationalist struggle, the tensions that followed in the wake of the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in Hebron in 1994 served to alter the attitude of Palestinians towards the peace process. It highlighted the religious tensions at the heart of the conflict for the Islamic movement.

Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', Oslo peace process

Milton-Edwards, B. (2002). Researching the Radical: The quest for a new perspective. *Interpreting Islam*. H. Donnan (ed). London, Thousand Oaks & New Dehli, Sage Publications, 2002: 32-50.

In this largely theoretical essay on the biases inherent in much research on radical Islam, the author details her experiences as a female researcher of Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

By focusing on a specific interview with leaders of Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' in Hebron, Milton-Edwards demonstrates how the notion that researching radical Islam is a male prerogative is reinforced by the cultural and religious attitudes prevalent among the Islamists, but also within the discipline itself by predominantly male researchers. The leaders of Hezb and Hamas that she interviewed repeatedly patronised her by referring to her as *ya bint* (the girl), and by directing their responses to her queries to male co-researchers whenever such a person was present at the interviews.

She suggests that the gendering of research on radical Islam contributes to Orientalist essentialisations of the Islamist movements.

Keywords: Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami', Hamas, gender

Mishal, S. and R. Aharoni (1994). *Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground*. Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press.

This book contains translations of leaflets issued by the Islamic Resistance Movement/Hamas in the course of the first Intifada, an editorial introduction and a statistical breakdown of issues raised in leaflets issued by the UNLU (the nationalist camp) and Hamas. The authors suggest that Hamas was more influential than the UNLU in Gaza, whereas the reverse held in the West Bank. Keywords: Hamas, Covenant

Mishal, S. and A. Sela (2000). *The Palestinian HAMAS: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York, Chichester, Columbia University Press.

The authors of this book take issue with the prevailing image of Hamas as an ideologically intransigent and politically rigid movement, ready to pursue its goals at any cost. The book seeks to portray Hamas from a discursive and practical perspective. Mishal and Sela contend that Hamas' record demonstrates that it is essentially a social movement. It is a socially composite movement that has been able to transcend class divisions within Palestinian society. The authors see the disillusionment with modernity and secularism among urban, educated, lower middle-class Muslims as an explanation for the growing trend towards Islamisation. However, they also emphasise that historically the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank represented strata higher up on the socio-economic scale than in Gaza. In the West Bank, the Muslim Brotherhood consisted of merchants, landowners and middle-class officials and professionals. Mishal and Sela regard charitable work for the poor in Palestinian society as having been a central avenue for the expansion of public support for the Muslim Brotherhood. The rising tide of militancy within the *Mujamma'* in the 1980s coincided with a shift in the composition of the backgrounds of university students in the West Bank and Gaza. By the 1980s, most university students had rural backgrounds. The founders of the *Mujamma'*, who had initially thought that armed struggle against Israel (the external jihad) should be postponed until the Islamisation of Palestinian society had been completed and *shari'a* imposed, were forced by young militants in their movement to take up arms against Israel. The surprise outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987 further strengthened this position, as *Mujamma'* leaders feared a loss of support if they did not opt to take part in the uprising. According to the authors, controlled violence, negotiated coexistence and calculated participation in the Palestinian Authority have become the main features of Hamas' political conduct since the Oslo Agreements. Much of the politics of Hamas can be explained in terms of the tension between Hamas' dogmatic ideology and its pragmatic approach to political and institutional survival. The authors conclude that Hamas will continue to mobilise wide popular support in Palestinian society in the absence of tangible economic benefits and territorial achievements for the Palestinians in the course of the peace process. The book includes a translation of the Hamas covenant of 1988. Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, the *Mujamma'*, Hamas, PNA

Mishal, S. and A. Sela (2002). "Participation without Presence: Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the Politics of Negotiated Coexistence." *Middle Eastern Studies* 38(3): 1-26.

The authors analyse the internal debate of Hamas on whether the movement should be transformed into a political party or not. This debate evolved as a result of the peace process. An internal discussion paper is reproduced in extenso. Elections to the PLC and to the Office of President of the PA were held in 1996. Despite an inclination among Hamas leaders in Gaza towards taking part in the elections, Hamas officially boycotted them. However, Hamas encouraged individual Islamists to run as independents, in order to secure representation of Islamists' views in the PA's executive organs. Exit polls from these elections suggest that 60 to 70 per cent of Hamas' supporters participated in the elections. Mishal and Sela align Hamas' stance to developments within other Islamist movements in the Middle East. Initially, these adopted violence in response to violent repression from the state. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamists in the region increasingly turned toward political party organisation and to participation in political processes in spite of the prevailing regimes' non-Islamic character. A confrontational strategy based on ultimate objectives and ideal aspirations was discarded precisely because this would endanger the very existence of the movement's social and religious infrastructure.

Keywords: Hamas, elections, PA

Monshipouri, M. (1996). "The PLO rivalry with Hamas: the Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism." *Middle East Policy* 4(3): 84-105.

In this article, the author argues that in the post-Oslo era the PLO and Yasir Arafat face the choice of accommodation or confrontation with Palestinian Islamists. Monshipouri regards a sustainable peace as being dependent on increased living standards among Palestinians, especially in Gaza, and on political and financial reform of the PA. Monshipouri suggests that Hamas may be included in a democratic process, since he sees their political concerns as much more important than their Islamic positions. He claims that through their resistance to Israeli occupation Palestinians have demonstrated that they regard popular consent and elections as the main sources of legitimacy. Therefore, a rivalry between the PLO and Hamas in the context of a Palestinian democratisation process may lead to good governance, checks on the authoritarian tendency of the PLO, and to a consensus about democratic outcomes.

Keywords: Hamas, PLO, democracy

Nüsse, A. (1998). *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas*. Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers.

This work focuses exclusively on the ideological side of the phenomenon of Hamas. The source material, dating from 1990 to 1996, includes the Hamas covenant, articles in the London-based organ *Filastin al-Muslimin* and the Hamas handbills issued in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The author asserts that Hamas' repetitive use of supposedly fixed concepts in reality demonstrates ideological flexibility. Non-Islamic concepts are regularly invoked in Hamas' writings, and Nüsse singles the nationalistic and democratic elements in Hamas' ideology out as comparatively strong.

The Hamas covenant quotes the forged *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and the author suggests that one can find remnants of modern European anti-semitism in Hamas' image of the Jew as the strong party. She regards the idea that the Palestinian territory is sacred (an idea regularly invoked by Hamas) as a recent invention, and asserts that this idea has been adopted from Judaism. Hamas conceives of Israel as an essentially religious state, and any concessions to this state as equal to abandoning belief in Islam. The movement depicts the defensive struggle for the liberation of Palestine as an individual religious duty upon Muslims, *fard 'ayn*. Hamas claims to be a movement of all Palestinians, Muslims and Christians alike, but in an eventual Islamic state, Christians are to be accorded a status as a religious minority, and tolerated only to the extent that they accept Muslim superiority. In contradistinction to Legrain, Nüsse perceives Hamas to have been essentially supportive of Iraq in its confrontation with the West, even if opposed to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. She demonstrates that Hamas' criticism of the DoP focused on economic issues, and not only religious ones, and concludes that the margin between rhetoric and realpolitik in Hamas leaves a space open for participation in a pluralistic political system, and possibly abandonment of the armed struggle.

Keywords: Hamas, ideology

Paz, R. (2000). "Higher Education and the Development of Palestinian Islamic Groups." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4(2): 81-95.

The author links the emergence of Palestinian Islamist groups in the 1980s to the expansion of educational infrastructure in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the 1970s. A rise in the standard of living of Palestinians in this period led to the formation of a Palestinian middle class. This class used the higher education system as a means to further their social mobility. The Palestinian Islamists focused to a great extent on issues of morality at the universities. This reflected the confrontation between students coming from villages or refugee camps with strict moral norms, and the secular-nationalist environment of many local universities. This article focuses primarily on the activities of Islamist-orientated students at the al-Najah University in Nablus, and at the Islamic University of Gaza. Paz ascribes the increased militancy of Islamists in the West Bank to the influx of Islamist students into the universities of the West Bank. In conclusion he claims that institutions of higher learning in the Territories were crucial to the development of Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Keywords: Keywords: Islamists, universities, morality

Rekhes, E. (1990). The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip. *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*. D. Menashri (ed). Boulder, San Fransisco & Oxford, Westview Press: 189-206.

This essays sets out to explore the ideological links between the militant Sunni Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Shiite revolutionary regime of Iran. The author traces Islamic Jihad's views on martyrdom and self-sacrifice back to concepts in Twelver Shi'ism. In the writings and statements of the ideologues of Islamic Jihad, Iran becomes a model, since it advocates Islam, rather than nationalism, as the solution to the Palestinian problem. However, the notions adopted by Islamic Jihad from Shi'ism have not been worked into a coherent

and explicit ideology. Rekhess suggests that this has to do with the fact that Islamic Jihad consists of different groupings, whose ideological affinities are divided between the doctrines of the Iranian revolution, of Sayyid Qutb, and those of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement. According to the author, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement recruited extensively among PLO prisoners in Israeli prisons, and has often co-operated with factions of the secular-nationalist Fatah. Whereas Islamic Jihad focuses on *jihad* in a more restrictive sense, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to stress the non-military and non-violent aspects of the concept.

Keywords: Islamic Jihad, Shi'ism, Iran, Fatah

Robinson, G. E. (1997). *Building a Palestinian State: the Incomplete Revolution*. Bloomington & Indianapolis, Indiana University Press.

Chapter VI in this book deals with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamists. The author describes the 1980s as a period of deepening Islamisation of Palestinian society, evidenced by the proliferation of mosques and Islamic institutions on the West Bank and in Gaza. He links the shift towards a religious view of the conflict on the Palestinian side to the ascent to power of the right-wing Likud Party in Israel in 1977. Robinson distinguishes between two "types of Muslim cadres" encompassed by the Islamist movement: the first socially conservative and quietist, the second activist. As a result of the first intifada, the latter group of cadres revolted against their traditional leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood and formed Hamas, according to the author. He claims that the appeal of Hamas after the Oslo Accords derived from the failures of Fatah. The support for Hamas therefore came from Palestinians who were disillusioned with the accords and their implementation, but not necessarily religious. Contrary to common assumptions, Robinson states that the universities were more important than the mosques in garnering support for Hamas.

Keywords: Islamists, universities, Hamas

Roy, S. (1991). "The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20(3): 58-69.

In this article, the radicalisation of Palestinians in Gaza is linked to the deterioration of living standards that was the result of the first Intifada and the Gulf War crisis, and to the stalemate of the political process towards peace. However, the author describes it as a misconception to believe that Hamas commanded considerable support in the Gaza Strip at the time of writing, and notes growing irritation among residents with Hamas' struggle against moral and behavioural impropriety. She points out that these issues are not accorded importance by Islamic Jihad. She warns that violence is becoming an increasingly viable option for Palestinian residents in Gaza.

Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Gaza

Sahliyeh, E. (1995). Religious Fundamentalisms Compared: Palestinian Islamists, Militant Libanese Shi'ites, and Radical Sikhs. *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*. R. S. Appleby and M. E. Marty (eds). Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press. V: 135-152.

In this essay, the author explores common features of these seemingly divergent movements. He sees the development of fundamentalism among these groups as a response to processes of secularisation and modernisation, and emphasises the strong nationalist overtone of all of them. In the case of Hamas, Sahliyeh points to deteriorating economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the 1980s, manifested in a significant decline in the number of Palestinians working in agriculture. The author maintains that the secular political movements that preceded Hamas were inconclusive, insensitive to the political and economic grievances of its followers inside the Occupied Territories, and neglectful of developmental issues. This in turn created a psychological gulf between the urban elite, the rural population and the population in the refugee camps, which combined to contribute to the rise of fundamentalism. He also stresses the charismatic leadership of sheikh Yasin as a factor accounting for the popularity of Hamas. According to the author, nationalism in Hamas came at the expense of Islamic universalism. The propensity for violence in the case of Hamas is regarded as a reaction to governmental actions and policies.

Keywords: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, fundamentalism

Shadid, M. K. (1988). "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza." *Third World Quarterly* **10**(2): 658-682.

The author surveys the development of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza in the period between 1946 and 1987. Shadid notes that the Muslim Brotherhood in these two areas has separate organisational structures, and that authority in the movement is decentralised, with decisions being taken collectively by local leadership. The participating members of the Muslim Brotherhood primarily consist of college and high school students. Most members have a rural background, originate in the lower-income groups and are young, whereas the leadership mainly comes from urban areas and has an upper-middle income background. The latter tend to be heavily involved in commerce. Funding for the Muslim Brotherhood derives from the collection of tithes, *zakat*, locally and in the Gulf states, and from state support from Saudi Arabia. According to the author the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy for assuming power in Palestinian society involves two phases: one, the transformation of the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza into an Islamic society and two, the call for a holy struggle against Israel. Shadid regards the increased importance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestinian society as the outcome of efforts by the USA and Israel to weaken the nationalist movement (the PLO), and claims that it poses a potential threat to mass support for the nationalist movement.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, the PLO

Sh'hada, N. Y. (1999). *Gender and Politics in Palestine: Discourse Analysis of the Palestinian Authority and Islamists*. The Hague, Institute of Social Studies (ORPAS): 88.

The author describes the Palestinian Islamists' reaction to the Palestinian Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (MP), a group established in Gaza in 1997. The group's aim was to bring about a modification of Palestinian Family Law in order to correct its discriminatory nature. The author regards

Hamas as an expression of popular discontent with the autocratic style and the poor performance of the Palestinian Authority. She suggests that Hamas is an entity created by Israel. Sh'hada claims that the rationale behind the Islamists' attack on the MP is that any attempt at modifying the Family Law is perceived as a challenge to national and religious identity. Furthermore, she argues that the Palestinian women's movement cannot perceive the PA or the Islamists as allies, since even the PA has appropriated an Islamist discourse. The author's description of the Islamists' response to the MP indicates that the Palestinian women's movement's demands were seen as Western and contrary to Islam. Sh'hada believes that the PA's initial support for the MP was based exclusively on a wish to satisfy its external funders. In conclusion, she asserts that the Palestinian Islamists' ultimate goal is not the destruction of the peace process, but rather to reassert Islamic culture as the predominant feature of Palestinian society. She sees no significant difference between the PA and the Islamists as far as women's rights are concerned.

Keywords: Islamists, PA, MP, women's rights

Shikaki, K. (1998). "Peace Now or Hamas Later." *Foreign Affairs* 77(4): 29-43.

The author presents survey data on Palestinian perceptions of the peace process. He argues that even if the Islamists have no consistent demographic characteristics, the strongest support for the Islamist opposition comes from illiterates and educated youth. Palestinian students in particular are less likely to renounce terror against Israeli targets. Shikaki claims that the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister in 1996 created a climate of distrust between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities. He suggests that the two-steps approach of the Oslo Process (which implied the postponement of problematic political issues until final status negotiations) generated a problem by raising expectations on both sides. Thus, when disillusionment with the peace process set in, it created a constituency for terror. The author concludes that the Netanyahu administration has the choice of "dealing with the PLO today, or with Hamas tomorrow".

Keywords: Islamists, Oslo peace process

Shikaki, K. (2002). "Palestinians Divided." *Foreign Affairs* 81(4): 89-105.

The Al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000, was the response of the "young guard" in the Palestinian nationalist movement (notably, Fatah) to the stalled peace process, and to the failure of the PLO's "old guard" to deliver on the promise of Palestinian independence and good governance. According to the author, the "young guard" of the nationalist movement consists of local leaders from the first Intifada. Like the Islamists, with whom they have entered into a tactical alliance, the "young guard" does not regard negotiations with Israel as a necessity. The motivations behind their alliance with the Islamists were to avoid the creation of parallel institutions and leadership by the Islamists, as occurred during the first intifada. Shikaki notes that support for the Islamists, which waned throughout the peace process, has risen dramatically in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and predicts that a continuation of the current Palestinian-Israeli impasse is likely to benefit the Palestinian Islamists.

Keywords: Al-Aqsa Intifada, Islamists, PA, Fatah

Strindberg, A. (2000). "The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: a Primer." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29(3): 60-76.

This article explores the history, purpose and activities of the Damascus-based Alliance of Palestinian Forces, as well as the histories, ideologies and interrelationships of the member factions. The alliance was established in 1993 in response to the Oslo Accord. The ten factions of the alliance include Islamic Jihad and Hamas. According to Strindberg, the alliance's aim is to derail the peace process. The principal sponsors of the alliance are Syria and Iran. Syria sponsors and hosts the alliance as a means through which to influence Palestinian issues and in order to destabilise Arafat. The alliance's main function is to co-ordinate rhetoric.

The novelty of this alliance was that the Islamists were brought into alignment with secular and leftist nationalists for the first time in Palestinian history. For the Islamists, one motivation for taking part in the alliance was to be able to dispel the historical reservations about their national commitment. The alliance's main constituency is the refugees. The Damascene leadership of Hamas is opposed to the moderation of Hamas leaders in Gaza, and Strindberg indicates that this reflects the differing interests of the diaspora and the local Palestinians.

Keywords: Islamists, the Damascus Alliance, Hamas, Islamic Jihad

Taraki, L. (1990). The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*. Z. Lockman and J. Beinin (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris: 171-177.

Taraki emphasises the role of Israeli and foreign media in promoting Hamas as a rival to the PLO in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. She regards the establishment of Hamas as an attempt to rehabilitate the Muslim Brotherhood as a credible political force, after decades of conflict with Palestinian nationalist forces and absence from anti-occupation activities. Hamas' views on the territorial issue is likened to that of religious Zionism, inasmuch as both regard the territory as a divine trust granted exclusively to them. Taraki is sceptical about the prospect of mobilising Palestinians around a strategy for liberating all of historical Palestine, and suggests that Hamas' chances of gaining support will be slim if a political process gains momentum.

Keywords: Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Israel

Usher, G. (1997). The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority [an interview with Bassam Jarrar]. *Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report*. J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris Publishers: 335-339.

This interview with Bassam Jarrar, an Islamist thinker with links to Hamas, based in Ramallah, was made in March 1994. Jarrar outlines the Islamist movement's stance with regard to the Palestinian Authority and the peace process. From Jarrar's point of view, participation in self-rule is not possible, since it lends legitimacy to the peace process. He emphasises, however, that the Islamist movement has no desire for confrontation with the PA as long

as it respects the demands of Islamists with regard to the curricula of Palestinian schools and Personal Status Law.

Keywords: Jarrar, Oslo peace process, PA

Usher, G. (1997). *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*. London & Chicago, Pluto Press.

Chapter 3 of this book bears the title The Islamist Challenge and deals with the Palestinian Islamists' (mainly Hamas') response to the DoP. Usher implies that Hamas' armed policy in the wake of the DoP was tactical, rather than wholly destructive. Therefore, according to the author, Hamas' aim was less the destruction of the Oslo Accords than to assert an Islamist social agenda for Palestinian civil society. Usher emphasises that political Islam in the Palestinian context is homogeneous in terms neither of its constituency nor of its aims. He claims that most of the support for Hamas is drawn from socially conservative sectors in Palestinian society, for whom the PLO's secular nationalism is an apology for materialism, corruption and the moral permissiveness of the region's political elites. The 'red line' for Hamas therefore is infringement of the freedom of expression of religious points of view in all spheres of public life, and attempts at infringing the status of Islamic courts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. A younger generation of cadres has infused Hamas with nationalism; the question is whether the alliance between these forces can hold over time.

Keywords: Hamas, Islamists, Oslo Accords

Usher, G. (1997). What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories. *Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report*. J. Beinun and J. Stork (eds). London & New York, I.B Tauris Publishers: 339-354.

The author portrays the Islamist movement in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in the 1970s as a culturalist and social movement that was supported by Israel as a means by which support for the PLO among Palestinians could be eroded. He points to the fact that in contradistinction to the PLO-backed popular committees of the first Intifada, Hamas was only declared illegal by Israeli forces two years into the revolt. Usher describes the establishment of Hamas as the result of the dilemma between continued accommodation with the Israeli occupation and losing the Palestinian streets. He suggests that the bulk of Hamas' support is drawn from the socially conservative sectors of Palestinian society, for whom the reproduction of the patriarchal Palestinian family through *shari'a* rule over personal status is crucial. However, the author emphasises that Palestinian support for Hamas is not the result of a turning towards faith, but rather the consequence of a political and ideological crisis generated by the PLO's inadequate leadership and the questions of the social agenda of any future Palestinian polity. It is suggested that Hamas will flourish as long as Palestinian nationalists avoid addressing this crisis.

Keywords: Islamists, PLO

Works unavailable at the time of writing

Abu-Shanab, I. H. (1999). *An Islamic Approach to the Resistance against Israeli Occupation in Palestine: the Strategy of Hamas in the Present and in the Future. Palestinian Perspectives*. W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Ahmad, H. H. (1994). *HAMAS: from religious salvation to political transformation: the rise of HAMAS in Palestinian Society*. Jerusalem: PASSIA.

Freund, W. (2002). Looking into HAMAS and other Constituents of the Palestinian-Israeli Confrontation. *Palestinian Perspectives*. W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Hamed, G. A. (1999). The Relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA): the Conflictual Past and the Unknown Future. *Palestinian Perspectives*. W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Kurtz, A. N., Tal (1997). *Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle*. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

Mishal, S. S., Avraham (1997). *Hamas: A Behavioural Profile*. Jerusalem: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research: 65.

Paz, R. (1998). "Sleeping With the Enemy": a Reconciliation Process as Part of Counter-Terrorism: is Hamas capable of "Hudna"? Herzlia: The Interdisciplinary Center, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism: 31.

Rantisi, A. (1999). Hamas Towards the West. *Palestinian Perspectives*. W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Rashad, A. (1993). *Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue*. Annandale, Virginia: United Association for Studies & Research.

Timmermann, Kenneth R. (1994). *In Their Own Words: Interviews with Leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood: Damascus, Amman and Gaza*. Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center.

Webman, E. (1994). *Anti-Semitic Motives in the Ideology of Hizballah and Hamas*. Tel Aviv: Project for the Study of Anti-Semitism, Faculty of the Humanities, Tel Aviv University.

3. List of references

Abu-Amr, Ziad. 1993. HAMAS: a Historical and Political Background. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22 (4):5-19.

Abu-Amr, Ziad. 1993. Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism and Democracy. In *Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, edited by E. Kaufman, S. B. Abed and R. L. Rothstein. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Abu-Amr, Ziad. 1994. *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad, Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.

Abu-Amr, Ziad. 1997. Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and the Origins of Hamas. In *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, edited by R. S. Appleby. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Abu-Shanab, Ismail H. 1999. An Islamic Approach to the Resistance against Israeli Occupation in Palestine: the Strategy of Hamas in the Present and in the Future. In *Palestinian Perspectives*, edited by W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Ahmad, Hisham H. 1994. *HAMAS: from Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of HAMAS in Palestinian Society*. Jerusalem: PASSIA.

Al- Ayid, Khalil. 1999. The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview with Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28 (4):61-73.

Al-Jarbawi, Ali. 1994. The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Oslo Accord. *The Muslim World* LXXXIV (1-2):127-154.

Andoni, Lamis. 1997. Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide Bombers. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26 (4):33-45.

Ayubi, Nazih N. 1991. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London: Routledge.

Barghouti, Iyad. 1991. Religion and Politics among the Students of Najah National University. *Middle Eastern Studies* 27 (2):203-218.

Barghouti, Iyad. 1995. The Islamists in Jordan and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. In *The Islamist Dilemma: the Political Role of Islamist Movements*, edited by L. Guazzone. London: Ithaca Press.

Burgat, Francois. 2003. *Face to face with political Islam*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Darwish, Bassma Kodmani. 1996. Arafat and the Islamists: Conflict or Cooperation? *Current History* (January 1996):28-32.

Ebrahim, Saad Eddin. 1980. "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Notes and Preliminary Findings", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12: 423-453.

Ebrahim, Saad Eddin. 1995. "The Changing Face of Egypt's Islamic Activism", paper presented at the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies, Cairo May 1995 and reprinted in Ebrahim, Saad Eddin. 2002: *Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays*. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press.

Esposito, John. 1995. "Islam: An Overview" in Esposito, John (ed): *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Muslim World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Farouki, Suha Taji. 2000. Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb al-Tahrir and Al-Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews. *Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (4):21-46.

Freund, Wolfgang. 2002. *Looking into HAMAS and other Constituents of the Palestinian-Israeli Confrontation*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Gaess, Roger. 1998. Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab. *Middle East Policy* 6 (1):116-120.

Hajjar, Lisa. 1993. The Islamist Movements in the Occupied Territories: An Interview with Iyad Barghouti. *Middle East Report* (183):9-12.

Hamed, Ghazi A. 1999. The Relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA): the Conflictual Past and the Unknown Future. In *Palestinian Perspectives*, edited by W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Hammami, Rema. 1997. From Immodesty to Collaboration: Hamas, the Women's Movement, and National Identity in the Intifada. In *Political Islam: Essays from the Middle East Report*, edited by J. Beinun and J. Stork. London & New York: I.B Tauris.

Hassan, Nasran. 2001. An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the "Human Bombs". *The New Yorker* 77 (36):36-41.

Hatina, Meir. 1997. Iran and the Palestinian Islamic Movement. *Orient* 38 (1):107-120.

Hatina, Meir. 1999. Hamas and the Oslo Accords: Religious Dogma in a Changing Political Reality. *Mediterranean Politics* 4 (3):37-55.

Hatina, Meir. 2001. *Islam and Salvation in Palestine: the Islamic Jihad Movement*. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.

Hijazi, Hussein. 1995. Hamas: Waiting for Nationalism to Self-Destruct: An Interview with Mahmud Zahar. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24 (3):81-88.

Hroub, Khaled. 2000. *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*. Washington, D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies.

Human Rights Watch. 2002. Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks on Israeli Civilians. New York, Washington, London & Brussels: Human Rights Watch.

Inbar, Efraim. 1997. Islamic Extremism and the Peace Process. In *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East*, edited by E. Inbar and B. Maddy-Weitzman. London: Frank Cass.

Jensen, Michael Irving. 1998. Islamism and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip. In *Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths and Realities*, edited by A. Mousalli. Reading: Ithaca Press.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2000. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press.

Karamé, Kari. 1996. "Rekruttering til politisk islam" [Recruitment to Political Islam]. *Internasjonal Politikk* 54(2): 199-213.

Karmon, Ely. 2000. Hamas' Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and Political Constraints. *Meria* 4 (1):1-13.

Kepel, Gilles. 1996. *La Revanche de Dieu*. Paris: Seuil.

Kepel, Gilles. 2002. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. Translated by A. F. Roberts. London & New York: I.B Tauris Publishers.

Klein, Menachem. 1996. Competing Brothers: the Web of HAMAS-PLO Relations. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8 (2):111-132.

Klein, Menachem. 1997. Quo Vadis? Palestinian Authority Building Dilemmas Since 1993. *Middle Eastern Studies* 33 (2):384-404.

Kramer, Martin. 1980. *Political Islam*. The Washington Papers no. 73. Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications.

Kristiansen, Wendy. 1999. Challenge and Counterchallenges: Hamas' Response to Oslo. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28 (3):19-36.

Kurtz, A. N., Tal. 1997. Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle. Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies.

Legrain, Jean-Francois. 1990. The Islamic Movement and the Intifada. In *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*, edited by J. R. Nassar and R. Heacock. New York & Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Legrain, Jean-Francois. 1991. A Defining Moment: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism. In *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, edited by J. Piscatori. Chicago, Illinois: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Legrain, Jean-Francois. 1994. Palestinian Islamisms: Patriotism as a Condition of Their Expansion. In *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: the Dynamic Character of Movements*, edited by M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Legrain, Jean-Francois. 1997. HAMAS: Legitimate Heir of Palestinian nationalism? In *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?* edited by J. L. Esposito. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reine Publishers, 1997.

Litvak, Meir. 1993. Palestinian Leadership in the Territories During the Intifada, 1987-1992. *Orient* 34 (2):199-220.

Litvak, Meir. 1998. The Islamisation of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: the Case of Hamas. *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (1):148-163.

Meijer, Roel. 1997. From *al-da'wa* to *al-hizbiyya*: Mainstream Islamic Movements in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in the 1990s. Amsterdam: Research Center for International Political Economy and Foreign Policy Analysis (RECIPE), University of Amsterdam.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1992. The Concept of Jihad and the Palestinian Islamic Movement: a Comparison of Ideas and Techniques. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (1):48-53.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1996. *Islamic Politics in Palestine*, Library of Modern Middle East Studies. London & New York: Tauris Academic Studies.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1996. Political Islam in Palestine in an Environment of Peace? *Third World Quarterly* 17 (2):199-225.

Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 2002. Researching the Radical: The quest for a new perspective. In *Interpreting Islam*, edited by H. Donnan. London, Thousand Oaks & New Dehli: Sage Publications.

Mishal, Shaul, and Reuben Aharoni. 1994. *Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. 2000. *The Palestinian HAMAS: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press.

Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. 2002. Participation without Presence: Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and the Politics of Negotiated Coexistence. *Middle Eastern Studies* 38 (3):1-26.

Mishal, Shaul & Sela, Avraham. 1997. Hamas: A Behavioural Profile. Jerusalem: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research.

Monshipouri, Mahmood. 1996. The PLO rivalry with Hamas: the Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism. *Middle East Policy* 4 (3):84-105.

Norton, Augustus Richard. 1995. "The Challenge of Inclusion in the Middle East", *Current History*, 94 (588), January.

Nüsse, Andrea. 1998. *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Paz, Reuven. 1998. "Sleeping With the Enemy": A Reconciliation Process as Part of Counter-Terrorism: is Hamas Capable of "Hudna"? Herzlia: The Interdisciplinary Center, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Paz, Reuven. 2000. Higher Education and the Development of Palestinian Islamic Groups. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 4 (2):81-95.

Rantisi, Abdelaziz. 1999. Hamas Towards the West. In *Palestinian Perspectives*, edited by W. Freund. Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang.

Rashad, A. 1993. *Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue*. United Association for Studies & Research.

Rekhess, Elie. 1990. The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip. In *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, edited by D. Menashri. Boulder, San Fransisco & Oxford: Westview Press.

Robinson, Glenn E. 1997. *Building a Palestinian State: the Incomplete Revolution, Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Roy, Olivier. 1994. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Roy, Sara. 1991. The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip. *Journal of Palestine Studies* xx (3):58-69.

Sahliyeh, Emile. 1995. Religious Fundamentalisms Compared: Palestinian Islamists, Militant Libanese Shi'ites, and Radical Sikhs. In *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, edited by R. S. Appleby and M. E. Marty (eds). Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.

Shadid, Mohammed K. 1988. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza. *Third World Quarterly* 10 (2):658-682.

Sh'hada, Nahda Y. 1999. Gender and Politics in Palestine: Discourse Analysis of the Palestinian Authority and Islamists. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies (ORPAS).

Shikaki, Khalil. 1998. Peace Now or Hamas Later. *Foreign Affairs* 77 (4):29-43.

Shikaki, Khalil. 2002. Palestinians Divided. *Foreign Affairs* 81 (4):89-105.

Strindberg, Anders. 2000. The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: a Primer. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29 (3):60-76.

Taraki, Lisa. 1990. The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising. In *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, edited by Z. Lockman and J. Beinin. London & New York: I.B Tauris.

Timmermann, Kenneth R. 1994. In Their Own Words: interviews with Leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood: Damascus, Amman and Gaza. Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center.

Usher, Graham. 1997. The Islamist Movement and the Palestinian Authority [an interview with Bassam Jarrar]. In *Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report*, edited by J. Beinin and J. Stork. London & New York: I.B Tauris Publishers.

Usher, Graham. 1997. *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence After Oslo*. London & Chicago: Pluto Press.

Usher, Graham. 1997. What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories. In *Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report*, edited by J. Beinin and J. Stork. London & New York: I.B Tauris Publishers.

Utvik, Bjørn Olav. 1993. "Islamism: Digesting Modernity the Islamic Way", *Forum for Development Studies* 2: 197-210.

Webman, Esther. 1994. *Anti-Semitic Motives in the Ideology of Hizballah and Hamas*. Tel Aviv: Project for the Study of Anti-Semitism, Faculty of the Humanities, Tel Aviv University.

Summary

This report consists of two parts. Part one gives an overview of the Islamist movements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second part is a select bibliography of the main academic works in English on these movements (Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezb al-Tahrir al-Islami' and Khalas). The report highlights the complexities of the political and religious goals of the Palestinian Islamist movements since 1987, including the use of extreme violence (suicide bombings).

Recent Reports

- R 2002: 10 ISAKSEN, Jan et al.
Socio-economic effects of HIV/AIDS in African countries. Bergen, 2002, 89 pp.
- R 2002: 11 KOLSTAD, Ivar and Line Tøndel
Social development and foreign direct investments in developing countries. Bergen 2002, 29 pp.
- R 2002: 12 KAMETE, Amin Y.
Governance for sustainability? Balancing social and environmental concerns in Harare. Bergen, 2002, 56 pp.
- R 2002: 13 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge and Adel Zagha
Between Oslo and al-Aqsa. Taxation and state formation in Palestine 1994-2000. Bergen, 2002, 42 pp.
- R 2002: 14 KNUDSEN, Are
Political Islam in South Asia. Bergen, 2002, 60 pp.
- R 2002: 15 ISAKSEN, Jan
Restructuring SADC - Progress and Problems. Bergen, 2002, 82 pp.
- R 2002: 16 ISAKSEN, Jan and Göran Andersson
Best practice in capacity building in public finance management in Africa. Experiences of NORAD and Sida. Bergen, 2002, 53 pp.
- R 2002: 17 AMUNDSSEN, Inge and Basem Ezbid
Clientelist politics. State formation and corruption in Palestine 1994-2000. Bergen, 2002, 17 pp.
- R 2002: 18 LANGE, Siri, Arild Spissøy, Marie Brudvik
Fra motstander til medspillere: Partnerskap mellom norske frivillige organisasjoner og norsk næringsliv. Bergen, 2002, 74 pp.
- R 2002: 19 KOLSTAD, Ivar and Arne Wiig
A cost-benefit framework for allocating SPS-related technical assistance. Bergen, 2002, 70 pp.
- R 2002: 20 SØRBØ, Gunnar M., Elin Skaar and Hugo Stokke
A review of Ireland Aid's Human Rights and Democratisation Scheme. Bergen, 2002, 45 pp.

A complete list of publications, CMI's Annual Report and CMI's quarterly newsletter are available on CMI's homepage www.cmi.no .

For priced publications:

Surface mail (B-economique) free with prepaid orders. For airmail (A-prioritaire) outside the Nordic countries add 20 %

Four easy ways to pay:

Cheque, issued in Norwegian kroner

Post office giro, paid by International Giro: 0808 5352661

SWIFT: DNBANOB, Den norske Bank no: 5201.05.42308

Order from:

Chr. Michelsen Institute

P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, Norway

Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 Phone: + 47 55 57 40 00

E-mail: cmi@cmi.no