Norway and Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries

Elling N. Tjønneland

R 2003: 12
Norway and Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries

Elling N. Tjønneland

R 2003: 12

Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights
Indexing terms

Norway
Development aid
Security
Peace building

Project title

Project number

22057
# Table of contents

List of Boxes 2  
Executive Summary 3  
Introduction 7  

**Conflict, Development and the Security Sector** 9  
Origins of security sector reform 9  
DAC guidelines 10  
Governance and institutional dimensions 12  

**External Assistance to Security Sector Reform** 15  
The UN and the international financial institutions 16  
European Union 18  
OSCE and NATO 18  
Bilateral donors 19  
Lessons and challenges for external assistance 24  

**Norwegian Support to Security Sector Reform – an Overview** 31  
Policies on peace building 32  
Commitment to the UN and multilateralism 33  
Norwegian military and police 34  
Civil society 35  
Research and policy development 36  
Governance and the security sector 37  

**Southern Africa and Security Sector Reform** 39  
Regional co-operation and the security sector 39  
Norwegian support 41  

What should Norway do? 45  

Annex 1: Literature 49
## List of Boxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Box 1</td>
<td>What is security sector reform?</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 2</td>
<td>DAC recommendations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 3</td>
<td>DAC definitions</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 4</td>
<td>Supporting security sector reform – entry points</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 5</td>
<td>Is support for security sector reform ODA-eligible?</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 6</td>
<td>Challenges for donor agencies</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 7</td>
<td>Working principles for support to security sector reform</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 8</td>
<td>Categories of reform activities in the security sector</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 9</td>
<td>Norwegian support</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 10</td>
<td>Norway’s main priorities</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 11</td>
<td>Civil society and security sector reform</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 12</td>
<td>Training for Peace</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box 13</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

I

Security sector reform addresses two main challenges: (1) assisting institutions capable of providing security for the state and its citizens and (2) ensuring appropriate governance of these institutions in accordance with the principles of democracy and civilian oversight.

This report is based on a study prepared as an input in a policy debate on the role of security sector reform in Norwegian assistance to peace building in developing countries. The report reviews the evolution of thinking around external assistance to security sector reform, and discusses the policies and programmes of the main donor agencies. The report also provides an overview of Norwegian support to security sector reform. This is followed by a case study of Southern Africa. The final section provides suggestions and recommendations for the future role of security sector reform in Norwegian support to peace building and development.

II

Traditionally, the concern with security sector has focused on military assistance, military training and supply of weapons. This started changing in the early 1990s with the new and growing concern for issues such as democratisation and good governance, peace building and support for demobilisation and post-conflict reconstruction.

Three sets of developments converged and gave birth to the current thinking around security sector reform. One was a number of national and regional peace accords after the end of the Cold War, which led to new thinking about the security-development relationship. A second was the eastward enlargement of the European Union and NATO, which led to a new focus on the role of the security sector in the new democracies. A third factor was the donor agencies themselves, which increasingly began to address security issues, especially in post-conflict countries.

OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation
became an important forum for the evolution of donor approaches to the role of development aid in peace building and security sector reform.

III

An increasing number of donor agencies have started to view security as a precondition for poverty reduction and development. Now the substantive focus of donor activities goes well beyond the 1990s interest in military spending and military roles, and increasingly encompasses activities also intended to promote a democratic governance of the security system. In particular, donors offer increased support for justice and internal security/police reforms and to the rebuilding of security institutions in countries emerging out of violent conflict.

However, there is not a shared international understanding of security sector reform and the approaches required. Development agencies define and approach security work in keeping with their differing institutional mandates, organisational priorities and administrative constraints. The “war on terrorism” paradigm has also had an impact on security assistance programmes and donor approaches to security sector reform.

Some donor agencies, most notably DFID, have developed comprehensive stand-alone polices and programme for security sector reform. Others have policy documents and programmes in the broader area of peace building. Many are engaged in policy discussions within the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Several are also engaged in supporting security sector reform in post-conflict countries, but not funded over the aid budget. Much of this assistance has primarily focused on support to rebuilding operational capacity, often inspired by the war on terrorism agenda. Many aid donors are reluctant to engage in direct support to military institutions and to the strengthening of their operational capacities.

A notable feature is also that while most Northern countries have given priority to a strengthening of the operational capacities of the police and the justice sector and sometimes the military forces they seem to have offered limited attention to how civilian oversight and democratic control of the security sector can be promoted. This appears to have been reinforced with the war on terrorism agenda.

Most donor support for democratic oversight of the security sector is also pursued under other headings, such as support for legal reform, good governance or strengthening of democratic institutions. However, reviews of donor support to peace building suggest that assistance suffer from a strategic deficit. While the support is characterised by considerable strengths and growing professionalism it appears that many projects supported fail to establish any link to a broader peace building strategy for the country in which they are implemented. There is often no such strategy for them to be linked to, or the projects show no connection to it.

IV

Norway has a firm and strong political commitment to peace building in developing countries. It does not, however, have a policy framework or document specifically dealing with “security sector reform”. Norway is engaged in this debate within OECD DAC’s Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. It also addresses several related issues in its policy documents on peace building and in several aid programmes and projects.

The bulk of Norwegian aid disbursements are allocated to various efforts to strengthen operational capacities of certain institutions, especially the police.
and the legal institutions. There has also been a preference for channelling funds to the security sector through the multilateral channel and to post-conflict countries. Limited funds have been allocated through the bilateral channel to Norway’s “normal” partner countries in the South.

The Norwegian assistance has several notable features. One is a strong emphasis on the role of the UN and other international organisations. A second is the use of Norwegian military and, especially, police in its assistance to the security sector in post-conflict countries. A third feature of the Norwegian policy is the strong role of Norwegian and international NGOs as channel and vehicle for disbursement of aid to this area. Norway also has a relatively large pool of knowledge based at various research institutions and think-tanks which provides important policy advise and implementation assistance in this area.

There has not been a systematic and focused attempt to address issues of governance and civilian oversight in the direct Norwegian support to the security sector. The most comprehensive Norwegian contribution is in relation to the Balkans. Important lessons and experiences can, however, be found in the extensive Norwegian support to improved governance in other sectors.

The regional dimension has been strongly emphasised in Norwegian support to peace building and development. In many countries it is impossible to address security issues without also examining the wider regional dimensions. Regional co-operation and harmonisation of norms and standards for governance can also help ensure the success of nationally based security sector reform programmes.

Southern Africa has been the biggest recipient of Norwegian bilateral development assistance over the past 20 years. Norway has also been a firm supporter of regional co-operation in this region. Direct Norwegian support to security sector reform has, however, been limited and mainly confined to a strengthening of operational capacities in post-conflict situations. Lessons from the general Norwegian bilateral support to democratisation and good governance are, however, highly relevant for a possible future support to the reform of the security sector in this region.

VI

Norway rarely uses the term “security sector reform”, although they do provide support for a number of activities in this area, probably with the Norwegian assistance to the Balkans as the most comprehensive. This report concludes that Norway should continue to play a role and to provide financial and technical assistance to reform of the security sector both as part of the support for peace building in post-conflict countries, and in co-operation with new and consolidating democracies in the South. In most cases this would probably imply that Norway should focus on a component of the security sector (e.g. policing and judicial reform), either as part of a comprehensive international support for security sector reform to a particular country or region, or as part of Norwegian bilateral support for democratisation and good governance.

This report recommends that Norway continue to provide development assistance addressing security challenges. The focus should, however, be sharpened to improve effectiveness and efficiency. This includes

- Finalising a policy document on peace building which includes approaches to security sector
reform. This involves continued engagement with the policy discussion within the OECD Development Assistance Committee;

• Continuing to use multilateral and regional organisations as channels for delivering support to reform of the security sector;
• Developing skills and programmes in delivering bilateral assistance to civilian democratic governance of the security sector in Norway’s partner countries;
• Using the Norwegian military and police as channels for delivering niche products in strengthening operational capacities of institutions in the security sector;
• Applying a regional approach and regional support channels to assist security sector reform in individual countries; and
• Improving co-ordination and information-sharing between the different Norwegian government departments and stakeholders involved in security sector reform.
Security and development are increasingly seen to be inextricably linked. Safety and security are recognized as precondition for development. 22 of the 34 countries furthest away from achieving the international development goals, are affected by current and recent conflict. More than half of the countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index suffer the direct and indirect effects of warfare. Crime continues to plague the security of people in many parts of the developing world. And the poor suffer the most also from this violence and insecurity. The traditional understanding of security has also been affected by these trends. The focus of security policy is broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state ability to also include the well-being of the populations of the state that constitute them. And the notion of security institution is broadened. The military is seen as just one instrument of security policy with other institutions and instruments given greater prominence. This has provided the basis for mainstreaming security policy to a public policy and governance issue, thereby inviting public scrutiny of the security policy.

Box 1: What is security sector reform?

Security sector reform addresses two main challenges: (1) establishing and strengthening appropriate and affordable institutions capable of providing security for the state and its citizens and (2) appropriate governance of these institutions in accordance with the principles of democracy and civilian oversight.

Development assistance has also been forced to address the security institutions and their role in development. Aid donors have recognized that they must be more actively engaged. The challenges have been two-fold. On the one hand development actors are confronted with how to assist in establishing and strengthening appropriate and affordable institutions capable of providing security for the state and its citizens. The other main challenge has been to ensure appropriate governance of these institutions in accordance with the principles of democracy and civilian oversight. These challenges are now increasingly referred to as security sector reform.

Norway has a strong profile as supporter of peace and development in many regions in the South. Norwegian assistance has addressed conflict prevention, conflict resolution and
peacemaking as well as peacebuilding. Norway emphasises as pointed out by the Norwegian Minister of International Development, in a 2003 speech, that peace-building must address social and economic development as well as political and security issues.\textsuperscript{1} External assistance, according to the Norwegian Minister, must also include security sector reform. The bulk of the Norwegian engagement has been concentrated on support to the strengthening of the operational capacities of certain types of security institutions, especially related to their peacekeeping capacity.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently drafting guidelines for a Norwegian strategy for support to peace building and development, including security sector reform. This report is based upon a study commissioned by the Ministry and is an input to this ongoing work. The particular focus in the commissioned study was the governance dimension of security sector reform in Sub-Saharan and Southern Africa.

This report will first review the evolution of thinking around external assistance to the security sector. It will then proceed to a discussion of key strategies and programmes of some of the main actors in this field. Main lessons learnt and main challenges for future assistance to reform of the security of the sector, will then be identified.

The next section provides an overview of current Norwegian support to peace building and the security sector and attempts to identify the main features and characteristics of the Norwegian contribution. This is followed by a case study from Southern Africa. The concluding section provides suggestions and recommendations for future Norwegian support to reform of the security sector in developing countries.

The finalisation of the report benefited from many discussions with Norwegian senior officials involved in assisting security sector reform and with colleagues at CMI. Drafts also benefited from comments and suggestions from several departments and sections in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice as well as from NORAD. A first draft was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late April and the final report was submitted in October.

Needless to say, the flaws and omissions are entirely mine. I have the responsibility for the views and recommendations expressed in this report.

\textit{Bergen, December 2003}

\textsuperscript{1} See her opening remarks at the Opening and celebration of PRIO’s Centre for the Study of Civil War, Monday, 6 January 2003 (www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/statsraad).
Conflict, Development and the Security Sector

Traditionally, the concern with security sector has focused on military assistance, military training and supply of weapons. Development involvement has been limited (although some engagement did take place in the 1960s based on the premise that the military might play a positive role in modernisation and in building new nations). This began to change in the early 1990s with a new and growing concern with issues such as democratisation and good governance, peace building or support for demobilisation and post-conflict reconstruction. There was a shift from state and military-centric notions of security to a greater emphasis on human security. At the same time there was a growing recognition that democracy and poverty reduction could not be achieved and sustained without meeting the basis security needs of individuals and communities. A recent study identifies three sets of actors and concerns that converged and gave birth to the concept of security sector reform.  

Origins of security sector reform

One is the impetus from a number of national and regional peace accords in the early 1990s. A number of these initiatives – typically focusing on procedures for controlled reduction of troops and reintegration of former combatants – developed around UN peacekeeping operations and post-war reconstruction programmes. The aim was often implementation of comprehensive peace settlements. This led to an increasingly greater attention to the security-
development relationship. New issues such as policing, small arms and judicial systems were addressed and led to a refocusing of UN operations.

Another force behind the reconceptualisation of the security-development relationship was the eastward enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Reform of candidate members’ security sectors were a condition for eventual membership. This included issues such as border control, trafficking in small arms, and the reform of the security forces. It involved reintegration and retraining programmes, destruction of weapons, transparency in military budgeting and rightsizing of military forces and expenditures, and civilian control of the military. For countries in Central and East Europe security sector issues were seen as complementing the wider economic and political reforms in which many of them are engaged.

Finally, the development aid community also began to address the issue of peace building. This in turn led to a growing concern with the security institutions, their functions and how they could be governed. The concept of security sector reform was however, mainly the focus of defence- and foreign affairs ministries although most thinking around civilian oversight and governance tended to come from the development side. In addition a number of important international NGOs and research institutions began to explore these issues and recommend policy changes. Compared to Central and East European states most developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia, have been cautious about embracing security sector reform.

Part of this new thinking was inspired and drew upon local and regional dynamics in the South. The onset of democracy in several Latin American countries led to a process of bringing military institutions under the control of national legislatures and to reform of the police. In South Africa, the end of apartheid generated a process of far-reaching security sector reform. Both these developments, and in particular the South African case, gave strong impetus to new thinking within the development aid community.

DAC guidelines

The evolution of security and development thinking has perhaps been most evident in the work of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee which brought together the main donor organisations first in a Task Force and then in a Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. The DAC discussion has broadened in scope from demobilisation and reintegration projects, and landmine clearance, to capacity building of security and judicial

---


systems. By 2001 DAC had firmly situated security sector reform within broader efforts to promote good governance and democratisation. In the same year the OECD Development Ministers formally approved the DAC guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.

---

**Box 2: The DAC Recommendations**

A 2001 study prepared to assist OECD DAC countries in developing security sector reform policies and more integrated approaches to security and development made six broad recommendations:

1. Recognise the developmental importance and legitimacy of addressing security issues and security-system reform, and the need for more coherent and comprehensive international responses to security problems;
2. Elaborate a comprehensive security-system reform policy that outlines the appropriate roles for actors across all areas of donor governments: foreign affairs, financial, trade, security-defence and development co-operation;
3. Identify what kinds of capacity and internal institutional reforms are required in donor governments to provide security-system assistance effectively on a partnership basis within the context of a development co-operation agenda;
4. Work to develop an effective ‘division of labour’ amongst development and other relevant international actors that will allow each to pursue their comparative advantage without undermining common objectives;
5. Work towards the integration of security-system concerns in the overall foreign and trade policies of OECD countries and encourage greater co-operation between OECD countries in this domain; and
6. Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen the institutional framework for managing the security system in a manner consistent with sound governance practices.


The security sector, in accordance with the DAC guidelines, comprises all those institutions and security forces responsible for ensuring the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion. In other words, the security sector includes the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions; and the civilian authorities responsible for control and oversight (Parliament, the Executive, government departments and other public institutions, etc). In addition non-statutory security actors such as armed opposition groups, traditional militias, private security firms and civil society actors must be included.6

“Security sector reform”, according to the DAC guidelines, means

“transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well functioning security framework”.7

---

6 See e.g. also Chanaa (2002), and International Alert, Saferworld and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, *Towards a Better practice framework in security sector reform. Broadening the Debate* (Occasional SSR Paper No 1 August 2002).

7 From p. 38 in *The DAC Guidelines* (2001). In recent documents DAC has also used the term “security system” rather than “security sector”.

11
Box 3: DAC definitions

“Security” is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing. Underpinning this broader understanding is a recognition that the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. It follows that a wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme and widely used by development actors.

The “security sector” includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions; and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.).

“Security sector reform” is the transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well functioning security framework.


Another important impetus to the security sector reform agenda came from trends in peacekeeping and peace support missions, especially in the wake of the UN Brahimi report in 2000 with its call for development and defence communities to work together. In some disintegrating states undergoing reconstruction – involving both conflict resolution and rebuilding of institutions – the security sector has become a particular important component in this process (in particular in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Afghanistan).

Governance and institutional dimensions

The security sector reform agenda revolves around two main dimensions. One is the political dimension; the character of the management of the security sector. This revolves around the legitimacy of the security sector – in particular promotion of civilian governance and of democratic civilian control. Security sector reform in this perspective is judged to be part of a good governance reform package. It deals with the comprehensive relationship between the security sector and the society at large. It is thus, much more than the internal structure of the security forces.

Democratic civilian oversight requires democratic institutions to be in place together with a basic acceptance of democratic politics by the political leadership, civil servants and security personnel. Democratic control of security institutions is also considered strategic for

---

democratisation. These institutions have close and intimate relationships with political power and they are important also for the survival of democracy, including the management of tensions and insecurities that may be generated by the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security sector requires a democratically elected government with the ability to exercise control and oversight over the security sector. It typically seeks to establish civilian expertise and control in the ministries of defence, justice and internal affairs, together with independent audit units, ombudsman offices and civilian review bodies, and capacity building of NGOs, professional associations, media research and advocacy institutions. Civil society plays an important role in providing the checks and balances that are necessary for the promotion of democratic control of the security sector.

There is also an important economic aspect to the civilian oversight: revenue collection and the consumption of resources. A main focus here has been the provision of accountable defence budgets and anti-corruption measures as well as conversion issues (transfer of resources from the military to the civilian sector).

The institutional dimension focuses upon strengthening the capacities and skills of the security institutions. This revolves around the effectiveness of the institutions. It typically involves “right-sizing” of the armed forces (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of excess forces) and professionalisation (e.g. reorientation away from domestic politics to tasks such as territorial defence and peace support activities). It also involves strengthening the capacities of the police forces (shift to peacetime policing). This will often involve separating the police from the military and armed forces. The judicial and penal or correctional systems are also critical in order to strengthen the rule of law and provide control over the security forces. This also applies to other divisions of the security forces (emergency services, border guards, customs and immigration, intelligence). “Effectiveness”, in this perspective, cannot be separated from governance standards appropriate to a democratic political context.

It must also be emphasised that there may also be tensions between the political and institutional dimensions of security sector reform. This is perhaps most sharply evident in a number of conflict situations after 11 September 2001, especially in countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq. The priority in the US-led “war on terrorism” may pursue building up institutional capacities in a way which undermine efforts to build democratic governance.

“Security sector reform” thus covers a very wide area and comprises many elements. These elements can be mixed in innumerable ways depending on the context, but in nearly all cases practically all elements will have to be addressed in one way or another. There is no “one size fits all” solution to security sector reform. Careful attention must be paid to national variations. Some lessons can, however, be extracted from the emerging literature. Two main categories of countries may be distinguished. On the one hand there are transitional and consolidating democracies such as South Africa, Chile, Mozambique and Ghana. These are countries where the state has remained reasonably stable during the transition to democracy, and its security institutions have remained largely intact.

Reform of the security sector is far more difficult in countries where violence remains endemic; a democratic transition has failed; the security structures have fractured or disintegrated and been replaced by informal militias and/or external forces; or the state has collapsed. Countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, the DR Congo, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Iraq are examples of such countries.
A second observation is that the international or regional security environment is often very critical for the success of security sector reform. A stable external environment of relative security is often a requirement for democratisation and security sector reform. Support for regional security organisations or mechanisms are therefore important as a confidence- and security-building measure which may help facilitate domestic reform.

A third observation is that although democratisation is a necessary requirement for security sector reform it is not sufficient. It also – and this is a main lesson from the South African case – requires domestic commitment to a transformation of the security sector and demilitarisation of the state. Domestic ownership is crucial if security sector reform shall be sustainable.

A fourth observation is the important role played by civil society in nearly all cases of successful security sector reform. They may mobilise or control popular masses, fill policy gaps with their expertise and form a counterweight to security establishments. The role of civil society does, however, vary considerably. They tend to be especially prominent during transitions while their influence tends to wane once a legitimate democratic regime has been established.
External Assistance to Security Sector Reform

An increasing number of donor agencies perceive security as a precondition for poverty reduction and development. The notion of “security sector” as constituting something broader than just the armed forces has not only entered the discourse of NGOs, academics, policy makers and OECD’s Development Assistance Committee – it has also largely been accepted. Several important donors have begun to engage with aspects and dimensions of reform and governance of the security sector – especially in relation to aid-dependent countries in Africa other developing countries. However, this does not imply that there is shared international understanding of security sector reform and the approaches required. Development agencies define and approach security work in keeping with their differing institutional mandates, organisational priorities and administrative constraints. The “war on terrorism” paradigm after 11 September 2001 has also had an impact on security assistance programmes and donor approaches to security sector reform. This is currently most strongly felt in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these situations aid agencies and governance issues play a far more limited role with the main focus being to build operational capacities.

This section summarises key policies and programmes of some of the main actors’ activities in this area.9

---

9 Useful sources of information are emerging from two British research milieus financially supported by DFID and the UK Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Conflict, Security & Development Group based at Kings College in London (http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk) and the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) based at Cranfield University’s Shrivenham Campus (www.gfn-ssr.org). Both put out a number of publications, newsletters as well as two important journals (also available at their website) Journal of Conflict, Security & Development (published since 2001) and the Journal of Security Sector Management (the first issue appeared in March 2003). A number of important unpublished consultancy reports, including reviews of security sector reform in all regions of the world have also appeared under the auspices of the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation.
The UN and the international financial institutions

The United Nations is an important actor in security and development. It has played a particular important role in the peacekeeping field. More than 50 operations have been deployed since the launch of the UN peacekeeping operations more than 50 years ago. With the end of the Cold War, the UN was assumed placed centre stage in efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts. However, this was not always accompanied by coherent policies or integrated military and political responses.10

The mandate of the UN operations expanded during the 1990s. This was evident in a growing involvement in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DD&R). However, it is perhaps most evident in the UN’s role in the policing component of peacekeeping. The UN has been the main actor in this area since the Congo operation in the 1960s. The mandate in the first decades was, however, limited and mainly confined to monitoring. The Namibia operation in 1989-90 saw a major expansion in terms of the size of the UN police forces, and subsequent operations saw a major expansion also of the mandate. The UN civpol operations now increasingly began to focus training, support and advice to the restructuring of the local police forces. In some cases (East Timor and Kosovo) the mandate also went beyond monitoring and training to include executive policing.11

The 2000 report from the UN’s Brahimi panel on peacekeeping operations *inter alia* called for UNDP, in co-operation with other UN institutions, to take the lead in implementing peace building activities. UNDP seeks to play a central role in the UN’s crisis prevention and peace building efforts. It also attempts to address some of the causes of conflict through its various projects. However, it still has to develop a comprehensive approach and operational guidelines that focus directly on the security sector. Its own programmes are in most cases small, and there is an element of rivalry between the various UN agencies involved. Different UN agencies are currently involved in security sector reform issues (in addition to the UNDP this includes, e.g., the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of Political Affairs). UNDP has tended to play a minor role in many of the major UN missions such as the one in East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

UNDP has a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) with a focus on crisis and post-conflict countries. This unit established in 2002 a “Justice and Security Sector Reform” team. This is a small team which seeks to further develop the UNDP approach as well as providing technical support and assistance to regional and country offices.12 By 2004 it may also be in a position to provide operational support, especially related to selected post-conflict countries. UNDP has a stronger focus on issues related to justice and the legal sector and has therefore tended to use the term “justice and security sector reform”. BCPR also has a small team on small arms.


UNDP provides assistance to projects with strong relevance for the security sector reform. Some may be linked to its governance/democratisation programme but more importantly such projects are located within its crisis and post-conflict programme. Some if its projects in post-conflict areas such as Central America, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans have focused on security components such as small arms, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, and prison and police reform. In Guatemala, in particular, UNDP played an important role in developing a judicial assistance project.

UNDP has also sought to assist in facilitating the emergence of an enabling environment for reform of the security sector. In a few countries UNDP has been positioned to bring stakeholders together and to facilitate development of national strategies (although UNDP’s special relations with the host government may also act as an obstacle). Zimbabwe may be an example of UNDP’s efforts to facilitate such a political process (although the outcome is unclear). In 2003, UNDP signed a project document with the government of Zimbabwe to enhance the capacity of the government, the business community and civil society to manage and transform the conflict in the country. The intention is also to provide training for stakeholders in the security sector.\(^\text{13}\)

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have not focused on the broader issues of security sector reform, but they have – beginning in the late 1980s – focused on the level of military expenditure in developing countries. A main concern was the impact of such spending on the macroeconomic stability. The World Bank also became increasingly involved with other aspects of the security and development relationship through policy studies and lending operations to countries emerging from violent conflict. A main initial focus for these lending operations was demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. This began with a World Bank-designed programme in Uganda in the early 1990s to demobilise and reintegrate some 30 to 50,000 ex-combatants and their families. The programme itself emerged out of a desire to reduce public expenditure on defence, a key objective in the Bank’s adjustment operation in that country.\(^\text{14}\) The Bank’s increasing emphasis on governance issues has provided further impetus towards focusing on security and development issues, but it has not led to particular interventions targeting the governance of the security sector.\(^\text{15}\)

It is important to emphasise that the policies and activities of the multilaterals also evolve. There is no organisation-wide agreement within either of the multilateral organisations on their approach to security sector reform. Their financial strength is also extremely uneven - the Bank is in a very solid position while the UNDP has very limited funds at its disposal. Ideally these organisations should define their comparative advantages. This may happen gradually. The World Bank may, e.g., focus on security expenditures and incorporate this into their public expenditure work (including financial management). UNDP may have a longer way to go before a strategy has been developed. They may also to a greater extent focus on facilitating the process towards security sector reform and less on specific project implementation.

\(^{13}\) See the unpublished project document, Government of Zimbabwe/UNDP, *Developing capacity for negotiation skills and conflict transformation in Zimbabwe*, n.p. (Harare), n.d. (2003). The document was prepared with technical assistance from regional experts through a South African NGO (Centre for Conflict Resolution).


European Union

Recently, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a major actor. It has applied pressure and incentives, and provided guidance and assistance for the restructuring of elements of the security sector of applicant states and in transitional, post-conflict and developing countries. The “carrot” of eventual membership is a significant source of leverage in relations to countries in Central and East Europe. Much of its activities at Headquarters in this area have been focused on building capacity for what is termed “civilian crisis management” and other dimensions of “internal security reform”. Within this category the main focus has been to assist police reform in post-conflict reconstruction. The main and bigger operational programme has been the newly established (2002) European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and other and related activities in the Balkans). The EUPM comprises some 500 police officers (mainly from the EU), some 50 civilian experts and a local staff of 300 (until the end of 2002 the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina had the responsibility for the International Police Task Force in the country). The mandate and objectives have become fairly comprehensive. When support for the local police began in the mid-1990s, the focus was on training and assistance. This has now expanded to include support for more comprehensive police reform and a shift towards promoting democratic policing, including also support for improved linkages to the justice sector and the penal system. The police reform programme is an addition to traditional economic assistance and the carrot of possible future membership in the EU.

The evolution of the EU approach to policing closely resembles the general UN approach to assistance to policing in peace operations and reconstruction. The EU has emphasised civilian components and the linkages between the role of the police, the judiciary and the military in its Balkan operations (and with the US and NATO concentrating on the military dimensions). Its approach has echoed views and recommendations put forward in the Brahimi Report on UN peacekeeping.

OSCE and NATO

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has also highlighted security reform issues. Through its work on arms control and confidence and security building measures, the member countries agreed (in 1994) on a Code of Conduct for political-military aspects of security. The OSCE Code of Conduct devotes an entire section (VII, #20-33) to the democratic control of military, paramilitary and security forces. States would clearly define the roles and missions of such forces (#21), provide for legislative approval of defence expenditures (#22), ensure that its armed forces were politically neutral (#23), guard against accidental or unauthorised use of military means (#24), ensure that recruitment was consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms (#27), and make widely available the international humanitarian law of war (#29). Furthermore the Code of Conduct emphasises that defence policy and doctrine must be consistent with international law (#35) and that

18 Cf. also an overview of procedures and mechanisms developed by both OSCE and NATO in this area in W. F. van Eekelen: “Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The National and International Parliamentary Dimension”, pp. 57-121 in H. Born, P. H. Fluri & S. Lunn (eds.) (2003).
internal security missions should be assigned in conformity with constitutional procedures (#36).

Democracy, human rights and humanitarian questions represent another main working area for OSCE. Work on these issues has not focused specifically on security sector issues, but has tended to focus on elections and election monitoring as well as on monitoring of the human rights situation. Its activities have, however, been more extensive in the Balkans and have included projects such as the establishment (with Norwegian support) of a police academy in Kosovo.

OSCE has provided important guidelines although its operational work has been hampered by differences of approach between the EU, the US and Russia.

NATO has also begun to address security sector reform issues, especially related to the defence sector, including a focus on the role of civilian oversight of armed forces. This began with the enlargement of the organisation with new members from Central and East Europe. A key step was the 1994 Partnership for Peace document which also brought in other OSCE countries. Each partner was committed to fulfil a number of objectives. This included transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes and democratic control of the armed forces. This was also reaffirmed in NATO’s Membership Action Plan. In a similar way as the EU the “carrot” of membership is a source of leverage. NATO wields considerable influence over which issues and structures are tackled in the domestic reform processes of applicant states. NATO’s role has however, been made more complicated by the tensions in transatlantic relations, especially over the Iraq issue.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also, since 1989, added “development of parliamentary mechanisms and practices essential for the effective democratic control of armed forces” to its list of activities and aims.

**Bilateral donors**

A 2002-2003 survey of donors commissioned by the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation demonstrates that development actors are increasingly engaging in security-related work. The substantive focus of donor activities now goes well beyond the 1990s interest in military spending and military roles, and increasingly encompasses activities intended to strengthen capacities of security institutions. Donors provide strong support for justice and internal security/police reforms and for activities designed to demilitarise society. They are giving limited but growing attention to strengthening civil oversight of the security bodies and to enhancing the capacity of civil management bodies. However, donors still do very little work towards non-state actors (beyond Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DD&R) programmes) and for the most part seem unfamiliar with the value of activities intended to create an environment in which serious governance-oriented reforms can go forward.

---

19 See especially the overview and discussion in M. Caparini (2003).
20 This section is based on the presentation of the findings in Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball: *Good Practice and Working Principles in Security Sector Reform. Draft Note Prepared for the OECD DAC Task Team on Security Sector Reform, 27 August 2003.*
The most comprehensive policy has emerged from the United Kingdom and its Department for International Development (DFID). In early 1999 the Development Secretary, Clare Short, launched a security sector reform initiative which for the first time in official UK aid policy documents acknowledged the link between good governance, sustainable development and security sector reform. This culminated with the publication in late 2002 of comprehensive practical guidelines for DFID governance advisors and programme managers. The main focus is on the military, paramilitary and intelligence services and the civilian structures responsible for their oversight and control. There was more limited attention in this document to policing and the justice system.\(^{21}\)

DFID does not provide direct support to the military, but focuses on the governance agenda (civilian oversight) and the role of civil society. This is however, co-ordinated with a number of other government departments, primarily the Foreign Office (providing the political framework but also with their own projects) and departments providing specialised assistance to the military (Ministry of Defence) or the police (Home Affairs). This co-ordination also applies to the field office involving, in particular, defence advisors in embassies and high commissions. An interdepartmental working group has been established to help develop a government-wide security sector policy. It expects to conclude that work by the end of 2003.

Interdepartmental co-operation/coherence in the UK has also been facilitated by the establishment of special funding mechanisms. The UK has created two inter-departmental funding pools, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) in order to improve the UK’s conflict prevention policy and effectiveness. Both pools have security sector reform as one of the thematic priorities. Much of UK and DFID’s support to security sector reform is financed through these two pools.\(^{22}\)

The key political challenges identified in DFID’s guidelines are military disengagements from politics; military disengagements from other non-military roles; redefinition of security roles; civilian policy-making role; re-professionalisation of the military; military restructuring and demobilisation; regional frameworks for peace; and management of relations with donors. The guidelines provide help in analysing and providing a diagnosis. See the box below.

---

**Box 4: Supporting security sector reform – entry points**

DFID’s guidelines for security sector reform lists seven areas most likely to serve as entry points for support to sector reform. The particular entry point chosen will vary depending on local contexts. The seven entry points are:

1. Building public awareness and engagement on security issues (through educational activities, capacity building among civil society groups, workshops and seminars bringing stakeholders together);
2. Building strategic planning capacity for governments (capacity building for civilian and security personnel to conduct joint planning, institutional evaluations and produce legislation, and to support development of central co-ordination and policy-making machinery for security matters);
3. Strengthening constitutional and legal frameworks, including relations between security forces, the legislature and the executive and their effective operation (technical assistance and

---


\(^{22}\) Cf. the presentation of these two pools and their current priorities in S. Lawry-White (2003).
advise on roles and mandates, constitutional law, specific legislation and human rights issues);  
4. Strengthening civil oversight mechanisms, including the legislature, ministers and civil servants, and civil society bodies (technical experts and advice, seminars and training courses, study visits, civil service reform/strengthening, support for security think tanks);  
5. Strengthening financial management systems through improved governance mechanisms (support for transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, auditing);  
6. Facilitating war-to-peace transitions by assisting in restoring basic state security capacity and addressing the legacies of war (policing and public security, civil oversight, demobilisation and reintegration, disarmament); and  
7. Improving human resource management through promoting a sense of public duty and political neutrality (training to improve civil control, relations with public and respect for international law and human rights).

The guidelines also emphasises donor co-ordination. In particular DFID calls for incorporating security sector issues into donor country assistance strategies, public expenditure reviews, Comprehensive Development Frameworks, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The PRSP process, according to DFID, offers potentially important mechanisms for mainstreaming security sector issues into development policy.

Sierra Leone is the major example of how various British government departments have teamed up (albeit not without tensions) to support reform of the security sector since the UK’s military intervention. DFID has funded a variety of activities that come under the heading civilian control of the security sector, including, with assistance from the Ministry of Defence, the development of a national security policy, the reorganisation of the defence ministry and the development of its management capacity. The Ministry of Defence and the UK armed forces are helping to restructure and train the national army and to strengthen its management capacity. The Home Office has provided personnel to help manage and reform the national police service. The Foreign Office has provided funding for military education and training and is active in supporting efforts to consolidate the peace process, including the promotion of a UN ban on import of rough diamonds other than those certified by the government of Sierra Leone.23

Beyond DFID, hardly any bilateral donor has developed stand-alone polices and programmes on security sector reform. Several have however, policy documents and programmes in the broader area of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Many are also engaged in the policy discussion within the OECD Development Assistance Committee on the role of security sector reform within development co-operation. Furthermore, many countries are engaged in support to the security sector, often outside development aid budgets. Afghanistan and Iraq are major examples. Much of this assistance to the security sector has primarily been focused on rebuilding operational capacity, often inspired by the “war on terrorism” agenda, and has been less concerned with the governance dimension of security sector.

Denmark has, among the Scandinavian countries, been in forefront in developing a strategy for providing support to conflict prevention and conflict management.24 They do not attempt to address systematically the issue of the governance of the security sector, but they have provided assistance to a number of innovative projects focussing of aspects of governance, especially in Southern Africa. Since the early 1990s Denmark has been a major donor to a

24 Cf. also the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Violent Conflicts in Developing Countries, Copenhagen 2000 (MFA Issues in Focus).
couple of research/civil society-initiatives (the Defence Management Programme in Johannesburg and the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town) which has played an important and effective role in shaping South African thinking on security sector reform and civilian oversight. Denmark has also been the chief donor behind the establishment of SADC’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre which was a pivotal attempt at building regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa. They have also provided assistance to major legal reform programmes in the region.

Sweden has a policy document and action plan on conflict prevention. They do not specifically address the issue of security sector reform although several Swedish-funded projects address aspects of this (e.g., judicial reform, civil society interventions, human rights). Most assistance is given to various activities facilitating dialogue, to small arms control and to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. A process to revise its current policy documents on conflict management was initiated in 2003 and is expected to be completed in 2004.

Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development established in early 2003 a “Security Sector Reform Project” based at its Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). This is one of several pilot programmes established to develop approaches, methods and instruments for peace building. The security sector reform programme has an overall objective to develop methods and procedures that can strengthen democratic and civil oversight over the security sector. The programme will provide advisory services in three priority thematic areas: community policing, interface between the judiciary and the police, and cross-cutting themes. Projects at this stage are few in numbers with activities, often at the micro-level, concentrated in areas such as policing, judicial reform or demobilisation. Outside the aid framework, major German-funded activities have however, been implemented in post-conflict countries (e.g. - and in particular - policing in Afghanistan). Germany has also taken the lead in efforts to get the World Bank to focus more on security sector expenditures.

The Netherlands is another country with an emerging interest in this area. The main activities supported through peace building and good governance division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs currently revolves around conflict management in the Sudan and the Great Lakes. Beyond this the Dutch aid efforts appear mainly to have been channelled into human rights, legal reform and civil society.

The Swiss government initiated (in 2000) an international foundation – The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces – which has produced a number of important studies and lessons learnt on civilian oversight, particularly related to the role of Parliament. 40 countries are members of this foundation which primarily focuses on Central and Eastern Europe. The Centre is expected to increasingly also focus on experiences from developing countries.

---

26 See also a recent evaluation of German assistance to peace building; U. Kievelitz, G. Kruk & N. Frieters., Joint Utstein Study of Peace Building, National Report on Germany, Bonn: GTZ 2003 (available at http://www.gtz.de/crisisprevention/download/utstein.pdf)
A *first* observation emerging from this brief overview of bilateral donors is that most donor agencies generally appear to be weak on policy guidelines and strategies for security sector reform. Many are, however, increasingly engaged in supporting a range of related activities, mostly as part of broader peace building efforts. This is perhaps most evident in some of the major current peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in countries such as East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq.

A recent major evaluation of peace building projects supported by the four Utstein governments – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK – finds that there are considerable strengths and growing professionalism in the support to peace building. The study does, however, also identify a major strategic deficit in the peace building efforts of the Utstein partners. Most projects supported failed to establish any link to a broader peace building strategy for the country in which they are implemented – either because there is no such strategy for them to be linked to, or because the projects show no connection to it. One expects that such findings would also apply to projects related to reform of the security sector.

A *second* observation is that in post-conflict countries – especially in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans and former Soviet Republics – the bilateral development aid institutions often play a less prominent role. Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries have tended to be far more prominent in policy formulation and implementation compared to the aid agencies. This has been reinforced with the focus on the “war on terrorism”. In transitional and consolidating democracies in developing countries and especially in Africa the bilateral aid agencies have been far more important.

A *third* observation is that the bilateral aid agencies have tended to focus more on the justice dimension while foreign affairs and defence ministries have focused more on the military and external security dimension. A *fourth* trend is that the bulk of assistance to security sector reform, appears to be directed towards what in Ch. 2 was referred to as the institutional dimension – supporting efforts to build capacity and skills. Relatively modest assistance appears to be channelled towards the political dimension – democratic and civilian oversight and management issues.

A *final* observation is also that many donor agencies are concerned with the eligibility of peace and security-related assistance as official development assistance. Donor countries are working together in the OECD Development Assistance Committee to agree on the definitions of the characteristics and boundaries of aid that can be categorised and calculated as Official Development Assistance. Military assistance has never been accepted as development aid, but with the close linkages between security and development donors have been forced to rethink this classification. There is an agreement to include a broad range of security-related assistance as development aid. This includes assistance to a number of civilian, security-related development activities, including civilian oversight over police forces, police and judicial reform, and justice systems. Various activities under UN post-conflict peace-building operations such as demobilisation, conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; small arms control; and removal of explosive mines for developmental purposes are also included. However, this eligibility does not cover support to

---

civilian oversight of defence and military issues which is an important dimension of any
democratic reform of the security sector.29

Currently, there is a debate within the OECD
Development Assistance Committee whether
to expand the list of security related activities
eligible for support. For some countries, such
as the Scandinavian countries, this is de facto
a precondition for support to security sector
reform which directly involves the defence
and military institutions. Many member
countries are reluctant to make such an
expansion. There is a special sensitivity
around security-related assistance in light of
the Cold War experience and other instances
of assistance to security forces which
subsequently engaged in human rights
violations, attacked neighbouring countries,
or committed other atrocities. There is also a
concern that scarce aid funds will be diverted from core development co-operation to
activities which more appropriately may be financed from other budgets. There is also a
concern that if parts of certain activities (e.g. civilian oversight over the military) could be
considered ODA-eligible, identifying and accounting for these components could be
extremely difficult.

Lessons and challenges for external assistance

The security sector reform agenda appears extremely ambitious and, if fully implemented,
promises a great deal. It requires major and radical social and institutional changes that entail
considerable time and resources. Surveys also indicate, as pointed out above, that
development actors are increasingly engaged in security-related work. This also increasingly
eccompasses activities intended to promote democratic governance of the security sector.
Most of the support for civilian oversight is, however, pursued under other headings such as
support for legal reform, good governance or strengthening of democratic institutions with
limited or nor specific focus on the security sector as such.

The debate and the literature on security sector reform are largely informed by a small group
of consultants, research and advocacy institutions and by engagements by the military and the
police forces in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the institutional implementation lags
behind the vision. With a couple of exceptions, donors and major actors do not have an
explicit security sector reform agenda. In most cases, what we see is that a number of existing
programmes and projects are grouped together and classified as support to reform of the
security sector. And in many cases this may be a sensible approach, since security sector
reform is an extremely ambitious agenda. This presupposes, however, that the donor has a
clear understanding of how the individual project supported may contribute to security sector
reform.

See also pp 40 in OECD, The DAC Guidelines (2001).
Operational implementation and success are still limited. New security structures may have
with some success been set up or supported by international donors and actors in some post-
conflict countries in Africa (e.g. Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa), in Central
America (e.g. Guatemala), in Asia (e.g. Cambodia and East Timor) and in Central and East
Europe (e.g., Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo). Some of the more successful examples,
especially in relation to democratic and civilian oversight (such as in South Africa and in
some South American countries), have however, largely been “home grown” and the outcome
of domestic processes although foreign donors may have contributed important financial
support at critical stages.

Some general findings based on the relatively few cases of external support to reform of the
security sector can be drawn.  

One is the general insufficient attention to civilian oversight and democratic control of the
security sector. Attention to this is often either absent or late in the process of promoting
reform of the sector. The preference is strengthening the operational capacities of the various
institutions comprising the security sector.

A second finding is the tension between development objectives on the one hand, and
traditional military aid as extension of commercial and foreign policy objectives on the other.
This was also illustrated with the above-mentioned case of Sierra Leone. While one British
government department argued about the negative consequences of excessive military
spending, another department called for increased arms export. Both departments used the
jargon of security sector reform to justify their arguments. More recent examples are the cases
of Afghanistan and Iraq. Here development objectives such as the governance dimension may
be at odds with other foreign policy/security objectives (such as anti-terrorism objectives).

For some, and this include many of the dominant stakeholders among the Northern donors,
security sector reform can be used to justify a continuation of traditional military assistance.
Selling arms and promoting reform of the security sector are not always reconcilable. These
tensions have been reinforced with the “war on terrorism” agenda. The immediate priority is
now often to strengthen the operational capacities of the police or the army with governance-
related reforms being less important.

A third observation is that support to reform of the security sector sometimes appears to be
attempts to remould military institutions according to the traditions of the donor. Projects
initiated and supported by external donors often do not take sufficient account of local
contexts. Security sector institutions in many developing countries may play very different
societal roles than security institutions in Northern democracies. The strategic priorities of the
security sector in the South may also be very different. They may, e.g., be far more concerned
with regime security than with citizen security. Moreover, many external interventions risk
over-emphasizing the security sector as a target for funds and as an agent of change. The
external assistance may serve to insulate security sector reform from the wider political

30 In addition to the literature mentioned above, especially in note 2, some of the arguments in the following are
also based on the important 2003-collection of studies - Governing Insecurity - edited by G. Cawthra and R.
Luckham (see above). See also more on post-conflict and collapsed states in A. Suhrke, “Peacekeepers as
development Group, Kings College 2002 (Working Paper No 5) and the important recent evaluation from the
same institute: A Review of Peace Operations. A Case for Change – Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor,
economy and other factors which may be more important in development and management of a specific conflict.

A fourth finding is that military institutions and the police in Northern donor countries have been major channels for delivering assistance to security sector reform. These institutions possess valuable technical skills, but they are not always well-suited to address certain key dimensions of reforming the security sector. This includes working with governments to develop and design comprehensive reform strategies, capacity-building of civil oversight bodies or assistance to civil society. Their main strength appears to lie in delivering traditional military (and police) assistance combined with specialist skills in certain areas, such as peacekeeping and international law.

Large-scale engagement of military and police officers – especially in post-conflict countries as seen in the Balkans – are also costly and difficult to fund over longer periods. Donor countries are reluctant to deploy highly skilled and qualified personnel, especially police officers, for such service. Such personnel may be scarce also in the home or deploying countries.

A fifth observation is insufficient attention to the operational level for rule-of-law strategy. A main shortcoming revolves around insufficient co-ordination between police reform on the one side and the justice sector on the other. Lack of a coherent strategy and insufficient co-ordination are recurrent problems.

A sixth observation emerging from nearly all cases, is that security defies bureaucratic compartmentalisation. The understanding of security needs to be expanded to address the range of security threats faced by post-conflict countries – it may include issues such as smuggling, organised transborder crime and militia threats.

Finally, and most importantly: the process of security sector reform has often been as important to success as its substance. The key stakeholders need to be brought on board. This includes not just the security decisions makers and managers themselves, but also national legislatures, the media and informed groups in civil and political society.

These findings pose several challenges for aid donors. Two shall be singled out for the purpose of this paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6: Challenges for donor agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Northern countries prioritise strengthening of the operational capacities of the police and the armed forces in their support to the security sector. This may have been reinforced with the “war on terrorism” agenda. There is insufficient attention to the need for civilian oversight and democratic control of the security sector in external assistance. Donors also need to develop a strategic framework for their interventions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One is the need to pay greater attention to civilian oversight in the assistance programme. Civilian oversight mechanisms need to be established early on. This is a major capacity building exercise and is linked to the development of a viable civil service structure. To achieve this, donor agencies must pay greater attention to how they can assist the critical tasks of building a nationally-owned vision of security and preparing the political and policy terrain for security sector reform through national dialogue.

A second challenge relates to management within donor agencies and the need to develop an appropriate context-specific strategy guiding the support for security strategy. This may be
anchored in a peace building approach or a strategy for support to democratisation. This involves establishing a strategic planning mechanism, undertake an analysis of the security sector, provide a needs and a feasibility assessment, and identify the activities and goals of particular interventions.

It should be noted that it is particularly demanding to provide assistance to and promoting good governance in an area as politically sensitive as security policy and reform of security institutions. It is not sufficient to simply provide technical assistance to fragmented aspects of the security sector. Local ownership and policy dialogue become very important and donor co-ordination is crucial. Donor staff also needs to have specialised skills to handle the conceptual and operational security sector issues. They need to be familiar with local contexts and have the skills to analyse political trends and security challenges. They have to be in a position to provide swift and flexible responses to windows of opportunities. Above all donors must be able to provide assistance to processes that can create an environment enabling reform of the security sector.

OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation have taken the lead in developing guidelines for assistance to security sector reform. Its most recent draft document (from November 2003) provides guidelines on policy and good practice. It emphasises process and identifies working principles (see the outline in Box 7). Donors and partners are encouraged to adhere to these.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 7: Working principles for support to security sector reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. <em>Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes</em> and strengthen the institutional framework and human capacity for managing the security system in a manner consistent with sound democratic governance practices and sound financial governance of the security system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. <em>Recognise that needs, priorities and circumstances governing SSR differ substantially regionally as well as by country.</em> This should be underpinned by the understanding - through appropriate analysis – of differing capacities, willingness and ownership to embrace SSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. <em>Make it a priority to help local stakeholders determine what will work best for them, maximising use of scarce resources, through confidence-building efforts and by finding ways to build incentives into their systems to promote change.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. <em>Work together in partner countries to ensure that the principles and objectives of SSR work are clear.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. <em>Ensure that the principles behind donor support for SSR programmes are coherent and transparent through work by development actors with all other departments concerned to ensure this.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. <em>Develop country-specific SSR approaches against the background of an assessment (such as a national security system review) of the country’s security needs and the context for reform.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. <em>Encourage donor governments to develop workable multi-sectoral strategies and enhance the links between development and security policy within SSR frameworks for whole-of-government action.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. Although local demand for change cannot be created by donors, they can support activities that:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Help to increase dialogue among members of the security forces, the wider security system, civil society organisations, and the general public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bring an appropriate mix of expertise to the dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Further integrate the security system into government planning and budgeting processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support regional dialogue and confidence-building mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix. <em>Identify entry-points and develop methods of working through local actors. Donors should seek to build on on-going initiatives and to avoid imposing organisational structures and modes of operation on partner country governments.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x. <em>In countries where there is lack of government commitment and capacity is weak, prepare the political and policy terrain and support dialogue through civil society and regional networks.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xi. Support civil society efforts to create a pro-reform environment of democratic governance, in particular where there are significant obstacles to achieving local ownership and active partner participation.

xii. Assist in the development of more integrated development and security policies by encouraging donor and partner governments to expand more traditional public sector management, public expenditure management, and anti-corruption activities into the security domain.

xiii. Adopt a regional perspective even when assistance is provided in support of a national reform programme. Regional dynamics can have a major impact, positive or negative, on security systems. Needs and priorities governing SSR, such as incentives for reform, differ. Where feasible, development actors should work through or support regional or sub-regional organisations involved in security-related activities.

From the draft *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*, OECD DAC
November 2003

In this DAC document the security sector reform concept is primarily seen as a framework to structure thinking and how to address diverse security challenges. It elaborates on management and approach. It strongly calls for a “whole-of-government” approach. The evolving DAC policy and approach may, however, not sufficiently take account of a situation where most donors would prefer to take a more partial approach to these issues. Donor policies and activities would perhaps in most cases be classified as support for “good governance”, “democratisation”, “anti-corruption”, “civil society” and so on. Only in exceptional cases, involving reconstruction of collapsed states, may donor agencies pursue a comprehensive programme for assistance to the security sector. It is therefore important that policy guidelines in this area also provide lessons and recommendations on how these issues can be pursued in other sector programmes. This also applies to DAC policy guidelines in other areas.

The current draft document does, however, provide a good summary of the relevant categories of security sector reform-related activities. They are reproduced in Box 8. It is a further development of the DFID entry points listed above (cf. Box 4).

**Box 8: Categories of reform activities in the security sector**

1. **Political and Policy Dialogue and Initiatives**: Activities aimed at improving civil-security force relations, increasing civilian input into security policymaking, and preparing the terrain for reform. This can include confidence-building activities between civilians and security force personnel.

2. **Armed Forces and Intelligence**: Activities aimed at improving governance of the armed forces, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces and other reserve or local defence units that support military functions, provide border security and so on.

3. **Justice and Internal Security Apparatus**: Activities involving police functions, prisons, courts, secret services, and civilian internal intelligence agencies.

4. **Non-state Security Forces**: Activities involving private security companies and other irregular security bodies which enjoy a degree of public authority and legitimacy that is not derived from the state itself or legal status: political party militias/security forces, local militias, bodyguard units, and so on.

5. **Civil Oversight Mechanisms**: Activities involving formal mechanisms — such as the legislature, legislative select committees, auditors general, police commissions, human rights commissions — and informal mechanism — such as civil society “watchdog” organisations, and customary authorities.

6. **Civil Management Bodies**: Activities aimed at strengthening functions for financial management, planning and execution; security policy development; personnel management and the like found in finance, defence, internal affairs and justice ministries, president/prime minister’s offices, national security advisory bodies and the like.

7. **Civilian Capacity Building**: Activities aimed at general capacity building/education initiatives that do not fit into the civil management and oversight categories, including activities designed to build capacity of civil society groups seeking to analyse and influence security policy and increase public literacy on security issues, academic or other training courses on security issues.
A recent study commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides additional guidelines on how donor agencies can assist in supporting democratic governance in the security sector.\textsuperscript{32} The study outlines an institutional assessment framework focusing on five entry points. One is the rule of law in relation to the security institutions. The second focuses on how the government develop and implement security policies. The third entry point is an assessment of the normative and technical professionalism of the security forces. The fourth is the accountability of the security sector and the quality of the oversight. The final entry point is the management of security expenditures. The Dutch study then goes on to provide recommendations on the procedures to be followed which may culminate with the adoption of a locally owned security governance strategy.

The guidelines developed in the Dutch study basically apply standard institutional assessment criteria and guidelines and applies them to the security sector. As such it is a useful tool for donor agencies contemplating how to approach security reform issues, either as a stand-alone policy or as a component in other sector strategies.

Norwegian Support to Security Sector Reform – an Overview

Norway has firm and strong political commitment to peace building in developing countries. It sees peace as the main precondition for development.33 The Government considers external assistance to conflict resolution and peace building as very important. This may include assistance in getting the parties in the conflict to negotiate, but also assistance to the building of peace by addressing social and economic development as well as political and security issues.34

Box 9: Norwegian support

“External assistance (to peace-building) should include long-term plans and initiatives that promote reconciliation, good governance, democratic development and respect for human rights. Refugees and internally displaced persons must be repatriated and reintegrated. Civil society must be reconstructed. And we must not forget the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, humanitarian mine-related issues, getting small arms under control and security sector reform. Efforts to consolidate peace must also include long-term measures to promote high-quality and accessible education, health services, and productive sector development.”

Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Norway’s Minister of International Development, 2003


34 See e.g. the January 2003 speech by the Norwegian Minister of International Development (note 1). The key documents are a draft strategy paper from the Foreign Ministry, Peace building and development – What can Norway do? (Unpublished draft 17.09.02), and two regional papers: West Africa (with a focus on Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia). Elements of a Norwegian strategy for peace building (unpublished 26.10.01) and Great Lakes. Strategy for Norwegian support for peace building (Unpublished, September 2002). All these documents are in Norwegian. Cf. also the overview provided of Norwegian support to peacebuilding in W. Hauge, Norwegian peacebuilding policies: Lessons learnt and challenges ahead, Oslo: PRIO November 2003 (Contribution to the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Available from www.prio.no.
Norway has a high profile as conflict mediator and facilitator of dialogue in several major conflicts – Israel/Palestine, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Sudan and others. It has also played a role in facilitating and assisting co-ordination of development assistance to a number of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, e.g., in Afghanistan and Palestine.

The financial disbursements to the political and security dimensions of peace building activities from the development aid budget are also significant although precise figures are not available. In the bilateral assistance sector (which accounts for roughly half of Norway’s NOK 14 billion official development assistance in 2002) NOK 1.4 billion was allocated to peace, human rights and democracy and NOK 1.6 billion to humanitarian purposes. Both these categories contain significant funding to activities in support of peace building. The multilateral assistance sector also has major and significant components focusing on peace building, especially in relation to post-conflict countries. This includes support channelled through UN agencies such as the UNDP, but also support to a range of international NGOs active in this field.

In 2002 a special budget line for “transitional assistance” was set up. The main purpose of this allocation is to fund assistance to countries and areas recovering from conflict and disasters. Spending on such “transitional assistance” amounted to NOK 345 million in 2002. Afghanistan was the main recipient (NOK 90 million) followed by DR Congo (53 million, including support to regional projects in the Great Lakes). Other recipients included countries such as Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. The majority of the allocations from this budget line has been channelled through the UN (mainly UNDP) and the World Bank – 76% in 2002. The remaining 24% was channelled through Norwegian and international NGOs.

**Policies on peace building**

Norway has no policy framework or document specifically on “security sector reform”. They are however, engaged in this debate within OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. They also address several related issues in their policy documents on peace building and in several aid programmes and projects. The bulk of the aid disbursements are allocated to various efforts to strengthen operational capacities of certain institutions, especially the police and the legal system. There has also been a preference for channelling funds to this sector through the multilateral channel and to countries emerging out of violent conflicts. The most comprehensive support has been provided to the Balkans where support for a more comprehensive security sector reform also has been developed. Limited funds for such purposes have been allocated through the bilateral channel to Norway’s “normal” partner countries or for regional co-operation in the South.

**Box 10: Norway’s main priorities**

The major Norwegian 2002 action plan *Fighting Poverty* states that Norway’s main contribution to peace and security in the South shall be to

- Strengthen the capacity of the UN and other international organisations to co-ordinate conflict resolution and prevention;
- Prevent the spread of small arms and anti-personnel mines;
- Improve living conditions in vulnerable areas to reduce recruitment of poor people into armed conflicts, and focus on the poor in peace building and reconstruction;
- Strengthen capacities for non-violent conflict management;
• Promote a co-ordinated, holistic approach to peace building and a coherent, effective structure for international co-operation;
• Build regional perspectives into peace making and conflict resolution where this is relevant;
• Integrate peace building with development strategies in areas that are in conflict or in a post-conflict situation; and
• Consolidate peace through humanitarian assistance and long-term assistance.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prepared a handbook or guidelines for Norwegian support to peace building (currently – mid-2003- in its final draft stage) Combined with specific strategy documents for Norwegian support to peace building in the Great Lakes and in West Africa and key speeches, this is the main reference document for a Norwegian policy and strategy (cf. note 34 above). NORAD has the operational and management responsibilities for most bilateral aid, including support to peace building, although significant funding also is channelled directly from the Foreign Ministry. NORAD has established an informal discussion group to assess and review experiences of support to peace building. A planned restructuring of the relations between NORAD and the Ministry will take effect from early 2004. This is expected to have important implications for the management of future Norwegian support to peace-building.

While Norway does not have any official operational guideline or strategy for support to security sector reform, they do support a range of activities and programmes in this area. Together with policy statements and the documents listed above patterns and trends in Norwegian support can be identified.

**Commitment to the UN and multilateralism**

One notable feature of the Norwegian position is the historically strong emphasis on the role of the UN and other multilateral organisations. This has long been a pillar of Norwegian foreign policy, but more recently it has been reinforced with the new emphasis on supporting peace and security in developing countries. The argument is frequently made that international co-ordination and co-operation assume special importance in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction. It is also argued that Norway does not have the capacity and competence to play a strong and direct role in many of the countries where such assistance is required. Therefore Norway would like international organisations to take the lead through their field operations. The 2000-2002 membership of the UN Security Council further reinforced the Norwegian focus on peace building.

The emphasis on the multilateral institutions has been manifested in many ways. One is Norwegian political support and financial allocations to UN bodies and international organisations active in this field. This includes generous funding of a number of special funds and allocations managed by, e.g., the UNDP or the World Bank, for various peace building purposes, especially in countries and regions where there are no Norwegian field missions (as in the Great Lakes and in West Africa and for interventions in areas such as demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants) or where an international organisation is considered to have a strong comparative advantage (e.g., Guatemala). Another manifestation is the strong Norwegian involvement in a number of global issues such as the ban on the use of anti-personnel mines, and the role of small arms and light weapons. Norway has also been a firm supporter of UN peace operations and a strong participant in debates on the effectiveness and reform of such UN operations. Finally, Norway has in its bilateral development policies
pursued policies and initiatives emanating from the multilateral arena. And it has used the multilateral channel in its bilateral assistance to peace building (through “multi-bilateral” assistance).

Norway is also an active member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, and is engaged with the policy debates there on peace building and security sector reform.

Another notable and related trend is a strong Norwegian emphasis on regional approaches and regional institutions in the support for peace building. In many conflict zones, it is impossible to address security issues without also examining the wider regional implications. Furthermore, helping to foster regional co-operation can help ensure the success of nationally based reform programmes. In the Norwegian assistance, this is perhaps most evident in the support to the Great Lakes. Both in Burundi and in DR Congo, regional-led initiatives are supported.

Recent years, particularly following 11 September 2001, has seen certain additional features of Norwegian foreign policy which by some is interpreted as a weakening of the commitment to multilateralism and the UN. Deployment of Norwegian military troops in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the main manifestation of this new trend to participate in military operations outside the UN. NATO’s “Out of Area” policy and Norwegian ties to the US may increasingly shape certain dimensions of the Norwegian policy related to peacebuilding.

**Norwegian military and police**

A second major feature of Norwegian engagement has been the use of the Norwegian military and police to deliver external assistance to crisis and post-conflict countries, especially related to the strengthening of the operational capacities of similar institutions in these countries. Focus for both groups have been participation in UN and other international peace operations (which is not discussed in this report), and in offering specialised training programmes related to peace operations. This has involved bringing people from developing countries to regular training courses in Norway, as well as the holding of “train-the-trainer” courses in the South. The training has been closely linked to the demands and needs of UN peace operations. The involvement of the military and police have, however, also in a few cases moved beyond this and included support to police reform and institutional restructuring in crisis and post-conflict countries. This has mainly been in the Balkans but also in East-Timor and in Afghanistan. An early effort was participation by Norwegian police in the support (through the UN) to the police training institution in El Salvador following the 1992 peace accord.

The military contribution revolves around the *Norwegian Defence International Centre* (NODEFIC), a small unit which runs training courses for personnel who wish to qualify for specialised positions in peace operations. This is part of the joint Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) education programme where Norway is responsible for logistics and command, Finland for military observers, etc. Most participants in these courses are from the Nordic and European countries while 3-4 of the 30-40 officers attending each course are from countries outside Europe.

In addition, NODEFIC maintains a small pool of instructors that conduct “train-the-trainer” courses in developing countries. This is mainly at the request of the UN and its Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, but some requests come directly from the country concerned. The Norwegian specialised skills are mainly in logistics, but other areas – especially civil-military relations (CIMIC) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DD&R) are also covered. Consideration is also currently being given to the establishment of a Norwegian pool of instructors in DD&R.

Military officers from conflict/post-conflict countries have also in a few cases been invited to Norway to be exposed to the Norwegian military and the role of the military in a democratic society. This was the case, e.g., during the peace process in Guatemala. Currently (2003) this also involves the military in Colombia.

The police have similar functions. The Police Directorate has a small unit of three persons working on civilian police and deployment of Norwegian police personnel in peacekeeping operations. This is mainly through the UN, through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, through the European Union and through bilateral agreements. At any one time a maximum of one percent of the Norwegian police – equivalent of about 80 people - can be deployed abroad on such missions. Currently (mid-2003) some 50 people are deployed. Most are deployed in the Balkans. Five officers are currently (mid-2003) part of UN missions in Africa (in Western Sahara and in Sierra Leone).

Police selected for deployment attend a two-week preparatory course at the Police Academy. The Academy also offers a specialised course in human rights and law enforcement, and provides “train-the-trainer” courses in this topic. A pool of instructors in human rights and law enforcement has been established to provide similar courses in other countries. This has included post-conflict countries in Balkan, East Timor and – in 2003 - Afghanistan.

In 2003 Norway began to broaden its support to also include other aspects of the justice sector (see the section on governance below).

The single largest project involving instructors from both the Norwegian military and the police is Training for Peace in Southern Africa (TfP). It was started in the mid-1990s and the objective was to establish a self-sustaining, multifunctional peacekeeping capacity in the region (see more in the next chapter).

There are no proper reviews or evaluations specifically of the relevance and impact of the use of Norwegian military and police officials in such operations. Studies of the activities in the early 1990s, suggest that the Norwegians may not have been sufficiently prepared, that they lacked important knowledge of local contexts, and that the relevance of the missions were at times unclear. However, the impression is that there may have been significant improvements in the latter half of the 1990s.

Civil society

A third feature of the Norwegian policy is the strong role of Norwegian and international NGOs as channels and vehicles for disbursement of aid. This applies not only to “traditional”

---

35 This is a finding emerging from the assessment of the role of the Norwegian police in the peace accord in Mozambique. See Chr. Michelsen Institute in association with Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997 (Evaluation Report 4.97).
development aid, but also to Norway's assistance to peace building and post-conflict countries. Northern NGOs have been a particular important channel in countries and regions, such as the Great Lakes, where there is limited official Norwegian presence. They have been engaged in providing support to, e.g., conflict mediation, community development, repatriation of refugees and provision of humanitarian assistance. NGOs have also been important in some of the main international issues where Norway has a high profile, such as campaigns against the use of anti-personnel mines and control of small arms.

Furthermore, Norway has used NGOs as vehicle to help strengthen civil society in post-conflict countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also established a Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), managed by the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Refugee Council. These institutions second personnel to UN missions, to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other organisations to promote human rights and democratisation. It has not focused specifically on security sector reform although it has worked in related and relevant fields, especially in the legal sector and in crime investigation. NORDEM may potentially be in a position to play a more important role in this field.36

Research and policy development

Norway has a relatively large research milieu providing input, policy advice and implementation assistance related to the security sector. This milieu is found in a range of research institutions and university departments. The five major ones are the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Centre for Human Rights (CHR), the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) and the FAFO Institute for Applied International Studies (FAFO).

NUPI has a Foreign Ministry-funded UN programme which involves several researchers working on different aspects of security sector reform. Its strongest contribution may be in its policy related work regarding the role of the police in peace operations and justice sector reform. It also works closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Police Directorate on these issues. Close ties have also been established with the relevant UN agencies and an international network of scholars and practitioners, including UNDP, and related to justice and security sector reform. It is intimately involved in the assessments of peace building in the Balkans and also manages the Training for Peace in Southern Africa-project.

CHR at the University of Oslo’s Law Faculty offers professional advice and training in international and human rights law. It advises the relevant Ministries and NORAD on policy issues and aid programmes related to human rights, international law and external assistance to legal sector reform. It also manages the NORDEM-project (see the civil society section above) and other operational programmes, and offers short-term training courses.

CMI has a stronger focus on development and aid policy. It has provided policy advice and evaluations for a range of donors and international organisations on issues related to security

sector reform. They are focusing *inter alia* on donor policies, strategies for peace building and governance dimensions (including oversight, expenditure reviews and anti-corruption issues). They also have major research projects on aid in conflict, and on transitional justice. CMI’s work is combined with a strong knowledge of local conditions in several geographical regions, especially related to Southern and Sub-Saharan African and Central/South Asia (including crisis and post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan and East Timor).

PRIO has contributed less as policy advisors but has a particularly strong academic record on several of these issues, especially related to the causes of violent conflict and conflict management. It is also managing a range of community-level projects focusing on dialogue and has evaluated several projects related to conflict management and peacebuilding.

FAFO has a Programme for International Co-operation and Conflict Resolution focusing on policies and practices of international responses to armed conflict. There is no direct focus on security sector reform with most projects focusing on the economics of conflict.

**Governance and the security sector**

Norway’s main contribution to security sector reform may have been in strengthening the capacity of selected aspects of security institutions in some, mainly crisis and post-conflict, countries and regions. Mostly this has been through the use of Norwegian military and police officers and instructor courses in peacekeeping (logistics, demobilisation and reintegration, human rights, civil-military relations, etc). There have also been some efforts to support national training institutions and police reform in crisis and post-conflict countries. In some countries this is now being expanded to focus on the broader issue of institutional reform in the justice sector. Furthermore, Norway has been an important supporter of international and regional organisations and their engagements in this area.

Notably, there has been no systematic and focused attempt at addressing issues of governance and civilian oversight in direct Norwegian support to the security sector with the partial exception of the Balkans. Governance issues are otherwise an area where there are considerable lessons to be learnt from the extensive Norwegian support to democratisation and human rights, especially in the main Norwegian partner countries. This includes areas such as financial management and anti-corruption, human rights commissions and ombudsman institutions, the role of parliaments and public sector reform. The Norwegian efforts to support political democratisation processes through support for civil society, including media and research/advocacy institutions, are other examples of areas where Norwegian experiences may be highly relevant also to security sector reform.

There is some support to the justice sector and legal reform in Norwegian bilateral assistance, but most support in this area has been channelled through multilateral institutions (such as UNDP’s work in Guatemala). This also includes the extensive Norwegian support for justice and reconciliation in post-conflict countries. In the bilateral assistance, the main focus in assistance to the legal sector has been on access to justice and community empowerment, and in support to infrastructure (mainly construction of court buildings). In 2003, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice established a small team of senior officials with a capacity to provide rapid advice on legislation, institutional reform and implementation in the justice sector. This civilian crisis management team is intended to become an important supplement to the assistance provided through the Police Directorate. Through these efforts, Norway intends to provide assistance to nearly all aspects of the justice sector. The assistance will mostly be
made available through the UN, OSCE and the European Union, and target crisis and post-conflict countries and countries where reform of the justice sector is required.
Southern Africa and Security Sector Reform

The countries of Southern Africa provide important lessons learnt for security sector reform. Many of the countries here are involved in peace building and in improving governance. Furthermore, there is a relatively strong political commitment to increased regional co-operation. For many countries it is also difficult to address security sector reform without regional support.

Foreign aid donors have also been engaged in efforts to assist security sector reform. Some have also turned to regional institutions and have supported efforts to harmonise norms and standards for governance to ensure the success of nationally based security sector reform programmes in the region. Southern Africa has been the biggest recipient of Norwegian bilateral development assistance over the past 20 years. Norway has also been a firm supporter of regional co-operation. This chapter will briefly assess the experiences of security sector reform in Southern Africa and the role of Norwegian aid.

Regional co-operation and the security sector

Southern Africa entered the 1990s with a lot of optimism. Independence in Namibia, a comprehensive peace settlement in Mozambique, the end of apartheid and a wave of multi-party elections promised a new era. Some countries in the region with South Africa as the prime example, also witnessed extensive reform of the security sector. Regional co-operation, now under the umbrella of Southern African Development Community (SADC), also placed peace, democracy and human rights issues at the centre stage. However, the achievements at the end of the 1990s were much less than expected. Some countries had consolidated their democracies, others saw a reversal into growing authoritarianism, and new threats to regional security emerged (such as small arms, transborder crime, population movements and the spread of HIV/AIDS). SADC was also becoming increasingly incapacitated due to, inter alia, growing political divisions between member countries. The conflict in the DR Congo and
later in Zimbabwe, in particular, had a strong impact on SADC’s ability to deal with issues of governance, peace and security issues.37

The new millennium saw some positive developments. Peace settlements in war-torn Angola and the DR Congo signalled a new development with major regional implications. Efforts were also made to revive SADC through a major organisational restructuring, including a stronger Secretariat. Of particular importance for the discussion in this report, was the 2001 adoption by SADC of a protocol providing guidelines for how the organisation should engage politics, security and defence issues. This SADC protocol also provided the outline of a revived SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. This Organ established a number of institutional structures. The Organ is chaired on a Troika basis by three SADC countries (in a model similar to the OSCE-structures); it has two ministerial committees under it. One is an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (led by SADC’s Defence, Public and State Security Ministers). This is an old committee (its roots are in the Frontline States of the 1970s) and it has a large number of functional subcommittees and structures (most notably in policing). The second ministerial committee is the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee. This committee is new. It brings together Foreign Ministers and deals with issues involving governance, conflict management and other matters.

SADC is making some progress at the policy level in addressing security and governance issues. A strategic plan for the SADC Organ was approved at the Summit in August 2003. It outlines a number of principles to facilitate good governance, security sector reform and confidence building among member countries. A Mutual Defence Pact was signed at the same summit. In a few areas SADC is also making some progress at the level of implementation, especially in policing related to organised crime and other areas (small arms), but also in assisting peace building in some member countries (the DR Congo and Lesotho).

However, and despite some progress, the operationalisation and implementation of the emerging SADC policies are lagging far behind. In some areas the gap between policies and implementation is widening. SADC’s inability to appropriately respond to the growing crisis in Zimbabwe has further reinforced a perception of SADC as both unwilling and unable to address such issues. SADC has difficulties in responding to these challenges. This appears to be so partly because SADC does not have any mechanisms or procedures to intervene when members fail to adhere to adopted policies and principles. And partly because certain member countries do not wish to give SADC the authority and powers required. Finally, and most importantly: there is also insufficient agreement and lack of consensus between member countries on how to approach and pursue governance and security issues.

It is therefore expected that we will see a slow and tortuous evolvement of SADC’s security and governance policies. One may also expect that the evolving regional security architecture will be designed primarily to protect states and ruling elites and pay less attention to human security concerns.38 On the other hand: there is also a growth of associated SADC structures – such as the Parliamentary Forum, the Election Commissioners Forum, and the regional organisation of the Police – which are developing common policies and guidelines which will


38 This is argued in A. Hammerstad, Defending the State or Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads?, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, November 2003 (SAIIA Report Nr 39).
also positively impact on SADC itself and its efforts to develop common and harmonised policies in this field.

The most dynamic development at the inter governmental level with a potential strong impact on evolving SADC policies on peace and security is emerging out of pan-African initiatives associated with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Union. While NEPAD’s peer review mechanism may provide an important platform for interventions in domestic affairs the focus of the peer review is increasingly expected to be on economic governance issues. It has been left to the new African Union’s Peace and Security Council to develop policy guidelines in the security and political governance field. These are currently being drafted and are expected to provide an important framework for future engagement with security sector reform and peace building.

Some countries in the region have implemented far-reaching reforms of the security sector and facilitated civilian oversight and democratic governance. Civil society and non-security actors have played a very important role in this process. The chief example is the end of apartheid and transformation of the security sector in South Africa. This has provided an important impetus for reform of the security sector also in other countries in the region. (See box 11).

Box 11: Civil society and security sector reform

A NGO-based Military Resource Group was established in South Africa in 1993. It was an important think-tank behind the reform of the security sector after the end of apartheid in 1994. It was later established as the Defence and Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand and developed innovative training programmes for senior security officials on civilian oversight and democratic governance. It later established a regional network – the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) – which has project units in six other SADC countries. External funding has been provided by Denmark with additional project funding from DFID and Canada.

Source: www.sadsem.net

Norwegian support

Norway has been a firm and financial supporter of regional co-operation and SADC since its establishment in 1980. A special Nordic-SADCC Initiative was established in the mid-1980s to provide a framework for an expanded economic co-operation as well as political dialogue between the two regions. This co-operation began to falter in the 1990s, and the Initiative was formally dissolved in 1995. While Norway continued to provide funding for specific regional co-operation activities, direct communication between Norway and the SADC Secretariat had almost ended by the late 1990s. Eventually Norway through NORAD adopted a new regional strategy in early 2001 as a response to changing regional dynamics and new challenges. These guidelines emphasised that support to peace, human rights and democracy should be a priority

---


area for Norwegian support to regional co-operation in Southern Africa. Norway also became
the main donor behind SADC’s process of institutional restructuring.

Norway has not engaged directly with the new SADC Organ and the efforts to formulate and
implement new polices in this area. Norway has however, provided some direct funding for
the new NEPAD initiative and has taken a strong interest in pan-African initiatives. Norway
has also supported a few regional and national projects and programmes related to security
sector issues. It has also provided funding through a variety of multilateral channels to assist
peace building and security sector issues in the region.

Currently, the chief regional project supported is Training for Peace in Southern Africa. This
project seeks to provide training and build capacity in Southern Africa for participation in
peace operations, with a recent strong focus on policing. The project does not engage directly
with regional institutions, except for some small, but important past linkages to the SADC
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs
Organisation (both based in Harare and both nominally falling under the SADC Organ). The
project’s formal links to these organisations came to an end with the deteriorating political
situation in Zimbabwe, although there are still important informal links to the regional police
organisation.

Working through the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and two South African
NGOs (Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)) a number of training courses were held in Southern
Africa with instructors from NODEFIC and the Police Academy. Officers from Southern
Africa also attended courses in Norway. In addition, the project made influential inputs in the
South African debate on peacekeeping, and contributed to the government’s policy
formulation. In the current second phase, the emphasis has shifted from the military to the
police and civil-military relations.

Box 12: Training for Peace

Training for Peace in Southern Africa (TfP) is the main example of a Norwegian-initiated effort to pursue
security sector reform in Norway’s “normal” partner countries in the South. TfP began in the mid-1990s with
the objective of assisting in establishing a self-sustaining, multifunctional peacekeeping capacity in the region.
In addition, the project made influential inputs in the South African debate about peacekeeping and contributed
to the South African government’s policy formulation. In the current second phase, the emphasis has shifted
from the military to the police and civil-military relations. The project is implemented through the Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs and two South African NGOs (Institute for Security Studies and African Centre
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes). A number of training courses have been held in Southern Africa
with instructors from the Defence International Centre and the Police Academy in Norway. The project has
established its own website - www.trainingforpeace.org

The Norwegian instructors mainly focused on delivering “mainstream” UN type training and
capacity building. Under the auspices of the South African partners, some efforts have,
however, also been made to extract lessons learnt from the myriad of peacekeeping operations
in the region which in turn could assist in doctrinal development of peace operations and
peace enforcement in Africa.41

41 See more on this in M. Malan: “Towards more effective peace operations: Learning from the African
“laboratory””, pp. 100-128 in R. Thakur & A. Schnabel (eds.) op.cit. Additional information and assessments of
TfP were made in a recent joint Norwegian/South African review, P. Pillay & E. N. Tjønneland, From Aid to
At the bilateral level, a number of activities are supported, both directly and through multilateral institutions. There has been extensive support to clearing of anti-personnel mines in Angola and Mozambique (mainly channelled through a Norwegian NGO) and support to projects against small arms (mainly through South African NGOs and an *ad hoc* grant to a destruction of small arms-project run by the police in South Africa). These projects were important also in light of Norway’s strong international profile in the campaign against anti-personnel mines and small arms.

Norway has also provided an *ad hoc* financial grant to South Africa’s Department of Defence as a contribution to South Africa’s peace support mission in Burundi. There has also been some limited contact between military officials in Norway and South Africa, mainly in relation to the UN and other multilateral issues.

There has been some Norwegian support to policing. This has mainly revolved around (in addition to policing as part of peace support missions) support for applied research on how to combat transborder and organised crime (through South Africa private institutions) and community policing (through NGOs and research institutions in South Africa and Malawi).

There has been significant support to the legal sector in several SADC countries. This support has mainly been confined to efforts to improve access to justice as well as support to public and private watchdog bodies such as ombudsman, human rights institutions and NGOs. Support has also been provided to applied research on transitional justice in post-conflict reconstruction (mainly through NGOs and research institutions in South Africa).

Norway has also provided support – mainly channelled through multilateral institutions – to peace settlements and reconstruction. This included Namibia and Mozambique in the early 1990s. Currently support is provided to peace building in Angola and the DR Congo. In the DR Congo this includes support to the UNDP, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the UN’s peace support mission (including – also through the World Bank – support for demobilisation and reintegration), humanitarian assistance through the UN and NGOs, and (through Norwegian NGOs) support for peace and reconciliation at the community level. In Angola much of the funds for peace building are channelled through the UNDP.

Direct support for governance issues related to the security sector has, however, been limited. Lessons from the general Norwegian bilateral support to democratisation and good governance are however, highly relevant for a possible future support to the security sector. There is substantial Norwegian support in many SADC countries to strengthen parliaments, public watchdog committees, the media, and public financial management and anti-corruption bodies. There is also a general support for the promotion of human rights and international law. All of these are highly relevant in any effort to develop future support for good governance related to the security sector.
What should Norway do?

What are the implications for future Norwegian support to security sector reform? The above review of the global experiences tells us that although there are many examples of external assistance to security sector reform in the 1990s, there are few evaluations and limited reflections of this support. The donor engagement has also been varied – response to local initiatives, part of a good governance agenda, or linked to a post-conflict reconstruction agenda. The entry points and priorities for donors frequently depend on the department or office (defence, foreign affairs, police, development aid) responsible and on the geographical location of the country concerned. The defence and security establishments in the Northern countries have often other perspectives, views and experiences compared to donor agencies. Furthermore, the “war on terrorism” agenda poses new challenges for reform of the security sector.

These weaknesses in the conception and implementation of the international support to security sector reform should, however, not detract from its many strengths. The current concern with security sector reform is a significant evolution from earlier and Cold War approaches to military aid. It provides an important framework for structure thinking around the relation between security and development, more specifically the relations between security institutions and governance. It is now increasingly recognised that peace building and security not only depends on effective security institutions; the institutions also need to be governed in a legitimate way.

Norway in its foreign policy and development aid policy rarely uses the term “security sector reform”, although they do provide support for a number of activities in this area, probably with the Norwegian assistance to the Balkans as the most comprehensive. This report concludes that Norway should continue to play a role and to provide financial and technical assistance to reform of the security sector both as part of the support for peace building in post-conflict countries, and in co-operation with new and consolidating democracies among its partner countries in the South. In most cases this would probably imply that Norway should focus on a component of the security sector (e.g. policing and judicial reform), either
as part of a comprehensive international support for security sector reform to a particular country or region, or as part of Norwegian bilateral support for democratisation and good governance.

The report does not call for major changes and new policies, but suggests that the focus should be sharpened to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the Norwegian assistance. This may involve a number of issues.

*First*, Norway should develop a policy document and guidelines for its assistance to peace building and the role of the security sector. This could also serve as a handbook and help facilitate an understanding of how the diverse security challenges can be addressed through an integration of development and security policies focusing on the security institutions themselves. This can most easily be achieved through a finalisation of the Foreign Ministry’s current draft document on ‘*Peace building and development. What can Norway do?’* This will also be of help for staff on the ground involved in developing and implementing programmes and projects. Such guidelines will also help ensure an improvement in the linkages between projects and activities supported and their impact on peacebuilding and security sector reform. Such guidelines will also help facilitate co-ordination between the many different actors and stakeholders on the Norwegian side. The policy discussion with the OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on security sector reform provides important guidelines as well as a platform for donor co-operation.

*Secondly*, the importance given to multilateral and regional organisations must be maintained. This includes support to a strengthening of the institutional capacity of the UN and regional organisations to engage with security sector reform. In the African context, this also implies a strong capacity to monitor and respond to efforts made by pan-African (African Union, Nepad) and sub-regional (e.g., SADC) institutions to pursue governance and security sector reform. These channels assume an added importance in relation to countries emerging out of violent conflicts.

*Thirdly*, Norway should, in its bilateral assistance, consider assistance to the governance and oversight dimension of security sector reform. To achieve this, it will be important to identify areas where Norway has comparative advantages. This includes competence and knowledge of local context and support to political processes facilitating an environment enabling reform of the security sector. Such assistance is mainly relevant where Norway has extensive ongoing bilateral co-operation.

Norway provides extensive bilateral development assistance to governance dimensions in several of its main partner countries. This assistance provides many lessons learnt of high relevance also for future support to improved governance in the security sector. The main examples of such relevant Norwegian assistance are the support to financial management (including also anti-corruption and combat of organised crime); human rights bodies and ombudsman institutions; parliamentary oversight; and civil society (including media and research institutions). Many of these are also highly relevant entry points to facilitate political dialogue on security sector reform.

Such Norwegian support for the security sector should be integrated in current development strategies, including, where appropriate, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) - process. The PRSP is a relatively new mechanism to facilitate a national consensus and ownership of development priorities with the overall objective of reducing poverty. Spending
on security and the role of the security institutions are crucial issues in this process, but they have so far hardly been addressed. Governments have often been reluctant to include such issues in the PRSP forum and donors have generally not pressed for it. This is however, now beginning to change in several countries, especially as a result of civil society interventions.

_Fourthly_, Norway should continue and further strengthen the role of Norwegian military and police officers in delivering Norwegian assistance to a strengthening of the operational capacities of the security sector. Their competence is, however, technical and limited to certain niches. Strengthening operational capacities, and the need to improve physical security in many both post-conflict and “normal” developing countries, are very important, but it is also crucial to approach this from a governance perspective. Support for training programmes and other projects have limited impact unless it is linked to wider reform of the security sector. Current Norwegian efforts to focus also on other institutional aspects of the justice sector (prosecution, courts, and the penal system) are an important move in this direction.

_Fifthly_, a regional approach should where possible be pursued in Norwegian support for security sector reform. In many cases it is impossible to address security sector reform issues without also examining the wider regional dimensions. Regional co-operation may also help ensure the success of nationally based security sector programmes. Lessons from current Norwegian regional support to security sector reform in the Balkans are important.

_Finally_, the management of the security sector reform is particularly demanding and challenging. It is currently channelled from a variety of offices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from NORAD, from the Ministries of Defence and Justice, and from various research institutions and NGOs. It is important that an institutional model is found which enables these various milieus as well as the expertise at research institutions, to meet, exchange and share information and experiences. Furthermore, it is important that NORAD becomes more strongly involved in this field because of their professional skills in assessing programmes and projects in related governance issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 13: Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway should continue to provide development assistance addressing the security challenges. The focus should be sharpened to improve effectiveness and efficiency. This includes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Finalising a policy document on peace building which includes approaches to security sector reform. This involves continued engagement with the policy discussion within the OECD Development Assistance Committee;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Continuing to use multilateral and regional organisations as channels for delivering support to reform of the security sector;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developing skills and programmes in delivering bilateral assistance to civilian democratic governance of the security sector in Norway’s partner countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Using the Norwegian military and police as channels for delivering niche products in strengthening operational capacities of institutions in the security sector, but broaden the policing focus to include also other dimensions of the justice sector;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Applying a regional approach and regional support channels to assist security sector reform in individual countries; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Improving co-ordination and information-sharing between the different Norwegian government departments and stakeholders involved in security sector reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 1: Literature


Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Violent Conflicts in Developing Countries*, Copenhagen 2000 (MFA Issues in Focus)


Eide, E. Barth et al., *Security Sector Reform as a Development Issue*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs 1999 (paper prepared for the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation)


*Journal of Conflict, Security & Development*, Published by the Conflict, Security & Development Group, Kings College, London (http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk)

*Journal of Security Sector Management*, Published by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK (www.gfn-ssr.org)


Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Peace building and development – What can Norway do?* (Unpublished draft 17.09.02) (in Norwegian)

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *West Africa (with a focus on Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia). Elements of a Norwegian strategy for peace building* (unpublished 26.10.01) (in Norwegian)


Suhrke, A. “Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor”, *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 8, 2001, 4: 1-20


Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Reflection on Development Co-operation and Violent Conflict* ([www.sida.se/content/1/c6/01/88//00/Info-konfl-mgmt.doc](http://www.sida.se/content/1/c6/01/88//00/Info-konfl-mgmt.doc))


Recent Reports

R 2003: 2 JERVE, Alf Morten et al.  

R 2003: 3 KNUDSEN, Are  

R 2003: 4 SANDELIEN, Guri  

R 2003: 5 Hugo Stokke, Tone Kristin Sissener, Mukta S. Lama-Tamang  

R 2003: 6 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge and Lise Rakner  

R 2003: 7 K.A.S. MURSHID et al.  

R 2003: 8 LANGE, Siri  

R 2003: 9 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge, Ivar Kolstad and Siri Lange  

R 2003: 10 TVEDTEN, Inge et al.  

R 2003: 11 STRAND, Arne et al.  

CMI's publications, Annual Report and quarterly newsletter are available on CMI's homepage www.cmi.no.

For priced publications:
Surface mail (B-economique) free with prepaid orders. For airmail (A-prioritaire) outside the Nordic countries add 20%.

Easy ways to pay:
Cheque, issued in Norwegian kroner
Post office giro, paid by International Giro: 0808 5352661
SWIFT: DNBANOB, Den norske Bank no: 5201.05.42308

Order from:
Chr. Michelsen Institute
P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, Norway
Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 Phone: + 47 55 57 40 00
E-mail: cmi@cmi.no
Summary

Security sector reform addresses two main challenges: (1) assisting institutions capable of providing security for the state and its citizens and (2) ensuring appropriate governance of these institutions in accordance with the principles of democracy and civilian oversight.

This report is based on a study prepared as an input in a policy debate on the role of security sector reform in Norwegian assistance to peace building in developing countries. The report reviews the evolution of thinking around external assistance to security sector reform, and discusses the policies and programmes of the main donor agencies. The report also provides an overview of Norwegian support to security sector reform. This is followed by a case study of Southern Africa. The final section provides suggestions and recommendations for the future role of security sector reform in Norwegian support to peace building and development.