Rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa: Contemporary debates and implications for Kenyan urban workers in the 21st century

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**Introduction**

Urbanisation is a global phenomenon, caused by a combination of economic and socio-cultural factors. Some 47 per cent of the world’s population currently live in towns and cities. North America, Latin America and Europe have the highest urbanisation rates at about 75 per cent. Africa is the least urbanised continent, but its pace of urbanisation is currently the highest in the world at 3.7 per cent. Some 52 per cent of Africa's population are expected to live in towns and cities by 2025. People leave rural areas because of land shortage and low agricultural productivity, poverty, war and natural disasters, and migrate to urban areas in search of employment, education and a ‘modern way of living’.

The growing attention paid to urbanisation processes should not be taken to mean that the rural areas can be disregarded. The bulk of Africa's population will remain in the countryside for some time to come. Notwithstanding rapid urbanisation, however, there is a growing awareness of the importance of rural-urban links – through exchange of goods, services and people – for the development of both rural and urban areas alike.

This paper will first provide a brief overview of rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa as documented in the literature. Thereafter, I will recount major strands of contemporary academic debates on this issue and delineate the main positions. Finally, I intend to venture some speculation as to the implications of those diverging positions for the future of Kenyan urban workers in the 21st century.

**Rural-urban linkages: an overview**

The persistence of rural-urban linkages is thoroughly documented in the literature (e.g. Murray 1981; Berry 1983; Unwin 1989; Baker 1990; Gugler 1991; Baker and Pedersen 1992; Potts 1997; Kamete 1998; Smit 1998; Tacoli 1998; Beall et al. 1999; Andersson 2001; Chukwuizi 2001; Kamete et al. 2001; Meagher 2001; Englund 2002; Gugler 2002). They manifest themselves in a variety of ways.

The economic aspects are associated with livelihoods and production. They encompass various kinds of resource flow – principally labour, natural resources, commodities, and financial flows (Baker and Pedersen 1992). There is an exchange of raw materials and finished or semi-finished goods, whose sources are found in rural areas and urban areas respectively. Whereas urban areas facilitate extractive processes in rural areas, rural areas facilitate manufacturing in the urban areas. The exchange of labour is driven by urban centres' need for human resources that rural areas have in abundance, especially in the semi-skilled and unskilled categories.

The selling of goods and services produced in one type of settlement to another marks the trading and commercial relationships between towns and the surrounding rural areas.

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1 This paper is a slightly revised version of the trial lecture over a given topic for the Dr. Philos. degree, held on 30 May 2003 at the University of Bergen.
(Pedersen 1992). They are each other’s market and source of income. Towns serve the additional task of providing access to markets farther afield for their rural hinterland.

Environmentally, the interface is characterised predominantly by urban areas polluting the rural landscape, water and air. Industrial, residential and institutional waste in urban areas is often dumped directly onto rural areas or into rivers or emitted into the air that ultimately ends up in rural areas (Abdel-Ati 1992; Kamete 2000). The rural areas also pollute the urban environment by affecting sources of drinking water or the atmosphere through the use of agricultural chemicals such as pesticides (Kamete 2000). A lot of the solid waste, especially in urban market places, can be traced to rural produce.

At the level of the household, evidence suggests that most rural dwellers maintain close links with their urban counterparts and vice versa (Tacoli 1998; de Haan 1999; Jerve 2001). This applies not only to first-generation urban migrants, but also to people who have grown up in urban settings. It applies as well to most income groups, although the intensity of interaction is probably greater among the poor out of sheer necessity.

Such links first of all take the form of exchange of goods and services. Urban households typically send money or commodities to rural relatives or friends. Rural households for their part may supply their urban relatives with foodstuff, firewood and building material.

In addition to exchanging goods and services, many poor urban households have members staying in rural areas for longer or shorter periods of time. This typically involves children who stay with relatives where food is more easily accessible and life more tranquil; youngsters staying in the rural areas to attend to land and cattle; or older people moving back to their rural area of origin when they are unable to work in town any more. On the other hand, many poor urban households are compelled to host and feed rural relatives and friends who need a place to stay when they are in town. Visits like these often represent a heavy economic burden on the households concerned, but they are difficult to escape because they form a reciprocal element of social capital.

Many households pursue a circular migration strategy or are semi-permanently split in a rural and an urban part by means of ‘straddling’ – i.e. not relinquishing their roots on either side of the rural-urban divide (Murray 1981; Tostensen 1991; Bank 1998; de Haan 1999). It may be argued that African households are translocational rather than based on territorial co-habitation. Whereas circular migration and ‘straddling’ may contribute to the forging of constructive relations between urban and rural areas, they are also likely to increase the vulnerability of the household as a social unit and exacerbate intra-household tension.

In concluding these introductory remarks it should be emphasised that what is analytically designated ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ cannot be treated as a sharp dichotomy of discrete spheres. Considering the ‘rural’ and the ‘urban’ as one social field would be analytically more appropriate. There are ‘grey’ zones in between that can be classified as neither ‘urban’ nor ‘rural’. When considering policy interventions the close urban-rural linkages need to be taken into account as a reality; it is more important to acknowledge the interdependence
of urban and rural areas than to insist on their separateness. Having said this, the analytical distinction between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ is still pertinent because there are significant differences – after all - that have a strategic bearing.

**Contemporary debates**

There is a broad consensus in the academic community about the fact and persistence of rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa, as enumerated above. The debates revolve around other issues. How persistent or permanent are these rural-urban linkages? Are they waning? Is circular migration a transitional phenomenon? Will the oscillating migrants inevitably end up as members of a fully-fledged, stabilised, urban proletariat who have severed their links with their rural origins? Do the urban migrants need their rural linkages in order to survive in town? Are the rural-urban linkages at the level of the household detrimental to agricultural productivity? What policy implications derive from this or that position in the debates? The questions are many and the answers diverge.

There are at least two debates running concurrently, yet they are interrelated. One is about the historiography of migrancy, predominantly in Southern and Eastern Africa, with a point of departure from the Copperbelt of Zambia; the other one is about the relationship between research on labour migration and the policy prescriptions that ostensibly follow. This paper addresses them both.

**Historiography and developmentalist narratives**

James Ferguson sparked off the historiographical debate with his publication in 1990 of a two-part article in which he criticised both liberal and Marxist scholars for superimposing their analytical models and normative foundations on the object of their research (Ferguson 1990a and 1990b). He argued at three levels: the empirical, the theoretical, and the methodological. At the empirical level, Ferguson took issue with the liberal scholars of the 1950s and 1960s associated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Lusaka, and with the Marxist researchers of the 1970s about their periodisation of migrant labour and the alleged urban ‘stabilisation’ of miners on the Zambian Copperbelt. At the theoretical level, he warned against the dangers of applying models and schemata based on Euro-centric assumptions to African situations that differ fundamentally. In terms of methodology, he criticised the shaping of historical data and secondary interpretations by ideological perspectives and by the political struggles of the day over policy issues.

Ferguson claimed that labour migration and circulation of population between urban and rural areas in Zambia had predominantly been analysed within the confines of a grand modernist narrative. In this over-arching, progressive narrative, changes in the nature of migration and urbanisation over the years had been seen in terms of a stage-wise transition through which a ‘classic migrant labour system’ featuring short-term migration by lone, male, rurally-based migrants gradually gave way to a ‘permanently urbanised’, ‘fully proletarianised’, settled urban working class. In Ferguson’s view, such a conceptualisation obscured the understanding of the complex relations urban workers had maintained with rural areas over the years, and precluded coming to terms with developments in Zambia since the demise of the copper industry.
Ferguson's criticism was directed first and foremost against the liberal social anthropologists affiliated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Lusaka from the 1940s to the 1960s. Key figures included Godfrey and Monica Wilson, Max Gluckman, J. Clyde Mitchell and A.L. Epstein. According to Ferguson, they pursued the idea of the detribalisation of the African worker and conceptualised the emergence of an urban-based working class in the classical sociological terms of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Ostensibly, they saw the villager, living in relative harmony and splendid rural isolation, being propelled by the forces of industrialisation into an alien urban environment. The urban existence on the Copperbelt proved inimical to normal family life and brought about a pattern of oscillatory labour migration. Wilson and his associates, in Ferguson’s account, found this pattern deeply destabilising. Hence, they saw the need for state intervention with a view to stabilising the urban industrial workers and the rural peasantry, and to breaking down labour migrancy. Overlaying this endeavour, Ferguson charged, was the grand modernist master narrative à la W.W. Rostow (1960) which considered the trajectory of labour history to follow successive phases from the classic migrant labour phase to a permanent urbanisation phase. Curiously, in his 1999 book Ferguson did not refer to Rostow’s seminal work, although there can be no doubt that he referred to thinking in the Rostowian vein, which was so influential at the time and informed much policy-making. It also permeated academia.

Ferguson also had an axe to grind with the Marxist-orientated scholars of the 1970s whom he accused of much the same as the liberals of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, albeit on somewhat different grounds. The key figures included Lionel Cliffe, H.J. Simons, Ben Turok, Giovanni Arrighi, Helmuth Heisler, K. Little, Martin Legassick, and Harold Wolpe. Not all of them had confined themselves to Zambia but dealt with the entire Southern African sub-region. Similar to the liberal scholars of the time, the Marxists saw oscillatory labour migration as a phase in a movement from ‘primitive accumulation’ to developed capitalism under which the workers would be entirely divorced from the means of production and living off their wage alone, thus pitted against the bourgeoisie as the owners of the means of production. Inherent in this schema, charged Ferguson, was a deterministic conception of history.

Based on his own social anthropological fieldwork on the Zambian Copperbelt Ferguson did not find evidence to support the alleged process of permanent urban settlement and the stabilisation of a proletariat. The urban-rural linkages had not been severed for the majority of the miners. Instead, facing retirement and retrenchment when the mining industry went into decline the urban miners made use of their rural links. This spurred a search for an alternative explanatory framework.

Ferguson’s criticism was not left unanswered. In 1993 Hugh Macmillan published a rebuttal in the same journal (Macmillan 1993). He took issue with Ferguson’s allegation that the labour history on the Copperbelt had been dominated by a ‘modernist narrative’ by means of which progressive scholars of both liberal and Marxist persuasions had seen the transition to urban settlement and proletarianisation as both inevitable and desirable. Macmillan claimed that Ferguson had constructed a straw man against whom he levelled his criticism, and that the modernist master narrative was largely a figment of Ferguson’s
imagination (Macmillan 1993:682–683 and 710). Macmillan asserted that the “rural-urban links which were important in the early 1930s are as important in the late 1980s or early 1990s” and that none of the scholars mentioned by Ferguson had ever denied the existence of such links (Macmillan 1993:689).

A new response followed by Ferguson (1994) and yet another rejoinder by Macmillan (1996). The debate fizzled out by a short bibliographic note by Ferguson (1996) in which he referred to newer research which ostensibly supported his position. In the end, neither of the contestants had budged and Ferguson later expanded his analysis in book format.

Ferguson’s alternative approach to those of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and Marxist scholars is enunciated in his book Expectations of Modernity from 1999 (Ferguson 1999). From the basic premise that the development of the Zambian mining industry was far from the beginning of an industrial revolution, he sees the plummeting of copper prices on the world market and the resultant demise of the Zambian copper industry as the start of the reinforcement of rural-urban ties that had existed all along. With regard to the position of urban-based miners Ferguson coined the terms ‘localist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ to denote two different urban styles or postures (Ferguson 1999:91–92). The ‘localists’ have strong links to rural kinfolk in their home village or region and invest heavily in maintaining a position there. In town they are exhibiting a preference for ‘African’ or home-brewed beer, speaking the local language of their home area, listening to ‘local’ music, wearing drab, inelegant clothes, and displaying subservience to authority. They visit their homes regularly and bring gifts to their kin. Through such behaviour they signal allegiance to the rural mores and culture.

By contrast, the ‘cosmopolitans’ hang out in modern bars and clubs, drinking bottled beer or liquor, listening to Western or ‘international’ music, speaking English, dressing smartly, and relating apparently with ease with strangers and foreigners. The ‘cosmopolitan’ style marks the distance a miner keeps from his ‘home’; it signifies the shrugging off of localist cultural traits and often a rejection of rural ties, combined with an embracing of Western-dominated transnational mass culture.

Ferguson insists that the two styles do not reflect membership in ‘two worlds’ – one traditional and the other modern. Nor do they imply a necessary historical sequence in a relentless movement towards urbanisation and modernisation. ‘Cosmopolitans’ and ‘localists’ alike are members of a single society; they represent not the co-presence of two different social types or evolutionary stages, but contrasting styles within a single social setting (Ferguson 1999:102).

Localism is an urban style, not a rural one. But it is an urban style that signifies a micropolitical and economic attachment to rural allies (Ferguson 1999:110). Therefore, with the “performative competence” (Ferguson 1999:104) that the ‘localists’ have acquired they have proven better able to negotiate the downturn in their fortunes on the Copperbelt.

By comparison, the ‘cosmopolitans’ have alienated themselves from their rural origins and thus find it very difficult to cope without the assistance drawn from home. The informal
economic opportunities available to retirees or retrenched miners – such as petty trading, small businesses, or employment as domestic servants or security guards – have become less viable options in a depressed economy. As an urban style the very existence of ‘localism’ and the rural-urban linkages it incorporates disproves, in Ferguson’s view, that the miners on the Copperbelt are moving towards urban settlement and complete proletarianisation. ‘The ‘localist’ style is living proof of the persistence of rural-urban linkages.

**Migrancy and policy-making**

The other debate centres on oscillatory labour migration and policy issues. The forces that initially shaped the labour migration system in the 1880s were primarily interested in cheap labour for the mines and the manufacturing industries. They cared little for the repercussions on peasant agriculture and the social conditions it created in the countryside or in the urban areas. However, the massive scale of oscillatory labour migration in the sub-region, even across international borders, raised questions about the consequences for small-scale agriculture which after all was the mainstay of most economies, as well as for social conditions generally.

Gradually, governments and policy-makers became concerned about these problems, particularly in the 1980s when many African countries embarked on structural adjustment programmes. The academic and policy debate focused on the ‘neither-here-nor-there’ positions of the hyphenated ‘worker-peasants’ and ‘farmer-housewives’ as a seemingly durable expression of the migratory system and the persistence of rural-urban linkages (Potts 2000). One strand addressed the economic effects on small-scale agriculture and urban-based manufacturing, and another strand dealt with livelihoods or poverty in urban and rural areas and their inter-relationship.

Complaints had long been heard about absenteeism and indiscipline among the worker-peasants in town because they had intermittent tasks to perform on their smallholdings in the countryside; they were simply not committed to life as urban proletarians. Correspondingly, the farmer-housewives suffered because of the absence of the male heads of household and the labour input of their spouses. Would it not make sense, then, to create commitment to either side of the rural-urban divide by insisting on a choice between full-time wage work in town or full-time agricultural work at the homestead? Echoing the anthropologists of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the 1950s and 1960s, this has been a widespread line of argument (Low, cited in Potts 2000), predicated not only on the commitment notion but also on secure land tenure for the smallholders as an incentive to invest and increase productivity.

Counterarguments on grounds of economic efficiency included the significance of remittances for investment purposes, even though remitted money often went into pure consumption. The importance of remittances for rural investment has been well documented (see e.g. Oucho and Mukras 1983; Evans and Ngau 1991; Andersson 2001; Chukwuezi 2001). Besides, the main problem of peasant agriculture was not lack of commitment; the peasants had been driven from the land because of economic need, not
by their own volition. Most peasants actually preferred to remain cultivators but it had ceased to be a viable option.

The livelihood argument from an urban vantage point stressed the importance of access to land for survival (Potts and Mutambirwa 1990; Potts 1995; Potts and Mutambirwa 1998; Smit 1998; Englund 2002). An urban existence without access to land would be intolerable in the current circumstances with only rudimentary forms of social security. ‘Straddling’, in other words, was seen as the only feasible livelihood strategy in the short run. Consequently, the severing of rural-urban ties by means of state intervention would probably mean further immiseration or destitution for the urban and rural dwellers alike.

Arguably one of the best syntheses of the interdependence of rural and urban areas and its significance for policy, especially related to poverty reduction, is an article by David Satterthwaite and Cecilia Tacoli in a recent anthology (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002). They maintain that national governments and international agencies alike tend to make policy and act as if urban and rural economies and societies are unconnected and as if agriculture only affects rural populations and non-agricultural production only takes place in urban areas. They also argue that national governments and international agencies know too little about the local contexts in which their projects and programmes operate. Satterthwaite and Tacoli make an appropriate plea, therefore, for a greater appreciation of the complexity and diversity of local context when policies are formulated and interventions made.

**Commentary on the debates**

Before turning to the implications of the various positions in these debates for Kenyan urban workers, I would like to offer a commentary and state my own position.

Both of the above debates are marred by the proclivity of social sciences to confuse the positive and the normative - what is and what ought to be. Analytically the positive and the normative should be kept separate. It is a social scientist’s primary responsibility to investigate, describe, analyse and uncover causal relationships in social phenomena. It is a fallacy to think, however, that specific policies follow from research findings. In fact, research results can often be used for widely different normative purposes, depending on the circumstances and the structural framework into which they are inserted. Research findings are mediated through convoluted processes of policy-making, often infused with politics, before they end up as bases for policy choices – if at all.

Yet, social scientists often venture into the perilous terrain of policy prescription. This is so particularly for those engaged in applied social science research, commissioned by users, be they governments, private businesses, aid agencies or NGOs. Their research agenda is under constant pressure to be relevant to policy formulation. This applies especially in developing countries where problem-solving is particularly urgent. To acquire funding applied social scientists are tempted to succumb to the pressures. As a result, they leave the role of researcher and enter that of policy maker.
But the relevance criterion is highly problematic. Research may be relevant in the sense that it is potentially usable for some purpose, without actually being used or producing utility. Such a situation may arise if the potential users remain unaware of the existence of research results, in other words, if communication between the researchers and the potential users is poor. Furthermore, potential users may simply ignore research results, even when known to them, if the findings are found to be objectionable or repugnant in ethical terms, or politically incorrect, or running counter to vested interests. Research findings may be dismissed by prevailing knowledge regimes or paradigms embedded in power structures.

In other words, it is a fallacy to take for granted that the actual application of research results will necessarily produce societal utility. This means that there is a conflict perspective inherent in the relevance criterion. No research can be relevant in an absolute sense; it can only be relevant to solving a problem for particular actors at a given point in time. For that reason I am wary of venturing policy advice.

This is not to say that social science research should remain aloof. But such activity calls for circumspection. Effective policy research depends on the ability to identify and determine the likely impact of various policy options, to assess trade-offs, and to present thought-out choices to policy-makers. Policy researchers need special abilities to analyse and synthesise; to weigh various alternatives for solving complex problems under conditions of uncertainty, inadequate data, competing interests, and limited time; to explain persuasively and clearly to policy managers the strengths and weaknesses of various options in keeping with the economic and socio-political realities of the area in question. Policy advice must be founded on technical and research competence, but it also requires insight into and sensitivity to political and bureaucratic conditions, creativity and imagination, as well as effective communicative skills.

Another problem with the debates that I have discussed is the tendency to make sweeping generalisations in space and time on limited data foundations. In debates, the penchant for sweeping generalisation often leads to stylised facts and phenomena, exaggeration and straw men to make points when normative meanings are read into formulations. The casualties are nuance and qualification. Ferguson’s fieldwork was on the Copperbelt in Zambia but one gets the impression that he would like to think that his findings apply to Africa at large, at least to the Southern African sub-region. In this regard, Zambia might be a special case. Even though mineral-based wealth and development is not a feature peculiar to Zambia, its very high rate of urbanisation certainly sets it apart on the African continent.

Generalisation in time is also problematic, as is periodisation. What constitutes a historical era? Which events are epoch-making? There are no general guidelines on this. It is hard to say, for instance, whether or not the Zambian miners’ return to their rural roots after the decline of the copper industry is merely a temporary setback for the stabilisation thesis. In the longer view the grand modernist narrative may ultimately prove correct.
I completely agree with Ferguson’s warning that models and paradigms stemming from one set of circumstances – in space or in time – should not be transplanted uncritically to another setting. But the ambition to generalise and theorise is very strong – indeed, they are ideals of scientific endeavour – and can lead researchers into the temptation of forcing data into pre-conceived models or of over-interpreting data to fit deterministic schemata. The epistemological power of inappropriate models is considerable and can blind researchers to new realities. With specific reference to labour migration studies Thaddeus Sunseri (1996) has made the valid point that the South African historiography on labour migration exercised such a hegemonic position that it distorted the understanding of comparable processes in colonial Tanzania. In a different vein, the dangers of reification are similarly great whether they emanate from the political engagement of ‘organic intellectuals’ of the Marxist brand or liberals with Christian precepts, both of whom with normative projects to promote.

**Future perspectives**

I cannot see that the contemporary debates on rural-urban linkages will have any implications whatsoever for the future of Kenyan urban workers. But I suppose that is not what is meant by the somewhat awkwardly formulated title of this paper. I presume the intention is for me to chart the likely course of the future of the Kenyan urban worker in the 21st century – if this, that or the other position in the debates is the correct one.

If the social sciences are not particularly good at policy prescription, they are notoriously bad at prediction. From what I have said so far it is evident that I am reluctant to gaze into the crystal ball and speculate about the future. Anyway, here is my futurology – for the next generation at least, if not towards the end of the 21st century. I will retain a number of ifs and qualifications, though.

In the concluding chapter of my dissertation I suggested some future scenarios (Tostensen 2003). The oscillatory labour migration system is clearly under severe strain, which is likely to increase in years ahead. A key factor is access to land. Land shortage is the single most important push factor precipitating migration in the first place, because the migrants need to supplement the household income. As long as the principle of partible land inheritance is practiced whereby the plots are sub-divided from one generation to the next by the number of sons in the family, the plots will progressively become smaller. The ensuing fragmentation will only reinforce the need for an urban source of income. Yet, the peasants cling to the little land they have and manage somehow to eke out a living by ‘straddling’. Land ownership – however small – thus acts as a deterrent against a massive rural exodus.

‘Straddling’ is a means of survival. As long as neither the urban wage level nor the agricultural production on small plots suffice to support an average family, the system is likely to persist. It is not a question of commitment to either rural or urban life; it is about struggle for a reasonable livelihood. Yes, the urbanites need their land just as much as the cultivators whose land has become sub-economical need an urban wage income. They are two sides of the same livelihood coin.
Over a couple of generations perhaps, the population pressure on land is likely to increase the number of landless or near-landless whose land can only accommodate a house but no cropping. They have no option but to seek formal employment in the urban areas – in manufacturing, domestic or security services. Alternatively, they will join the ranks of operators in the informal economy. In that sense, the landless will have converted to committed urbanites, not by choice but by sheer necessity.

The only prospect for the emergence of a stabilised urban proletariat lies in high economic growth rates and attendant employment creation. The recent change of government in Kenya gives some grounds for optimism in that regard. Kenya still has some comparative advantages in infrastructure, despite decades of neglect and bad governance. A new policy framework might attract foreign investment and contribute to growth. But competition remains stiff on the world market. To be competitive Kenyan manufacturers will need to upgrade their production technology and invest in skill formation for the workers. However, with more efficient technology the increasing capital-intensity would probably mean fewer jobs created than expected. On the other hand, more skilled jobs could mean higher wages to enable entire workers’ families to live as stabilised townpeople. This prospect should not be dismissed outright, but it is a tall order and the time horizon required for its realisation is exceedingly difficult to guess. Besides, a relapse into authoritarianism cannot be ruled out.

References


Summary

Despite the rapid rate of urbanisation in Africa, most migrants retain links to their rural origins. Many households pursue a circular migration strategy or are semi-permanently split in a rural and an urban part by means of ‘straddling’ - i.e. not relinquishing their roots on either side of the rural-urban divide. It may be argued that African households are translocational rather than based on territorial co-habitation.

The debates in this paper revolve around the following issues: How permanent are these linkages? Will the oscillating migrants inevitably end up as members of a fully-fledged, stabilised, urban proletariat who have severed their links with their rural origins? Do the urban migrants need their rural linkages in order to survive in town? Are the rural-urban linkages at the level of the household detrimental to agricultural productivity?

Generally, national governments and international agencies alike tend to make policy and act as if urban and rural economies and societies are unconnected and as if agriculture only affects rural populations and non-agricultural production only takes place in urban areas. Greater appreciation of the complexity and diversity of local context is needed when policies are formulated and interventions made.

In conclusion, this paper asserts that rural-urban linkages reflect the survival strategies of poor households. The only prospect for the emergence of a stabilised urban proletariat lies in high economic growth rates and attendant employment creation.
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