

## SADC's Restructuring and Emerging Policies Options for Norwegian Support

Elling N. Tjønneland  
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**R 2005: 7**



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Commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy, Harare

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## Executive Summary

### Purpose

In 2001 SADC approved an ambitious program for a major overhaul of the organisation. Through institutional reform SADC hoped to establish a more efficient Head Office and Secretariat which could provide stronger leadership, ensure a more regionally focused programme of action, and close the gap between policies and implementation.

Norway was major donor behind this process and provided a de facto core funding the restructuring. The present report was commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Harare. The Embassy is responsible for managing Norwegian assistance to the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. The report sets out to take stock of what has been achieved in terms of reforming SADC and developing a new programme of action in all areas of SADC's operation. This provides a basis for discussing and making recommendations for continued Norwegian support to the organisation and its objectives.

### The restructured SADC

The report concludes that the restructuring has only been completed in a very formal sense. The decentralised and country-based sector co-ordinating units have been closed down, the Head Office Secretariat has been expanded, reorganised and strengthened and new governing structures have been put in place. In 2005 the organisation is in a better shape and in a stronger position to address the major development challenges facing the region, but there are still major shortcomings and weaknesses. The SADC Secretariat – the engine room of the organisation – is still a weak institution and is struggling with bureaucratic tendencies, shortages of staff, and limited capacity to monitor and propose policy solutions. The reorganisation is taking much more time than expected and – at best – the Secretariat will only be fully operational sometime in 2006. The institutional reform process has also been characterised by a lack of transparency, poor communication and a failure to engage properly with key stakeholders in civil society and the private sector.

The Secretariat has been expanded to provide administrative support to the SADC Organ on politics, defence and security co-operation. That unit remains particularly weak and it will take some time before it is in a position to provide strong support to SADC's work in this area. The division of labour and communication between the SADC Secretariat's work in the social and economic field and in politics and security are also particularly weak and undeveloped. Progress in the politics and security field still very much depends on the role and inputs provided by the Troika chairing the SADC Organ.

The restructuring of SADC did not intend to increase the political power and authority of the Secretariat. The Secretariat is still in a legal sense an administrative unit with all policy decisions being made by its governing structures. SADC has a hierarchy of such structures. One problem is duplication and an unclear division of labour between its two parallel governing structures – one for social and economic issues and one for political and security issues. A second and far bigger challenge is stemming from the fact SADC decisions are based on the principles of consensus. SADC's governing structures do not have supra-national decision-making powers and have no real enforcement powers if a member country fails to adhere to or implement a decision. This has also

contributed to a situation where the leaders of the organisation – the two SADC Troikas – have been unable to provide strong leadership.

The new restructuring have facilitated the emergence of specialised regional implementation bodies outside the Secretariat but they suffer from insufficient political frameworks and guidance from the Secretariat. The efforts to set up implementation mechanisms in member countries through SADC National Committees have so far only been partly successful. The committees have been established, but have in most cases not emerged as any efficient national vehicle for a deepening of regional co-operation and integration.

## Policies and programmes of action

SADC is still very much a regional community in the making. It has progressed rapidly at the formal level of policies and agreements, but its institutions are still weak and the organisation has not come far in the implementation of protocols and regional decisions. SADC has however, made a number of important decisions in establishing a programme of action that will help give the organisation a stronger regional focus, that will ensure prioritisation, and which can be implemented. The two key documents are the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) covering social and economic issues and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO).

SADC's emerging social and economic programme of action is based on the overarching objective of deepening economic integration through trade liberalisation and financial integration. The Secretariat is succeeding in drawing up work programmes to ensure a stronger regional focus and prioritisation. The implementation of policies is still lagging behind and the move towards economic integration is progressing at an uneven and slow pace. This is a reflection of overlapping memberships in competing trade organisations and the inability to take common positions in negotiations with third parties. The poor implementation may also reflect competing and different visions within SADC about the type of regional integration they wish to see.

The operationalisation of SIPO has not advanced as far as the RISDP. SADC still has to operationalise, prioritise and develop implementation mechanisms for its engagement with politics, defence and security. In doing this SADC will be confronted by the divergent political outlooks and priorities of its member states. The SADC Organ is however, making some progress in developing plans for the establishment of a standby SADC Peacekeeping Brigade. There may also be movement in regional approaches to the combating of small arms and in the methodologies for carrying out election observation. SADC has also seen strong technical co-operation in the field of public security. Furthermore, the current Organ Chair (South Africa) is also very active in facilitating the peace process in SADC's newest member state, DR Congo.

The operationalisation of RISDP and SIPO also suffers from insufficient attention to a number of overlapping areas. This relates in particular to a number of governance issues with the implementation of SADC's anti-corruption protocol being a major example.

SADC has made important progress. It has attempted to address many of the key challenges facing the organisation and its cause. SADC member states also have a strong political commitment to the organisation. Still, progress is slow and characterised by many setbacks. This is partly due to weak institutions and limited capacity within nearly all of the member states. A major obstacle to progress, however, is the fact that member states are reluctant to give up some of their national sovereignty for a future common good. Nor do they necessarily share the same political outlook on major challenges facing the region.

South Africa – as the dominant regional power – plays a crucial role in SADC. South Africa remains strongly committed to SADC, but has struggled to translate its commitment into action. Zimbabwe is also an important country for the future of SADC. Its geographical location, historical role and economic importance make the country a key player in the region. At the same time South Africa's and SADC's perceived failure in finding a solution to the political crisis in that country has weakened SADC, especially in relation to governance and democratisation issues.

The African Union and its Nepad programme may also potentially be in a position to strengthen regional co-operation in Southern Africa. Nepad formally relies on SADC for its implementation and has helped fast-track some development projects in Southern Africa, especially related to infrastructure. Continental initiatives have been less relevant in relation to policy development and formulation of regulatory frameworks. Limited implementation capacities have been familiar constraints both for AU/Nepad and for SADC.

## Recommendations

Norway has provided important political and financial support to SADC since its establishment in 1980. Historically the bulk of the support has been financial and technical assistance to energy, transport and resource management. Currently, the main Norwegian support channelled directly to SADC is confined to budget support for the restructuring. However, Norway is also providing financial support to activities falling within all five major areas of SADC's work program - trade and finance, infrastructure and services, food and natural resources, social and human development, politics and security, as well as the cross cutting priority areas of gender and HIV/AIDS. Two projects within electricity and HIV/AIDS dominate.

A major feature of the Norwegian regional support is the strong focus on capacity building and training. There is also an emphasis in several sectors, perhaps most strongly within energy, to facilitate development of regional policies and regulatory frameworks. There is a new and strong regional support to good governance and security issues, but virtually all support in these areas is channelled through national and regional private institutions and outside governmental and inter-governmental institutions.

Norwegian regional support should assist SADC, strengthen public and private regional institutions, support the harmonisation of laws and procedures, and facilitate the exchange of experiences and capacity building. The report argues that main challenges for Norwegian policy revolve around SADC's weak capacity to absorb donor funds, the need for improved harmonisation with other donors, insufficient coherence and alignment between national and regional support, and a need for improved focus and concentration of the Norwegian regional support.

Based on these challenges, together with guidelines and principles derived from Norwegian policy documents, the report identifies options available for Norwegian regional support in the five main areas of regional co-operation. It argues that regional support must be based on support for SADC's goals and objectives. It may include several forms of regional co-operation. In selecting issues and areas of support Norway should also seek to improve coherence and alignment between national and regional support and achieve greater concentration. It should prioritise areas where Norway may have a comparative advantage and facilitate harmonisation with other donor agencies.

SADC remains the best instrument for inter-governmental co-operation in Southern Africa. Norwegian support should be provided through political dialogue and support to specific projects focused on SADC's prioritised thematic areas and capacity building at the Secretariat. At present

the Secretariat does not have sufficient capacity to absorb budget support. Funding to the Secretariat should be harmonised with other donors, preferably also through co-financing (e.g. with Sweden). One option is to provide assistance in strengthening SADC capacity to do strategic planning, monitoring and propose policy solutions.

The bulk of Norwegian assistance to SADC-related institutions is provided to the electricity sector and partly also in natural resource management. The greatest scope at present for continued and expanded assistance can be found in the electricity-sector. This should focus on assistance to policy development and formulation of regulatory frameworks and seek to increase alignment between national support to partner countries and regional support

There is also significant Norwegian regional support to trade and finance, but little scope at this stage for expanding assistance beyond support to regional training and capacity building institutions. There is scope for improved alignment between the regional support and support provided at the national level.

This also applies to the social and human development, including gender and HIV/AIDS. All Norwegian regional support is channelled outside SADC structures and institutions. Norway should consider expanding regional support in this area, perhaps especially related to HIV/AIDS and higher education. This will require a close monitoring of regional developments in this area, including also the role of other donors, and a capacity to respond to opportunities.

The main challenges for Norwegian regional support may be found in the area of good governance, peace and security. Norwegian support is provided to a range of sub-sectors – media, human rights and civil society, elections, anti-corruption, small arms, and peace support. Virtually all regional support in these areas is channelled outside SADC structures or other governmental and inter-governmental institutions. The report recommends a sharpening of the focus for Norwegian assistance in this area. This should primarily be achieved by better coherence and alignment of national and regional support, improved harmonisation with selected donor countries (such as Denmark and/or the UK in the security area) and an increased emphasis on responding to new opportunities emerging from SADC developments in this area (such as the plans for the establishment of a stand-by peacekeeping force).

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
ADB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BIDPA	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DFID	UK Department for International Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EU	European Union
FANR	SADC Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources directorate
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICM	SADC Integrated Committee of Ministers
ICPs	International Cooperating Partners
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
IS	SADC Infrastructure and Services directorate
ISDSC	SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISPDC	SADC Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MEFMI	Macro-Economic and Financial Management Institute of Southern Africa
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPRU	Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NSJ	NSJ Southern African Media Training Trust
ORGAN	SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PLANELM	Planning Element (Standby Force)
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RERA	Regional Electricity Regulatory Association
RISDP	SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SA	South Africa
SACTAP	Southern African Counter-Trafficking Assistance Programme
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCA	Regional Accreditation Structure for SQUAM
SADCOSAI	SADC Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
SADC PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SAD-ELEC	Southern African Development Through Electricity
SADSEM	Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
SAHRIT	Southern African Human Rights Trust
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SARDC	Southern African Research and Documentation Centre
SARPPCO	Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-ordination Committee

SQUAM	Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
SHD	SADC Social and Human Development and Special Programmes directorate
SHIRBRIG	Standing High Readiness Brigade
SIPO	SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
SNC	SADC National Committee
STAP	Infrastructure Short-Term Action Plan (Nepad)
TfP	Training for Peace in Southern Africa
TIFI	SADC Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment directorate
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States of America
USD	US Dollar
WILSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## Introduction

SADC is one of the oldest regional communities in Africa. Norway has been a firm supporter of the organisation and its objectives since its establishment 25 years ago. SADC has progressed rapidly at the formal level of making agreements and policy declarations, but it has not come far in the implementation of regional decisions and in deepening regional co-operation and economic integration. The SADC Headquarters remain small and bureaucratic, with limited resources. In 2001 SADC embarked upon a major restructuring and overhaul of its institutions in order to make it a more effective and efficient organisation in deepening economic integration and in promoting democracy, peace and security in Southern Africa.

This report sets out to take stock of what has been achieved in terms of reforming the institution and developing a new programme of action in all areas of SADC's operation – economic, social, political and security. This will provide a basis for discussing and making recommendations for continued Norwegian support to the organisation and its objectives. Options available for external assistance will be identified and ways and means of providing support outlined.

The study was commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Harare. This Embassy is responsible for managing Norwegian assistance to the SADC Secretariat. The Terms of Reference is attached as Annex 4 to this report. The study was intended as an input to the Norwegian preparation for the SADC consultative conference with co-operating partners to be held in Mauritius in April 2005. This conference has now been postponed and is scheduled to take place in October 2005.

The Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway was commissioned to undertake the study. The team comprised Elling N. Tjønneland (senior researcher, CMI, team leader), Jan Isaksen (senior researcher, CMI) and Garth le Pere (executive director, Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa). Elling Tjønneland wrote the report, with inputs from Isaksen and le Pere.

Data and documentation was collected during a field visit to Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa in the period 1 – 17 February. The team leader conducted additional interviews in Oslo. A list of persons interviewed and consulted appears in Annex 3.

The team has benefited from the support and assistance of a number of people. In Gaborone, Dr J. Mayuyuka Kaunda, senior researcher fellow at the Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis, helped to organise and facilitate the team's meetings. In South Africa, Cynthia Sinclair of the Institute for Global Dialogue assisted in arranging many of our meetings. Thanks are also due for the help provided by Kari Traedal Thorsen, second secretary at the Norwegian Embassy in Harare.

Above all we would like to take this opportunity to thank the numerous officials and other stakeholders in Southern Africa and in Norway. In particular, we express our gratitude to officials within the SADC secretariat. They all gave graciously of their valuable time to provide information, analysis, interpretations and explanations. The views of all of these stakeholders were crucial in helping the team to formulate its assessments and recommendations.

The team leader held a debriefing at the Norwegian Embassy in Harare on 16 February and at the Section for Southern and West Africa at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 10 March. A draft report was submitted to the Embassy in Harare on 31 March. The final report has benefited from written comments from the Embassy. The final report was also presented to a seminar in

Johannesburg 2 June for the Norwegian embassies in the SADC region organised. This was organised by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with technical assistance provided by the Chr. Michelsen Institute and the Institute for Global Dialogue.

The team has attempted to address all the issues in the Terms of Reference and in the written response to the draft report. Needless to say, the flaws and omissions are entirely ours. The team is also responsible for the views and recommendations expressed in this report. The published version is identical with the final report with the exception of some technical adjustments and correction of printing errors.

Bergen and Johannesburg

June 2005

## Institutional Reform

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980 to facilitate and co-ordinate external development assistance, to promote regional co-operation through joint development projects, and to reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa. In 1992 it was decided to transform SADCC into a Southern African Development Community (SADC) with a stronger focus on promoting economic growth and poverty reduction through integration. The new SADC was also given the task of consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace and stability in the region. South Africa's membership from 1994 contributed dramatically to a change of purpose and vision for the organisation.

However, the new SADC experienced major difficulties in implementing its new aims and objectives. Critical questions emerged in the latter half of the 1990s, raising doubts concerning SADC's ability to drive a regional integration programme. Its work programme seemed to lack a clear focus and was not sufficiently linked to its overall objectives. Its organisational structure and resources appeared inadequate and unable to adapt to changing circumstances. Furthermore, new political tensions and divisions emerged, threatening to immobilise the organisation and the commitment of its member states.

### Towards a new structure

Following several studies, the SADC Summit decided in 2001 to approve recommendations for a series of far-reaching changes in SADC's institutional framework and the structure for executing its 1992 mandate. These included changes in the governing structures at the regional and national levels. The most far-reaching changes were related to the operations of the Secretariat itself. The 21 sectoral committees and commissions responsible for the planning and implementation of SADC's work in each sector and located in 12 of SADC's member countries were to be closed down. The sector units were to be brought together in four clusters in an expanded and strengthened Secretariat in Gaborone.<sup>1</sup> Annex 1 provides an organogram of the current structure of the Secretariat and SADC's governing structures.

The four clusters to be set up were the directorates for *Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI)*; *Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources (FANR)*; *Social & Human Development and Special Programmes (SHD)*; and *Infrastructure & Services (IS)*. In addition, it was decided to set up three separate units on HIV/AIDS, Statistics and Gender in the Chief Director's Office. In the Executive Secretary's Office three units of relevance for this discussion were established – on policy and strategic planning, on resource mobilisation and on legal affairs.

A major shift in the work of the Secretariat and the directorates was also envisaged. The directorates were to focus their activities on regional integration and the mobilisation of financial resources and concentrate on policy development, harmonisation and assistance to member states. Little attention was paid to implementation in the early days of the restructuring, but the intention was that this – based on the principle of subsidiarity – should be undertaken at the lower levels, primarily by

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<sup>1</sup> See more on the background to and the purpose of the restructuring in J. Isaksen & E. N. Tjønneland, *Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies and Progress*, Bergen: CMI 2001; *The IGD Guide to the Southern African Development Community*, Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue 2001; and M. C. Lee, *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press 2003.

member states and specialised agencies. Each member state was also to establish a SADC National Committee (SNC) responsible for national co-ordination and implementation

At the governing level the many sectoral committees of ministers were to be abolished. Instead a new body, the *Integrated Committee of Ministers*, would be established to guide and supervise the work of the Secretariat.

*Through institutional reforms SADC hoped to establish a more efficient Head Office and Secretariat which could provide stronger leadership, ensure a more regionally focused programme of action, and close the gap between policies and implementation*

The intention was to complete these changes over a period of two years, beginning in March 2001.

In a separate but parallel development the SADC Summit also decided to bring the *SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation* firmly under the control of SADC. It was established in 1996 as a semi-independent institution headed by the President of Zimbabwe but it remained ineffectual due to political tensions in the region and the uneasy relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa. While the Organ was to retain its own set of regional structures and mechanisms for decision-making, it was decided to establish a small permanent secretariat or administrative unit of the Organ based at the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone.

The achievements of the restructuring and the institutional reforms were - by early 2005 - mixed. Some of the targets have been met. In particular, SADC has succeeded in closing down all country-based sector units and in moving them into four directorates in Gaborone. It is also in a better organisational position to address key obstacles and challenges facing regional integration efforts. On the other hand, SADC has not yet succeeded in creating an efficient Secretariat. There are still unresolved issues related to staffing and management, major capacity constraints are still visible, and the Secretariat suffers from bureaucratic inertia. New problems and obstacles have also emerged: these have been associated with the performance of governing structures, difficulties in finalising work programmes and in defining priorities. These issues will be examined below.

## Challenges, constraints and opportunities

### 1: The Secretariat

The Secretariat has experienced major problems in establishing strong directorates. One challenge has been staffing. All directorates still suffer from severe shortages of key technical staff. The restructuring was also expected to be implemented before the new operational policies and programmes of action had been developed and approved (see more on this in the next chapter). At the beginning, the dilemmas were solved by relying on seconded staff from member states combined with some new regional recruitment and external advisers. Most of the contracts were short-term and temporary. Only by the end of 2004 had the Secretariat managed to complete the process of appointing the heads of the directorates. The heads of three of the four main directorates were taking up their positions from January 2005. (The selected candidate to head up the important Trade, Industry and Finance directorate declined to take up the position and a new recruitment process may have to be launched.) The staffing of the directorates has still not been completed. The Council of Ministers at its February 2005 meeting decided to retain the transitional arrangements of

using both seconded and recruited staff until the end of March 2006, when regionally recruited staff is expected to be in place.<sup>2</sup>

The planned staff complement for the directorates is being kept at the minimum. In 2004 the staffing of each directorate was around ten. The current budget (2005/6) envisages further major cuts, especially in the FANR and SHD directorates. In addition, there are some donor-funded technical advisers in the directorates. The directorates are expected to operate with a skeleton staff and then “organically expand”, based on needs and available resources. The water division within the Infrastructure and Services directorate may serve as an illustration. It is probably among the strongest units in the Secretariat, managing several major projects. It has a professional staff of six. Two are secondments on short-term contracts from Lesotho and Botswana and four are technical advisers provided by UNDP, Switzerland, France and Belgium.

The internal management structures, work environment and organisational culture at the Secretariat also appear to be in need of improvement if the Secretariat is to emerge as an efficient and lean institution able to run with SADC's ambitious agenda. One challenge is to decentralise within the Secretariat – essentially to give the directorates more power and freedom to manoeuvre. Insufficient administrative resources (such as proper access to email and communications) have been a regular problem at the Secretariat.

*SADC successfully centralised planning, policy formulation and administrative capacity at the Secretariat in Gaborone, but shortcomings also became evident. The Secretariat is still a weak organisation and is struggling with bureaucratic tendencies, shortages of staff, and limited capacity to monitor and propose policy solutions*

The work environment and staff shortages have also contributed to growing and visible frustrations among staff. Some have also complained about insufficient salaries. The team has not examined this in any detail. It does, however, note that gross salary packages (including generous allowances) appear high – although possibly not sufficient to be very attractive for staff from countries such as South Africa and Botswana, which have the highest salary levels in the region. Present SADC salary packages appear comparable to the salaries of other African regional institutions, but are below the levels of UN organisations and some of the international agencies recruiting in the region.

In recruiting staff regionally the Secretariat will also, like most multilateral institutions, have to ensure a balanced representation from the member states and avoid allowing some countries to dominate. The new quota system (as approved by the Council of Ministers in February 2005) is based on the principle that no member country should have more than one position in the top posts from Director to the Executive Secretary. Such principles may reduce efficiency, but this is probably unavoidable.

The institutional reform has also unveiled a number of other problems. One is implementation capacity. While the bulk of implementation under the new structure is expected to be handled by member states and specialised agencies (see below), the Secretariat is intended to play an important role in facilitation, monitoring and assistance. It does not at this stage have sufficient capacity to address these issues. The Secretariat has therefore proposed that a dedicated project management

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<sup>2</sup> Information related to the meeting of the Council of Ministers in February 2005 is derived from the homepage of the SADC Secretariat ([www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int)). This meeting took place after the team's meetings at the Secretariat.

office be established within the Secretariat. The Terms of Reference for a study to explore this further and prepare detailed proposals have just been finalised. However, one should not expect such an office to be up and running before 2006 or, perhaps more likely, 2007. A related weakness is also an insufficient capacity at the Secretariat to monitor and undertake strategic policy planning and research. The unit in question is staffed by one person (with one more focusing on macroeconomic monitoring expected to come on board). This is far from sufficient to proceed in any meaningful way with such tasks. The unit is also currently restricted in its focus and deals only with social and economic issues.

It will therefore still take some time before the Secretariat becomes fully operational and an effective and efficient instrument for promoting regional co-operation and integration. At best, the restructuring of the Secretariat will be completed some time in 2006. These constraints are, however, mostly managerial and administrative bottlenecks, which can be overcome. A potentially much bigger constraint emerges from the Secretariat's restricted mandate. The tasks of the Secretariat suggest that it should also have a strong mandate and the freedom to push and pressure for a deepening of the regional agenda. The mandate of the Secretariat restricts it to being an administrative unit with no political decision-making powers. When the current Executive Secretary was appointed, the SADC Summit was keen to select a manager and technocrat rather than a politician or a person with strong political influence. With the appointment of a new Executive Secretary in August 2005 this issue will resurface again. This brings up the critically important issue of how to structure the relations between the Secretariat and the member countries. First, however, we shall take a look at the administrative unit of the Organ.

The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation has established a small administrative unit at the SADC Secretariat. It has been running with a staff of two since its establishment in 2003, but with an additional secondment from South Africa (the Chair of the Organ) who arrived in January 2005. In addition, the unit has one external technical advisor (from Germany) working on small arms. He took up his position in February 2005. At one stage the ambition of the Organ was to establish an entirely separate Department, but it has now been decided to develop the unit into a *de facto* fifth, political directorate, headed by a Chief Director, and with three subdivisions (politics/diplomacy, defence/security and strategic analysis, including an early warning/situation room). Most of the staff, including the position of Chief Director, will have to be recruited. The Organ directorate may therefore not be fully operational before sometime in 2006.

The relations between the Organ directorate and the rest of the Secretariat are also a bit unsettled. Formally, the Organ directorate is part of the Secretariat, it is served by the support staff of the Secretariat, and it reports to the Executive Secretary. However, it has an entirely different governing structure (see below) and tends to see itself as being separate from the rest. There is limited or no co-operation between the activities of the four social and economic directorates and the political directorate. The Executive Secretary also appears to pay little attention to the Organ Secretariat and its work. A proper division of labour between the two still has to be worked out. There are potentially many overlaps and grey areas, perhaps especially in the governance field, and considerable scope for the rationalisation and merger of certain functions.

*The Secretariat has established a small administrative unit to provide support to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The unit is very weak and it will still take some time before it can provide strong support to SADC's work in this area.*

## 2: Governance

The restructuring established different governing structures for the social and economic part of the Secretariat and the political directorate. Cf. also the organisational structure presented in annex 1. Several problems related to each of the governing structures and to their separation have become evident. The main bottleneck is that SADC still operates on the basis of consensus, with no proper mechanisms to deal with disagreements or failures to adhere to principles and decisions. SADC does not have supra-national decision-making bodies.

The key governing institutions in the social and economic field are the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), the Council of Ministers, the Troika (the past, current and incoming chairs of SADC) and the Summit. Previously, SADC also had Ministerial Committees in the different sectors, but they were abolished following the institutional restructuring and the introduction of the ICM. The ICM was a new committee set up to provide directions to programmes and activities. Several problems have emerged. One is the apparent weak capacity of the ICM to provide proper guidance for the various sectors. Such a committee presupposes a strong policy coherence and information flow between government departments at the national level. This is not much developed in most countries. It has therefore now been decided to revive some of the sectoral committees (e.g. within energy and trade) in order to provide the relevant directorate with better guidance and facilitate the development of regional policy frameworks.

A second problem relates to the role of the Council of Ministers. Too much of their time appears to be spent on administrative details with insufficient attention to overall leadership. The Troika system has also failed to provide strong political leadership between the meetings of the ICM and the Council. To improve communication the Council of Ministers, at its meeting in February 2005, decided to establish a SADC Committee of Ambassadors in Gaborone. This committee would meet more frequently and would potentially also be in a position to provide guidance and directions (with a function similar to the heads of African missions in Addis in relation to the AU). However, the key question is the need for strong political leadership of SADC. We shall return to that in the next chapter.

The Organ has a separate governing structure. It has its own Troika (which reports to the SADC Summit). Below this level there is a Ministerial Committee comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, public and state security from each of the member countries. The defence and security ministers also meet in the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee and the foreign affairs ministers meet in the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Each of these sectoral Committees has sub-committees. It has become difficult to make the Ministerial Committee a functioning committee (potentially it includes more than 50 ministers). In practice the Troika and the current Troika Chair (South Africa) have been active in providing direction and in taking initiatives. The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (originally established in 1995 as a direct successor to the Frontline States) has also been very active, especially in relation to technical issues in the defence area. The Politics and Diplomacy Committee, on the other hand, appears to have been less active.

*SADC's governing structures are not supra-national decision-making bodies. The Secretariat has not been provided with political powers or authority and the SADC member states have not provided strong political leadership to the organisation.*

The relationship between the governing structures of these two legs of SADC has also been complicated by these structures. The composition of, e.g., the Council of Ministers is largely the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These ministers also meet – or are supposed to meet – in the Organ's Ministerial Committee and in the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Some rationalisation of these structures may be required to make them more effective.

The biggest challenge, however, may be to ensure that the Troika becomes a functional body able to provide the Secretariat with the required political support and guidance.

### 3: Implementation

In the old SADC structure sector co-ordinating units and commissions were responsible for resource mobilisation and implementation. With the closing down of these units and commissions each country was expected to be in charge of the implementation of regional projects affecting their own country. SADC National Committees (SNC) in each member country would be responsible for this. In addition, a number of specialised regional subsidiary organisations (e.g. those bringing together public utilities in sectors such as energy or civil aviation) would also be charged with developing and implementing regional projects. The Secretariat would provide assistance and support and provide overall guidance and direction through regional policy frameworks.

Several bottlenecks have become apparent. One is – as noted above – a limited capacity at the level of the Secretariat to develop proper regional policies, to engage in implementation, or to provide support or assistance to member countries. This may improve with fully functional directorates and the establishment of a project management unit, but these will take some time.

The main obstacles are at the national level. SNCs have nominally been established in all member countries with the SADC focal point acting as a Secretariat. The focal point is in most countries based at the Foreign Ministry. These SNCs are expected to be modelled on the SADC Secretariat and set up with sub-committees corresponding to each of the directorates. The SNCs are expected to co-ordinate and facilitate national inputs to SADC, be responsible for the national implementation of SADC programmes and projects, and to ensure popular participation and support for SADC. Furthermore, the SNCs are expected to be much more than interdepartmental working groups – they are obliged to include representatives from all national stakeholders.

*The Secretariat still has to develop the capacity to monitor, facilitate and assist implementation of SADC activities. SADC's national committees in member countries are weak and specialised regional institutions, often with strong implementation capacity, suffer from a lack of political direction and regional frameworks*

The original plan was also that the SNCs would have a sub-unit dealing with Organ issues. Some countries have apparently also established such a sub-unit in their SNCs. The current thinking within the Organ directorate, however, is that the SNCs should not deal with such issues, although may in many cases they share the same focal point in the Foreign Ministry. The Organ directorate still emphasises the importance of engaging with civil society and other stakeholders. The intention, as communicated to the team, is to develop guidelines for this engagement in the course of 2005.

In most countries the SNCs still appear to be an empty shell. It is hard to identify their proper role and function. At best they may meet before important SADC meetings. Communication often takes place more efficiently directly between the relevant SADC directorates and line ministries or public utilities in individual countries. The team is reluctant to make a final judgement and

recommendations relating to the role of the SNCs. At present it looks as though they may run the risk of remaining empty bureaucratic shells. They may consider tying themselves more closely to existing national institutions (such as planning or budget committees), but at the same time it is important that they maintain working relations with stakeholders outside government. It will also be important to clarify relations between the SNCs and issues falling under the Organ. If it is decided to continue to separate the social and economic from the political issues, it may not be feasible to continue to let Foreign Affairs be responsible for co-ordinating the SNCs.

There are also several regional institutions which develop and implement regional programmes and projects under the subsidiarity principle. They are probably strongest among public utilities in energy, transport and communication. Examples include the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and the Regional Electricity Regulatory Association (RERA). Examples in other areas are the SADC Gene Bank and the SADC Development Finance Resource Centre. Within the area falling under the Organ a strong regional agency has been established in public security (policing) through the Harare-based Southern African Police Chiefs' Co-ordinating Conference (SARPCCO). Some of these regional institutions may have a formal relationship with the SADC secretariat (often through a MoU giving them a legal subsidiary status) and depending on the relevant protocol, are also turned into Treaty-based regional institutional delivery mechanisms. Many of these institutions and agencies have strong implementation capacities, but they suffer from a lack of clear political guidance and direction.

While the Secretariat has secured working relations with government departments, agencies and public utilities, both in member countries and at the regional level, the track record is at best more uneven in establishing relations with the private sector and civil society, or even Parliaments. The Secretariat appears to have been reluctant to engage with these groups. A lack of transparency and communication has been a feature of the institutional reform process. This has contributed to a situation where important stakeholders do not have sufficient ownership of the SADC project and are often ignorant about SADC and its activities. This may have reinforced the strong feeling of sensitivity and secrecy which often pervades the work of the Secretariat. This is reinforced by a tendency within the Secretariat to refrain from communication on particular issues until a final political decision has been made at the highest political level. This is most strongly pronounced where the Organ is concerned, but is also very visible in other areas.

*SADC's institutional reform process has also been characterised by a lack of transparency, poor communication and failure to engage with key stakeholders in civil society and the private sector*

Some progress has, however, been made in improving relations with the private sector. The SADC Business Council, which brings together the important regional business associations, is now developing closer relations with the Secretariat. Civil society, on the other hand, is still *de facto* kept at a distance, although working relations have been established in certain areas. NGO coalitions in SADC member countries have set up a SADC NGO Council with a Secretariat in Gaborone. It struggles to get access to the Secretariat and establish a working relationship with the institution. There has also been limited interest in developing closer ties with the Windhoek-based SADC Parliamentary Forum. A proposal to let the Parliamentary Forum become a legislative assembly under SADC (modelled on the lines of the Pan-African Parliament/AU, or the East African Parliament/East African Community) has not been approved.

#### 4: SADC and Nepad/AU

The formal linkages between SADC and AU/Nepad are far-reaching. SADC participates in both. It is recognised as a Regional Economic Community (REC) by the AU. Nepad is premised upon the RECs and their implementation ability. SADC and AU/Nepad also share the same visions and objectives. SADC recognises AU's Nepad programme and regards its own programmes and priorities as a regional expression and vehicle for achieving the ideals contained in the Nepad programme. One would therefore expect a strong basis for establishing effective co-operation between SADC and Nepad/AU.

Institutional mechanisms and procedures have been established to facilitate communication, dialogue and co-operation.<sup>3</sup> In the current arrangement the SADC Secretariat is intended to act as an anchor point for the submission of projects from member states. The Secretariat prioritises the projects and submits them to the Nepad Secretariat. In practice, relations have run less smoothly – there have been elements of institutional rivalry, Nepad has been unhappy with the quality of the inputs from SADC, and there have been accusations of “stealing” each others’ projects. These differences now appear to have been (almost) ironed out and a mutual understanding and division of labour between the Nepad and SADC secretariats are emerging. SADC's political institutions have pledged improved cooperation between the secretariats and have emphasised the need for regular meetings between SADC representatives and members of the Nepad Steering Committee.

The SADC Secretariat and the Nepad Secretariat have met to work out the practical details of policy harmonisation and institutional co-operation. This includes establishing Nepad focal points at the SADC Secretariat and in the SADC National Committees. Capacity constraints have slowed down the institutional implementation of these decisions, especially those related to the role of the National Committees. The SADC Secretariat is currently preparing a project document to facilitate fundraising for this. A major challenge is to keep the number of institutional arrangements to a minimum and to avoid the duplication of committees and bodies. See also the discussion of the role of Nepad at the end of the next chapter.

## Policies and Actions

What policies and activities are emerging out of the new SADC? The restructuring of SADC is complete in only a formal sense. A number of obstacles will have to be overcome before the proper institutional mechanisms are in place. Under the old SADC structure the work suffered from a lack of a proper focus, many of the activities were national development projects and did not really have any regional scope, and their implementation was at best uneven. The new SADC Treaty adopted in 1992 attempted to give the organisation a new focus based on integration and good governance. Regional policies and guidelines for action were developed through the adoption of a series of protocols which spelled out the aims and objectives for each sector or policy area. They were supplemented by less comprehensive Declarations and Memoranda of Understanding in areas where no protocol had been developed. Once ratified, these protocols have status as legal instruments. Some 25 such instruments had entered into force by the end of 2004.

SADC has put considerable effort into developing strategic programmes to ensure a proper regional focus for their activities. The main programme has been in the social and economic field with the development and adoption of the 2003 *SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan* (RISDP). This was followed by the *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and*

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. the document from the meeting of senior officials from the SADC and Nepad Secretariats in August 2004 (*Report of Senior Officials Meeting on Nepad, SADC/CM/2/2004/10.2*, 13 pages).

*Security Cooperation (SIPO)*, also approved in 2003.<sup>4</sup> In assessing these documents and their ability to realign and refocus SADC policies and strategies, some issues are particularly important. Have RISDP and SIPO succeeded in giving SADC a proper regional focus for its activities? Have the two strategy documents managed to prioritise? What are the main obstacles and opportunities for implementation? And what role can pan-African initiatives – in particular the AU/Nepad agenda – play in furthering these aims and objectives?

*SADC needs a programme of action that will help give the organisation a strong regional focus, that will ensure prioritisation, and which can be implemented.*

Finally, is there sufficient political will and commitment among member states to make the programmes work?

## RISDP

After much delay, the RISDP was completed and approved in 2003. It identifies challenges and priorities in a wide range of areas. This in turn leads to the identification of 12 priority areas for intervention. For each of these intervention areas the plan lists strategies and activities. These are general and comprehensive, but do not provide SADC with clear regional and operational priorities. More guidelines to emerging priorities were developed through the 2004 *RISDP Implementation Framework*, which provides a rather detailed 15-year, five-year and one-year (2005-2006) implementation plan for each of the four directorates. This was followed by the preparation, in the second half of 2004, of business plans for these directorates and a list of priorities and ranking of existing and potential RISDP projects.<sup>5</sup>

The final approval of budgets and priorities may lead to some changes, but a fairly clear picture of SADC's intentions emerges from these documents and is confirmed by interviews at the Secretariat in February 2005. The overarching priorities for SADC over the next five years are as follows:

*Integration of markets and economic development*

- *Trade facilitation mechanism*
- *Financial market integration*
- *Macroeconomic convergence*

*Infrastructure, including ICT*

*Statistics*

*Emergency Services, including HIV/AIDS and food security*

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<sup>4</sup> These two documents have been published and can be downloaded from the SADC homepage. See *Southern African Development Community. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan*, n.pl. (Gaborone), n.publ., (SADC), n.d. (2003), (xviii + 150 pages), and *Southern African Development Community. Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*, n.pl. (Gaborone), n.publ. (SADC), n.d. (2003, but only released a year later) (86 pages – the document also includes the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the Mutual Defence Pact).

<sup>5</sup> These documents are all unpublished and restricted. They are: SADC Secretariat. *RISDP Implementation Framework 2004*, (178 pages); Deloitte & Touche, *Business Plan for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Directorates and Units*, November 2003 (165 pages); and Imani Development, *Scoping, Prioritisation and Ranking of Existing and Potential SADC RISDP projects, Final Report*, December 2004 (98 pages + annex 3-4 in separate files). The last document was prepared for the SADC Secretariat and the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

The intention is that all activities and projects shall be assessed according to these priorities, and how they contribute to the overarching objectives. Furthermore, the documents make a distinction between “soft” projects to be implemented by the Secretariat and “hard” projects to be implemented by member states and other regional institutions, where the Secretariat may have only a monitoring and evaluation function. “Soft” projects typically revolve around policy formulation, harmonisation and implementation; programme monitoring and implementation; and the co-ordination of regional integration. This often involves issues such as capacity building and institutional development, research, feasibility studies and the like. “Hard” projects are dominated by infrastructure and often relate to physical development such as transport networks, energy interconnectors, water resources and IT infrastructure. “Hard” projects will often relate to a sub-set of SADC countries, while “soft” projects more often involve the whole SADC region.

*SADC's emerging social and economic programme of action is based on the overarching objective of deepening economic integration through trade liberalisation and financial integration. The Secretariat is succeeding in drawing up work programmes to ensure stronger regional focus and prioritisation.*

SADC is in the process of finalising a priority portfolio of projects. Some 125 projects have been identified and ranked in the current draft business plan from November 2004. Of these projects, 46 have been moved to a priority list; the list is provisional and still (in February 2005) needs formal approval. This includes 15 “hard” projects and 31 “soft” projects. Fact sheets (project description, funding status, etc) have been developed for most of these priority projects. One of the “hard” projects is particularly comprehensive and a rather special case. This is the spatial development initiatives (SDI), or development corridors. They comprise a long list of different projects and different corridors. They fall within SADC’s sphere of influence, but are developed and managed independently, primarily through the Regional SDI Support Unit based at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in South Africa (see more below).<sup>6</sup>

These documents and emerging priorities show that the SADC Secretariat is making serious efforts and progress in giving the organisation’s social and economic work a sharper regional focus. The selected projects also correspond to overall priorities. Question marks may be attached to some of the projects, but overall the priorities convey an impression and image of regionalism and economic integration. Will SADC succeed in implementing these priorities? One obstacle is limited institutional capacity, which will in particular have an impact on the Secretariat’s ability to make progress on “soft” projects. This ability presupposes strong directorates as well as functioning national committees (or at least strong focal points). Furthermore, the Secretariat has very little capacity for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of projects. This situation is likely to cause delays in the planning, launching and implementation of projects. On the other hand, the number of projects is relatively small and the directorates – once fully staffed – should have sufficient capacity to oversee them.

The “hard” projects partly struggle with a different set of problems. Where strong regional agencies or project management units are in place, implementation capacity may be stronger – particularly within certain areas of infrastructure. The main challenge is rather to develop proper regional policy frameworks which can provide clear guidelines for the development and implementation of projects. The directorates in the Secretariat are critical to ensuring that such frameworks are in

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<sup>6</sup> For a full presentation of the regional spatial development initiatives see [www.africasdi.com](http://www.africasdi.com) (the official website of South Africa’s SDI support programme).

place. The energy sector is a typical example.<sup>7</sup> Several major projects in this area have been developed and implemented by regional agencies such as the Southern African Power Pool, but these projects suffer from the absence of clear political guidelines and direction.

*SADC's move towards economic integration is progressing at an uneven and slow pace. This is a reflection of the insufficient implementation of the trade protocol, overlapping memberships in competing trade organisations and the inability to take common positions in negotiations with third parties. It may also reflect competing and different visions within SADC about the type of regional integration they wish to see.*

Capacity constraints will cause delays, but they can be overcome. The bigger challenges remain: is there sufficient political will and commitment to ensure that SADC's ambitious objectives are achieved? The obstacles facing trade liberalisation and financial integration illustrate the challenges. The chief instrument here has been the 1996 Trade Protocol, which came into effect in 2001. SADC is making some progress in its implementation but is lagging behind the set time schedules. In any case, the suggested target dates (free trade area by 2008, customs union by 2010 and common market by 2015) appear unrealistic. The design of the Protocol and its implementation suffer from critical weaknesses which threaten to undermine potential benefits. In particular, the Trade Protocol has failed to ensure a phased elimination of non-tariff barriers. Some SADC member states are continuing to introduce such barriers, which undermine the credibility of the Protocol and make it irrelevant in the eyes of traders and investors. The recently completed Mid-Term Review of the Trade Protocol – scheduled to be discussed by SADC in April 2005 – is a first important opportunity to address the critical implementation issues and shortcomings.<sup>8</sup>

A related challenge is the time and scarce resources SADC spends on responding to global developments and certain initiatives. This applies in particular to the European Union's efforts to negotiate free trade agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states through "Economic Partnership Agreements" (the Cotonou Agreement). SADC has not succeeded in taking a common stand in these negotiations. Member countries have pursued different interests and many have even opted to negotiate through COMESA and outside SADC. This has weakened SADC's integration agenda and undermined its ability to establish a SADC customs union.<sup>9</sup>

The sluggish implementation of the trade protocol, overlapping memberships in competing trade organisations and the inability to take common positions in negotiations with third parties does not necessarily imply that SADC member states are opposed to trade liberalisation and a deepening of economic integration. There may, however, be competing and different visions within SADC about the type of regional integration they wish to see. This is reinforced by the very wide differences between the member states in the size, structure and strength of their economies.

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<sup>7</sup> Some of these issues are discussed in Margareth Matinga Njiramba, "Pooling African Power: Issues, Developments and Outlook of a Reforming and Integrating Southern African Power Sector", pp. 91-105 in D. Hansohm et al. (eds.) *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa*, vol. 4, 2004 (Windhoek: NEPRU 2004). Much information was also provided by Tore Horvei, Chief Executive, Southern African Development Through Electricity (SAD-ELEC), a consultancy company with particularly close working relations with the main actors and stakeholders in the energy sector in the region.

<sup>8</sup> See the informed discussion and assessment of the Trade Protocol in P. Kalenga, "Implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol: A Preliminary Review", pp. 17-28 in D. Hansohm et al. (eds.) (2004).

<sup>9</sup> See also the discussion in M. Meyn, "Are Economic Partnership Agreements Likely to Promote or Constrain Regional Integration in Southern Africa?", pp. 29-58 in D. Hansohm et al. (eds.) (2004).

SADC will at best move at a very uneven speed (“variable speed”) in reaching these goals, with some countries moving relatively fast towards realising them but others lagging behind (“variable geometry”). One scenario is a split of SADC on these issues, ending up with two (or more) economic groupings – one based on (an expanded) Southern African Customs Union, the other centred on one or two northern groups. We shall return to these below. First, we shall take a look at SADC’s “political leg.”

## SIPO

SIPO has not advanced as far as the RISDP. There has not yet been a similar operationalisation of its strategic goals and objectives. SIPO itself focuses on four areas or sectors: the political sector, the defence sector, the state security sector and the public security sector. It identifies a series of objectives for each sector – in total 28 objectives are listed. For each objective, a number of general strategies and activities are listed. The Organ has also developed additional policy documents. One is the *Mutual Defence Pact* (signed at the SADC Summit in August 2003), which has not yet entered into force (by the end of 2004 only four countries have ratified the Pact). The other is the *SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections*, approved by the SADC Summit in August 2004.<sup>10</sup>

SIPO is comprehensive and covers a wide range of issues, but the objectives and strategies/activities listed are very uneven. Some are broad and general while others are detailed. Generally, the least developed objectives and activities can be found in the political sector, while the defence and public sectors contain more detail. The lines of division between the RISDP and SIPO are also unclear, especially in relation to political and governance issues. This may also be the result of the different origins of the two strategy documents and the absence of co-ordination between the Organ Secretariat and the rest.

The Organ still has to operationalise, prioritise, and develop implementation mechanisms and business plans for its engagement with politics, defence and security. In doing this, SADC has been and will continue to be confronted by the divergent political outlooks and priorities of its member states.<sup>11</sup> SIPO endorses a broad understanding of security through its focus both on governance and democratisation issues as well as the “hard” defence and security issues. However, behind the agreement we find divergent opinions and approaches to these issues. Some regimes in the region are preoccupied by state security issues, while others emphasise human security. Some favour a politico-military approach to external threats while others look to non-violent and diplomatic means. Regimes have also adopted different approaches to dealing with internal challenges. The process of approving the Mutual Defence Pact illustrates these tensions and differing approaches. The Pact went through different drafts. The delaying paragraph was the proposal that SADC member states would be legally obliged to come to the military aid of a fellow SADC member in the case of a military attack by internal or external forces. The final Pact was a significantly watered down version, which only obliged member countries to “participate in such collective action in any matter it deems appropriate”.

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<sup>10</sup> Both are available from the SADC website ([www.sadc.int](http://www.sadc.int)).

<sup>11</sup> See also the discussions of the SADC Organ in H. Solomon (ed.), *Towards a Common Defence and Security Policy in the Southern African Development Community*, Pretoria: Africa Institute 2004, especially the contribution by A. Hammerstad on pp. 211-44, “Is SADC heading in the wrong direction? Two approaches to Security Integration for Southern Africa”. See also G. van Schalkwyk & J. Cilliers, “Civil Society and the SADC Security Agenda”, pp. 106-130 in D. Hansohm et al. (eds.) (2004).

*SADC still has to operationalise, prioritise and develop implementation mechanisms for its engagement with politics, defence and security. In doing this SADC will be confronted by the divergent political outlooks and priorities of its member states.*

Despite the lack of a shared common outlook, the absence of a common enemy, and the insufficient operationalisation of its strategic documents, the SADC Organ is making some progress on practical issues. The work programme and priorities are *de facto* being shaped by some of the SADC institutions. The work on public security (policing) is strongly shaped by the existence of SARPCCO, which is active in facilitating technical co-operation between police agencies in the region. The Organ's work is also shaped by the generally good technical co-operation between the defence forces in the region through the working groups of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee. Importantly, the Organ Troika (and in particular its current Chair, South Africa) is active in its attempts to push the Organ to the centre stage and in turning the Organ Secretariat and SIPO into effective instruments.<sup>12</sup> One scenario is that the Organ's approach and work, at least in certain areas, may come to resemble those of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Three priority areas for the Organ may be emerging in addition to a strong South Africa-led engagement with DR Congo. The major one revolves around peace support and efforts to operationalise the plans and visions of the African Union for the establishment of standby forces in each of Africa's regions. The SADC Organ has decided to establish a SADC Peacekeeping Brigade as part of the AU standby force. Much effort has already gone into planning this brigade, building upon previous efforts by SADC to set up such a peace support capability. Military planners in SADC have met regularly over the past year to work out the strategic details on force composition, training, finances, logistics and operations. The framework is expected to be approved by the ISDSC structures and the Ministers of Defence in March 2005 and at the SADC Summit later in the year. It has been decided that the planning centre (PLANELM) – modelled on the Danish/Nordic SHIRBRIG concept – will be based in Gaborone, while the Harare-based SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) will co-ordinate the training component. RPTC has been revived and new SADC resolutions have been passed which legally turn the RPTC into a SADC institution, with Zimbabwe acting as the host country.<sup>13</sup>

Small arms are also getting attention. SADC's protocol on fire arms has entered into force but regional efforts to facilitate implementation are lagging behind. The Organ Secretariat has failed to get the SADC Small Arms Committee up and running and regional activities have largely been left to the regional police organisation (SARPCCO), which – with donor funds channelled through South African NGOs – has facilitated co-operation between national police agencies on some of the technical issues. SARPCCO and the Organ Secretariat have not succeeded in establishing a working relationship and this has further weakened the implementation of the protocol. However, there is evidence of a renewed focus in the Secretariat. Better resources and the presence of a technical advisor (funded by GTZ), who took up the position in February 2005, may lead to greater efforts in

<sup>12</sup> See also the report from a policy advisory group meeting on *South Africa's role as chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security*, hosted by the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the Burger's Park Hotel, Pretoria, 30 November 2004 (rapporteur: Guy Lamb)

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Cedric de Coning, "Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System", pp. 183-196 in H. Solomon (ed.) 2004 and papers prepared for SADC's first conference on defence and security co-operation in Maputo 6-7 December 2004, e.g. "Challenges, Strategies and Approaches for Enhancing SADC's Relationship and Response to the African Standby Force" (11 p.)

this area. Beyond this, the presence of SARPCCO suggests that technical co-operation in public security will continue to expand and deepen.<sup>14</sup>

*The SADC Organ is making rapid progress in developing the plans for the establishment of the SADC Peacekeeping Brigade. There may also be movement in regional approaches to the combating of small arms and in the methodologies for carrying out election observation. SADC has also seen strong technical co-operation in the field of public security.*

A final area where more activity is envisaged – despite the shortcomings of SADC's engagement with Zimbabwe – is the field of election monitoring and election institutions. Substantial work is required before SADC is in a position to proceed in any meaningful way with these guidelines. SADC is bound by its commitments and political pressures and one may expect that there is scope for further activities to increase its technical capacities to assist member states. This is, however, likely to require facilitation by other regional institutions, further operationalisation of the AU guidelines and financial support from donors.<sup>15</sup>

A final note must, however, be made on the relationship between SIPO and the RISDP. There is a need to further clarify the relations between them. This includes managerial and organisational issues such as the rationalisation of governing bodies, the proper integration of the administrative unit of the Organ with the rest of the Secretariat, and clarification of the role of National Committees (cf. the discussion in the previous chapter).

Most importantly, however, it requires a further clarification on the relations between SADC's operational activities in the socio-economic and political arena. This is especially evident in respect of governance issues, where it appears that neither the RISDP nor SIPO are keen to intervene. SADC's implementation of the anti-corruption protocol is an example of an area which suffers from this reticence.

*SADC needs to harmonise the RISDP and SIPO, especially in relation to governance issues.*

## Political will and commitment – can SADC work?

The discussion above has identified achievements and advances, but it has also highlighted shortcomings and delays. In particular, we have noted the continued weakness of the SADC Secretariat – five years after the launch of the restructuring. This makes it necessary to ask some basic questions. Do the SADC member states have sufficient political will to make SADC work? Can such political will and commitment be transformed into political action?

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<sup>14</sup> See more on the implementation of the small arms protocol in Chandré Gould & Guy Lamb (eds.), *Hide and Seek. Taking Account of Small Arms in Southern Africa*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also a background discussion in Khabele Matlosa, "SADC's electoral guidelines: what's new?", *Global Dialogue*, vol. 10, 2005, 1: 15-17.

SADC is an old institution – it turns 25 in 2005 and is thus one of the oldest regional communities on the continent. The political regimes in the member countries are also deeply concerned about the organisation. They appear to be taking a strong interest in the restructuring and would like the reform process to be successful. This is also emphasised by the generally very strong participation at SADC Summits. The support and commitment are probably much stronger from some of SADC's original core members and from South Africa than from some of the more recent members. It can reasonably safely be concluded that there is the required political support for the SADC project. However, this basic political commitment to SADC also masks the often very different political outlooks and interests among member countries, and the huge disparities in development challenges in the region. This is also very evident in the two main issues discussed above - economic integration and political-security integration – where member states may not share the same opinion about the desired path to integration. In particular, member states are reluctant to give up some of their national sovereignty for a future common good.

*SADC is still a regional community in the making. It has progressed rapidly at the formal level of policies and agreements, but it still has weak institutions and has not come far in the implementation of protocols and regional decisions. SADC in 2005 is in a better position to make progress than in 2001.*

SADC is still very much a regional community in the making. SADC has progressed rapidly, even very rapidly, at the formal level of protocols and agreements. Its regional institutions, on the other hand, are still weak and have not come far in the implementation of protocols and regional decisions. The SADC Summit and the meetings of its governing bodies are still primarily “talk clubs” where political leaders meet and exchange views, rather than supranational decision-making organs. The Secretariat itself remains small and bureaucratic with little power or resources to implement regional decisions. The capacity of the Secretariat to research and propose policy solutions is limited. Outside the arena of formal institutions and policies the level of integration is even smaller. Intra-regional trade is small and the level of SADC identity among the populations of the region is weak. Many are not even aware of SADC.

For SADC the key challenges are to become more effective and to begin to close the gaps between protocols and implementation, between rhetoric and action. SADC is in a better shape to do so in 2005 compared to 2001 – the foundations have been laid through the institutional reform and through the process of identifying key priorities for action and intervention. For these potentials to be realised, it is crucial that the political will and commitment to SADC from member states are transformed into support for SADC and the implementation of regional co-operation and integration. Will this be forthcoming?

*A major obstacle to progress is the fact that member states are reluctant to give up some of their national sovereignty for a future common good. On the other hand, SADC member states have a strong political commitment to the SADC project. A key challenge is to transform this commitment into support for SADC, its institutions and implementation.*

That crucially depends on the role of South Africa as the regional power. South Africa has remained strongly committed to SADC, but has struggled to translate this into action.<sup>16</sup> This may partly be the result of its search to define its proper role as a regional power. Multilateralism is, however, emerging as a strong component in its Africa policy. Another problem is the limited capacity of South African government departments, which has also become evident with the strong emphasis on the AU and Nepal. This has reduced its capacity to engage with sub-regional issues. On technical aspects, several South African government institutions, perhaps especially the Development Bank, have played and are continuing to play an important role. A final issue to be mentioned is the often limited co-ordination between government institutions. Many South African government departments and agencies have engaged with SADC, but the lessons learnt from this may not have been sufficiently processed and translated into coherent policy responses and solutions.

A renewed South African commitment may now be emerging, as illustrated by both the President's State of Nation Address in February 2005 and the current strong focus on the SADC Organ.<sup>17</sup> A successful outcome will also depend on the extent to which South Africa manages to build an alliance with other SADC member states. Its potentially strongest political allies here remain Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho. Namibia, on the other hand, has not been equally close, which may have some impact on the activities of the SADC Organ. Namibia will take over from South Africa as the Chair of the SADC Organ in August 2005, but South Africa will remain part of the Troika for another year.

*South Africa's position and actions – as the regional power – are crucial for the future development of SADC. South Africa has struggled to translate its commitment into action.*

South Africa's and SADC's failure in facilitating a political solution in Zimbabwe will impact negatively on the SADC Organ and SADC itself. SADC observed Zimbabwe's March 2005 parliamentary elections. The South Africa-led observer team from SADC attempted to use the SADC guidelines as benchmarks. It stopped short of declaring the elections free and fair, but fully endorsed the results as a legitimate expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. The SADC Organ's handling of the Zimbabwe crisis illustrates SADC's weaknesses in dealing with governance and democratisation issues. SADC has no enforcement mechanisms, it is reluctant to put pressure on member states and prefers, and it does not really know how to engage with blatant violations of its own rules and guidelines.

Zimbabwe's role is crucial for the future of SADC. Historically, it has been a strong engine behind the development of SADC – it was the regional power within SADC before South Africa joined. Its geographical location, historical role and economic importance make Zimbabwe a key player in the further development of SADC. For Zimbabwe to play such a role, and for SADC to succeed, a political solution to the current crisis in that country has to be found. Zimbabwe may then become both an important ally and a “counterforce” to South African dominance – both important for the facilitation of regional integration.

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<sup>16</sup> See also C. Alden and G. le Pere, *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – from Reconciliation to Revival*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 2003 (*Adelphi Paper* 362).

<sup>17</sup> See also pp. 19 in South Africa, *Department: Foreign Affairs, Strategic Plan 2005-2008*, Pretoria 2005 (available from [www.dfa.gov.za](http://www.dfa.gov.za))

A final note should also be made regarding the role of Nepad. Nepad has a range of activities, which occur at the continental, regional and national levels.<sup>18</sup> Do they undermine and weaken or do they reinforce and strengthen SADC's programmes and projects? Nepad formally relies on SADC and the regional economic communities for implementation. It was noted in the previous chapter that although there was an element of "institutional rivalry" between the SADC and Nepad Secretariats, mechanisms to facilitate communication, dialogue and a division of labour are now coming into place. More importantly, SADC's new strategies and emerging programmes of action (RISDP and SIPO) are harmonised with the strategic plans and priorities of Nepad and the African Union. Nepad's "comparative advantage" and areas where it may assist in moving SADC forward include, firstly, its role as continental advocate and fund raiser. It is in a better position to negotiate with the world, sensitising it to African problems, to identify external blockages to development and to mobilise external funding for major programmes. A second area where Nepad interventions may help SADC is its role as an agent of pressure on national governments. Its chief instrument here is the African Peer Review Mechanism and its ability to address governance issues. This work is potentially of great help in assisting the SADC Organ's efforts to operationalise its strategic objectives, especially in relation to politics and governance issues. Nepad's important contribution in the sphere of peace and security – it spawned the idea of the AU's Peace and Security Council – may be less relevant in the sense that SADC is already relatively far advanced in developing policies for peacekeeping and peace building. It should also be added that Nepad and the AU are far ahead of SADC in developing modalities for engaging with civil society, and for securing transparency and good communication.

The final and most challenging area is the relations between SADC and Nepad in developing and delivering social and economic development projects. An interesting pattern is developing at the level of project development and implementation. Nepad is not an implementation agency, but it is becoming fairly efficient as a facilitator and planner. Nepad has been strong in bringing in other specialised agencies and consultancy companies to offer solutions and provide project proposals. In some areas they have been far more efficient than SADC. This includes, in particular, priority areas such as information and communications technology where SADC still has to engage properly, or in areas where it currently has weak capacity, such as tourism or higher education and research. In the field of trade and financial integration, on the other hand, Nepad has left most activities relating to Southern Africa to SADC. The closest interaction appears to be in the field of infrastructure development, particularly in the transport and energy sectors. SADC submitted its own proposals to Nepad for inclusion in Nepad's continent-wide Infrastructure Short-term Action Plan (STAP) from 2002. This was basically a list of old and new SADC projects. Nepad picked some of them for inclusion in STAP.<sup>19</sup> For these priority projects Nepad is expected to be able to provide additional resources and facilitate fast track implementation, with the African Development Bank acting as the lead agency. A similar development is taking place relating to the "spatial development initiatives" (SDI) or development corridors. They are highlighted and prioritised both in Nepad and SADC documents. The development of SDI projects is essentially run by South Africa's Development Bank (see more on SDIs in the section on RISDP above).

The SADC/Nepad interaction has helped fast-track some priority projects. However, the current status of the projects also illustrates familiar constraints. The capacity to implement them remains a bottleneck and the contributions of these projects to regional economic development suffer from the absence of clear policy guidelines and regional frameworks.

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<sup>18</sup> The literature on Nepad is huge. Nepad maintains an informative homepage ([www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org)) and a good introduction to the debate and issues are provided in *South African Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 11, 2004, No 1 (a special issue on Nepad).

<sup>19</sup> See a presentation of SADC's original proposals with a progress report in *SADC Today*, vol. 7, 2004, No 5 (December). Nepad's STAP and progress report on implementation can be downloaded from [www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org).

## External support and Norwegian assistance

### SADC and foreign aid

SADC's budgeted expenditure for the 2005-2006 financial year is about USD 38 million. Foreign donors – or international co-operating partners (ICPs) – are expected to cover nearly USD 24 million of this amount while the rest will be secured through contributions from member countries. In addition, a much larger amount is channelled directly to regional institutions managing regional programmes outside the Secretariat but operating within SADC's "sphere of influence".<sup>20</sup>

In 2003 it was decided to establish a *Joint Task Force* comprising representatives of the SADC Secretariat and the ICPs but also open to other SADC representatives and stakeholders in the region. It is chaired by the Chief Director in the Secretariat. A smaller Core Group composed of the ICPs represented in Gaborone and the Secretariat is taking care of the day-to-day work. The partnership between SADC and the donors is still limited and suffers from major frustrations. On the SADC side the Secretariat struggles with little capacity to absorb donor funds and to engage in dialogue with its donor partners. There is also frustration at the poor co-operation and co-ordination within the donor group. Donors have shifting priorities and policies and different procedures for decision-making, which increase transaction costs.

On the donor side, there is a very noticeable and growing frustration with the perceived poor performance of the Secretariat. The restructuring is slow, there is a lack of transparency and communication, and the capacity to absorb donor funds is limited. The main donors are still committed to SADC and its objectives, but funding committed directly to SADC has been reduced. One donor (Belgium) has recently decided to end its funding (or not to prioritise SADC when making new commitments), another agency (DFID) has withdrawn one major commitment as a result of non-absorption of funds, and USAID has stopped providing funding directly to the Secretariat because Zimbabwe may benefit.

SADC's response to the evolving political crisis in Zimbabwe has added to donor reluctance to expand their engagement. This has, in particular, been felt at the level of political dialogue between SADC and the ICPs.

The Joint Task Force has put effort into addressing some of the issues ahead of the planned SADC Consultative Conference on partnership (first scheduled for April 2005 but now postponed till October).<sup>21</sup> This may lead to a strengthening of dialogue mechanisms through the Task Force. Beyond this, there appear to be limited prospects for increased co-operation at the current moment.

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<sup>20</sup> The main bilateral donors are the UK, the Nordic countries, Germany, France, USA, Canada, and Belgium and among the multilaterals we find the European Union, World Bank, UNDP and the African Development Bank. The main current (2004) donors providing support directly to the Secretariat and activities implemented by the Secretariat are the European Union, DFID, Belgium, Germany and some of the Nordic countries.

<sup>21</sup> Two papers have been commissioned on *Frameworks for a new SADC/ICP Partnership*, and *Constraints Study in the SADC-ICP Partnership*, of which draft versions ("pre-final") were first presented at an ICP Co-ordination meeting in Gaborone, 2 March 2005.

*Co-operation and harmonisation of donor support to SADC needs to be improved. Donors must not overload the Secretariat with tasks and expectations and must also focus their attention on other levels of the organisation.*

It is important to emphasise that the harmonisation of donor policies can take place at different levels. Through the Task Force an important mechanism can be provided for dialogue, information sharing and the exchange of experiences. It will be more difficult to achieve co-operation through co-funding of support directly to SADC and SADC-implemented activities. The one area where such co-operation is taking place is the SADC water programme.<sup>22</sup> This has been co-ordinated by a donor (UNDP) which has also been driving the process and ensured a minimum of disruption during the restructuring. The special character of the UNDP has enabled it to play such a role. Similar partnership efforts have not been forthcoming in other thematic areas.

Donors tend to focus on the Secretariat when they plan support to SADC. This invariably implies a preoccupation with constraints and slow performance. The Secretariat is important, but in line with the restructuring its focus will now be less on implementing programmes and projects. The Secretariat will primarily handle “soft” activities while implementing agencies deal with “hard” projects (cf. the discussion in the previous chapter about the operationalisation of the RISDP). At the implementing level outside the Secretariat, or with SADC’s political and governing bodies, there is limited or no co-ordination and harmonisation of donor policies.

A final level of harmonisation should focus on the individual donor country and to what extent it manages to harmonise what it supports at the regional level with what it supports at the national level. Few donor countries have succeeded in this. This also applies to the harmonisation of what is supported through government-to-government co-operation and what is supported through NGOs or private sector channels.

A final note should also be made regarding the nature of SADC’s ICPs. They are usually regarded as being all the traditional donor countries in the North together with multilateral institutions. However, another group is also emerging – investors and traders from Asia (and to a lesser extent from Latin American countries, especially Brazil). Their engagement is primarily now with individual countries in the region. Little is known about the impact this will have on SADC, but as these links are deepened – also at the political level – we may expect that new issues will emerge and require attention. They may, for example, affect the ability of the traditional donor agencies to push their positions on governance and human rights issues.

## What does Norway do?

Norway has provided significant financial and political support to SADC and its activities since the inception of the organisation in 1980. Together with the other Nordic countries and the European Union, Norway has also been the main financial supporter of SADC during its 25 years of existence. Since the late 1990s, Norway’s chief direct contribution to SADC has *de facto* been budget support for the planning and implementation of the restructuring. Annex 2 provides an

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<sup>22</sup> UNDP’s co-ordination of the donor support to the water programme predates the restructuring. The programme was adopted in 1998 and implemented through the Water Sector Co-ordinating Unit in Lesotho before it was moved to the water division in the new directorate on Infrastructure and Services in Gaborone. Some USD70 million has been secured from a range of donors for a variety of projects.

overview of current Norwegian assistance to regional co-operation. In 2005 an estimated NOK 150 million will be allocated to a wide range of projects and activities in all of SADC's work areas. These allocations have several features. They cover many different areas and projects, but two projects in electricity and HIV/AIDS account for nearly 60 million. About half of the allocations are implemented by intergovernmental and governmental institutions. Very little is, however, going directly to the SADC Secretariat and SADC institutions. In certain areas, especially within governance and peacebuilding, all funding is channelled outside governmental institutions. Capacity building and training remains a major component in a large number of the projects and activities supported. There is also an emphasis in several sectors, perhaps most strongly within energy, to facilitate development of regional policies and regulatory frameworks.

In parallel to the restructuring of SADC, Norway has also sought to develop proper guidelines for its regional support. An internal restructuring of Norwegian aid administration and in the relations between NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has slowed down the process of approving and issuing guidelines. Some clear messages are, however, emerging from the various documents. The first is a clear recognition of the importance of regional co-operation. The first guidelines approved by the Director-General of NORAD in 2001 identified six priorities for Norwegian assistance: economic development; energy; environment and natural resource management; peace, human rights and democracy; the social sector; and culture. Subsequent working groups attempted to operationalise these guidelines further. A 2003 report highlighted support for good governance and higher education as new priority areas and a major 2003 study undertaken by NORAD's Technical Department presented a comprehensive document outlining a strategy and a programme of action for Norwegian regional support to good governance in Southern Africa.<sup>23</sup>

*Norway has provided important financial support to the restructuring of SADC. The bulk of Norwegian support to regional co-operation is channelled outside formal SADC structures. Norway is committed to supporting regional co-operation. Support to peace and democratisation is emphasised. There is also a desire to see an alignment between support to continental and sub-regional organisations.*

In a parallel development, Norway also began to approach support to regional development through pan-African initiatives, at first through Nepad (which receives budget support) but later also through a renewed commitment to the African Union and that organisation's role in peacebuilding on the continent. A major policy document on peacebuilding published in September 2004 provided further impetus towards a new approach to regional co-operation.<sup>24</sup> Following a visit by the Norwegian Foreign Minister to the African Union in late 2004, a new emphasis was placed on the need to support the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights in Africa and to align support provided to the AU with support to sub-regional organisations such as SADC.

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. here *Guidelines for Norwegian Regional Assistance to Southern Africa*, (unpublished, NORAD 2001, in Norwegian), *Programme of Action for Norwegian Support to Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa, Activities in 2003-2006* (unpublished, Section for Southern Africa, NORAD 12.09.2003, in Norwegian) and *Strategy for Regional NORAD Support to Promote Good Governance in Southern Africa* (unpublished, Technical Department, NORAD October 2003).

<sup>24</sup> See the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Peacebuilding – a Development Perspective. Strategic Framework*, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004.

Furthermore, Norway has signed a new Declaration of Intent and co-operation agreement with South Africa for the 2005-2009 period. This agreement further reiterates the Norwegian interest in focusing on Southern Africa in engaging with South Africa. Within all areas of bilateral co-operation between the two countries, the agreement states that there shall be an emphasis on promoting regional development and co-operation.<sup>25</sup>

An important impetus towards support for regional programmes is also provided by Norwegian policy documents that do not specifically focus on (Southern) Africa, but which have implications for the work of the Norwegian embassies. One is the Norwegian Government's Programme of Action against trafficking in women and children. While most emphasis has been on Europe, it has also led to support for specific projects in Africa (cf. Annex 2). Other examples are the strong Norwegian interest in small arms transfer, trade issues and the Foreign Ministry's work related to the World Trade Organisation. The Norwegian engagement with environmental issues and natural resource management is also an example of global issues impacting on Norwegian support to the region.

Finally, the overview provided in Annex 2 also indicates that the harmonisation and alignment of regional and national support remains a challenge in Norwegian development co-operation. There are many small stand-alone projects. The impact of Norwegian regional assistance would have been strengthened by improved concentration and better co-ordination of national and regional support.

*The impact of Norwegian regional support will benefit from stronger concentration and better alignment with national support.*

## Future Norwegian support: recommendations

This final section of the report presents recommendations for future Norwegian support. These recommendations are based on lessons learnt from previous and current support to SADC and regional cooperation, and from guidelines, priorities and objectives of Norwegian foreign policy and development assistance. Furthermore, the recommendations outlined below are based on the assessments of the state of regional co-operation and the challenges facing SADC. First, the chapter provides a list of general recommendations and principles guiding support to regional co-operation in Southern Africa. This is followed by an identification of options available for Norwegian regional support in relation to SADC itself and to activities in each of the five thematic areas within regional co-operation. This will also include an identification of areas where closer co-operation with other donor agencies may be possible.

### 1: Principles for regional support in Southern Africa

Most development challenges in Southern Africa will have to be addressed at the country level, but many require close regional co-operation. Increased co-operation and a deepening of economic integration are judged to be important in accelerating poverty reduction and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Some challenges can only be addressed through regional institutions and mechanisms. Developments in individual countries are also often heavily affected by developments in other countries. Countries influence each other, learn from each other and establish common norms and standards; they work together and they create a degree of collective pressure for adherence. The main *objectives* of Norwegian regional support in Southern Africa should therefore continue to be to

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<sup>25</sup> The Declaration of Intent can be downloaded from [www.norway.org.za/development](http://www.norway.org.za/development)

- i. *assist SADC and its programme of action;*
- ii. *strengthen public and non-governmental regional institutions and their capacity to promote and assist regional co-operation*
- iii. *support efforts to develop common norms and standards, harmonise laws and procedures, and ensure adoption at national levels;*
- iv. *facilitate the exchange of experiences and lessons learnt across country borders; and to*
- v. *facilitate co-operation in training and capacity building, and in the sharing of scarce expert skills, equipment and facilities to reduce costs.*

In assisting regional co-operation Norway must realise that regional co-operation is also weak and in poor state. Co-operation under the auspices of SADC, in particular, suffers from a

The main *instruments* available for Norwegian regional support are policy dialogue and financial and technical assistance. The policy dialogue will mainly be with SADC institutions and other intergovernmental organisations in the region, as well as with pan-African institutions and member countries.

The main challenges in formulating and implementing a Norwegian policy in response to these objectives revolve around SADC's limited capacity to absorb donor support, the need for improved harmonisation with other donors, insufficient coherence and alignment between Norwegian regional and national support, and a need for improved focus and concentration of the Norwegian regional support. The discussion in the previous chapters has underlined that SADC and the regional project are struggling. The institutional reforms, introduced to make SADC a more effective and efficient organisation, is only completed in a formal sense. At the very best the Secretariat will only emerge as a reasonably strong institution sometime in 2006. More likely, we will witness both pockets of strengths and pockets of weaknesses and a SADC struggling to ensure compliance and implementation of decisions. SADC is however, moving in the intended direction and progress is being felt in selected areas. Importantly, regional institutions and implementing agencies are being established which are taking the SADC agenda forward. On the other hand, this has reinforced the need for regional policy-making and harmonisation of laws and procedures. If movement in the "soft" areas of policy making are lagging behind, progress in the "hard" areas of infrastructure and the like may have unintended consequences and reinforce a pattern of uneven development in the region.

In responding to these challenges we shall first outline a number of guidelines for regional support. They are intended to assist help in advancing the overall objectives as outlined above. *The first* is that regional support should be supportive of the regional (SADC) focus and have a clear adherence to the RISDP and SIPO strategies and national development challenges. Regional support includes assistance to several forms of regional co-operation. It includes support to regional intergovernmental institutions, but also to co-operation between public and private sister institutions in two or more countries. It will also include support to regional activities implemented by a national institution.

*Norwegian regional support should assist SADC, strengthen public and private regional institutions, support the harmonisation of laws and procedures, and facilitate the exchange of experiences and capacity building. This should be achieved through policy dialogue and financial and technical assistance. The main challenges in formulating and implementing a policy in response to these objectives revolve around SADC's limited capacity to absorb donor support, the need for improved harmonisation with other donors, insufficient coherence and alignment between regional and national support, and a need for improved focus and concentration of the Norwegian support.*

*Secondly*, in order to maximise impact Norway should focus its regional support on areas where Norway provides national support in partner countries. This will also facilitate the alignment of regional and national support, which is becoming more important in the current phase of regional co-operation and the strong emphasis on national participation and implementation. Norway should also seek to ensure a stronger concentration of its support and limit the number of small, stand-alone projects. However, this is not easy to achieve, and some fragmentation is likely to continue.

*Thirdly*, local ownership and recipient responsibility should also be guiding principles for regional assistance. This implies that Norwegian support to SADC and related intergovernmental institutions should focus on issues and areas prioritised by those institutions. This will invariably imply that certain Norwegian priorities cannot always be pursued through these institutions, although regional support should always have a clear adherence to the overall objectives of regional co-operation.

*Fourthly*, Norwegian support should continue to recognise the importance of South Africa for the future development of regional co-operation. The challenge is partly to ensure the inclusion of regional components in Norwegian bilateral relations with South Africa. However, it must also take cognisance of South Africa's regional power position, so as to ensure that this will be a contribution to balanced regional co-operation and avoid being an instrument for national South African interests. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that Norway and South Africa do not have the same political outlook on some of the key issues confronting the region – most notably illustrated in divergent opinions on how to respond to the political crisis in Zimbabwe.

*Fifthly*, Norway should wherever possible seek to harmonise its support with that of other donors providing funding for regional co-operation. This includes co-financing arrangements where possible.

*Finally*, in selecting areas of support Norway should prioritise those where Norway has – or is perceived to have – a comparative advantage over other donors.

Based on the above objectives, criteria, and the risks and opportunities identified in the previous chapters, a number of more specific recommendations can be made.

## 2: What should Norway do?

A first important recommendation is that *Norwegian support to SADC should continue*. The SADC institutions are weak and they have not come far in implementing regional decisions and policies, but SADC remains the best intergovernmental instrument in the region for advancing regional co-operation.

Secondly, *political dialogue* is an important mechanism in assisting the process of strengthening SADC. It will be increasingly difficult for a small country like to carry out such a dialogue on its own. Dialogue will therefore have to be pursued in co-operation and consultation with other donor countries. Continued active participation in the Joint Task Force will be important here. The prospect of active participation by the double Troika (the SADC Troika and the SADC Organ Troika) may enhance the role of the Task Force and give it a stronger position. Beyond this, Norway should also seek to pursue regional issues in its bilateral dialogue with SADC member countries and members of the double Troika. In many cases this objective should be pursued in co-operation with like-minded donor countries, which will often here mean the other Nordic countries (as in the current arrangements for informal consultations between the Nordic countries and South Africa).

Thirdly, Norway should continue to provide some *funding directly to the SADC Secretariat* to strengthen its capacity to move restructuring and implementation forward. This is not, however, easy to achieve. The Secretariat's capacity to absorb donor funding is limited, as is illustrated by the difficulties in current Norwegian funding to the Secretariat. Budget support to the Secretariat is therefore not recommended at this stage. One area where funding may be possible is the Secretariat's unit for policy and strategic planning. To succeed here it is important to develop a good project document with activities, outputs and indicators to measure progress. Such funding may also have to include funding for a regionally recruited technical adviser. Such a project would benefit from the planned Norwegian funding to BIDPA and its regional partners in their efforts to research and monitor the integration process in close co-operation with the Secretariat (cf. Annex 2).

In exploring the possibilities for such capacity building support it is also strongly recommended that Norway considers the possibility of a co-funding arrangement with Sweden. Such a co-funding arrangement would also benefit from the presence of a Swedish Embassy in Gaborone with the capacity to manage such a project on a day to day basis.

*SADC remains the best instrument for inter-governmental co-operation in Southern Africa. Norwegian support should be provided through political dialogue and support to specific projects focused on SADC's prioritised thematic areas and capacity building at the Secretariat. At present the Secretariat does not have sufficient capacity to absorb budget support*

Another area where support for capacity building may be feasible is the Secretariat's planned project management unit. Funding may be made available for, e.g., the regional recruitment of technical advisers. The establishment of such a unit is, however, still expected to take some time.

Funding may also be made available to SADC National Committees in Norway's main partner countries, depending on activities and needs. Such funding should go directly to the Committees.

Fourthly, Norway should carefully consider ways and means of *supporting the thematic areas* central to the co-operation and integration process (cf. also Annex 2 for a full presentation of current Norwegian-supported activities). Below an attempt has been made to identify options for Norwegian support within each of the five main thematic areas, or clusters, as identified by SADC. Currently Norway is supporting activities within all these areas. This may continue, or Norway may

decide to concentrate its support fewer areas. The team does not make any recommendations regarding, but has confined itself to providing guidelines for assistance within each of the five areas.

Support for regional activities in these five areas will in most cases imply supporting various regional institutions and agencies outside the SADC Secretariat. This is also in line with the SADC's restructuring and its new policy documents where outside institutions are expected to be responsible for implementation of "hard" projects. In some cases Norway is also supporting institutions that seek to contribute to SADC's policy development and related activities which nominally is the responsibility of the SADC Secretariat. In such cases it is important that Norway as a matter of routine considers the possibility of providing also direct support to the Secretariat. This includes assessing the capacity and ability to spend donor funds in the individual directorates.

#### A: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment

There has been limited Norwegian involvement in SADC's work in this crucial area. The main regional support has revolved around support to MEFMI and SADCA, both new projects and both focusing on training in important areas. There is at present little scope for direct Norwegian assistance to the TIFI directorate and its activities. TIFI does have priority projects for which funding have not yet been secured. However, TIFI has difficulties in absorbing the financial and technical support already provided (mainly by the EU, DFID, GTZ and Canada and with USAID supporting related activities outside the SADC Secretariat). Some capacity can, however, be found in the new Gaborone-based SADC Development Finance Research Centre (with funding from, amongst others, Denmark). It has been established as a subsidiary organisation and has close relations with the region's development finance institutions as well as with the Finance Ministries in SADC countries. Once SADC has adopted the finance protocol it will be turned into a Treaty-based regional institutional delivery mechanism of the finance sector.

It is recommended that Norwegian support in this area focus on member countries and their participation in and implementation of SADC protocols and policies, especially in trade and finance. This will require discussion in the main partner countries with a view to identifying possible areas of support. It may also involve support to regionally-focused training and capacity-building initiatives (such as through MEFMI and SADCA). It is, however, important that consideration be given to aligning national and regional support to ensure focus and enhance impact. Can Norway support activities in member countries to strengthen further the work of, for example, SADCA? Another example: in several partner countries Norway is funding support to supreme audit institutions, including their participation in regional training initiatives. No support is, however, provided to the SADC Association of Supreme Audit Associations, which provides much of this training.

Another area where support is feasible is civil society activities. Several such activities are assisted through national support to various NGO and research initiatives.

*The main challenges for Norwegian regional support may be found in the area of good governance, peace and security. Norwegian support is provided to a range of sub-sectors – media, human rights and civil society, elections, anti-corruption, small arms, and peace support. Virtually all regional support in these areas is channelled outside SADC structures or other governmental and inter-governmental institutions. A sharpening of the focus for Norwegian assistance in this area is required. This should primarily be achieved by better coherence and alignment of national and regional support, improved harmonisation with selected donor countries and an increased emphasis on responding to new opportunities emerging from SADC developments in this area.*

## B: Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources

SADC's FANR directorate covers several areas – food security and agricultural development; environment and land management; agricultural and natural resources research and development; and natural resource development. Most of the current projects were developed prior to the restructuring. The main donors are the EU, DFID, France, the Nordics, Canada and the Belgians together with multilateral institutions like the World Bank and FAO. The priority of the FANR directorate is food security, primarily linked to agriculture. It operates with a particularly small skeleton staff. The intention is that the directorate will see future expansion based on the needs and commitments from member states.

Norway's current funding is channelled into agriculture research and training (to the Lusaka-based SADC Gene Bank in a co-funding arrangement with other Nordic countries), lands and wildlife (Regional Wetland Conservation Programme), and a new programme to support community based natural resource management (implemented through the World Wildlife Fund but also with a component involving the SADC Secretariat). Some funding is also provided to applied research institutions working on land reform issues. Importantly, Norway also provides direct funding to the Secretariat for a regionally recruited technical adviser in fisheries. The fisheries adviser took up her position in December 2004 – after considerable delay in recruitment – but at the same time the one staff member in the FANR directorate working on fisheries (on secondment from Mozambique) left. It is unclear when a replacement will be in place – it may not happen in 2005. A main focus of the work of the adviser is expected to be to develop a strategy for the implementation of the protocol on fisheries (which came into force in 2003) and to present it to a high level committee of fishery officials. The support to the FANR directorate in fisheries was a natural extension of Norwegian support to several fishery projects in the region, mainly in marine fisheries.

The staffing situation at the FANR directorate suggests that Norway may find it difficult at this stage to provide additional funding to new projects through the Secretariat. Possible new or expanded support in this area (related to, for example, environmental issues and the implementation of decisions made at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development) may therefore primarily focus on the main partner countries, regional subsidiary organisations and co-operation in training and capacity building.

*There is limited scope for additional Norwegian funding to FANR and its activities and most support will have to focus on member states and implementation.*

## C: Social and Human Development and Special Programmes

The SHD directorate covers a range of issues. The sub-units are human resource development; health; employment and labour; and culture, information and sport. HIV/AIDS and Gender have been identified as priority cross-cutting issues and are managed through separate units reporting to the Chief Director. SHD has, together with FANR, a particularly small staff and its capacity is limited. The main donors are DFID, the EU, Sweden and Belgium. Sweden has a strong focus on employment and labour issues and gender, DFID is engaged in supporting health issues well as the HIV/AIDS unit and Belgium provides support to SHD's work related to information and the media.

Norwegian support in this area is channelled outside SADC to a variety of NGOs and university institutions, mainly related to HIV/AIDS, media, gender and culture. Trafficking is a recent project that has been implemented through the IOM. HIV/AIDS is a priority in Norwegian support to the region. Regional co-operation at the governmental level is weak and there is a certain urgency to address that deficiency through SADC. Norwegian support should be considered, but based on lessons from the experience of DFID, which has been a main donor to SADC's work in this and related health issues (a roll back malaria project).

Higher education and research also falls under the SHD directorate. This is a strong component in Norwegian co-operation with South Africa and the stated intention is to include regional components. This is still to be developed beyond providing funding for individual projects at university and research institutions. The SHD directorate has no capacity to engage properly with such issues. Nepad, on the other hand, has this on its priority list, with a focus on projects related to distance education and teacher training (with the University of South Africa as one of the implementing institutions) and to centres of excellence in science and technology. Nepad has not addressed regional policy frameworks. There is scope for further Norwegian assistance in relation to a number of important policy and regulatory issues – such as trade in services, the harmonisation of certification and accreditation, and improved co-operation between higher education institutions – but at this stage such assistance will have to be facilitated by national and regional institutions outside the Secretariat.

*Norway does not provide regional support to SADC activities related to social and human support and channels all its assistance to private institutions and implementing agencies. An increased emphasis on regional support – especially related to HIV/AIDS and higher education – should still be considered.*

SHD's activities in relation to the media – one of Norway's main priorities – are limited. It has included activities with regional media training institutions to facilitate better coverage of regional development issues (see also section F below).

Norway has supported several regional projects on culture in the past, often implemented by national institutions with regional activities. SHD has now developed a project document for the establishment of a SADC Culture Trust Fund and is keen to seek Norwegian funding for this. This project is also on the RISDP priority list. Careful consideration should however, be given to the Secretariat's capacity to run with such a project before support is provided

## D: Infrastructure and Services

The IS directorate focuses on energy; tourism; transport, communications and meteorology; and water. The development corridors also fall under the sphere of influence of the IS directorate. The main donors include the EU, Norway, Sweden, Germany, the World Bank and UNDP.

The main Norwegian funding for SADC activities is channelled to electricity and – until recently - water. The electricity projects are being implemented outside the Secretariat through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and the Regional Electricity Regulator (RERA), while the water sector has been implemented by the IS water division and funded through a donor consortium led by the UNDP.

Large projects are implemented and fall under the sphere of influence of SADC and the IS directorate. Most are related to the electricity and development corridors. They are also managed by generally strong implementation agencies at the regional or national level. The main challenge is insufficient progress in developing regional policy frameworks in some of the sub-sectors – the responsibility of the IS directorate. This includes the energy sub-sector, where progress is hampered by the failure to develop proper regional policy frameworks to guide the technical and developmental projects and address common challenges. The IS directorate may make good progress in extending power grid interconnectivity but is making less progress in harmonising energy policies, regulations and legislation. This is an area where Norway is often perceived to have a comparative advantage, perhaps especially in establishing a regulatory framework. Consideration should be given to providing funding for technical advisers in the energy division of the directorate to help develop a regional energy policy (similar to that being provided for fisheries in the FANR directorate). This would be a supplement to the main support provided through RERA and SAPP. Again, a main bottleneck is the SADC Secretariat's limited capacity to absorb such funding.

*Norway should consider increasing its assistance to SADC with regard to the energy sector and the development of regional energy policy.*

## E: Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation

SADC's capacity to absorb and implement projects in this field remains particularly weak. There are no prospects of getting an efficient directorate up and running this year. Most funding will therefore still have to be channelled through various private national and regional institutions and through member states. Policy dialogue will also have to be an important instrument – nationally and regionally. It is important that Norway, when providing funding to such a wide range of activities outside SADC as it currently does, - pays careful attention to SADC's evolving peace and security architecture, with a view to responding to opportunities for direct support and dialogue.

Anti-corruption has been one priority area for Norwegian support. The SADC protocol is expected to enter into force soon, but the Secretariat has not prioritised this work; currently it falls under the legal unit in the Executive Secretary's Office, although one may expect that at a future stage it will be moved to the Organ directorate. Regional funding to this area therefore still has to focus on NGOs and various efforts to facilitate capacity building and information sharing across borders.

There are limited prospects for any early involvement by SADC structures relating to the media, which currently falls under the "information" portfolio of the SHD directorate, but may also at a future stage fall under the governance portfolio of the Organ directorate. There are thus no

immediate possibilities of linking Norwegian media support to new activities implemented through the Secretariat. In the short-to-medium term, Norwegian regional support may therefore continue to be channelled to regional training and advocacy institutions.

In providing regional support to free and fair elections, careful consideration should be given to ways and means of providing assistance to the further development and implementation of SADC's 2004 election guidelines.

Support to the implementation of the SADC fire arms protocol should continue. Norway is particularly interested in assisting efforts to regulate arms brokering and has had some success in facilitating this in West Africa through Ecowas. There may be a stronger involvement by the SADC Organ through the regional small arms committee if it becomes active, and this may also lead to a greater focus on brokering.<sup>26</sup> A more active involvement by the Organ structures may facilitate direct support to specific regional intergovernmental projects, including the regional police organisation.

*The main challenges for Norwegian regional support may be found in the area of good governance, peace and security. Norwegian support is provided to a range of sub-sectors – media, human rights and civil society, elections, anti-corruption, small arms, and peace support. Virtually all regional support in these areas is channelled outside SADC structures or other governmental and inter-governmental institutions. A sharpening of the focus for Norwegian assistance in this area is required. This should primarily be achieved by better coherence and alignment of national and regional support, improved harmonisation with selected donor countries and an increased emphasis on responding to new opportunities emerging from SADC developments in this area.*

Norway is a leading donor to SARPCCO through funding for training activities in human rights, small arms control and peacekeeping. All support is channelled through NGOs. Norway should have a dialogue with SARPCCO and explore ways and means of providing direct financial project support to the organisation. It is important to note, however, that SARPCCO focuses on technical issues related to co-operation in policing and public security matters, and not on political issues.

The biggest challenge for Norwegian assistance in the peace and security field revolves around Training for Peace (TfP) and the move towards the establishment of a SADC Peacekeeping Brigade. TfP has a focus on the training of police officers through SARPCCO and is now targeting SADC countries that provide such personnel for participation in peace support missions.<sup>27</sup> TfP has suffered from insufficient national and regional ownership. Norway should follow the evolving SADC plans for the brigade, especially those related to the planning and command centre (PLANELM) and the regional training centre (RPTC), and should explore the opportunities for providing direct support. This may be focused on the police component. Such support would require communication and dialogue with the Organ Troika and its current Chair (South Africa). Norway

<sup>26</sup> Norway has also commissioned a study to identify options for intervention. See N. Stott & S. Meek, *Regulating Arms Brokering in Southern Africa: Assessing the scope for action. Results of a scoping exercise conducted for the Royal Norwegian Government*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, draft 15 March 2005.

<sup>27</sup> See also M. Golding et al., *Review of the Training for Peace in Southern Africa Programme*, (unpublished, 16 August 2004).

should also consider co-operation with the other Nordic countries in this area, especially Denmark (which may emerge as a potential lead donor in this field).<sup>28</sup>

Norway provides considerable financial support to certain South African NGOs involved in regional activities. This has contributed towards building a strong South African competence, but Norway should put greater emphasis on ensuring that its support also contributes to capacity building among NGOs and partner institutions in other SADC countries. Norway should consider the pros and cons of working with the new DFID/SIDA-funded Civil Society Fund as a channel for assisting civil society organisations with a regional focus.


Further recommendations are provided in the 2003 document on regional support to good governance prepared by NORAD's Technical Department.<sup>29</sup>

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
<sup>28</sup> See also the comprehensive Danish project document, *Denmark's Africa Programme for Peace 2004 – 2009*, Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DANIDA, May 2004 (available from [www.um.dk](http://www.um.dk)).

<sup>29</sup> See *Strategy for Regional NORAD Support to Promote Good Governance in Southern Africa* (unpublished, Technical Department, NORAD October 2003).

Annex 1: SADC's Institutional Structure



*The SADC Secretariat*



## Annex 2: Overview of Norwegian support to SADC and regional co-operation

This annex provides a summary overview of current Norwegian support to SADC and regional co-operation. It should be read in conjunction with the section on Norwegian support provided in the main text. The overview only includes projects and activities where Norwegian support is managed by the Norwegian embassies in the SADC region (Harare, Pretoria, Maputo, Lilongwe, Lusaka, Luanda and Dar es Salaam). Regional support channelled through Norwegian/international NGOs and research institutions is not included (in financial terms, support through such channels is also limited). Nor is support to global and continental organisations included, unless funding is specifically for regional activities in Southern Africa. All disbursement figures for 2004 are provisional and figures for 2005 are indicative. Minor allocations (less than one million) are not included. While most regional support is believed to have been included some projects may have escaped. This applies in particular to national support, which may include minor regional components (e.g. participation in regional training courses).

The presentation of activities supported is based on thematic areas as defined in the SADC structure. This review suggests that the planned allocation to regional support in Southern Africa may add up to about NOK 150 million in 2005. Of this amount, two projects – in electricity and in HIV/AIDS – account for about 60 million. About 70 million are channelled to intergovernmental and governmental institutions. In certain sub-areas – media, anti-corruption, human rights, gender, peace and security – all funding is channelled to private institutions and universities. Capacity building and training remains an important and often the main component in a large number of the projects and activities supported.

In addition to the above it should also be mentioned that Norway provides core funding to the Nepad Secretariat in South Africa (NOK 2 million per year, co-funded with other Nordic countries), as well as some funding for the AU Secretariat in Addis Ababa, mainly revolving around conflict management and peacebuilding and channelled through UNDP. A number of other continent-wide African institutions with Norwegian support, such as the African Development Bank and African Capacity Building Foundation, also provide regional support to SADC and its activities.

### ***A: Support to SADC institutions***

Norway has provided direct financial support to the Secretariat for the restructuring and the preparation of the RISDP since 2001. This has *de facto* been budget support for the restructuring. The current (2004) support of NOK 2.3 million is mainly intended for various activities related to the Secretariat's policy and strategic planning unit and the provision of a technical adviser in fisheries. The planning figure for 2005 is NOK 7.3 million, but a project document has not yet been prepared. Actual disbursement may be much lower.

Outside the Secretariat, Norway has also provided support to various projects monitoring SADC and the Secretariat. Funding has been given to the South African Institute of International Affairs for a two-year project (2003-2005) to publish a quarterly *SADC Barometer*. Currently, Norway is also entering into a major four-year *formative process research project on regional integration* with the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA). BIDPA, along with institutional partners in several SADC countries, will research and monitor SADC's activities in several areas. A close working relationship has been established with the Secretariat's policy and strategic planning unit. In the current set-up this unit only focuses on social and economic issues, but one of the partners in the project (SADSEM) has particularly close links to the Organ directorate's work on peace and security.

### ***B: Trade, industry, finance and investment***

Norwegian regional support is focused on training in financial management issues and on standardisation and accreditation in trade policy. Beginning in 2005, financial support will be provided to the Harare-based *Macro*

*Economic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI)*. This is co-financed with Sweden. NOK 4 million is the indicative figure for the first year. MEFMI provides training courses in finance ministries and central banks in its 12 member countries. The members are 11 SADC countries plus Uganda (South Africa is not a member).

New funding is also provided to *SADCA* (NOK 0.7 million in 2004 and 2.3 million in 2005). SADC is the regional accreditation structure of *SQUAM* (Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology). It brings together national accreditation bodies in SADC countries and national accreditation focal points in each SADC member country. It eventually seeks to establish a regional accreditation body (*SADCAS*). The Secretariat is based at the South African National Accreditation System in Pretoria and is chaired by the Tanzania Bureau of Standards. Norwegian support is mainly for training purposes.

In addition, Norway also assists related activities through its national support in several countries. One example is funding facilities to enable supreme audit institutions in several partner countries to participate in training courses run by the *SADC Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (SADCOSAI)*, based at the Office of the Auditor General in South Africa. On a more modest scale, funding has been provided to national NGOs engaged in regional advocacy and training work (e.g., *IDASA's budget project*).

### **C: Food, agriculture and natural resources**

Current Norwegian support is provided to the *SADC Gene Bank*, a project linked to the Lusaka-based SADC Plant Genetic Resource Centre. The project was first supported in 1989. Current support is NOK 2.9 million in 2004 and 3 million in 2005. This is a co-funding arrangement with other Nordic countries.

There has also traditionally been Norwegian regional support to a variety of environmental and natural resource management issues, but no funding disbursements to these areas are planned for 2005. Support for SADC's *wetlands conservation* programme came to an end in 2004.

Support is provided for capacity building in community based natural resource management implemented through the World Wildlife Fund. The programme focuses on ensuring that community based management is adopted as a mainstream strategy for rural development in Southern Africa. Current support is NOK 6 million in 2004 and NOK 6.5 million in 2005. The project is in its inception phase (2003-2006). It also included a component involving the SADC Secretariat.

Norwegian regional support for *fisheries* has in financial terms been dominated by marine fisheries and stock assessments and scientific research in the Benguela current (the Nansen/Benefit programme). This came to an end in 2004. The current regional fishery components are funding for a *technical adviser* in the FANR directorate (see support to the Secretariat above), funding for a regional programme for the marketing of fish and fish products (*Infopeche*, NOK 1.7 million in 2004 and NOK 2.3 million in 2005), and a fishery education programme at the *University of Namibia* (NOK 4 million in 2004).

There may be some regional components in various national support programmes, perhaps most extensively in the environmental programme in South Africa.

There has also been some support to NGOs and research institutions active in this field. This has been most pronounced in research around land reform issues, with funding to the *African Institute for Agrarian Studies* in Harare and the *Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies* in Cape Town.

### **D: Social and human development**

There is no direct support to SADC in this area, but Norway does support a range of regional activities falling within it. The single biggest regional project is to be found in HIV/AIDS, where Norway is providing NOK 30 million in 2005 (15 million in 2004) to a series of community projects implemented by an NGO, the

*Project Support Group*. The Group was originally based at the University of Zimbabwe, but has relocated to Pretoria.

As far as gender is concerned, Norway's support is concentrated on two projects. One is an old and continuing project supporting a regional MA programme in gender and law implemented by the *University of Zimbabwe* (NOK 3.7 million in 2005 and 5 million in 2004). The other is new support to the Lusaka-based *Women and Law in Southern Africa Research and Education Trust* (WILSA), a regional network to improve the research skills of female lawyers in the region (NOK 2 million in 2005).

In the field of higher education and research, Norwegian support is limited to supporting several projects involving researchers from two or more countries.

Norway has supported several regional culture projects and has also encouraged SADC to establish regional activities in this area. Currently, no major regional activities are supported, but several projects implemented by national institutions with a regional focus are supported. This includes projects such as the Zimbabwe International Book Fair.

Finally, Norway has begun providing funding to the Pretoria-based Regional Office of the International Organisation of Migration for a new *Southern African Counter-Trafficking Assistance Programme* (SACTAP). SACTAP is a two-year programme that targets eleven countries in the SADC region with a range of activities, including continued research, information dissemination, institutional capacity building, and victim assistance and rehabilitation. NOK 2 million is being provided in 2005. The US State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration is the other donor behind this programme.

#### ***E: Infrastructure and services***

Norway provides funding to two major programmes in the energy sector. One is the *Southern African Power Pool* (SAPP), with an allocation of NOK 29 million in 2005 (6 million in 2004). The other is the *Regional Electricity Regulator* (RERA), providing NOK 3.5 million in 2005. The Harare-based SAPP has 12 SADC member countries represented by their electric power utilities. It was established at the SADC Summit in 1995. SAPP concentrates on the expansion of generation and transmission infrastructure in the region and on the expansion of energy trading. Norway is providing funding for the development of a competitive electricity market.

RERA was launched in 2002. It currently has five countries from the region as members. It has been slower in coming into action, but a Windhoek-based Secretariat has now been established and its activities are beginning to take shape. Its key focus is on building regional capacity and skills in regulatory responsibilities, including the establishment of independent regulators in countries where such bodies do not exist; on assisting in the harmonisation of legal and regulatory systems and practices governing electricity markets; and on regulating electricity interconnection and trade between SADC member states.

Norway also supports a new regional training and research project in energy regulation implemented by the *University of Cape Town*, but also involving the University of Zambia.

In addition, there are regional components in some of the national support. This may include support to national authorities in price negotiations with authorities in neighbouring countries, support for participation in regional training courses, and so on.

Norway had been providing funding to the water sector, but the support came to an end in 2004 with a final NOK 2.5 million allocation to the *Zambezi River Action Plan*.

***F: Politics, defence and security co-operation***

Norwegian support in this area covers a range of issues, with nearly all of it being channelled to NGOs and outside government channels. Media has been an important focus for the support, which has recently expanded. This has included support to the Windhoek-based *Media Institute of Southern Africa* (MISA) with NOK 3 million in both 2004 and 2005. New support is being provided to the *NSJ Southern African Media Training Trust* in Maputo with NOK 4 million in 2005. Minor support is also provided to the Johannesburg-based *Institute for the Advancement of Journalism*.

Anti-corruption is another Norwegian priority area. Funding has mainly been provided to the Harare-based *Southern African Human Rights Trust* (SAHRIT) and the *Institute for Security Studies* (ISS) in South Africa. SAHRIT has played a crucial role in developing the SADC Protocol on anti-corruption. It is now central in facilitating ratification and implementation as the Secretary to the Southern African Forum against Corruption. NOK 1.6 million is being provided as new funding from 2005. The bulk of the funding is provided to ISS' Cape Town office and its anti-corruption work, which is more focused on applied research and consultancies. NOK 7.8 million is being provided in 2005 (6.7 million in 2004); this funding also includes support for other activities, including combating crime and money-laundering.

Support for human rights and civil society work is more limited at the regional level. Funding is provided to SAHRIT (NOK 1.9 million in both 2004 and 2005, co-funded with Sweden) for their work, which includes running training courses in human rights for the regional police organisation (SARPCCO). Some funding has also been made available for the use of South African resources in national support to NGOs in individual countries, such as the role of IDASA in providing capacity building support to civil society in Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Norway has also assisted various efforts to promote free and fair elections in SADC. The main funding has been provided in new support to the *SADC Parliamentary Forum* for their election observation activities (NOK 6 million in 2005 and 4 million in 2004). Some smaller funding is also provided to a Johannesburg-based NGO, the *Electoral Institute of Southern Africa* (EISA). Current funding is for research, but EISA has been very significant in facilitating the development of common norms and standards for elections in the region, *inter alia* also as a Secretariat to the SADC Election Commissioners' Forum.

Small arms have emerged as an important issue in Norwegian support, with regional funding mainly being channelled to two South African NGOs, ISS and *SaferAfrica*. They have used part of their funds to support the work of the regional police organisation, mainly by providing funding for training courses and meetings.

The single biggest project is the *Training for Peace* project being implemented through two South African NGOs, ISS and Accord (NOK 10 million a year). The main current focus of their activities is the training of police officers for participation in peace support missions. Police agencies in SADC countries sending officers to such missions are targeted and courses are delivered through the regional police organisation (SARPCCO) in Harare.

A related smaller activity has been the Norwegian efforts to establish a roster of Africans that are qualified for participation in regional and continental missions. This has been pursued through the establishment of the Bulawayo-based *Southern African Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights* as well as the *NORAFRIC* project of the Norwegian Refugee Council.

## Annex 3: List of persons met

### *Zimbabwe*

Kjell Storløyken, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy  
 Kari Thorsen, Second Secretary, Norwegian Embassy  
 Mikael Johansson, First Secretary, Regional Advisor, Swedish Embassy  
 Felix Maonera, Director of Multilateral Affairs (Economic), and officials, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Munetsi Madakufumba, Deputy Director, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC)  
 Pamela Mhlanga, Head of Programme, Women in Development Southern Africa Awareness (WIDSAA), Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC)  
 Lawrence Musaba, Co-ordinator Centre Manager, Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP)  
 William Balet, Senior Advisor, Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP)  
 Philliat Matsheza, Executive Director, Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT)  
 Aurther Tonderai Shoko, Project Officer, Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT)  
 Kenny Kapinga, Head, SARPCCO/Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau for Southern Africa  
 Tholakela Gina, Regional Specialised Officer, SARPCCO/Interpol Sub-Regional Bureau for Southern Africa  
 Genevesi Ogiogio, Manager, Knowledge Management and Programme Support Department, ACBF  
 Anna Diallo, Programme Officer, ACBF  
 Apollinaire Ndorukwigira, Operations Adviser, ACBF  
 Adeboye Adeyemo, Programme Officer, ACBF  
 Mothae Maruping, Executive Director, MEFMI  
 Alphious Ncube, Director, Financial Sector Management Programme, MEFMI

### *Botswana*

N. H. Fidzani, Executive Director, Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis  
 Bjørn Førde, Resident Coordinator, UNDP  
 Margaret M. Nyirenda, Director, FANR Directorate, SADC  
 Sandy Davies, Fisheries Advisor, FANR Directorate, SADC  
 M. Madonsela, Head, Resource Mobilization, SADC  
 Rosalind Thomas, Chief Executive Officer, SADC Development Finance Resource Centre  
 Amanda Sealy, Second Secretary, Development & Regional Affairs, British High Commission  
 Stephen Sianga, Director and staff, Directorate: Social Human Development & Special Programmes, SADC  
 F. Pamacheche, Acting Director, Directorate: Trade, Industry, Finance & Investment (TIFI), SADC  
 Regine Qualmann, Technical Adviser, TIFI, SADC  
 Joao Machatine Ndlovu, Acting Director, Directorate: Political, Defence and Security Affairs, SADC  
 James Machakaire, Directorate: Political, Defence and Security Affairs, SADC  
 Phologane Magang, Directorate: Political, Defence and Security Affairs, SADC (on secondment from SA Department of Foreign Affairs, representing the Chair of the Organ)  
 Helmut Mueller-Glodde, Technical Adviser, Change Management, SADC  
 Anthony Vodraska, Supervisory Programme Officer, USAID Regional Center for Southern Africa  
 Annika Jagander, Ambassador, Special Representative to SADC, Embassy of Sweden  
 Stefan Andersson, Second Secretary, Embassy of Sweden  
 Thomas Feige, First Secretary, Delegation of the European Commission  
 E. M. Dewah and other executive committee members, Bocongo  
 Balefi Tsie, Dean, University of Botswana and member SADC Election Commissioners' Forum  
 Themba Mhlongo, Chief Director, SADC Secretariat  
 M.P. Lesetedi, Director, Directorate for Africa and Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Tapiwa Mongwa, Deputy Director, Directorate for Africa and Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Angelo Mondlane, Head of Strategic Planning Unit, SADC Secretariat  
 Charles Kunaka, Senior Policy Officer for Transport, Directorate: Infrastructure and Services, SADC Secretariat  
 Sakhe Silo, Principal Policy Officer for Transport and Communication, Directorate: Infrastructure and Services, SADC Secretariat

Gloria Somolekae, Chair, Vision 2016 and member of the Board, Electoral Institute for Southern Africa  
 Prega Ramsamy, Executive Secretary, SADC Secretariat

### ***South Africa***

Tor Sellström, Counsellor, Swedish Embassy  
 Sten Anders Berge, Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy  
 Inger Stoll, Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy  
 Lone Spanner, Minister Counsellor, Danish Embassy  
 Angela Bester, Governance Adviser, UK Department for International Development  
 Noel Stott, Senior Researcher: Arms Management Programme, Institute for Security Studies  
 Michael Sachs, Research Co-ordinator, Office of the Secretary-General, ANC  
 Cunningham T. Ngcukana, Deputy Director-General, The Presidency and member of Nepad Steering Committee  
 Angus September, responsible for SADC, International Trade and Economic Development, Department of Trade and Industry  
 Hennie Erasmus, International Trade and Economic Development, Department of Trade and Industry  
 Manelisi Genge, Director: Policy, Research and Analysis Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs  
 Lolette Kritzinger-van Niekerk, Senior Economist, The World Bank Country Office in South Africa  
 Thorbjørn Gaustadsæther, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy, Maputo  
 Khabele Matlosa, Research Director, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa  
 Gavin Cawthra, Director, Centre for Defence and Security Management, University of the Witwatersrand  
 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Defence and Security Management, University of the Witwatersrand  
 Richard Meissner, Editor, SADC Barometer, South African Institute of International Affairs  
 Rok Ajulu, Professor, Centre for Africa's International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand  
 Piet Viljoen, Programme Manager: Africa Partnerships Unit, Development Bank of Southern Africa  
 Berénice Lue Marais, Head: Strategic Marketing and Stakeholder Management, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
 Richard Humphries, Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network, Human Sciences Research Council  
 Jan Eriksen, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy  
 Tore Horvei, Chief Executive, South African Development Through Electricity (SAD-ELEC)  
 Tsepe Motume, Chief of Policy and Planning, Defence Secretariat, Department of Defence

### ***Norway***

Andreas Vogt, Programme Director, Training for Peace, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs  
 Katja Nordgaard, Director, Section for Southern and West Africa, Regional Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Tove Stub, Deputy Director, Section for Southern and West Africa, Regional Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Rolf Ree, Senior Adviser, Section for Southern and West Africa, Regional Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Rolf Willy Hansen, Senior Adviser, Section for Global Security Issues and Crisis Management, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

## Annex 4: Terms of Reference

### Preparation - SADC Donor Meeting April 2005

#### Background

The 2001 Guidelines for Norwegian support to regional co-operation in Southern Africa identified six priority areas for Norwegian assistance: economic development; energy; environment and natural resource management; peace, human rights and democracy; social sector; and culture. Support to the SADC Secretariat has been a major manifestation of the Norwegian support. In 2001-2003 Norway was a main financial donor behind the current restructuring of the organisation. This support was continued in February 2004 with an addendum to the 2001 agreement committing Norway to continue the support to the restructuring. This included assistance to the further operationalisation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP).

Norad has also prepared a document identifying areas and activities available for regional support within the priority area on peace, human rights and democracy (the 2003 Strategy for Regional Support to Promote Good Governance in Southern Africa). This document also identifies regional activities outside the formal inter-governmental SADC framework.

Norway has a strong political commitment to SADC. If the restructuring is successful and SADC becomes an effective inter-governmental organisation, Norway will be prepared to offer continued financial assistance and other support to the organisation.

The Norwegian Embassy in Harare is responsible for the management of the Norwegian support to the SADC Secretariat. This Embassy is also expected to be in charge of further Norwegian assessment of the RISDP as well as the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO). Possible future Norwegian support to the implementation of individual components of these plans may also be managed by other Norwegian embassies in the SADC region.

#### Objectives

The chief objective of this study is to provide the Norwegian Embassy in Zimbabwe with a set of forward-looking recommendations for Norwegian support to regional co-operation with SADC. This includes support to the achievement of SADC's social, economic, political and security objectives.

#### Scope

The study shall briefly summarise the status of the reorganisation of SADC, the planning and implementation of its development priorities through its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO). The summary shall include SADC/RISDP follow up and relations with NEPAD, as well as SADC-Organ/SIPO in the context of AU and efforts to operationalize SADC's role in the evolving security architecture in Africa.

The report shall discuss SADC's capacity to implement these plans and risk factors that may influence the development of the organisation.

The study shall describe trends in donor support to SADC, including areas of cooperation, main activities funded, current assessments and plans for future support. Emphasis should be on main international partners such as the European Commission, Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom and USA. The study shall also assess the scope for co-operation between Norway and other international partners, including prospects for co-financing.

The study shall make recommendations for future Norwegian cooperation with and support to SADC and SADC structures, including the Secretariat and institutions/activities of the Organ. The team should focus on overall priorities and the role of Norway, and identify areas suitable for Norwegian cooperation. When feasible, the recommendations could also specify suggested activities to be funded and the size of possible future financial allocations.

### **Structure and approach**

The study will draw on relevant documentation, including;

- Norwegian guidelines for regional support (Handlingsplan for støtte til regional samarbeid i det sørlige Afrika. Innsatser i perioden 2003-2006).
- Proposed strategy for Regional NORAD support to Promote Good Governance in Southern Africa, October 2003
- Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Operation (SIPO)
- Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)
- SADC documents prior to the Consultative Conference
- Other relevant literature

The study will draw on interviews with officials at the Norwegian Embassies in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad.

The study shall also collect data through interviews and discussions with SADC officials, relevant government and donor representatives and other resource persons in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This shall include the SADC Secretariat in Botswana and the Chair of the SADC Organ in South Africa.

The study shall also collect data through interviews with civil society and private sector.

Interviews in Oslo and desk-based collection of data shall be carried out from January with field work in Southern Africa in the first half of February with a debriefing before end of field work.

A first draft of the report should be submitted to the Embassy in Zimbabwe by 1st April. Final report should be submitted not later than one week after comments have been received from the Embassy, at latest 18<sup>th</sup> April. The Consultative Meeting is to be held between 26-27 April.

CMI's field work in Southern Africa should not exceed 16 days.

The report shall be in English and shall not exceed 15 pages, excluding annexes.

### **Team**

The team shall include;

- From CMI: Senior researcher Elling N. Tjønneland (team leader)  
Jan Isaksen (senior researcher)
- From the SADC region: Garth le Pere (Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue, South Africa)

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## SUMMARY

In 2001 SADC approved an ambitious program for a major overhaul of the organisation. Through institutional reform SADC hoped to establish a more efficient Head Office and Secretariat which could provide stronger leadership, ensure a more regionally focused programme of action, and close the gap between policies and implementation.

Norway was major donor behind this process and provided a de facto core funding the restructuring. The present report was commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Harare. The Embassy is responsible for managing Norwegian assistance to the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone. The report sets out to take stock of what has been achieved in terms of reforming SADC and developing a new programme of action in all areas of SADC's operation. This provides a basis for discussing and making recommendations for continued Norwegian support to the organisation and its objectives.

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