

# CMI REPORT



## Evaluation of the UNDP/UNOPS Peacebuilding and Community Development Project in Ituri, the Democratic Republic of Congo

Ingrid Samset  
Yvon Madore

**R 2006: 20**



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**Front page photo:** Brick production in Mudzipela, Ituri district, April 2006. This brick production initiative was one of the micro projects that were made possible through the Ituri peacebuilding and community development project.

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## Executive summary

This is an evaluation of the project “Support to peacebuilding and community development in Ituri”, a project implemented in the Ituri district of the Democratic Republic of Congo from mid-2003 onwards, by the United Nations Development Programme in conjunction with the UN Office for Project Services. The project, which is set to end in 2006, has been co-financed by the Government of Norway (USD 3.1 million) and UNDP (USD 400,000). The evaluation included two weeks of fieldwork in Ituri in April and May 2006, and is based on an investigation of 24 of the 85 micro projects that had been supported within the project by that time, as well as on a document review and interviews with UN staff, partners and beneficiaries.

The key idea of the project was that community development can function as a means to reduce violence and build peace. To realise this idea in the war-torn Ituri district, UNDP adopted the direct execution modality by which it supported local initiatives that were small in terms of budgets, geographical coverage, and duration. The selection and monitoring of projects and partners were done by the staff of the UNDP office set up for the project in Bunia. The 85 projects supported by April 2006 had a budget of on average USD 19,270 each; and more than 90 percent of them were carried out by local NGOs. The projects were to contribute to one or several of the overall project’s four objectives: to promote inter-community reconciliation, to improve access to and the quality of basic infrastructure and social services, to revitalise community development mechanisms and reinforce community-based organisations, and to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS.

The Ituri project was planned in a process involving consultations between UNDP, the Government of Norway and of the DRC, and other UN agencies – but few actors from the Ituri district, which was still in a situation of war. The insecure environment in which the project started gave its staff major challenges, and the planning process did not sufficiently take into account the difficult context in which the project would have to operate. An organisational framework was set up which centralised to UNDP and UNOPS in Kinshasa tasks such as the signing of contracts with each of the many partner organisations, and the disbursement of every instalment of funding to each micro project. Within the new Post-conflict Unit of UNDP, with which the project staff dealt, few resources were made available for the project and it was often not clear who was responsible for what in relation to the project. Communication between the two levels was difficult, and few visits were paid from Kinshasa to Ituri. The conflict situation in Ituri complicated efforts to implement the project according to plan, but the main problem was that the plans made at the outset were not well enough adapted to the challenges that the project was likely to face.

At the level of the micro projects, planning was weak at first but improved over time. Project staff in Bunia did a job which, in the circumstances, was efficient in selecting and following up each project and partner. The selection process involved the Local Committee for Project Approval (the LCPA), which contributed to verifying whether proposed projects would have a reconciliation and community development effect. While administrative management was sound at the Bunia level, the large number of micro projects, the volatile security situation and the uneasy communication with Kinshasa made it difficult for Bunia staff to keep an overall vision of the project. The view of “the forest” got lost in their focus on each “tree”. This was also due to the shortage of strategic guidance from the new Post-conflict Unit in Kinshasa, which was in charge of supervising the project as a whole but whose resources were largely absorbed into other projects.

Yet even if strategic management was weak among the UNDP actors, the partner organisations on the ground in Ituri fully grasped the idea of peacebuilding through community development. The great majority of the partners carried out the projects in an administratively, financially, and



strategically sound way, leading to significant results. The main deviation from individual project plans concerned duration, as each project lasted much longer than the two to six months they were usually set to last. Among the reasons for the delays, the most important was the slowness of disbursement of funding instalments.

The delays in the micro projects contributed to prolonging the project as a whole. It started in August 2003 and was designed for a two-year period, but at the time of fieldwork it had lasted for more than 2.5 years, while only about half of the 100 projects to be supported were finished. As a result, the proportion of the project's budget made up of non-micro-project expenses had increased from about 34 to 42 percent. High administration costs were also due to logistical restrictions stemming from the context of conflict, and to the fact that the project did not share premises with the other UNDP projects in Ituri.

Coordination between the project and other relevant programmes and projects was quite weak. Even though UNDP has been the lead agency within DDR and the Ituri project has supported micro projects aimed at reintegrating ex-combatants, this support was not coordinated with the UNDP project responsible for the reintegration. As for other UN and international agencies, coordination took the form of information exchange and networking through regular OCHA-led meetings in Bunia, but it was not effective at the micro-project level. UNDP met local government in the LCPA, but these meetings were rare and did not allow for much exchange beyond the approval of micro projects. Since the micro projects carried out within the project have thus remained relatively isolated and bilateral UNDP-partner-community initiatives, little ground has been prepared to allow for the scaling up or transfer of lessons learned in a subsequent phase.

Substantial progress has nevertheless been made towards the four overall goals of the project. The reconciliation objective entered into all of the micro projects as efforts were made to ensure that people from the different sides of the conflict participated in each project. Some projects also contributed more directly inasmuch as they involved efforts to raise awareness of the need for peaceful coexistence. Nine primary schools, four health centres, a blood bank and a stadium, as well as bridges, roads and water sources were (re-)built. More than 14,000 temporary jobs were created through the project, which suggests that about half a percent of Ituri's labour force gained income as a result. The micro projects also contributed to the goal of revitalising community development mechanisms and reinforcing CBOs: partners were not always "community-based" but still had a high level of awareness of how the project could help rebuild the local collective, beyond the immediate target group of, for example, women, youth, or ex-combatants. The project also contributed to raising awareness of the gravity of the HIV/AIDS crisis in the district.

Overall, the project has therefore contributed to the launching of the processes of reconciliation and community development in Ituri. While its impact has been positive at community level, it is still doubtful whether the impact can be traced at the level of the district as a whole. The conflict situation seems to evolve independently of the project, which has been a unique initiative in Ituri – given its development focus and its support of projects initiated and run by Iturians themselves. Anecdotal evidence suggests though that with an extension of the method used in this project to more initiatives and areas of the district, the forces seeking to perpetuate conflict will face difficulties in finding recruits and violence will consequently be reduced.

The success of the project has hence come about in spite of an unsuitable organisational framework, weak strategic management, insufficient coordination, and continued violence in Ituri. It is thus a "success by default", a success that came about despite choices made within the project that were not the most amenable to goal attainment. Should such a project be continued? Our answer is yes, conditional upon structural reforms being made within the project. We recommend the project's continuation due to its positive results, its as yet unrealised potential, its uniqueness in Ituri, Ituri's



continuing peacebuilding challenges, and the many initiatives underway within UNDP that show that it is learning from the problems faced so far.

We suggest two alternative options for the future of the project. It could be extended for 6-9 months, to allow for a proper follow-up and completion of remaining micro projects and for the preparation of partner organisations, the LCPA and local authorities for the project's exit. The alternative is to bring the project into a new phase of 1.5-2 years during which the obstacles that have prevailed so far can be overcome. The main challenges in a new phase would be to set up a more suitable operational framework, to improve strategic management, and to improve coordination. As a first step, micro-project tasks such as the signing of contracts and the disbursement of funding should be decentralised to Bunia; and the project should move its premises into the new regional UNDP office. A suitable plan for monitoring and evaluation should be adopted, project staff should be trained, strategic functions should be vested in the regional office's leadership, and more resources should be made available for the project at Kinshasa level. In Ituri, more targeted coordination efforts should be made vis-à-vis international and local government counterparts, to enable a scaling up of new micro projects to be started at a future point in time. Finally, training should be given in community development to members of partner organisations and of the LCPA.

In light of the fact that UNDP is moving in the right direction, that the project has yielded significant results, and that there is still a great need for it in contemporary Ituri, we recommend that the project not only should be extended, but that be brought into a new phase – if the required resources for this can be made available.

## Preamble and acknowledgements

This evaluation of the project “Support to peacebuilding and community development in Ituri, DRC” was commissioned by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, Angola through the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), together with the UNDP Country Office in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of Congo. The content of the report is however the sole responsibility of the authors.

This is the English version of the evaluation report, of which a French version is also available. While the two versions are identical in content, they intend to make findings accessible for different groups. The French version is to enable stakeholders in the evaluated project in the DR Congo including partners, project staff and other UN staff to access the report, and the English version to make findings available for non-francophone stakeholders, including representatives of the project’s main donor, the Government of Norway. The evaluator recruited by Norad has had the prime responsibility of the English version while the evaluator recruited by UNDP has been in charge of the French version of the report.

The evaluation team is grateful for the comments provided on previous drafts of this report. While all comments have been taken into account; some of them arrived after the main editing had been completed and are therefore commented on in an addendum to the main text.

We sincerely thank all those who gave of their time and insights to assist us in the evaluation endeavour. Special thanks go to the project team in Bunia for their helpful accompaniment during our visit in Ituri.

*Bergen and Montreal, August 2006*

*Ingrid Samset  
Yvon Madore*

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 The evaluated project

This is an evaluation of the project “Support to peacebuilding and community development in Ituri”. The project is located in Ituri, a district in the Oriental province of the Democratic Republic of Congo, close to the country’s border with Uganda and the Sudan.<sup>1</sup> Given that Ituri has been marked by armed conflict since the end of the 1990s, the project, which started in 2003, aimed at:

- Promoting inter-community reconciliation;
- Improving access to and quality of basic infrastructure and social services;
- Revitalising community development mechanisms and reinforcing the capacity of community-based organisations; and
- Raising awareness of HIV/AIDS (UNDP DRC 2002c).<sup>2</sup>

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has implemented the project, in conjunction with the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which has acted as the supervisor of part of the project and as the employer of its personnel.

The project has had a budget of approximately USD 3.5 million. It has been co-financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), which has contributed approximately USD 3.1 million (USD 3,107,615 to be precise, or NOK 22 million), and UNDP itself, which provided the remaining USD 400,000.

## 1.2 Aims of the evaluation

From the start of the project a final evaluation of it was stipulated. Given that the project is expected to end in 2006, in early 2006 Norad and UNDP recruited one consultant each for the evaluation team.<sup>3</sup> According to the Terms of Reference<sup>4</sup> prepared for the evaluators, our principal tasks have been to assess:

- The results of the project and the progress made towards its overall objectives, taking into account the political situation and the security conditions that have prevailed in Ituri;
- The nature and quality of the coordination between the project and other relevant activities undertaken by the Government of the DRC, UNDP, and other international actors;
- The quality of the planning, organisation, and implementation of the project; and
- To the extent possible, the impact of the project on the ground and how it has been perceived by target groups and communities.

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<sup>1</sup> A map of the DRC is provided in Appendix no. 1.

<sup>2</sup> The translation from French to English of this and other quotes in the report has been undertaken by the authors.

<sup>3</sup> Respectively Ingrid Samset, researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Norway and Yvon Madore, from Canada and previously an international official of the United Nations.

<sup>4</sup> The Terms of Reference for each of the evaluators are reproduced in Appendices 2 and 3.

### 1.3 Methodology and fieldwork approach

The evaluation was carried out between March and August 2006, and underwent three phases: a preparatory phase, the fieldwork, and the final phase of writing and editing this report.<sup>5</sup> The evaluators spent one month in the field, from 18 April to 17 May 2006, including two weeks in Ituri. Towards the end of the fieldwork period we presented our preliminary findings and conclusions firstly to UNDP in Kinshasa and secondly to the Norwegian Embassy for the DRC, which is located in Angola.

The methodology of the evaluation is based on what constitutes the backbone of the project: the micro projects. At the time of the team's visit to Ituri, 85 such projects had been supported within the project. Given our limited time in the district, we had to make a choice in order to select a sample of projects to study more closely. We identified five selection criteria for doing so: the micro projects' geographical and thematic distribution, terminated vs. ongoing projects, their budgetary size, and type of partner.

As a result of this exercise, 31 micro projects were identified for study, but during our fieldwork we reduced the number to 24 for two reasons. Firstly, security conditions in some areas where we had picked projects to visit proved to be too uncertain to allow us to go there. Given the importance of seeing the site and meeting partners to get an adequate impression of a given project, we therefore left out those projects. Secondly, time proved more of a constraint than initially thought, given the time needed to plan each visit and study the documents, as well as to speak with the parties involved, and given the distances that had to be covered.

The 24 projects we investigated still constitute around 28 percent of the micro projects and about one third of the total budget of the projects that had been supported. Moreover, the sample seems to be quite representative of the totality of the micro projects, when measured in terms of the above-mentioned criteria.<sup>6</sup>

Our study of the Ituri project as a whole and of the 24 smaller projects has been based on three complementary sources of information:

- A review of relevant documents;<sup>7</sup>
- Visits to micro-project sites; and
- Meetings with managers, implementing partners, and beneficiaries of the Ituri project, including with representatives of Congolese government authorities at the local level.<sup>8</sup>

To facilitate the interviews with project personnel, partners and target groups we prepared three types of questionnaire that served as a basic checklist for our meetings.

### 1.4 Structure of report

This evaluation report has seven chapters, structured around the key points in our Terms of Reference.

Chapter 2 assesses how the project emerged, from the stage of being an idea that arose in a certain geographical and historical context, to becoming a concept for a project with concrete objectives for

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<sup>5</sup> Appendix 4 provides a more detailed timeline of the evaluation process.

<sup>6</sup> More detailed information about the selected projects and their representativeness is given in Appendix 5A and 5B.

<sup>7</sup> Appendix 6 lists the documents reviewed.

<sup>8</sup> Appendix 7 provides the list of informants, and Appendix 8 the list of acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.

social change in the district of Ituri. The chapter also introduces the logic behind the micro-project approach.

The two ensuing chapters analyse the quality of the processes of planning and implementing the project. Chapter 3 discusses the extent to which the strategy and the organisational framework of the project were adapted to the challenges it would face. The quality of the planning of the micro projects is also analysed, with particular attention paid to the mechanism of the LCPA, the Local Committee for Project Approval. Chapter 4 examines how the micro projects have been implemented and the degree to which implementation has been consistent with the initial plans. It also assesses the processes of monitoring and evaluation, and is rounded off with an analysis of how the project as a whole has been implemented.

Chapter 5 looks at the coordination between the project and other relevant actors and projects in Ituri, while the sixth chapter assesses the results, the degree of goal attainment, and the impact of the project. Chapter 7 concludes and identifies recommendations for the future.

## 2. How the project started

In this chapter we examine the context in which the idea of the project emerged. From where did the inspiration for this idea come? Why did the UNDP get involved in this? And how were the initial ideas transformed into a concept for a project with concrete objectives for social change in Ituri?

### 2.1 National and sub-regional context

After more than three years of war in the DRC and several failed negotiation efforts, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue was initiated in South Africa in January 2002. It resulted in the signing of the Sun City accord in April 2002, but it was only with the “global and inclusive” Pretoria agreement of December 2002, and a final agreement of April 2003, that a comprehensive plan for a political transition in the Congo was put in place.

In spite of this national-level peace process, however, armed attacks continued in Ituri. In this district, which had been occupied by Ugandan government forces since 1998, “a war within the war” broke out in 1999 between militias representing the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups respectively. The violence was provoked by land disputes between the two sides, but eventually the two main militias started fragmenting. The splits came about partly as a result of the influence of Ugandan troops, who stayed in Ituri until May 2003, and partly as a consequence of the dynamic that emerged from the way in which most of the armed groups financed their activities: by means of exploiting and exporting valuable natural resources, timber and gold in particular. This economic dynamic contributed towards transforming the nature of the violence, in the sense that from 2002-2003 the violence was no longer inter-ethnic only: fighting also took place within more homogeneous communities. In a parallel development the militias took on a more inter-ethnic character, inasmuch as single militias such as the FAPC and the MRC started recruiting from different ethnic groups.

Vis-à-vis the negotiations at the national level, the military actors in Ituri came on stage rather late – too late, in fact, to qualify for positions in the transitional government which took office in mid-2003. Until then efforts to negotiate peace in Ituri had been futile. Meanwhile, civilians in the district have suffered severely: by early 2006, out of a population of approximately 4.6 million some 50,000 Iturian people had been killed, some 500,000 displaced, and thousands more wounded or traumatised by the fighting.

### 2.2 Anchorage points of the project

The idea of the evaluated project emerged from the influence and inspiration of three main sources<sup>9</sup>:

- From the Norwegian side: the person who became Ambassador for the DRC in the second half of 2002;
- From the Congolese side: the poverty reduction strategy of the Government of the DRC; and
- From the UNDP side: the RESCO project, as well as the agency’s broader experience in Eastern DRC since the mid-1990s.

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<sup>9</sup> This section draws in particular on the following written sources: GoDRC (2006); Norad (2002); UNDP DRC (2002a; 2002b; 2003c).

### 2.2.1 The Norwegian factor

The most immediate source of influence over what was to become the Ituri project was the current Norwegian Ambassador for the DRC, Mr. Arild R. Øyen. Before he took up this ambassadorial position, in mid-2002 Mr. Øyen worked as a special advisor for MONUC (the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC) and in this capacity had responsibility for monitoring the situation in Ituri. Øyen was thus able to develop an intimate knowledge of the situation, as well as ideas about what could be done to bring peace to the region.

When he left his engagement with MONUC in August 2002, Mr. Øyen proposed that a project be started in Ituri with the aim of supporting local development initiatives, and that UNDP might implement such a project. Discussions between UNDP in DRC and representatives of the Norwegian government got underway, and in mid-August the UNDP sent a request to Norad for funding for the new project, for which a USD 3 million budget was suggested (UNDP DRC 2002b). A few months later, in December 2002, Norad and UNDP signed a contract for the co-financing of the project that is the subject of the present evaluation (Norad 2002).

### 2.2.2 The DRC government's poverty-reduction strategy

Another source of inspiration for the Ituri project was the strategy of the DRC government for the fight against poverty (GoDRC 2006). This strategy identifies the reinforcement of the community dynamic, peacebuilding and reconciliation as key approaches to reducing poverty in the Congo. The Ituri project was thus an initiative that could directly support governmental efforts in this field.

### 2.2.3 The RESCO project

Following up on UNDP interventions in community development in eastern DRC (to which we return below), a project for the "reinforcement of community strategies" was realised between 2001 and 2003 (entitled *renforcement des stratégies communautaires* in French, abbreviated RESCO). The project was supposed to cover the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Oriental, where Ituri is located. In 2002, the manager of the project initiated contacts with community groups in Ituri, and managed to identify some initiatives in the Bunia area that could be supported within the RESCO project.

Given the deteriorating security situation in Ituri at the time, however, UNDP decided not to open the "antenna" or regional office in Bunia that it had initially planned for in the RESCO project. Moreover, when the opportunity for funding from Norway came up in 2002, the organisation decided not to implement the identified micro projects in Bunia within the RESCO project, but instead to transfer these projects to the planned new project (le Brun and Djidda 2004; Wirba 2003).

## 2.3 Choice of implementing organisation

In mid-2002, when the planning for the Ituri project got underway, the presence of the international community in Ituri was still limited to humanitarian and military agencies. UNDP was on the verge of getting involved in the district, but had not yet opened an office in Bunia or started supporting local initiatives. But even if UNDP had little experience in Ituri, by virtue of its mandate and experience in eastern DRC it was a logical choice of organisation to carry out the peacebuilding and development project.

Given that UNDP's mandate is within the sphere of development and that no UN agency exists that works solely on post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding, among the UN agencies only UNDP had a mandate that would be consistent with the ideas of the project. Moreover, in the DRC UNDP



was already involved in the conflict zones of the east. In fact, while UNDP will normally withdraw from a situation of armed conflict and only return when the strife is over, in the DRC the approach had been different: from the start of the regional turmoil in 1994 UNDP had engaged itself in the conflict-ridden areas in the east, notably the Kivu and Katanga provinces. It is as a result of this work in particular that the organisation had accumulated experiences that would be relevant for an engagement in Ituri. For instance, UNDP had ploughed new ground in DRC with regard to coordination with humanitarian actors, and to forging the transition from emergency to development (Wood 2001). Compared to similar situations in other countries, the development dimension thus seems to have entered more strongly into humanitarian work in the DRC. This does not mean, however, that administrative measures accompanied this evolution and were sufficiently adjusted to the requirements of flexibility and rapidity (aspects to which we return in Chapters 3 and 4).

UNDP, which would normally work in partnership with governmental agencies on relatively large projects, also found in eastern DRC that small community projects could make a big difference in the midst of crisis. At the same time, the organisation found a certain lack of political will as well as rigidity among donor agencies towards supporting such projects, factors that in turn had led to missed opportunities for assisting communities in preserving their development process and in advancing on the road to peace.

From this perspective, the Ituri project represented an unusual case of a donor not only offering funds to implement a development project in a conflict zone, but also offering to do it with the innovative approach of making the victims the artisans of their own communities' peace and development.

## 2.4 Conceptualisation of project

The project was conceptualised on the basis of the anticipated success of the national peace process and its effects on the Ituri district on the one hand, and on the other on the expectations and estimations of the capacities of local communities in Ituri. Out of these considerations emerged a quite original project concept.

The first element of the concept was the idea that peace and reconciliation can come about as a result of community development. The development of local communities was seen as a method of bringing about peace, as a factor of stabilisation. The idea actually represents the diametrical opposite of conventional thinking on aid to conflict-torn areas, which is that peace must come first – before any development activities can begin. In this project, it was held that the opposite is not only possible, but also necessary: in order to create peace, community development needs to be promoted and supported.<sup>10</sup>

The second element of the concept dealt with how community development could play this role of contributing to peacebuilding. The idea was that if you put people from groups that have found themselves on different sides of a conflict together to realise an activity of common interest – the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure or social services, or income-generating activities, for instance – this common work towards a shared purpose will contribute towards reducing tensions between the different groups, not only at the individual but also at the collective level.

If community development was seen as the means to bringing peace and reconciliation to the Ituri district, the reasons were, firstly, the finding in 2002 that efforts thus far to negotiate peace in the district had been futile. It was time to search for peace “by other means”, which explains this quite

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<sup>10</sup> While new for the UNDP, this idea has, however, been tried and tested by other organisations and in other contexts. For insights into the debate on what should come first – peace or development – see for instance Barakat (2005).

unconventional approach of peacebuilding through community development. The other element that entered into the analysis was the confidence that UNDP and its partners had in the local communities in Ituri: the belief that these communities would indeed be able to act as the “motors” of the pacification and stabilisation of their own district, through activities of common interest that they would themselves carry out.

This confidence existed in spite of the fact that the conceptualisation of the project involved little participation of Ituri-based actors: it was largely the result of a consultative process in late 2002 and early 2003 involving UNDP, the Government of Norway, the Government of the DRC, other UN agencies, and other international agencies – the bulk of which took place at the level of Kinshasa, Congo’s capital.<sup>11</sup>

## 2.5 Identification of objectives

The four objectives identified for the Ituri project largely mirror this conceptualisation. “Peacebuilding” or “inter-community reconciliation” was identified as the first objective, reflecting the fact that this was the overall purpose of the project. While community development was seen as an objective in itself in this project it was also, and perhaps primarily, regarded as a means to reach another end – that of bringing peace to Ituri.

The second and third objectives, of improving access to and the quality of basic infrastructure and social services, and of reinforcing community-based organisations and revitalising community development mechanisms, are consistent with the logic of promoting activities of common interest to sustain the development process, which in turn would help to consolidate peace.

Finally, extensive population movements as well as the presence of armed forces and the use of rape as a weapon of war made it possible that the HIV/AIDS rate in Ituri would be high. Raising awareness of the disease was therefore included as a fourth aim of the peacebuilding and community development project.

## 2.6 The micro-project approach

The main methodological approach of the project was to support projects that would be relatively small – in terms of budget, duration, and geographical coverage.<sup>12</sup> This micro-project approach was a logical choice for the UNDP in the circumstances, given the expertise that the organisation had accumulated through its work in eastern DRC, and the particular context of Ituri. Three considerations justified the approach.

First, due to the war that had ravaged Ituri for years, it was estimated that local communities and organisations that could potentially instigate projects would have little administrative experience, especially of financial management, and hence a limited capacity to manage big budgets.

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<sup>11</sup> On 16 December 2002 a meeting was held to discuss the project proposal, with 19 participants from UN agencies and the DRC central government, which approved the project yet recommended some changes to the proposal (UNDP DRC 2002a). In January 2003, UNDP accepted an invitation to be part of a working group on Ituri of the Congolese National Council of Development NGOs, in which both local and international NGOs took part (UNDP DRC 2003c). The consultation with local Ituri-based actors that this allowed for thus only started after the main phase of conceptualisation and planning of the project had been completed. An important reason why few Ituri-based actors were consulted in the preparatory phase was the dire security situation in the district at the time.

<sup>12</sup> The project document (introduced in section 3.1.1) does not define a micro project specifically. Our deduction of the three dimensions of such a project’s size – financial, geographic, and temporal – is based on our own interpretation of other sections of the project document. It might also be argued that the number of beneficiaries has been a dimension of the “definition”. We return to details of the micro projects when assessing their implementation in section 4.1.

Secondly, the presence of armed conflict in the area implied a potential risk of abuse or even embezzlement of funds by unscrupulous actors attracted more by the money than the prospects for development and peace. The possibility existed that certain actors would rather prevent than support the development process. One scenario, for instance, could be that an armed group would manipulate a local group to make it present itself to the UNDP with a project, then obtain funding, and subsequently transfer those funds to the backstage actor for which it would have acted as a proxy or façade.

The risk that the results of the Ituri project would be smaller due to the inexperience of potential partners in project management and/or the potential diversion of funds, motivated UNDP to adopt a strategy that would enable it to spread its resources across multiple small projects.

The third and positive justification of the micro-project approach was that the limited scope of each project would favour participation and learning by the local actors. Given the devastation that the war had brought with it and the need to reconstruct the communities in Ituri, it was seen as wise to start at the community level with projects that would be relatively small in terms of budget, duration, and geographical scope. The planning and implementation of such projects, given their manageable size, could realistically involve a broad range of people and hence promote local ownership and enhance chances that the initiative would remain at the community level. The smallness of the projects could thus become a stepping stone for community-level learning, which in turn could facilitate initiatives being taken by the same local actors for potentially larger initiatives in the future.

### 3. Planning and organisation

Having outlined the origins of the peacebuilding and development project in Ituri, we will now assess how the project has been managed in its operational phase. This chapter looks at how the project was planned and organised, while the next examines its implementation. In our analysis of the management issues we distinguish between two levels: that of the project as a whole, and that of the micro projects.

#### 3.1 Planning and organisation of the project as a whole

In 2002 and 2003, UNDP worked out a set of strategy documents and prepared an organisational framework for the Ituri project. This section introduces these modalities and discusses the quality of the processes of planning and organisation of the project as a whole.

##### 3.1.1 Strategy documents

Three types of strategy document were put in place to plan the project: a project document, a framework of results and resources, and annual work plans.

*Project document:* This document (UNDP DRC 2002c), dated 20 December 2002 and signed on 6 May 2003 by a representative of UNDP and the Government of DRC respectively, represents the main strategy of the project. It integrates the results of UNDP missions to Ituri and of discussions during the second half of 2002 internally and with the Government of DRC, of Norway and other UN agencies.

The document has seven parts. Firstly, it provides an analysis of the context and identifies problems to resolve, target groups, intervention areas, and the legal and institutional framework of the project. Secondly, a strategy is outlined, with details of the intended effects of the project, its thematic areas, intervention and partnership strategies, and sustainability considerations. Next, the document provides a framework of results; management and implementation arrangements; estimated risks; legal context; and the budget of the project. The document also contains details of the Local Committees for Project Approval (LCPAs), selection criteria for micro projects, funding types and ceilings, and terms of reference for the project's personnel.

*Results framework:* This document (UNDP DRC 2003a) is an elaborated version of the framework of results provided in the project document. It first specifies the expected effects of the project, indicators to measure these effects, and the partnership strategy. The subsequent and main part of the text is structured around the four general objectives of the project. For each objective expected results, targets for each result (overall and per year), and planned activities are identified.

*Annual work plans:* These work plans (UNDP DRC 2003b; 2004c; 2005b) depart from the expected results, targets, and planned activities given in the above-mentioned framework and specify how the activities are to be realised during the year in question: when, by whom, with what budget.

### 3.1.2 Organisational framework

To implement the Ituri project, the UNDP identified an organisational framework with a number of agencies involved. Appendix 10 gives an overview of this organisational set-up. How was the framework put in place on the ground, and what roles were identified for the key project actors?<sup>13</sup>

*Project office:* The process of setting up the project office in Ituri's main town, Bunia, started with the deployment of the project manager (entitled Chief Technical Advisor, CTA) in Bunia in July 2003, and was completed with the recruitment of all project staff by the end of that year.

Given the difficult security situation in Ituri at the time, a key consideration when recruiting personnel was how the composition of the team would minimise security barriers and maximise chances that the project would be appreciated in the district. A balance thus had to be struck between ensuring the team's neutrality vis-à-vis local conflicts, while at the same time having a connection to the ground level. It was in line with these considerations that the project manager was recruited internationally, and the experts were drawn from among Congolese ethnic groups that had not been most strongly involved in the Ituri conflicts (i.e. the Hema and Lendu).

During the project period, the project manager has been replaced once, in October 2004; and two of the three experts were replaced in early 2006. The experts cover the three key thematic areas identified within the project, namely peacebuilding and reconciliation, community development, and rehabilitation. Apart from the manager and experts, the project employs another five persons in Bunia: one financial and administrative secretary, one project assistant, two drivers, and one cleaner (UNDP DRC 2006).

The Chief Technical Advisor has been responsible for the day-to-day management of the project, including the follow-up of the processes of selecting, approving, and monitoring the micro projects. The CTA has also been charged with reporting on the project in the form of semi-annual and annual reports.

*Governmental agencies:* The setting up of a quite substantial project office in Bunia was a practical consequence of UNDP's choice of the direct execution (DEX) modality to implement the Ituri project. This modality implied that UNDP would execute the project as a whole, while working in partnership with local NGOs and other groups in Ituri that would implement the micro projects with assistance from UNDP.

The context in which the project would be run justified this unusual choice for UNDP, which normally works with government agencies (indirect execution). Due to the armed conflicts in Ituri and the degree of neglect by central state levels of the local administration there, by 2002 local government in the district was largely dysfunctional or absent, and therefore could not play the role of implementing partner.

Nevertheless, the project document does place the project "under the guardianship" of a certain Ministry and Directory in Kinshasa, while at the local level the responsibility for monitoring the project would be taken over by "decentralised administrative entities in charge of development planning, and competent sector divisions". Moreover, it was foreseen that local administration officials would be part of the Local Committees for Project Approval (LCPAs).

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<sup>13</sup> We will in the following touch on all the main actors identified in the framework except the LCPA, which will be analysed in section 3.2.2, and local NGOs, assessed in Chapters 4 and 6.

*UN system in Kinshasa:* The absence of a functional local government in Ituri also justified the choice of putting the project under the direct supervision of the Resident Representative of UNDP in Kinshasa. Another reason for this modus operandi was the volatile situation in Ituri (categorised by the UN as a phase 4 situation, phase 5 being the conditions under which expatriate staff are evacuated), which required that quick action at the top level would be facilitated if the situation on the ground so required.

Neither the Post-conflict Unit of UNDP nor UNOPS are mentioned in the project document. However, both were to play important roles in the Ituri project: UNOPS as the employer of project staff and the supervisor of the micro projects within the field of rehabilitation of physical infrastructure; and the Post-conflict Unit as the agency responsible for follow-up, overall management of, and guidance to the Ituri project. Both the Unit and UNOPS also had responsibilities for signing micro-project contracts and disbursing the funds for each project instalment by instalment, and for monitoring and evaluation of the project as a whole, and of the parts of the project that fell under their respective realms in particular.

*International agencies in Ituri:* The project document stipulates that the project was to forge close cooperation with other UN agencies in Ituri in relevant fields.

Amongst the other UN agencies in Ituri, the UN peacekeeping force MONUC was pivotal. The presence of MONUC on the ground in Ituri, with its ability to protect UN staff and facilitate their access to the more remote corners of the district, was indeed a precondition for the project to commence at all. OCHA was also present in Ituri, as were UNICEF, a few other UN organisations and a handful of international NGOs.

Finally, at the time when the project was being planned, UNDP was initiating two other nation-wide projects that would also be implemented in Ituri from 2003-2004. These were the COMREC project, COMREC being shorthand for “community recovery, reintegration of ex-combatants, and small arms reduction”; and the MRR project, MRR being the French acronym for “Rapid Response Mechanism”. The two projects were part of the countrywide process of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; a process that got underway in Ituri around mid-2004 after a long period of planning. The MRR project focused on the disarmament and demobilisation of the former fighters, while COMREC provided reintegration opportunities to the demobilised.

### 3.1.3 Assessment of the quality of the planning process

Were the strategies and the organisational framework that were prepared for the Ituri project well adapted to the challenges that the project would face? And to what extent were the plans adhered to?

Departing from the “centre stage” of the project to analyse these questions, namely the project office in Bunia, we find that the recruitment of the project team seems to have been based on wise considerations and that the personnel have had most of the qualities required in order to fulfil their tasks. However, throughout the project period and in particular during the first year, the scope for action of staff members has been limited by two main factors: the volatile security situation in Ituri, and insufficient follow-up from Kinshasa.

With regard to the latter factor, a key problem seems to have been that even though the Ituri project was innovative in many ways for UNDP, there was a gap between the level of ambition on the one hand and the operational framework put in place to enable the new project to succeed on the other. This operational framework clearly did not match the difficult challenges faced by the team on the

ground. Moreover, the team's requests for assistance to deal with the constraints was, in the early phase in particular, met with relatively little commitment to provide effective service on the part of the responsible units in Kinshasa.

Some of the difficulties confronted by the team in Ituri clearly related to the circumstances in which they worked. One example is the lack of a functioning banking system in Ituri in the first months of the project, which compelled staff to engage in the risky business of transporting large sums of money from Uganda in cash. However, other difficulties in the early phase were due to the fact that the organisational framework as a whole, and in particular the structures in place in Kinshasa, were not well adapted to dealing with the management of a project in what was virtually a war zone. The dire security situation often put Bunia staff in need of quick assistance from Kinshasa, but the performance of the responsible UN units seems to have been less than satisfactory. UNDP did not have or devote enough resources at the central level to the Ituri project; it also favoured a "culture of norms" with a focus on adherence to administrative rules and requirements instead of a focus on how it could best serve and assist its staff in the field.

Even though the planning documents are relatively comprehensive it is thus clear in hindsight that insufficient attention was paid to the setting up of an operational framework that would foster efficiency and goal-attainment within the Ituri project. The project was designed to follow largely the same rules, regulations and practices as other UNDP projects – even though it was qualitatively new for the UNDP in many ways. We will illustrate the point by summing up the main innovative traits of the project:

- The project sought to bridge the gap between emergency and development. UNDP, meanwhile, except for some experiences in eastern DRC, has traditionally worked to promote long-term development and less on forging the transition between the humanitarian and developmental phases.
- The project has taken place in a "phase 4" security situation (phase 5 being the conditions under which foreign staff are evacuated). This is a situation in which UNDP has rarely worked before.
- The project aimed at using development activities as a tool for building peace and promoting reconciliation. This idea is virtually the opposite of traditional thinking, according to which development activities are to materialise *after* peace is restored.
- The project adopted the direct execution modality, and was to work with local NGOs and to support a high number of small projects. By contrast, UNDP has traditionally worked with government entities and supported projects with a rather large budget.
- Finally, the project was one of the first endeavours that UNDP in DRC undertook in the sphere of post-conflict peacebuilding and the first such project in the Ituri district. The project demanded conflict analysis and sensitivity as well as attention to rapidly changing conditions on the ground. Even if UNDP had gained some experience from similar work in DRC these challenges remained daunting for an organisation which has traditionally focused on long-term development processes.

The peacebuilding and development project in Ituri was thus in many ways a new ball game for UNDP. The fact that the organisation undertook the implementation of such a project should be commended as a bold step; at the same time it could be expected that the innovative nature of the project, and the risks involved, would generate some changes in how it was to be implemented, compared to UNDP's traditional project arrangements. Yet the fact of the matter was that in spite of its originality, the operational framework identified or assumed in the project document followed relatively standard UNDP procedures.



One example of this was the arrangement noted earlier: that the project would be placed under the tutorship of a particular Congolese Ministry and Directorate and that it would be under the direct supervision of the UNDP Resident Representative. These actors are based in Kinshasa, some 2000 km from Ituri. A “pilot committee” was also envisaged, for the purpose of facilitating the monitoring and evaluation of the project. It was to be composed of representatives of the DRC government (i.e. of the ministries of planning and reintegration; of human rights; of international cooperation; and the peace process commissariat) and UNDP – all, too, based in Kinshasa (UNDP DRC 2002c). Given the considerable geographical distance and the costs and practical difficulties of transport, and taking into account the fact that Ituri has suffered for some time from a virtual absence of structures representing the Government of the DRC, these modalities seem in hindsight to have been overly optimistic, if not unrealistic.

Another indication that the planning process failed to take the context of the project adequately into account is the local-level framework envisaged. As noted, the project document alludes to “decentralised administrative entities in charge of development planning” as well as “competent sector divisions” as liaison agencies at the local level. However, at the time when the project document was prepared in 2002, such entities were hardly functional in Ituri. The strategy thus seems to be based on some degree of wishful thinking with regard to the government structures with which the project office was supposed to cooperate.

The project document further stipulates that the project team should forge cooperation with peer organisations in Ituri, including other UN agencies. The most obvious cooperation partners were the other UNDP projects underway in Ituri, namely COMREC and MRR. However, the fact that the project document planned for a separate office and did not envisage a common UNDP office for the different UNDP projects complicated efforts to cooperate from the start. To pool administrative resources together in one UNDP office in Bunia would have been more consistent with the cooperation objective as well as with efficiency and communication concerns. Instead, the project was given a separate office, next to that of COMREC in the beginning. But with the launch of the MRR project the COMREC office moved to bigger premises which it shared with the MRR, so the “neighbourhood effect” was lost. The structural disincentives that this parallel set-up generated clearly complicated efforts by the staff of the three projects to coordinate their work.

Yet the most serious modality gap between the originality of the project and the traditional structure identified for it is probably that related to the fund disbursement mechanism. In spite of the direct execution modality and the fact that the project would entail the support of approximately one hundred small projects implemented predominantly by local NGOs, each micro project was supposed to be approved and signed at the highest level of UNDP/UNOPS in Kinshasa. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, financial management was centralised to Kinshasa too. Each micro project involved several instalments from UNDP or UNOPS to the local partner, but each instalment was to come from Kinshasa. At the Kinshasa level, several factors delayed the process of having one contract signed or one disbursement effectuated: the relatively lengthy process of setting up the Post-conflict Unit from late 2002 onwards; frequent travelling by key personnel; the involvement of both UNOPS and UNDP in the project; and an occasional lack of clarity as to who was responsible for which micro projects. In light of the substantial delays that this administrative centralisation caused throughout the project period, it is striking that the project document does not consider alternative financial management mechanisms.

It is therefore beyond doubt that the planning process resulted in modalities that failed to take into account important needs that the project was likely to have. Our finding that the project document, the results framework, and the annual work plans seemed to have been little used by project staff

may therefore not come as a surprise.<sup>14</sup> There are few signs that the strategic documents have guided the project staff's daily work. One reason applicable to the first CTA and the three experts in Bunia may be the fact that they received very little training, especially on the UN system and how it works. Another and more general reason for the weak reference to strategy documents is that the process of planning took place in Kinshasa and before the team was recruited, while it was the team that was to implement the plans at the other extreme of the vast country. From the outset, therefore, there was both a geographical, logistical, and a mental gap to be bridged between the Kinshasa staff involved in outlining the visions and ideas of the project and the Bunia staff given the demanding tasks on the ground. In order for the gaps to be bridged, relatively close contact and a considerable degree of direct support by Kinshasa to the Bunia team, especially during the first months, would have been required. However, such bridging efforts seem largely to have been missing. From August to the end of 2003, the project manager did most of the work of identifying projects and recruiting personnel himself, and in 2004 there are few signs that follow-up from Kinshasa improved. Meanwhile, tensions between Kinshasa and Bunia intensified, especially during the first half of 2004, and eventually led to the replacement of the first project manager in October that year.

In terms of management of the project as a whole, the gap that existed at the outset thus widened rather than narrowed. Perspectives for the overall project existed at the Kinshasa level, and even though project staff in Bunia had been introduced to the overall ideas they soon found themselves immersed in the day-to-day tasks of identifying and following up a large number of projects and partners in a war-torn region. Keeping a bird's-eye view of the project was made difficult by the workload and logistical difficulties, as well as by their problems in getting responses on small and large questions from Kinshasa. Metaphorically speaking, it seems that UNDP Kinshasa only saw "the forest" while Bunia staff mainly saw "the trees" of the project. In addition to diverging visions at the outset, the serious communication problems between the field and the centre contributed further to the widening of the gap between the two sides' perspectives on the project.

A significant omission in the planning process was thus a clear specification of the roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis the project of the different key UN actors in Bunia (in particular the project office versus the representatives of the two other UNDP projects) and in Kinshasa (the UNDP Post-conflict Unit, its different staff members, and UNOPS), as well as of the communication and contact routines between them.

The Post-conflict Unit of UNDP was established more or less in a parallel process to the process of preparing the Ituri project. The lack of certainty at the time about what roles the unit would assume in relation to the project helps explain why the unit is not mentioned in the project document, in spite of the importance it was eventually given in relation to the project.

But if the Post-conflict Unit was not present in the minds of the planners of the project; its role in relation to the project remained vaguely defined throughout the project period as well. Documentary evidence is scarce on plans as to who would do what within the Unit in relation to the project, and interview data suggests that the division of labour within the unit in relation to the project has shifted. Overall, it is beyond doubt that between 2003 and 2005, the role of UNDP in Kinshasa vis-à-vis the Ituri project was not very clear.

To be more specific, from the creation of the Post-conflict Unit in late 2002 until early 2006 the management of the Unit was assumed on an interim basis. Moreover, the interim team leader had as his main task the management of the huge and countrywide DDR programme (i.e. the COMREC and MRR projects), and was also linked to the UNDP's Policy and Strategy Unit. Given that the

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<sup>14</sup> During our visit the strategy documents were hardly referred to by personnel in Bunia. We obtained the project document only upon our request for it, and annual work plans were hardly mentioned by any staff member.

team leader had to devote most of his time to what proved to be quite a difficult process in getting the DDR programme off the ground, most of the Kinshasa-level management of the Ituri project was transferred to a programme advisor within the unit who was given the title of “focal point” for the project. Yet this person was already in charge of many other projects and had little time to spare for monitoring and providing guidance to a new one. Hence part of the responsibility was transferred another step down in the system, to a programme assistant, who was given the task of dealing with the day-to-day work related to the Ituri project. This person did so, but apparently in a formal way without appreciating the special character of the project, in terms of both its positive potential but also the considerable risks and problems involved in it. In general, this type of attitude seems to have marked the approach of the Unit as a whole towards the Ituri project: the assistance provided to Bunia seems to have been more of a bureaucratic or “formalistic” character of assuring rule-abidance, rather than of a service-oriented and support-to-the-field character in providing strategic guidance and practical assistance to the staff, who often faced considerable logistical and security challenges on the ground.

In spite of its innovative character and possible strategic value, the Ituri project was hence given far less attention at the Kinshasa level than was required to respond to the needs of its staff in Bunia. Within the Post-conflict Unit, this can partly be ascribed to the newness of the unit and consequent efforts to find a *modus operandi* and to justify its *raison d'être* within the UN system in the country. This may have required it to focus on the Kinshasa level at the outset, at the expense of services to be rendered to the field. The initial temporary leadership structure also helps explain inadequate attention to Bunia, as does the imbalance between the different projects of the unit. For instance, as opposed to the tens-of-millions, countrywide and prestigious DDR programme of which the UNDP was assigned to be the national lead agency, the performance of this USD 3.5 million project in a remote corner of the country was not likely seriously to hamper UNDP's image. In a situation with scarce human resources at the Post-conflict Unit level, the project ended up suffering from being given less priority.

With regard to UNOPS, reports from the CTA in Bunia (e.g. UNDP DRC 2003d; 2004a) leave little doubt that the follow-up was equally insufficient. The fact that UNOPS is not mentioned in the project document is certainly a weakness in the planning process, given the agency's key role as the employer of the project staff and as the supervisor of the numerous rehabilitation projects.

The fact that the project would relate to two different UN agencies might also have been expected to lead to particular attention being paid to this in the project document. This could be in the form of a specification of rules regarding who would do what in Kinshasa, for example in situations that would require swift assistance, such as an incident of armed violence. However, the project document is silent on this point and reference is thus implicitly made to standard UN procedures, which clearly were inadequate for this type of project.

Finally, even though the project was designed for a two-year period, it was expected at the time of our visit to last for at least three years – at least 50 percent longer than expected. Gaps in the planning process, especially regarding the operational framework of the project along the Kinshasa-Bunia axis, help explain why the project has dragged on. Delays at the macro level of the project largely represent the accumulated effect of delays at the level of each micro project, and an important reason behind these delays has in turn been the slowness in signing contracts and disbursing funds.<sup>15</sup> The delays in the project as a whole can therefore also be ascribed to a planning process that only partly succeeded in taking into account the particular circumstances under which the Ituri project would be implemented.

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<sup>15</sup> We elaborate on the question of duration in section 4.1.3 below.

## 3.2 Planning of the micro projects

The micro projects have made up the backbone of the UNDP peacebuilding and development project in Ituri. In this section, we analyse how micro-project planning has evolved and take a closer look at the planning mechanism of the LCPA, the Local Committee for Project Approval. The organisation of each micro project will be discussed in the next chapter on project implementation.

### 3.2.1 Assessment of the micro-project planning process

By 31 March 2006, 85 micro projects had received UNDP support within the framework of the peacebuilding and development project in Ituri.<sup>16</sup> Of these, 48 – more than half of the portfolio – had been identified and/or approved by mid-2004, less than a year after the project office was set up.<sup>17</sup> By contrast, fewer than 40 projects were approved in the ensuing phase from mid-2004 through the first quarter of 2006, which covers almost two years. Over time, more and more time could thus be spent in preparing each micro project, and the quality of planning has improved accordingly.

The year 2003 was marked by continuing armed conflict in Ituri, combined with a growing sense of urgency within UNDP to get the project started. It was originally scheduled to start in January 2003, but the first project intervention was made only in April (namely, support to the Ituri Peace Commission's inaugural conference). By mid-2003, the sense of haste to get the project launched can be illustrated by a quote from a visiting mission from the CTA of the RESCO project, which was about to terminate at the time. He noted "an urgent need to accompany the peacebuilding initiatives in Bunia with concrete action. This will increase the confidence of the population and reinforce the peacebuilding mechanisms already underway", and further stated that: "given the presence in and the attention of the international community to Ituri, the visibility of UNDP is necessary and imperative" (Wirba 2003: 3).

Once in place from August 2003 onwards, the manager of the Ituri project set off at rather high speed searching for partners and projects that the UNDP could support. But at the time it was still almost impossible for him and his staff to move outside of Bunia town, due to security concerns that impeded their efforts to inform people about the new project and get in touch with potential partners. To circumvent this difficulty, the Okapi MONUC radio station as well as community radio channels were used to inform people about the project and the opportunities it entailed. Some meetings were also held with potential partners and target groups in the Bunia area, yet it is still clear that the difficult security situation in 2003 and 2004 complicated efforts to involve partners and target groups regularly throughout the process of planning for each micro project.

Even so, a total of 18 projects were selected already in 2003 (UNDP DRC 2004b), including eight projects transferred from the RESCO project. The CTA did this job almost single-handedly over a period of only three to four months, at the same time as he was recruiting staff for the team. The number of projects identified, planned, and approved under these circumstances can be regarded as impressive, but it also seems that the resources and conditions for planning each project were inadequate. The fact that several of the projects approved in this phase later underwent significant changes reinforces the impression of relatively poor planning of each project in this initial phase.

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<sup>16</sup> Appendix 5B explains how this number was arrived at.

<sup>17</sup> About eight of these 48 projects had first been identified for possible UNDP support within the RESCO project and had thus been transferred from that project to the new Ituri project (cf. section 2.2.3). Yet identification within RESCO was only a first step; most of the planning for each project had to be done by the new project team in Bunia.

Weak planning complicated later efforts to implement several of the early micro projects. Consequences included unrealistic budgets and unclear responsibilities and expectations within several projects, which in turn necessitated the strong involvement of UNDP staff during the implementation phase. In some cases, the partner organisation had to be changed; in others new contracts became necessary. These developments in turn delayed the process of implementation.

However, weak planning also had some positive corollaries. The fact that UNDP came to Ituri and, as one of the few donors – if not the only one – offered the opportunity for local groups to get funding for community development activities was a very concrete expression of confidence in the population and of a belief in the potential for peace and development in the district. This attitude, in turn, contributed towards boosting the collective self-confidence of Iturians, who witnessed the fact that projects based on needs and priorities that they had themselves identified were approved after a short period of time – even in the hour of crisis in 2003. While the planning of each micro project could have been better, the fact that local initiatives were supported contributed towards building trust amongst the local population in the UNDP.

From late 2004 onwards, the process of micro-project planning became tighter. Given the fact that some projects had been launched in a fairly ad hoc manner in the early phase, the project team saw it as pivotal to put in place firmer procedures to ensure that mistakes would not repeat themselves. Contextual factors also facilitated better planning, in particular the improving security situation, which enabled closer contact with partners and target groups. Accumulating experience within the team also enabled it to be more efficient in the process of selecting projects and preparing them in detail.

By early 2006, the process that each micro project underwent in the pre-implementation phase had become fairly standardised. It can be summed up in the following nine steps:

- (1) An organisation X presents a project idea to the UNDP.
- (2) UNDP and X discuss the project idea.
- (3) UNDP visits X's premises.
- (4) X elaborates on the idea and submits a project proposal to UNDP.
- (5) UNDP gives feedback to X on the proposal.
- (6) X presents the project for the Local Committee for Project Approval (the LCPA).
- (7) The LCPA approves, rejects, or suggests amendments to the project.
- (8) If the project is approved, UNDP prepares a contract for the project and sends it to Kinshasa.
- (9) The contract is signed by UNDP or UNOPS Kinshasa, and by organisation X.

### 3.2.2 The LCPA: A micro-project planning mechanism, and more

A noteworthy element in the planning process is the LCPA, the Local Committee for Project Approval. The LCPA is a brainchild of UNDP, first put in place as part of the RESCO project (see section 2.2.3). From the start of the Ituri project, UNDP gave high priority to establishing LCPAs for the project, and the first meeting of the first LCPA was held in Bunia in November 2003. An LCPA was also put in place within the COMREC project, but the committees for the two projects remained distinct throughout the period.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The two LCPAs had roughly the same members, but were distinct in the programmatic sense: the two projects consulted with the same group of people for different project purposes. The Ituri project convened a meeting when it had a batch of micro projects to present for approval; the COMREC project convened a meeting when it had activities within its project to present to the committee. The manager of the Ituri project, as well as UNDP partners met in the field, therefore perceived this as the two projects having one LCPA each.

Within the Ituri project, the LCPA has essentially functioned as a barrier that each project initiator has to surmount to get its project started. It has not only been up to UNDP, but also to the committee to decide whether a project would be supported or not. The LCPA phenomenon thus epitomises the decentralisation of decision-making power from UNDP to local actors.<sup>19</sup> Available evidence suggests that the LCPA has had the following six functions within the Ituri project:

- To provide local legitimacy to the process of selecting micro projects;
- To mitigate UNDP's power over the selection of projects and partners;
- To verify that the micro projects are consistent with local needs and priorities;
- To verify that the micro projects have a reconciliation effect;
- To promote synergies between the micro projects and other initiatives; and
- To allow for experts in the thematic field of the micro projects to give advice.

It seems that the LCPA has performed somewhat better in the first three functions identified here than in the latter two. Performance in relation to the fourth function is more uncertain.

The LCPA seemed to be well known and acknowledged in Ituri. Given Iturians' experience with international actors which had operated on the basis of less popular consultation, many clearly appreciated this effort to involve local actors in the decision-making process for the selection of projects to support. While UNDP may have lost some of its ability to influence the process of selection, it has thus stood to gain in terms of recognition, respect, and trust from the local population via the LCPA mechanism.

It also seems that LCPA members saw it as one of their main tasks to ensure that projects that came their way would respond to local needs and priorities. But we have less evidence to suggest that they consistently checked whether the micro projects would promote reconciliation. What was clear, however, was that thus far the LCPA had hardly promoted synergies between approved projects and other initiatives, or enabled thematic experts to provide inputs that had a consequence for the quality assurance of the project. While none of the micro projects we visited can be said not to respond to local needs, we found several projects where the reconciliation effect was unclear, where synergies with other initiatives were virtually absent, and where possible advice from experts did not seem to have made a difference for the better. While these inadequacies may not relate only to the LCPA, our impression is that the consciousness of LCPA members was oriented primarily towards ensuring a community development effect from each project; secondly, towards verifying – perhaps more superficially – that a reconciliation aspect was involved; while the orientation towards inter-project synergies, or experts' quality approval remained virtually non-existent.

Largely as a result of efforts by UNDP project staff in Bunia, the LCPA mechanism has gone through several stages of development during the project period. While at the start it included only male members, for instance, the current committee included women. And while first set up in Bunia, attempts have been made to establish LCPAs in other territories of Ituri as well, e.g. in Mahagi and Aru. However, in these two areas the LCPA had only met once by the time of our evaluation. The only LCPA that had become truly operational was the one in Bunia, which was also utilised to approve projects to be implemented in other territories in Ituri. This, however, contrasts with the intention expressed in the project document that LCPAs would be installed in every intervention zone, e.g. the five territories of Ituri (UNDP DRC 2002c).

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<sup>19</sup> The LCPA's composition has changed over time, but key participants have included representatives of local authorities, traditional and religious leaders, local NGOs, other UN agencies and international NGOs, beneficiaries of the micro projects, and the UNDP project team.

The Bunia LCPA has also met less frequently than envisaged: only twice in 2005 and once thus far in 2006 (in May), while the project document envisaged a meeting frequency of “at least 4 per year” (ibid.). At each meeting, moreover, a relatively high number of micro projects have been presented: around 20 on average. As a logical consequence, the committee has reportedly spent some 15 minutes only in processing each project. The evaluation team also found that before each meeting, most committee members are generally not informed about the content of the projects to be presented. The UNDP project officers prepared a summary of each project that LCPA members could come to the UNDP office to consult before the meeting, yet very few of them used this opportunity. This centralisation of the documentation at UNDP level represents another deviation from initial plans for the LCPA, according to which the committee would “centralise the files for assistance requests, analyse the requests, and appreciate them ...” (ibid.). Finally, the team received contradictory information regarding the essential dimensions of how the LCPA makes its decisions (whether through secret ballot, or hand-raising) and is led (whether the presidency is rotating or fixed).

The committee’s approval of a micro project does thus not constitute a guarantee of the quality of that project. The LCPA has augmented the legitimacy of the processes of planning and selecting projects, but it has not freed UNDP from the difficult task of ensuring that the partner in question is able to implement the micro project in a satisfactory way and according to plan. Furthermore, the geographical concentration of LCPA in Bunia and the low frequency of meetings suggest that apart from project approval, some of the anticipated effects of the LCPA – of technical advice and monitoring, for example – are yet to materialise.

And even though UNDP has made commendable efforts to improve the LCPA, we also find that its approach to the committee in Ituri has been more administrative than strategic. The LCPA is an achievement of the project and its potential is great, but to unleash this potential UNDP may be well advised to adopt a more holistic approach to it. The committee should be seen not only as a micro-project rubber-stamp mechanism, but also as an entity that may contribute even more than it does already to enhancing the sense of responsibility and interest among local actors for processes of community development in the district. The LCPA has started to fill the accountability vacuum in Ituri, yet to realise this democratisation potential more fully UNDP may need to work more on bridging its own gap between the more administrative approach in Bunia, and the more strategic approach prevalent at the Kinshasa level.

### 3.3 Quality of planning: preliminary conclusions

The quality of the planning of both the project as a whole and the micro projects was less than satisfactory. The most serious gaps existed at the level of the Ituri project as a whole.

As for the micro projects, the weak quality of planning in the early phase clearly improved over time. However, more work needs to be done on the Local Committee for Project Approval to enable it to fulfil its intended functions, and to realise more fully its potential for being an “accountability bridge” into a future situation in Ituri with a greater presence of state entities. There is also a need to shift the focus of micro-project planning from the administrative to the strategic level, enabling a view of how the micro projects contribute towards reaching the overall aims of the project.

Weak strategic management at Bunia level also relates to the deficiencies in the process of planning the project as a whole. The combination of a geographical, logistical, and mental distance from Kinshasa to Bunia and an organisational set-up that required close contact and smooth cooperation between the two levels was far from ideal. The scarce resources made available for the project at Kinshasa level, combined with the operational requirements, logistical bottlenecks and security



concerns that put Bunia staff in the position of requiring assistance from Kinshasa quite often, generated much frustration on both sides as well as serious delays within the project. The planners of the project did not take the steps required to set up an operational framework for the project that would be consistent with key challenges it would face. Such a framework would have to differ from standard UNDP procedures, yet in spite of the war-like situation in Ituri when the project was initiated the UNDP opted for roughly the same approach as it adopts in more conventional direct execution development projects. It was unrealistic to expect that this approach would work, and the main indicators that it did not include the conflict that developed with the first CTA of the project, as well as the fact that the project has taken more than 50 percent longer than was planned for. The security situation in the district complicated efforts to implement the project according to plan, but the main problem was that the plans were not well enough adapted to the security challenges that it was very likely that the project would face.

This brings us back to the administrative versus strategic, “tree versus forest” management approach to the project. Strategies were made in Kinshasa in 2002 with little or no involvement of actors in Ituri or the staff that would be recruited to carry them out. With a lack of attention towards bridging this gap in the implementation phase – combined with the inadequate attention paid to the project in Kinshasa – the strategic vision got blurred at Kinshasa level, while little of it trickled down to the Bunia level. Nevertheless, as we will see in the next chapter, the vision was in fact well understood by the local actors in Ituri – not primarily due to consistent efforts towards this end by UNDP, but rather because the initial idea of the project, that of peacebuilding through community development, so well responded to the needs of the local communities.

## 4. Implementation

In this chapter we look at how the Ituri project has been implemented. Firstly, we analyse the implementation of the micro projects. Secondly, we assess the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms at both micro-project and project level. Finally, we discuss the implementation of the project as a whole.

As a source of reference for the chapter, the table below identifies the five types of agency that played key roles in implementing the project as well as the principal tasks that were assigned to each.

**Table 1. Roles and responsibilities of actors involved in implementing the Ituri project**

<i>Actor</i>	<i>Assigned tasks in the implementation phase of the project</i>
UNDP Bunia (project office)	Monitoring and evaluation of the micro projects Verification of the activity reports from partners, transfer of these reports to Kinshasa
Partner organisation	Implementation of planned activities within the micro project Management of funding received for the purposes of the micro project Submission of reports at the end of each phase, and a final one at the end of the micro project Monitoring of the micro project
Target group	Participation in activities of the micro project, i.e. in management committees and/or by providing labour or materials
The LCPA	Monitoring of micro projects
UNDP/UNOPS Kinshasa	Verification of interim and final reports from implementing partners of micro projects Disbursement of funds, instalment by instalment, in each micro project Monitoring and evaluation of the project as a whole

### 4.1 Implementation of the micro projects

Supporting the implementation of local and relatively small development and peacebuilding projects has been the main approach of the Ituri project. In order to understand how the project as a whole has been implemented we will therefore begin by looking at how the micro projects have been carried out.

In the following, we first identify the standard procedure for implementing each micro project as of 2006. Secondly, we assess the extent to which the portfolio of supported projects is consistent with initial plans. Finally, we analyse in more depth the main strengths and weaknesses of the implementation process.

As noted in Chapter 1 and elaborated on in Appendices 5A and 5B, to assess the implementation of the micro projects the evaluation team selected 24 micro projects for closer scrutiny. Our observations on the implementation of micro projects hence largely draw on our study of these particular projects.

#### 4.1.1 Implementation procedure

Disbursement of funds for each project has been made in instalments, normally two, three, or four instalments per project. The implementation of a project starts with the receipt of the first instalment

by the partner from UNDP Bunia, which in turn has received it from UNDP or UNOPS Kinshasa. Following each disbursement, the procedure is the same. The cycle for one instalment runs as follows:

- (a) UNDP/UNOPS Kinshasa disburses an instalment, intended for one particular phase of a micro project implemented by a partner Y, to UNDP Bunia.
- (b) UNDP Bunia transfers the received instalment to Y.
- (c) Y spends the received funds to carry out the activities scheduled for a phase of the micro project.
- (d) Y submits a report to UNDP Bunia on the activities it has carried out on the basis of the instalment.
- (e) UNDP Bunia verifies the report.
- (f) UNDP Bunia sends the report to UNDP/UNOPS Kinshasa.
- (g) UNDP/UNOPS Kinshasa verifies the report.

Stage g thus closes the circle and the process is brought back to stage a.

#### 4.1.2 Plans versus realities

To what extent is the profile of the portfolio of micro projects as of 31.03.2006 consistent with plans made at the outset? In this section we compare plans and realities with regard to the number of projects, their budgets, geographical and thematic spread, types of partner organisation, and target groups.<sup>20</sup>

##### 1: Number of micro projects

By the end of the first quarter of 2006, 85 micro projects had received support within the Ituri project.<sup>21</sup> Of these projects, 49 were finished and 34 were still ongoing, while one had been stopped and another was yet to start. Furthermore, the project staff were about to prepare 17 new projects for presentation to the LCPA. Given that the Ituri project as a whole was expected to end in the third quarter of 2006, this batch of projects was to be the last to pass via the LCPA, and hence to bring the total number of micro projects up to roughly one hundred.

Does this relatively high number of micro projects correspond to the plan made at the outset? The project document does not include a quantitative minimum or maximum limit as to the number of projects. However, we get an idea of how many projects were envisaged by combining the total budget for the micro projects – USD 2.06 million<sup>22</sup> – with the financial ceiling suggested for each micro project, namely USD 20,000. Assuming that each project would have a budget of USD 20,000, the total budget would allow for 103 micro projects to be supported. The total number of projects that will be supported within the Ituri project therefore seems to be in line with initial plans.

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<sup>20</sup> Some of the information provided in this section builds on that already given in Appendix 5B.

<sup>21</sup> This count collapses into one project the three contracts signed with the partner organisation entitled APLCS on activities to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS.

<sup>22</sup> This amount is calculated on the basis of the budget provided in the project document (p. 14). It is the sum of the following budget lines: 21.01 (reconciliation/peace building), 21.02 (rehabilitation of health and maternity centres), 21.03 (construction of drinking water sources), 21.04 (rehabilitation of primary schools), 21.05 (rehabilitation of bridges, roads, and other basic social infrastructures), 21.06 (income-generating activities), 21.07 (awareness raising on HIV/AIDS and assistance to affected persons), as well as a certain proportion – set at one third – of budget line 32.01 (training). The latter budget line is included since one micro project involving training of partners has been supported within the project, which assumedly will have been covered from this budget line; however, we have reason to believe that the budget line is supposed to cover training not only of partners but also of UNDP staff in Bunia themselves. The budget set aside for training in total is USD 85,000, while the training micro project cost only some USD 12,000. The assumed one third of the total training budget that would have gone into the micro project budget hence makes up USD 28,333.

## 2: Budget size

The aggregate budget for the 85 projects that had been supported was USD 1.64 million, which gives an average micro-project budget size of USD 19,270. The budgets of the micro projects are spread across a relatively wide range from less than USD 5,000 up to more than USD 50,000, yet most projects are of the size of USD 10,000-30,000.

The average budget size is very close to the financial ceiling for each project that was set at USD 20,000 at the outset. In fact, 43 of the micro projects – roughly half the portfolio – have a budget that surpasses this maximum budget limit. The project document does allow for micro project budgets up to USD 28,000, but only “exceptionally” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 16). In the implementation of the project, this “exception” of having projects with budgets exceeding USD 20,000 has thus been as common as the intended rule of micro project budgets below this amount. Moreover, 18 projects, 21 percent of the portfolio, exceeded the absolute upper budget limit of USD 28,000. The micro projects supported have therefore clearly been bigger in budgetary terms than was planned for at the start.

## 3: Geographical spread

More than half of the 85 micro projects (46) have been implemented in Bunia and its surrounding areas; roughly one third of the projects (28) in the territories of Mahagi and Aru; while the remaining 11 projects have taken place in the territories of Djugu (including Kasenyi, 7 projects in total) and Mambasa (4 projects).

The project document (UNDP DRC 2002c: 4) says that the project should cover the five territories of Ituri (Aru, Mahagi, Djugu, Irumu, and Mambasa), but it does not specify how evenly projects should be spread across these territories. The concentration of activities around the main town of Bunia is surely not ideal; nevertheless it is understandable given the constraints posed by the security and logistical barriers, both of which have militated against the project team’s easy access to more remote areas of the district. The Djugu and Irumu territory in particular have been marked by violent incidents, while the big Mambasa territory, for its part, is a case of difficult access due to the poor state of roads and transport facilities.

We conclude that under the circumstances that have complicated access to the various corners of a quite extensive district, the project team in Bunia has come quite far towards the aim of spreading the projects across the various territories in Ituri.

## 4: Thematic orientation

According to the project team’s own system for categorisation, the micro projects are spread across the categories of peacebuilding and reconciliation, income-generating activities, rehabilitation, HIV/AIDS, and training of partner organisations. The “rehabilitation” category is in turn subdivided into four budget lines: roads and bridges, water sources, health and maternity centres, and primary schools.

The table below outlines how much of the total each of the five main types of project has made up, in both numerical and financial terms. It also identifies the average budget size of projects within each thematic area. Finally, it includes a comparison with the initial budget, both in numerical and proportional terms.

**Table 2. Distribution of micro projects across thematic areas**

<i>Thematic area/type of project</i>	<i>No. of projects in this thematic area per 31.03.06</i>	<i>Proportion of projects in each area, in percent, per 31.03.06</i>	<i>Aggregate budget of supported projects in each area, in USD; per 31.03.06</i>	<i>Proportion that each area's budget makes up of the total, in percent; per 31.03.06</i>	<i>Average budget size of projects per area, in USD; per 31.03.06</i>	<i>Total initial budget for each area, in USD*</i>	<i>Proportion of each area of initial budget, in percent</i>
Peacebuilding/reconciliation	27	31.8	590.932	36.1	21.886	289.600	14.1
Income-generating activities	30	35.3	396.407	24.2	13.214	504.000	24.4
Rehabilitation	23	27.1	561.609	34.3	24.418	1.055.000	51.2
HIV/AIDS	4	4.7	76.208	4.7	19.052	185.000	9.0
Training	1	1.2	12.808	0.8	12.808	28.333	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>1.637.964</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>19.270</b>	<b>2.061.933</b>	<b>100.1</b>

\*Source: UNDP DRC (2002c: 14). See footnote 22 for details.

If we first take a look at the micro projects that had been supported by the time of our evaluation, the table shows us that approximately 95 percent of both the number of projects and their budgets were made up by projects within the peacebuilding/reconciliation, income-generating activity, and rehabilitation categories. HIV/AIDS projects have received less than 5 percent of the funding and training less than one percent. The main deviation of this overall picture from the initial plans concerns the HIV/AIDS projects, which were supposed to absorb a larger share of the budget than they have done so far.

Looking more closely at the three most important categories of the project, we find that income-generating activity projects are the most common but also among the least costly projects. Rehabilitation initiatives, by contrast, are less frequent but have the highest average budget size. Overall, the biggest share of funding – more than 36 percent – has been given to initiatives classified as peacebuilding/reconciliation.

This reality represents a clear divergence from the budget made at the outset, according to which rehabilitation projects were to receive roughly half of all the resources for the micro projects – but have so far received only roughly one third. By contrast, peacebuilding and reconciliation projects were to receive far less than they had by the end of the first quarter of 2006 (14 vs. 36 percent). With regard to income-generating activities, the current proportion is almost exactly the same as was intended in the budget. However, in the text of the project document it is said that “priority should be given first and foremost to income-generating projects that will benefit from 20% of the available funds” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 16). In practice, however, it seems that such projects have benefited even more than that, i.e. from around 24 percent of the available finance.

Yet to assess meaningfully the extent to which the thematic spread of projects is consistent with initial plans, we also need to scrutinise the way in which the projects are classified in line with different “themes”. The project team in Bunia has of course had to find a workable system for categorising the large number of projects. Yet three problems can be identified in relation to this categorisation. Firstly, several projects are difficult to classify. Is, for instance, the building of the court in Bunia a rehabilitation project, or a peacebuilding project? Is a project that enables the young unemployed to get professional training and jobs of the income-generating or peacebuilding type? Answers will depend on how important various kinds of activities are regarded in the work to restore peace in a district like Ituri. Moreover, it does not seem that the categorisation of cases at the

Bunia office level happened on the basis of an agreed set of criteria, which could have helped in cases of doubt.

A second problem is that the categorisation may help to “hide” or render less clear the nature of the project itself. As noted in Chapter 2, all micro projects were to have a reconciliation aspect inasmuch as they were to involve the bringing together of people previously in conflict into activities of common interest. If a maternity centre or a bridge were built, for instance, the involvement of people from the different “tendencies” was seen as crucial. The fact that only one category of projects is identified as “reconciliation” may weaken the consciousness that all projects were to have such an aspect integrated in them. A third and related difficulty is that the category of “peacebuilding and reconciliation” gets very broad – almost as a residual category for projects that cannot be classified as job-oriented, construction, HIV/AIDS-related or training. Hence on the one hand, more projects than only those that are classified as “peacebuilding and reconciliation” have an aspect of that in them; while on the other projects that are classified as such may not necessarily contribute more to peacebuilding and reconciliation than other projects.<sup>23</sup>

To sum up, some fallacies are involved in the exercise of compartmentalising the micro projects into single categories. Yet if we take the categories at face value and revisit the question of how the thematic distribution of projects has fitted with initial plans, the portfolio of projects supported suggests that fewer HIV/AIDS projects and rehabilitation projects, and more projects classified as peacebuilding and reconciliation had received funding than initially planned.

#### 5: Type of partner organisations

According to the project document, “the implementation of the activities of the project is confined predominantly to local communities and NGOs”. If in certain parts of the Ituri district only international NGOs would be operational, the project would “use their services as executive agency while emphasising the participation of the community” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 8).

The project does seem to have achieved its intention of having the majority of projects implemented by community-based associations or local NGOs: more than 90 percent of the projects (79 of 85) were managed by such groups. The remaining partners include local administration bodies (1 project), international NGOs (3), bilateral development cooperation agencies (1) and other UN agencies (1).<sup>24</sup>

Another striking aspect with regard to the partner organisations is that there are almost as many partners as there are projects. Only one international and three local NGOs partnered UNDP in more than one project (i.e. in two projects each). More than 75 different groups have thus received support within the Ituri project.

The project document stipulates as one of the selection criteria for micro projects that the projects should not receive funding from other sources (UNDP DRC 2002c: 16). We did not find any

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<sup>23</sup> Two examples may illustrate the dilemmas involved in classifying the micro projects, and the possibly somewhat distorted picture one gets of the project when looking at it only category by category. The stadium and the blood bank in Bunia were classified as “peacebuilding and reconciliation” projects. However, the stadium might well have been seen as a rehabilitation/construction project, while the blood bank had links to the health centre category (a rehabilitation budget line) as well as the HIV/AIDS category. It may also be asked in what sense the stadium and the blood bank are more likely to “build peace” than, for instance, the rehabilitation of a health centre in a war-torn village such as Mandro (classified as rehabilitation), or the reinvigoration of manioc cultivation for Ituri’s majority of peasants (classified as income-generating activity). The fact that a “peacebuilding and reconciliation” category exists may blur awareness of the fact that all the micro projects were aimed at bringing peace and reconciliation.

<sup>24</sup> A tabular overview of this distribution is given in Appendix 5B.

evidence that such co-financing of micro projects had occurred, but some of the local NGOs had received funding from other international agencies to implement other projects.<sup>25</sup> Yet this applied only to a small minority.

It is still worth questioning what hides behind the term “local NGO” or “community”. Suffice to note here that several of the NGOs supported in this project were indeed non-governmental in the sense of not representing, or receiving funding from, the DRC government, but they were not necessarily composed of volunteers or had a non-profit or idealistic purpose. Several of the NGOs were in fact private companies, or would outsource the work to be done to private companies. Partners within many of the rehabilitation projects, for instance, were construction firms.<sup>26</sup> We will get back to the quality of the work done by the partner organisations in Chapter 6.

## 6: Target groups

The project document identifies the following target groups for the project: “people affected by the conflict and by the humanitarian crisis in Ituri, and in particular vulnerable persons including those who have been displaced due to the war, women and girls, and children” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 4). However, in the first annual report of the project the group of intended beneficiaries is broadened and classified as follows:

- (1) War-affected victims: internally displaced people, returnees, and refugees;
- (2) Vulnerable groups: women, children, handicapped, and AIDS patients; and
- (3) Local peace and reconciliation structures: the Ituri Peace Commission and Interim Administration (UNDP DRC 2004b: 7).

Compared to the project document, this source specifies three new target groups: the handicapped, people living with HIV/AIDS, and embryonic local government agencies. It also specifies that the “displaced” were to include both internally and externally displaced persons.

The main deviation from these initial plans as to whom the project would target has been the inclusion of ex-combatants as an additional target group. From 2005 onwards several micro projects have been supported within the Ituri project with the aim of reintegrating former fighters into their communities, by assisting both the ex-combatants and the communities in this endeavour. These projects have been run independently of COMREC, UNDP’s main reintegration project. A likely reason why the ex-combatants were not included as a target group at the outset is that DDR prospects for Ituri at the time were still uncertain.

Among the target groups listed initially, women’s associations, in particular, have benefited quite substantially via several micro projects. One project has been devoted to assisting the handicapped, while children have been assisted mainly via the projects of primary school and health centre rehabilitation.

As mentioned earlier, only a small number of projects included an element of assistance to HIV/AIDS patients. Because anti-retroviral drugs had not yet become available in Ituri, local organisations faced difficulties offering effective assistance to HIV-positive persons. As a result,

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<sup>25</sup> For instance, CIDRI had cooperated with Oxfam Québec and the UNHCR, AGEP-AER had run a project with funding from Oxfam Québec, and ADVSE had been supported by WHO.

<sup>26</sup> One example is the Mandro maternity centre, where two partners existed: COSAMA, the “Mandro health committee”, and ADSSE, a construction firm. UNDP signed the contract with COSAMA, which in turn transferred the money to ADSSE. A similar arrangement was made for two of the other maternity centres, while for the fourth, ADSSE, was the only partner. Similarly, in the water pumps and borehole project in Ariwara the partner, AGEP-AER, received the funds but outsourced the construction of the pumps to a Ugandan company.

most of the HIV/AIDS projects focused on prevention and awareness-raising to reduce the scope of the disease, while less could be done for those who had already been infected with the virus.

The extent to which the project has benefited the “displaced” – IDPs, returnees, and refugees – is uncertain. It may be that participants in various micro projects have included displaced persons; this dimension was rarely mentioned by project staff or partners, however. No micro projects that we are aware of have included the displaced as an explicitly mentioned target group. It seems, therefore, that this group may have benefited less from the project than was initially planned for.

Local administration structures, finally, benefited in various ways from the project: as partner (e.g. in the Bunia stadium project), as beneficiary (e.g. of the rehabilitation of the mayor’s office), and as participant in the LCPA. In light of the fact that local administration bodies were not explicitly mentioned in the project document as a target group, it seems that they have played a greater role in the project than first anticipated.

#### 4.1.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the micro-project implementation process

In general, the micro projects went well. Very few projects failed to produce expected results, and in the large majority of cases the activities identified at the outset were realised. At the level of the implementation of activities and achievement of results, our general assessment is overwhelmingly positive.<sup>27</sup>

There is one main deviation from the plans of each micro project, however, that we did not include in the above plan-versus-reality assessment since it requires more in-depth treatment. This is the dimension of time. Most of the micro projects in our sample, and we have reason to believe that this is also a general pattern, lasted for substantially longer than was planned for in each project.

How long does a micro project last – how is duration defined? Within the Ituri project a micro project has in fact had two starting points and two end points, which has led to a narrow and a broad conception of duration. Narrowly understood, a micro project’s duration is the time that passes between the disbursement of the first and the last instalment of finance by UNDP/UNOPS to the partner organisation in question. More broadly understood, the duration is the time that passes between the signing of the contract for the project by the two sides, and the acceptance by UNDP/UNOPS of the final report on the project submitted by the partner. In the contracts between partners and UNDP/UNOPS the project’s duration is stipulated (hence in the broader sense of the term), as follows: “this contract enters into force at the date of signing and expires after X months (of execution)”, X being variable.

To get an idea of the magnitude of the delays we turn to our sample of micro projects, more specifically the ten projects that had been completed by the time of this evaluation.<sup>28</sup> Of these projects, one was a one-off event, namely the training of partner organisations, which involved only one instalment. We therefore exclude this project from our analysis. Appendix 11 gives an overview of the duration of the remaining six micro projects for which sufficient duration data was available.

As the appendix shows, almost all the projects had serious delays. The estimated duration of each project – i.e. the one specified in the contract – was a little less than three months on average.<sup>29</sup> Still,

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<sup>27</sup> We will discuss results of the projects in detail in Chapter 6, while focusing here on implementation modalities.

<sup>28</sup> Several of the micro projects that were still ongoing were also seriously delayed, yet since we are not in a position to know the end date of these projects we focus on those that were already terminated.

<sup>29</sup> This may be seen as surprising, in light of the fact that the project document allowed for far longer durations, stating that “the implementation of the entire [micro] project [should take place] within 12 months, and exceptionally within 15 months, counting from the time when the first instalment of funding is disbursed” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 16).



nearly 11 months passed, on average, from the time the first instalment was disbursed to the last disbursement in each project. The period between the signing of the contract and the submission by the partner organisation of the final report was even longer: on average 13.5 months. Hence, even though duration can be calculated in two ways, both indicators point in the same direction. If we combine the averages of 10.8 and 13.5 months we find that each project took, on average, about four times longer to implement than was expected at the outset.

The main reason for the delays was the administrative set-up of the project, under which it was the responsibility of UNDP/UNOPS Kinshasa to disburse each instalment to each of the micro projects in Ituri. Both partners and project staff in Bunia said they would normally spend weeks, if not months awaiting an instalment – after having submitted the required reports and requests to Kinshasa. The speed of disbursement seems to have improved somewhat over time. Nevertheless, by the end of 2004 – 17 months after the start of the project, which was designed to last for only 24 months – the first instalment had been disbursed to only 29 micro projects. In other words, with more than three quarters of the total time of the project having passed, less than one third of the planned number of micro projects had been enabled to start. It is equally indicative that by the end of March 2006, when the project was already running 9 months over schedule, 34 projects were still ongoing – and another 17 were yet to start. Differently put, only about one half of all the micro projects had been completed by the time of this evaluation, which took place as the project was supposed to have been finished. There are therefore strong reasons to doubt whether the schedule of having the remaining almost 50 micro projects completed by September 2006 is realistic.

In our analysis, however, the problem of delays in the Ituri project is first and foremost due to the structural set-up of the project. No matter how strong a willingness individuals within this system may have had to speed up the proceedings, the fact that the sending of documents takes time and involves logistical challenges, that each disbursement decision has to pass via several persons in Kinshasa, and that Kinshasa staff tend to be busy and/or are often travelling (while not always delegating their tasks to others in their absence) are indicators that it is the system as such that has not been well suited to the project in question. As noted in Chapter 4, the UNDP and UNOPS senior personnel in Kinshasa would deal with micro projects within the Ituri project in the same way as they would with projects with a multi-million dollar budget implemented in partnership with the DRC government. This also helps explain why some of the micro projects coming from far away in Ituri, where the staff had few means to apply pressure to speed up processing in Kinshasa, suffered from not being given high priority.

To a lesser extent, delays have also been caused by other factors, including local level factors in Ituri. They have included problems involved in bank transfers in the DRC, the unavailability of some inputs required (for example in the project to construct a judicial inspection building in Bunia), poor planning (e.g. the Bunia stadium and the Matete bridge), poor performance by some of the partners (e.g. the Ariwara water project and the stadium), and a weak point of departure for several partners, which probably required more follow-up and better communication from UNDP's side than has been provided (for instance, the projects on micro-credit for women and the community radio station in Aru).

The delays may, however, have had a positive side to them as well. While regrettable from an administrative point of view, from a strategic point of view they may be regarded as an opportunity, inasmuch as they enabled persons involved in each project to spend more time together. Given the fact that processes of community development and reconciliation take time, far longer than the few months stipulated for each of the micro projects, the fact that the participants were allowed more time – by default, so to speak – may have enabled them to engage more strongly in the learning process of realising the project with persons from “the other side” of the conflict. However, there is also evidence to suggest that the delays had an opposite effect: that they caused impatience,

discouragement, and a reduction of interest by participants in the projects, since at several points they were rendered passive as they waited for new funding instalments, while not always understanding the reasons why they had to wait so long.

A second weakness in the implementation phase relates to efforts to involve target groups in each micro project. As shown in Table 2 above, the target groups were expected to contribute directly to the implementation of the project – by providing labour, contributions in kind, and/or by participating in the management of the project, together with the partner organisation. According to the project document, the contributions should ideally constitute around 15 percent of the total budget of each project (UNDP DRC 2002c: 16).

In a number of projects “management committees” involving the target groups have therefore been planned, and partners have pledged that they will actively seek to involve representatives of the target groups in such mechanisms. However, in some of the micro projects we visited it was clear that the involvement of the target group was weak, and that the intended management committees barely functioned.

One example is the project involving the construction of a primary school in Katanga, Aru territory. In this case those who had initiated the project had had to leave the project at an early stage, and the person who took charge of following it up saw it as most efficient to relate to only two persons in the community rather than an entire management committee. Moreover, he had chosen, in spite of intentions to the contrary in the plan for the project, to recruit construction workers outside the community in question, since there was no local competence, in his view. Representatives of the intended beneficiaries of the project, on the other hand, complained of a lack of information and felt that their requests related to the project had not been sufficiently taken into account.

In another project, the construction of boreholes and water pumps in Ariwara, Aru territory, the partner organisation had also done less than was planned to involve the local population. The organisation was to provide training on how to use and maintain the pumps and who to contact if repair were needed. Yet at the time of our visit one year after the system was built, two of the three pumps were virtually out of order, none were of use during the dry season, and the representative of the management committee did not know what to do about it or who to contact to find out. The representative of the partner organisation also gave contradictory information on who was responsible for what.

In other cases, however, the involvement of target groups and/or the local population in the projects seemed more satisfactory. This is the case with, for example, the projects in Mandro to build a maternity centre and reintegrate former combatants, the primary school in Poni, the project to reintegrate demobilised fighters in Mudzipela, FOSI's HIV/AIDS project, and the rehabilitation of a drinkable water network in Logo, Mahagi territory.

This brings us back to our general conclusion: that except for the deviations regarding duration and in some cases the participation of target groups, the micro projects were implemented more or less according to plan and, as we will return to in Chapter 6, show significant results. The partners have in general performed well in their implementation of the projects – incredibly well, one might even say, taking into account the circumstances under which the project started. Ituri was in reality a war zone in 2003, with tens of thousands of people having been killed, hundreds of thousands displaced and the infrastructure severely damaged. The fact that more than 70 different partner organisations since then have proven able to implement peacebuilding and development projects in accordance with the aims, activities and budget specified in a contract, and with the submission of interim and final reports underway, is little short of astounding. In only two of the 85 projects has financial

mismanagement been reported, and in both cases it is likely that the money will be returned.<sup>30</sup> In light of the fact that the bulk of the partner organisations had never before received either external funding to implement similar projects, or any training to manage such projects (before the training seminars in late 2005), this is quite an impressive overall result. Considering also the context of continued violent conflict in Ituri, in which there has been a clear risk that military actors could take advantage of the opportunity for finance that the project offered, the fact that partners have performed so well bears witness to strong capacities within Congolese civil society – capacities that were not destroyed during the war. Indeed, we even see the legacy of 32 years of Mobutuism in the Iturians' ability to “fend for themselves” and to realise successful development projects in the midst of crisis, with just a little help from outside. The success of the micro projects should first and foremost be ascribed to the Congolese themselves.

## 4.2 Monitoring and evaluation

If micro project implementation was generally satisfactory this is also due, however, to the monitoring activities undertaken by UNDP project staff in Bunia. In this section we assess monitoring and evaluation, firstly of the micro projects, secondly of the project as a whole.

### 4.2.1 Monitoring and evaluation of the micro projects

As shown in Table 1, three different actors were tasked with monitoring each micro project: the UNDP project team, the partner organisation itself, and the LCPA (the Local Committee for Project Approval). Of these, the LCPA had not yet engaged in any monitoring activity.<sup>31</sup>

The partners' own monitoring is detailed in the reports submitted to UNDP at the end of each micro-project phase. The reports are in general well written. They normally provide an overview of the project, an account of the activities realised during the period in question, an estimation of the number and type of beneficiaries, and a discussion of results thus far and of achievements and difficulties within the project. If there is a problem with these reports it might be that they are too well written – in the sense that they may leave the reader, including UNDP, with the impression that things are proceeding better than they actually are on the ground. The evaluation team did read reports that left a good impression, but when visiting the project finding that the reports were entirely misleading. So while in some cases the reports may function as an awareness-raising tool for the partner on how performance can be improved, in others they are probably used by partners to gloss over shortcomings. Since the value of partners' monitoring of their own projects thus will be limited by their possible bias in favour of their own project, and given the lack of LCPA monitoring, the monitoring done by UNDP in the project has been essential.

The UNDP project team in Bunia has spent a lot of its time and resources on monitoring the micro projects. In practical terms, the idea is that the expert in charge of the particular project should monitor each phase of it. The main tool for this is a monitoring sheet that the expert fills in upon each visit to the project site. The sheet first restates the objectives, intended beneficiaries, planned activities and expected results of the project, and secondly provides a “field report” which identifies the start date of the project and the amount of money received thus far, and then outlines realised

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<sup>30</sup> The cases in question were a pigsty project, and a project in support of painters in Bunia. In both cases representatives of the partner organisation had tried to embezzle parts of the funds provided. At the time of our fieldwork both cases were being pursued by UNDP and relevant state authorities had been engaged to resolve the matter.

<sup>31</sup> Reasons provided for this by LCPA members included lack of transport facilities and allowances for this purpose. UNDP project staff, on the other hand, argued that LCPA members should regard the monitoring of micro projects as their personal responsibility. Since most LCPA members worked in either local government or NGOs, they could use their position, UNDP argued, for the purposes of monitoring by combining other professional trips with a visit to a given micro project in the area, for example.

activities, achieved results, and difficulties met within the project. The sheet is signed by the expert, the CTA and a representative of the partner organisation.

In addition to this kind of regular monitoring, UNDP staff members have also visited projects upon request from partners or in cases when indications were received of serious or unintended problems within a project.

UNDP's own monitoring largely seems to have compensated for the lack of monitoring by the LCPA and the limited monitoring by the partner organisations. While security conditions have rendered the monitoring exercise difficult at times, improvements in the conflict situation have also enabled the monitoring efforts to intensify over time. Partners were generally satisfied with the availability of UNDP staff in cases when they had any problems or questions. Only in a few instances did we encounter partners who were frustrated with what they felt was insufficient follow-up or unclear communication from UNDP (e.g. the community radio station and the honey production project, both in Aru). Many partners complained about the slowness of funding disbursements, but many also realised that this was a problem that UNDP in Bunia could not solve alone. In a few cases partners said that the UNDP expert who had visited them had not behaved well (e.g. the HIV/AIDS project, the radio station in Aru) but these seemed to remain exceptions.<sup>32</sup>

A problem of UNDP Bunia's monitoring work was, however, that the lines between the areas of responsibility of each expert are blurred. Even though the three experts have their respective fields of expertise and hence are responsible for a certain section of the micro projects defined as belonging to their area, it was also an expressed aim that all experts should be able, in principle, to monitor all projects. The reasons given for this were largely practical, as it would enable an expert visiting one part of Ituri to monitor not only "her" or "his" projects but also those falling under the realm of the other experts. Yet such an unclear division of labour risks creating confusion among the staff and not least among partners. It also risks duplicating efforts and creating more work than necessary if each expert is supposed to have the overview of, in effect, all the projects. Another and probably more grave problem is that monitoring will lose some of its potency if an expert who in reality is not an expert on the thematic area in question is given the task of monitoring a project within this area.

The risks of confusion, duplication of efforts, and reduction of quality of the monitoring that the "common approach" to monitoring entails is compounded by the active engagement by the CTA as well in the monitoring exercise. Even though the manager's interest in how the micro projects are progressing on the ground is commendable, this interest also reduces the difference between the role of the manager and that of the experts. One effect of the manager's engagement in on-the-ground monitoring is that he or she risks becoming more focused on the micro level of the micro projects than on the macro level of the Ituri project as a whole. Another effect of the CTA's monitoring engagement – combined with the rule that all experts should be prepared to monitor any project – is that any person within the four-member team can monitor every micro project of the project. This may lead to superficial monitoring by many people, instead of in-depth monitoring by one expert, which seems to be the method with the greatest potential to uncover mistakes and problems and hence to increase the chances that each micro project will succeed.

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<sup>32</sup> It is also worth noting that at one stage, some partners had complained to the project management in Bunia about the behaviour of one expert, alleging that he had put pressure on them to give him money. Given the serious nature of the allegation it sparked a mission of investigation from the UNDP head office in New York. The investigation team visited Kinshasa and Ituri and conducted a range of interviews. By the time of the fieldwork of the evaluation team in April-May 2006, UNDP in DRC had not yet received the investigation team's report, but their impression was that nothing suspect had been found. The evaluation team has not seen the report either, and by the time of our visit to Ituri the expert in question had been replaced as his two-year contract had expired.

We still conclude that UNDP has been strong on the monitoring of the micro projects. By contrast, it has been weak on the evaluation side. UNDP Bunia staff members have written field reports and final reports on each micro project, but the reports include little analysis. Activities realised, results achieved and difficulties met are identified, but little is provided to explain and assess why the project went as it did, how the conflict situation in Ituri impacted on the project, what the beneficiaries felt about the project and why, and so on.

Weak analysis is also a more general trait of project management at the Bunia level, which helps explain a somewhat peculiar mismatch between systematic monitoring and, in several cases, failure to detect problems and/or resolve them efficiently. Two examples may serve to illustrate this mismatch. The community radio station project in Aru had been monitored according to the standard procedures, yet at the time of our visit long after the project was completed radio staff were still waiting for some solar panels that were to be part of the project. The UNDP, on the other hand, said it had opted not to provide these panels but to give the station a fuel-run generator that would provide the station's electricity supply instead. Yet this message had clearly not been perceived at the partner level, where frustration because of the waiting for the solar panels still prevailed, frustration that the monitoring by UNDP had failed to discover. The other example is the micro-credit project for women, also in Aru and also a project that was said to have been completed by the time of our fieldwork. However, the part of the contribution from UNDP to the partner organisation that had been given as a loan was still to be paid back – and perceptions clearly differed on when that should happen. The partner organisation said that it would be some time before it could pay back the loan and that UNDP had to be patient, while UNDP said it had given the partner a deadline that it would have to respect, a deadline that the partner organisation did not mention to the evaluation team.

In both cases it seems that a closer analysis by UNDP of how its messages have been understood at the local level would have prevented the disjuncture in understanding. Perhaps UNDP would be well advised to put itself even more into listening mode? The examples also illustrate that within the project some problems have been allowed to prevail since they have been inadequately analysed. If the follow-up of the micro projects had included not only monitoring but also evaluation efforts, it is likely that such analysis would have been forthcoming and problems would have been identified, resolution alternatives considered and solutions found. Finally, the cases suggest that although monitoring has been systematic, communication between UNDP and partners has not always been as smooth as would have been desired.

#### 4.2.2 Monitoring and evaluation of the project as a whole

As indicated in Table 1, responsibility for the follow-up and supervision of the Ituri project in its entirety resided first and foremost at the level of UNDP and UNOPS in Kinshasa. The Bunia office has also reported on the progress of the project, through annual (Togola 2006b; UNDP DRC 2004b; 2005a; 2006) and, less regular, semi-annual and quarterly reports.<sup>33</sup>

As for efforts by UNDP and UNOPS in Kinshasa to monitor and evaluate the Ituri project, three mechanisms have been used: day-to-day monitoring on the basis of reports and requests received from Bunia; monitoring missions to Ituri; and meetings in Kinshasa with the project's CTA. How much, and how, UN entities in Kinshasa used the three mechanisms is poorly documented. The evaluation team has not been able to get an idea of, for example, how many meetings the CTA has

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<sup>33</sup> The team is in possession of three such reports: a semi-annual report for late 2003, another for the first half of 2004, and a report for the last three months of 2005 (UNDP DRC 2003d; 2004a; 2005c). In addition, the current CTA has produced two status reports: one upon his taking the position in October 2004 (Togola 2004) and another at the end of March 2006, just prior to the evaluation team's visit (Togola 2006a).

had with the Post-conflict Unit and/or UNOPS during the various phases of the project, and what the results of these meetings have been. As for the monitoring missions, the team was informed during our fieldwork that more visits were paid to Ituri than those for which we had at the time received reports. We have at the time of writing (July 2006) received reports from four missions made by Kinshasa-based staff to monitor the Ituri project after August 2003: missions conducted by UNDP in April 2004 (Kiusi-Ngoma 2004), by UNOPS in August 2004 (Kiala Ki-n'soki 2004), and by UNDP in late 2005 (Schaefer 2005) and in March/April 2006 (Schaefer 2006b). This suggests that four missions took place during a period of two years and seven months, which gives an average rate of one monitoring visit by Kinshasa every eight months. Although more visits might have been paid than those reported on in this documentation, the written evidence, combined with signals from Bunia staff, leaves no doubt that supervision, guidance, and follow-up by Kinshasa was insufficient.

With regard to the day-to-day follow-up of the project in Kinshasa, in spite of the responsibility taken by the programme assistant for this during parts of the project period (as noted in Chapter 3) it remains unclear how the different types of responsibility for monitoring and evaluation were distributed within the Post-conflict Unit – and how they were to be coordinated with UNOPS. None of the strategy documents specifies an intended frequency, intensity, or structure of Kinshasa-level monitoring and evaluation of the Ituri project. Moreover, it appears that until recently no concrete plan was made as to who in Kinshasa would do what kind of monitoring and evaluation and when during the project's lifetime. This situation of vaguely defined responsibilities has recently changed, though, with the appointment in late 2005 of a person in charge of monitoring and evaluation of all projects implemented by the Unit.<sup>34</sup>

Yet it is clear that during most of the project period, the Ituri project has suffered from a lack of sufficient and adequate monitoring and evaluation by the relevant UN bodies in Kinshasa. The missions that did take place seem not to have followed an overall plan for when, and how often, the project needed to be visited. Instead, monitoring visits were rendered more on an ad hoc basis. It is also unclear how and to what extent the reports from the missions have been used. There are few signs of retroaction on the basis of the reports; little indicates that they were acted upon or contributed towards changing the project in any tangible way.

While the Ituri project started off with a set of strategic documents, the mechanisms have thus not been in place to verify whether the project was on its way towards reaching the overall objectives. Moreover, instruments to measure the impact of the project have been largely missing. As a result, UNDP has had a limited ability to check whether the performance of the project should be ascribed to aspects within the project itself, or rather to various factors in its surroundings. Finally, there seems to be an opportunity missed inasmuch as the monitoring and evaluation exercise did not contribute towards building tangible synergies with other similar projects in Ituri, such as UNDP's COMREC and MRR projects.

### 4.3 Implementation of the project as a whole

We round off this chapter by analysing how the Ituri project as a whole has been implemented, focusing on issues of financial, administrative, and strategic management.

The Ituri project currently has a budget of USD 3.507.615, the sources of which are Norad (USD 3.107.615) and UNDP itself (USD 400,000). UNDP first contributed USD 100,000, and later added another USD 300,000. Throughout the project period, the share of the budget allocated to micro projects has remained at the level of approximately USD 2 million. By the time of the evaluation

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<sup>34</sup> This person has, for instance, worked out a monitoring and evaluation plan for the Unit (Schaefer 2006a).

team's visit, USD 1.64 million had already been allocated to the 85 projects supported, and the 17 new projects to be presented to the LCPA after our departure had a budget of approximately USD 300,000. It is likely, therefore, that the project team will reach the target of spending approximately USD 2 million of the budget on micro projects.

The remaining part of the budget – USD 1.5 million – has been spent on administration costs. This is quite a substantial share: more than 40 percent of the available funds went to purposes other than the micro projects. Table 3 provides an overview of how this amount was to be spent.

**Table 3. Budget of the Ituri peacebuilding and development project**

<i>Budget line</i>	<i>Budget, in USD</i>	<i>Proportion of total, in %</i>
Micro projects	2,033,600	65.60
Monitoring and evaluation	124,500	4.02
Salaries, project staff in Bunia	389,760	12.57
Training	85,000	2.74
Office equipment and infrastructure	204,140	6.58
Reports and media	28,000	0.90
Administration costs	150,000	4.84
Misc.	85,000	2.74
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,100,000</b>	<b>99.99</b>

Source: UNDP DRC (2002c : 14).

Note: The aggregate sum for the micro projects is here slightly lower than the sum previously noted in this report (USD 2.06 million). This is because in this table we exclude the "training" budget line from the micro projects, thus mirroring more directly the original budget to reflect the initial plans.

This table is based on the original budget of USD 3.1 million, on the basis of which a 2.03 million allocation to the micro projects would constitute almost two thirds (65.6 percent) of the overall project costs. However, since the added USD 400,000 were allocated to budget lines other than the micro projects, the new total budget to USD 3.5 million meant that the proportion of the micro projects dropped to 58.1 percent of total expenditure, while the administration share of the budget increased from 34.4 to 41.9 percent.

Compared to other development projects, the 42 percent share of the costs spent on administration is high. The high level can be explained by the fact that the project was carried out in an area run down by war, as a result of which costs related to security, infrastructure, and communication had to be quite considerable. The direct execution modality opted for, largely due to the conflict, also necessitated sizeable allocations to salaries and to the operation of an office in Bunia. It still remains an open question whether the circumstances required a non-micro-project share of the budget as high as 42 percent. With a common office for the different UNDP projects in Bunia, for instance, administration costs would likely have been smaller, since that would have reduced the number of staff members as well as rent, car and equipment costs.

The financial management of the project as a whole was from the outset rather difficult, for two main reasons: the security situation and the lack of a functioning banking system in Bunia; and the administrative framework under which the disbursement of funds was centralised in Kinshasa. The transport of big sums of money by Bunia staff exposed them to severe risk, especially under the circumstances of armed conflict close to Bunia in 2003 and 2004. The disbursement of salaries from UNOPS to personnel was also made difficult and was delayed because of these logistical hindrances. It seems that these financial difficulties at the beginning contributed towards fuelling much of the frustration in Kinshasa as well as in Bunia; and also constituted a cause of much of the need for – and difficulties in – communication between the two sides.

With the improvement in security conditions, the establishment of a bank in Bunia in 2004, and the arrival of the second project manager in late 2004, financial management of the project clearly improved.

The administrative management of the project at the level of the Bunia office also appears satisfactory. A good team spirit prevailed among the personnel, who in general are competent and well equipped to undertake their tasks. The micro projects are documented in a very systematic fashion, and most kinds of documentation requested by the evaluation team would be forthcoming at short notice. The current manager seems very efficient and has adopted an inclusive leadership style, which implies that he is also available for partners' requests at almost any time. The CTA has further been firm in the cases of deviation from agreed-upon rules and plans that he has come across. These are all important and positive factors.

Yet some weaknesses in terms of management were also spotted at the level of the Bunia office, which probably have had an impact on the implementation of the project as a whole. One was the way in which the various tasks were shared and distributed among the experts and the project manager. We have already discussed the blurred division of labour with regard to monitoring. We also realised that the various members of the project team have a number of qualities that are important for the project, but that the current division of labour prevented some of these qualities from being fully benefited from. For instance, some of the experts have worked for UNDP's MRR and COMREC projects earlier. Their experiences could be more systematically drawn on, in relation to the micro projects in the Ituri project that relate to the reintegration of ex-combatants, for example. They might also be of use at the more strategic level, where they could provide advice to the CTA on how to forge closer cooperation with the other UNDP projects in Ituri. The different team members are also complementary in terms of personal characteristics, inasmuch as some of them have a more overall perspective on the project while others are more focused on the micro level. The fact that the project's manager keeps a close watch on the micro projects is a two-edged sword: monitoring is important, but the CTA is at the same time the only person in the team charged with managing the project as a whole, in line with overall visions and strategies. If, though, the experts were to be more strongly involved in discussions about the overall direction and future of the project, the risk that the view of "the forest" gets lost in the focus on "the trees" would be reduced.

Furthermore, at the level of the Bunia office it remains unfortunate that the experts have received very little training, in spite of a budget allocation for this purpose. Training would enable them to improve their evaluation skills, for example, and to get a better understanding of how the UN system of which they are a part functions.

Lifting our perspective somewhat to assess the implementation of the project along the Bunia-Kinshasa axis, it seems that this part of the project management represents one of the weakest links of the chain. We have already touched on the various problems involved: slowness of funds disbursement, difficulties in Bunia getting a response on urgent questions, insufficient monitoring and evaluation by Kinshasa, and an unclear division of labour within the Post-conflict Unit of UNDP and sometimes within UNOPS and UNDP in Kinshasa. Currently, several of these problems have been or are being resolved as mechanisms are put in place that will be more amenable to success for the Ituri project as well – predominantly the appointment of one person in the Post-conflict Unit in charge of monitoring and evaluation; and the setting up of a regional UNDP office in Bunia. It seems that changes such as these partly result from the experience of difficulties within the Ituri project, and in this sense UNDP is learning from experience, which is excellent. For the Ituri project however, the lessons are being learned a little too late. The project itself has in many ways functioned as a guinea pig, and it is mainly the project staff in Bunia that have had to suffer



from it. Yet in spite of this, important results have been produced within the project. This is for us one of the thrills of the Ituri project: it has produced results against all odds – it is a case of “success by default”.

#### 4.4 Quality of implementation: preliminary conclusions

We have in this chapter analysed the implementation of both the micro projects and the project as a whole and paid particular attention to the monitoring and evaluation part of the implementation exercise.

Our findings suggest that a principal deviation from the original plans at both levels concerns duration. Since the micro projects took on average four times longer to implement than planned, the project as a whole is set to last between three and four years, instead of the two years originally planned for. The delays were mainly due to the administrative framework by which much of the financial management of each micro project was centralised to Kinshasa. While the delays might have had some positive aspects, inasmuch as it enabled participants to engage in the trust-building exercises involved in each micro project for longer, the consequences were predominantly negative. They included an increase in the overall budget spent on administration (from about one third at the outset to more than 40 percent), as well as impatience and discouragement at the micro level of the participants involved in each of the many projects.

At the level of management of each micro project, however, most partners performed impeccably well and should be commended for their sound administrative, financial and strategic management.

This strong partner performance is partly thanks to intensive and systematic monitoring efforts by UNDP Bunia staff. While monitoring was extensive, it could, however, have been better organised with regard to the division of labour between project staff members in Bunia. Better listening and analytical capacities would also have resolved some of the misunderstandings that the monitoring had failed to uncover. Finally, the monitoring was accompanied by few evaluation efforts within the project. This relates partly to the lack of training of project staff in evaluation skills.

The lack of evaluation is also due to the insufficient focus from the Kinshasa level on the Ituri project and its need for follow-up and supervision. As elaborated on in Chapter 3, UNDP and UNOPS made few human and organisational resources available for the Ituri project in Kinshasa, and this had adverse consequences for the monitoring and evaluation of the project as a whole. No plan for monitoring and evaluation was made or adhered to during most of the project period. Few monitoring visits were made, and reports from the missions were rarely acted on. Supervision work is further poorly documented, and/or the documentation of it is not widely shared. It is thus beyond doubt that the Kinshasa level made insufficient effort to verify whether the project was on track towards reaching its objectives throughout the evaluated period.

## 5. Coordination

Coordination is not an explicit component of the Ituri project. The project document speaks of “partnership” and “institutional framework” rather than of “coordination” when outlining how the project is to relate to other actors in Ituri. But this does not mean that the project has not been part of coordination structures in practice. Efforts have been made to coordinate with three types of project and actor in Ituri: the other UNDP projects, other international agencies, and local government authorities.

### 5.1 Coordination with the two other UNDP projects in Ituri

Bunia, the base of the UNDP/UNOPS project of support to reconciliation and community development in Ituri, has also been a base of the COMREC and MRR projects that are also part of the programme of the Post-conflict Unit of the UNDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Coordination between these three projects at Ituri level can be justified by the fact that each project has had a community focus: the first aimed at supporting the communities’ development efforts towards reconciliation; the other two at assisting ex-combatants in their process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into these communities. Another reason why tripartite coordination would have made sense was that UNDP needed to project one image of its organisation in the district. A final reason why coordination between the Ituri project and the COMREC one, which dealt with reintegration, became relevant was that the Ituri project also eventually included projects aimed at the reintegration of ex-combatants into local communities.

Both CTAs of the Ituri project therefore took initiatives towards meeting the COMREC and MRR project personnel, but they faced difficulties in their efforts to coordinate with the other two projects. Difficulties were linked to the fact that the other projects were part of initiatives with a national coverage, and that the attention of their personnel was channelled into the fairly complicated DDR process. The complications related to the existence of two different approaches to reintegration: on the one hand, the community-based approach favoured by COMREC; on the other, a more individualised approach by which each ex-combatant got a one-off training course and “tool kit” but with little or no assistance towards his or her longer-term reintegration into local communities. The COMREC project staff had to spend considerable time defending its community-based approach, partly to the detriment of the attention required to develop a more coherent UNDP approach to the reintegration process in Ituri, for example with the project subject to the present evaluation.

The initiative that the Post-conflict Unit took in 2004 towards coordinating the three projects on the ground was therefore welcomed by the reconciliation and development project staff in Bunia. But even though a person was identified who could take charge of coordinating the three projects in accordance with the new plan from Kinshasa, it did not work out that way in practice. The difficult situation of the MRR project was a major reason why the plan failed; a situation which led UNDP Kinshasa to allow the person who had been designated as the three-project coordinator to focus solely on the MRR, which in practice led to her taking over its management. As a result, neither the exchange of information nor the possible synergies between the three projects that the coordination could have generated materialised.

Weak coordination between the evaluated project and the other two UNDP projects did not, however, prevent the former from engaging itself in the reintegration exercise. Yet while, as a

result, some micro projects were supported within the Ituri project that targeted ex-combatants, these came about not primarily as a result of coordination with the COMREC and/or MRR projects. They rather appear to be the fruits of local initiatives and of favourable circumstances determined by the communities themselves.

## 5.2 Coordination with other international agencies

Staff members of the Ituri project have participated in two kinds of forum with other international agencies, both organised by the Bunia division of OCHA (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Beyond these forums, there was no formalised coordination with other UN agencies or international NGOs. Still, as noted earlier, in four cases (FAO, Caritas, Oxfam Québec, and Coopì – the Italian bilateral development agency) such entities were engaged as partner organisations within single micro projects.<sup>35</sup>

The first OCHA-led forum has consisted of weekly meetings of humanitarian agencies, supervised and presided over by OCHA and MONUC jointly. In these meetings, information has been shared on the evolution of the situation in the district, including on the state of the people affected by the conflicts, of the advancement of the humanitarian aid efforts, and of security conditions that might influence intervention strategies.

The second type of forum has been linked to the national-level action plan for the DRC for 2006 (UN OCHA DRC 2005).<sup>36</sup> This plan includes a detailed approach to the coordination of humanitarian efforts, strategic plans, a monitoring system and six thematic programmes,<sup>37</sup> all placed within the overall perspective of promoting the transition in DRC from humanitarian action to longer-term development. At the local level of Ituri, the follow-up for this plan has taken place in sub-commissions and sector coordination groups, which reportedly met approximately once a month. The Ituri project personnel have participated in several of the sub-commissions and groups: for instance, the sub-commissions on socio-economic questions and on rehabilitation; and the groups on water and sanitation, health, education, and return and reintegration.

During the period in question, OCHA's coordination work in Ituri seems to have been effectuated with regularity and allowed for exchanges of information which have proven important for the UNDP/UNOPS project. The security briefings, for instance, have impacted on the plans of the personnel as to where they would support micro projects and where they could conduct planning and/or monitoring visits. For the project's personnel, the meetings have also had a networking function, inasmuch as they have informed peers about the activities of this project, and also promoted more informal contacts and hence lowered the barriers to getting in touch if need arises beyond the meeting forum. In one instance, moreover, the forums contributed towards generating ideas for collaboration at micro-project level.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The Belgian development cooperation agency (CTB) and USAID were other international organisations it might have been relevant to coordinate with, due to their activities being in partly the same thematic areas as the Ituri project and in particular the fact that they also had similar mechanisms as UNDP's LCPA in their programmes (Schaefer 2005). Yet, by the time of our visit, the Ituri project had not yet engaged in any visible coordination with these two.

<sup>36</sup> A previous plan for Ituri was produced in 2003 (UN OCHA DRC 2003).

<sup>37</sup> The programmes have the following thematic foci: (1) national dialogue, (2) small arms and mine action, (3) rule of law, (4) rural recovery, (5) social services, and (6) government coordination (UN OCHA DRC 2005).

<sup>38</sup> This related to an ongoing micro project involving brick production by ex-combatants with a view to facilitating their reintegration. It had been suggested that, when this project was completed, as a "transition mechanism" the ex-combatants could be linked up to the "food for work" programme of the World Food Programme. This could give them a second means of income generation in case brick production would not be enough, and also give them time to prepare for self-sufficiency in the future. Talks aimed at realising this idea were still ongoing at the time of our visit.

As a general pattern, however, neither the general forum nor the sub-commissions and groups have yet yielded notable coordination results beyond information exchange and networking. This may be explained by the fact that the primary aim of the meetings was, precisely, exchange of information, rather than the promotion of synergies between the various activities. Moreover, most other participants in the forums were more involved in humanitarian than in development work, which may have been seen as reducing the relevance of cooperation with the UNDP Ituri project. Finally, it seems that beyond the meetings the staff of the Ituri project gave little priority to practising operational coordination on the ground. The rule given in the project document that the micro projects could not have sources of finance other than UNDP/UNOPS may also have functioned as a disincentive for the project staff to promote closer contact with peer organisations.

### 5.3 Coordination with local authorities

As noted earlier, local authorities in Ituri were largely dysfunctional when the project was planned in 2002. But during the period of implementation of the project their presence has become more tangible, with the setting up of the Ituri Peace Commission and the Interim Administration in 2003, and the replacement of the latter by a District Commissariat in 2004. Also in 2004, at the level of the district's five territories administrators were identified and deployed.

In spite of the weakness of local authorities at the outset, it was still envisaged that the project would liaise with "decentralised administrative entities in charge of development planning, and relevant sector divisions" in Ituri (UNDP DRC 2002c). Given that such entities and divisions have been put in place slowly but steadily, it is worth asking whether and how such liaison has taken place, and to what extent it has involved elements of coordination.

The LCPA (the Local Committee for Project Approval, see section 3.2.2) has had local administration officials among its members, and has therefore been a forum for potential coordination between the project and local government – "potential", since coordination has not been an explicit part of the LCPA's mandate. Yet, due to the shortcomings of the LCPA noted in Chapter 3, particularly that it has been operational only in Bunia, its small number of meetings and the large number of micro projects to approve at each occasion, little time has been left for purposes of coordination with local government officials. In addition, the coordination that could take place was largely limited to the district and municipal officials in Bunia.

We also found that relatively little coordination with local authorities has taken place beyond the LCPA. In single micro projects "relevant sector divisions" were drawn on (such as officials within the health sector for the health centre construction projects and agricultural officials in the manioc cultivation project). Moreover, Bunia's municipal office has been partner in a project (the stadium) and beneficiary of another (rehabilitation of this office). It still remains the case that the only forum for coordination between the project and local authorities has been the LCPA, and that this opportunity has not been of much benefit. As a result, even if local authority representatives at various levels expressed clear appreciation for the project, they also called for the UNDP to be more transparent and inclusive vis-à-vis local government. If the administration officials were better informed on the progress of the project, its financial situation and intervention plans, it was argued, this would strengthen their basis for planning their own interventions and also help in avoiding a duplication of efforts and in reinforcing synergies between the various agencies' activities.

### 5.4 Coordination: preliminary conclusions

As the above has shown, the only national-level programmes that the project has made concrete efforts to coordinate with have been the DDR programme and OCHA's action plan. With regard to

the latter, it is too early to speak of results. As far as the former is concerned, it seems that efforts to connect the Ituri project to the overall programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants in Ituri have so far largely failed. The micro projects aimed at reintegrating ex-combatants in the Ituri project appear relevant, but they have not been part of the overall programme for reintegration as they have been run independently of COMREC, which is the UNDP project responsible for relating to the reintegration entities of the Government of the DRC.

Other national- or local-level programmes that it could be relevant for the Ituri project to liaise with, given its objectives and thematic foci, are activities related to (a) the return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs, (b) the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and social services, (c) awareness-raising about HIV/AIDS, and (d) reconciliation and transitional justice. Yet the only evidence we have that suggests any coordination with such programmes is the participation of Ituri project staff in relevant thematic OCHA-led groups and commissions. We know of no coordination at the micro-project level with other relevant programmes within the four above-mentioned areas. In some cases this has been due to the virtual lack of a presence of such programmes in Ituri (e.g. regarding HIV/AIDS programmes), yet in other cases other actors did run programmes (e.g. the Belgian NGO RCN in the reconciliation and transitional justice area); nevertheless, little project-level coordination took place. Some reasons for this have been noted above, but it is worth emphasising that an important general reason behind the weak coordination with other programmes was a lack of other relevant actors and programmes to coordinate with. The international actors were predominantly of the humanitarian type, and the presence of governmental entities was poor, at least at the outset. The fact that the project has remained relatively unique complicated coordination efforts. In general, little ground has therefore been prepared to “scale up” the achievements made within the project to a higher level in a subsequent phase.

Even though coordination efforts have been made by Ituri project staff, the overall result is that coordination has been rather weak. Coordination with other UN and international agencies in terms of information exchange worked well, but at the level of micro projects no coordination took place. There is also clear potential for improvement with regard to coordination with local authorities and with other UNDP-run projects. A mechanism for exchange between the leaders of the three projects would have benefited all three in terms of building and projecting a common identity of the UNDP, and in terms of harmonising the approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants – and other vulnerable groups – into local communities.

UNDP decided in 2006 to establish several regional offices in DRC, out of which one will be in Bunia. This measure is likely to contribute towards resolving many of the problems that have prevailed with regard to coordination between the different UNDP projects in Ituri, and it is a commendable sign of organisational learning within UNDP. However, the office will be set up as the UNDP/UNOPS project is winding up its activities; it therefore comes too late to enable better coordination within the evaluated project if the latter ends in 2006 as currently scheduled.

## 6. Results, goal attainment, and impact

We will now look at the results, degree of goal attainment, and impact of the Ituri project. The chapter has three parts. Firstly we analyse the results of the micro projects. Secondly we lift our perspective to the level of the Ituri project as a whole and examine the extent to which it has reached its four overall goals. Finally we analyse the impact of the project. As in earlier chapters, our analysis draws in large part on our study of the 24 micro projects selected for investigation, details of which are provided in Appendices 5A and 5B.

### 6.1 Results of the micro projects

As indicated in Chapter 4, our general finding with regard to the micro projects is that they went well: their results were generally satisfactory, and the aims specified for each project have to a large degree been reached. In this section we elaborate on and nuance this finding by examining those micro projects among the 24 in our sample that had been completed by the time of our evaluation. These include ten projects altogether: four peacebuilding projects (three of which we assess here), three rehabilitation projects, two income-generating activities, and one training project. Projects that were still ongoing at the time of our visit will be touched on in the two ensuing sections assessing goal attainment and the impact of the Ituri project.

#### 6.1.1 Peacebuilding micro projects

Ten of the 24 micro projects in our sample were categorised as “peacebuilding” and/or “reconciliation” initiatives. Four of these had been completed by the time of our evaluation, namely the Bunia stadium, the hairdressing project, the functional literacy project in Mahagi, and the community radio station in Aru. The budgets of these projects ranged from USD 11,000 in the case of the radio station to more than USD 50,000 for the stadium project, which had the biggest budget of all the projects. The four projects each had a very different character: two were training projects (hairdressing and literacy), one was a media project (the radio), and another was a building project (the stadium). In the following, we elaborate on the results of one project of each of the three types: the hairdressing, radio, and stadium projects.

**The hairdressing project** aimed at reaching 70 young people in the Irumu territory (in which Bunia is located), to train them in hairdressing and enable them to start new salons or reopen old ones that had been destroyed during the war. The strategy was to organise a training-of-trainers seminar first, and subsequently to let the trainers train more people in hairdressing in 12 quarters of Bunia. The training would not only deal with hairdressing but also with the need for peaceful coexistence and with awareness-raising about HIV/AIDS.

As a result of the project, 75 persons, including 20 women, of the age group 13 to 25, were trained and four salons were opened. The peacebuilding aspect was integrated by recruiting the trainees from different sides of the conflicts, and by raising awareness among them about the need for reconciliation. The HIV/AIDS dimension was also addressed during training, by raising awareness of the need to use sharp instruments carefully in order to avoid the spilling of blood when hairdressing; and at a more general level about risks involved in unsafe sexual relations. The trainees were further encouraged to attempt to spread positive attitudes about reconciliation and about protection against HIV/AIDS to their customers when hairdressing. The project had also been able to extend its reach beyond Bunia town, inasmuch as visits had been paid to salons in the broader and conflict-ridden Irumu district and awareness-raising activities had been conducted there

too. The main risks that the partner representatives saw that might jeopardise the gains of this project were theft, a new breakout of war, and/or competition from other hairdressing salons.

**The radio station in Aru** also had youth as its main target group. The station had started in a very small way before UNDP offered support. A problem in Aru territory, which is on the periphery of Ituri, which in turn is on the periphery of the DRC, was a lack of information about what was going on in the district and in the country, and the fact that most of the information one could get hold of came from across the Ugandan border.

As was the case with the hairdressing project, the description of the Aru radio station project appended to the contract with UNDP is not clear on what the aims, priorities, and chronological order of the interventions in the project would be. This is consistent with our previous finding on the relatively poor quality of planning of micro projects in the early phase of the Ituri project, as both the radio and the hairdressing projects were initiated at quite an early stage.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the radio station project did reach its aims of achieving a more stable basis on which to broadcast its programmes; extending its coverage beyond Aru town (by the time of our visit it had a 22 km reach); increasing the quality of its programmes; and including a stronger peace and reconciliation component in them. The radio had also functioned as a meeting forum for the youth of the area.

Still, not all the expected results materialised. For instance, while 29 persons had been trained for radio journalism through UNDP support, only nine of those had stayed with the radio – due, primarily, to the relatively low pay the station has been able to offer to its employees. Moreover, as noted earlier in this report, some of the material support that radio staff expected would be part of UNDP's inputs did not materialise, came very late, or arrived in forms other than expected. Given that the radio had to spend much of its resources on buying fuel for the generator (instead of having the solar panel, which was expected to result in lower day-to-day costs), they were operating on a tight budget and on the basis of a very strong commitment by staff members. This in turn posed a risk for the sustainability of the project.

On the other hand, given the shortage of resources, the low education levels of the staff, and their distance from centres of information and influence in the district, the results of this project are quite impressive. While the evaluation team did not have the occasion to speak with listeners to the radio, the feedback reported by the staff suggests that the station is much appreciated, that it fills a vacuum and has at least four important functions. It provides information about local, regional, and national affairs in 9 languages; opportunities for communication through ring-in and in-studio debate programmes; education through educative programmes, for instance on HIV/AIDS; and finally, it contributes towards upholding consciousness about the need for peaceful coexistence in a territory marked by the presence of displaced persons and by the proximity of Uganda, previously the occupying country. Consciousness about “peace journalism” was high among radio staff: when covering a dispute, for instance, they would try to explain the background of it in an understandable, thorough, and balanced way, and also appeal to the need to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner. The heterogeneous and multilingual composition of the staff helped to ensure such a balanced approach, and seems to have been a key to the radio's relative success.

The third project, the **Bunia stadium**, also illustrates the relativity of the success of the peacebuilding micro projects. Success has been relative in the sense that while gains were important and in some ways impressive, they also seem to be vulnerable: clear risks threaten the longer-term viability of these gains.

The stadium was one of the first projects started in the Ituri project, and the road to implementing it was long and quite tortuous. It involved a change of partners; budget increases from the initial USD 25,000 via a new estimate of USD 35,000 to the final USD 50,000 plus; as well as several contracts. All this also seriously delayed the implementation process. In the end the building of the stadium was undertaken jointly with MONUC, which also contributed financially and took charge of constructing the grandstand while UNDP's partner built the wall around the field. The price of more than USD 50,000 for this wall is rather high, yet it can probably be explained with reference to the various factors already mentioned.

The stadium has been used for football matches primarily, but it has also served as the location for religious meetings, national day and other celebrations, and the distribution of fees to ex-combatants as part of their government-run reintegration programme. It was mainly ex-combatants who built the stadium; hence the project also had a reintegration component. By the time of our visit a stadium management committee was operational and took charge of the activities taking place there, including of the collection of entrance fees for sports games. However, just before our visit a referee had been killed during a football match. As a result of this incident, players in the teams involved had been imprisoned and the stadium had been temporarily closed. According to Bunia's mayor, who was part of the management committee, the priority was now to raise consciousness among local teams about "fair play" and about the basic rules of the game.

While the construction of the stadium had important results in terms of creating a meeting place for Iturians – a place where, as it was said, "you don't need to ask whether the person next to you is from this or that tribe" – the killing incident also reveals that the legacy of war is still very much present in the district, and that violence is still easily resorted to as a conflict-resolution mechanism.

The hairdressing project, the radio, and the stadium also illustrate that small initiatives of very different kinds can help build peace in a district like Ituri, but that setbacks and longer-term challenges to these gains are likely. This, in turn, raises the question of the need for follow-up, to which we return in the final chapter.

### 6.1.2 Rehabilitation micro projects

Seven of the 24 projects in our sample were rehabilitation projects, consisting of the construction or the reconstruction of four types of infrastructure or social service: primary schools (3 projects), sources for drinking water (2 projects), roads or bridges (1) and health or maternity centres (1). The seven projects constitute 30 percent of all the rehabilitation projects supported thus far within the Ituri project, and their budgets range from some USD 8,000 (the water network in Mahagi) to approximately USD 30,000 (the Matete bridge). Of the seven projects, three were completed: namely, the two water projects and the bridge project.

**The Matete bridge project** consisted of building a bridge across a river between two neighbourhoods of Bunia town. Like the stadium, the bridge was one of the first initiatives of the Ituri project, and like the stadium and many other micro projects, participants – in this case construction workers – came from various sides of the conflict, and had also been combatants during the war. The team was told that the workers had got along well with one another in spite of their differences, and that they had spent working hours talking with another about all sorts of issues, including what happened during the war. The building of the bridge also had a symbolic aspect to it, given the fact that it had been destroyed as a result of the strife and that it was the previous fighters who now took charge of rebuilding it. The construction work could therefore be seen as a sign of an admission that what happened in the past was wrong, and of a belief in a more peaceful future. Having said this, the team was also told "the people who came here [to build the bridge] were not the worst cases". So even though the project seems to have reached its aims of



providing jobs to ex-combatants and promoting the reconciliation process, it made only a small contribution towards this end and the risk still existed that other ex-combatants who were less committed to reintegration could jeopardise the progress made.

Other important results of the bridge construction were the strengthening of communication between the different communities in Bunia, the facilitation of access, in the form of a shorter and easier way to school and to work for local residents, for example, and increased trade and interaction in general. In another parallel to the stadium the implementation process of the Matete project was a long and winding road including several contracts, a change of focus of the project (from building a walking bridge to one that cars could also use) and consequent increases in the budget. Yet even if these changes caused delays in the process it does not seem that they – or the implementation problems in general – affected the overall results of the project. The results came a bit later, but they did eventually materialise and proved to be largely those that were intended. The bridge is solid, its materials are provided locally and may easily be replaced if the need arises, it is much used and fulfils a number of important functions which, taken together, clearly seem to contribute to consolidating peace and speeding up community development processes in Ituri's main town.

**The two water source projects** we visited were both located outside Bunia, in Ituri's eastern territories of **Mahagi and Aru** respectively. While sharing their thematic foci, the two projects represent diametrical opposites with regard to results: the former a success, the latter a failure.

We have already touched on the Aru project in Chapter 4, where we noted that the involvement of the target group in the project was weak. Yet many more problems prevailed, which in turn affected the project's results and degree of goal attainment. The main goal of the project was to provide drinking water to part of the population in Ariwara town. However, our visit to two of the three water pumps that had been built and our conversations with users, a local leader, and a partner representative revealed that only one pump was fully functional and that none of them could be used during the dry season since the pumps did not then reach far enough down to the underground wells. Since the aim of providing drinking water materialised to a much smaller extent than was anticipated, the project hardly contributed to promoting community development in the area. Rather, it contributed to creating confusion and frustration at the local level since people there had been given expectations regarding improvement in water provision, but found the results to be rather disappointing.

The water project in Mahagi, on the other hand, was conducted in a very professional manner. The partner organisation had solid experience in the field. It had contributed to building the drinking-water network in 1998, and had got support to rehabilitate it as it had been destroyed during the war. The network had been impeccably rebuilt on a quite modest budget (approximately USD 8,300), and the local population had been mobilised to become active participants in the running and maintenance of the network. A scaled fee system had been put into place for families, churches and small enterprises that generated revenues for maintaining the system, and for the partner to be able to offer training to community members in water management. The community learning effects thus seem to have been high, which boded well for sustainability and for empowerment of the communities with a view to taking similar development initiatives in the future.

### 6.1.3 Income-generating micro projects

Five of the 24 micro projects selected for study were classified as income-generating activities. The five represent only one sixth (17 percent) of the total number of such projects in the Ituri project, and their budget ranged from some USD 12,000 (the egg production project in Aru) to approximately USD 30,000 (the manioc cultivation project implemented by FAO). Two of the five

projects had been completed, two were still ongoing and one was yet to start. The two completed projects, both located in Aru territory, were a micro-credit project for women and a project aiming at starting the production of eggs in the territory.

**The micro-credit project**, implemented in Aru town, was to provide 400 women with a loan of USD 40 each – and to install two mills. The credit would be rotational, in the sense that before the loan was to be paid back to UNDP it was to pass via altogether 1600 women in the area. The expected result was that the 1600 women would generate income which in turn would enable them to pay back the loan. Other anticipated effects were that agricultural and commercial activities would be boosted, that more children could go to school as their mothers could afford to pay the fees, and that the women, who had been adversely affected by the war, would be helped to regain the dignity of their lives. The loans would be managed by groups of 5-15 women. This meant that if one woman was not able to generate income quickly enough, the others in the group would take charge of paying back the agreed-upon sum by the deadline. As for the two mills, the revenues collected from their utilisation were to be saved for the eventual installation of further mills in the interior of Aru territory. Among other planned activities were the training of the women in financial management, and the collection of the loans for eventual transfer back to UNDP.

The project does seem to have reached its expected results of enabling the war-affected women to strengthen the economic basis of their lives, and on that basis play a more active part in their communities. The women met by the team reported that the loans had enabled them to sell more of the products they offered on the market, as they could invest in transport for getting the produce they wanted from the point where it was available to the best market places, and also improve their own stands, which in turn would make the product look more appealing to customers. The fact that the women were given the resources as loans and not as donations also seems to have had a positive effect, as it reinforced the already existing sense of responsibility among the participants for ensuring high output from the invested money. However, the system of rotational loans was a bit complicated, and some misunderstandings among the partner representatives and the participants had arisen, which in turn had increased the need for UNDP monitoring and also delayed the process of implementation. The partner, for its part, felt that UNDP should have spent more time explaining the system when introducing it at the outset. Even though the project was classified by UNDP as being “completed”, as the last instalment had been disbursed to the partner, the loan – consisting of USD 16,000 – was still to be reimbursed to the UNDP. It remained to be seen when, or if, this would happen.

Nevertheless, participants clearly seem to have been helped through the project, and the help was very relevant. The project contributed in a tangible way to empowering a large number of women who had suffered and lost much as a result of the war and therefore were in strong need of both support and trust. In this project they seem to have proven themselves worthy of the trust. In the team’s view, the delay with regard to the reimbursement of the loan is not mainly due to a lack of willingness by the partner or participants, but more to a shortage of training on the credit system. It should also be noted that the women had experienced efforts by other local actors to undermine their work, as rumours had been spread suggesting that the women lacked the capacity to run such a project. We interpret this mainly as a result of the general attitude that seemed to prevail in Ituri, in line with which women are seen as less valuable and capable than men. As a result, many are not prepared to see women becoming empowered and will therefore try to use mistakes women make as a way of casting doubt on the efforts and capabilities of women in general. As such, the “smear campaign” should first and foremost be seen as a sign of the importance that women’s initiatives be supported, and it also suggests that support of such women-oriented projects is vital.

The reconciliation effect of both the micro-credit and the **egg production project** can, however, be contested; we return to reasons why in section 6.2.1 below. Suffice it to note here that like the

micro-credit initiative, the most important result of the egg production project lies in its contribution to community development.

The egg production project aimed at promoting the production and sales of eggs in Aru territory. It was motivated by the fact that previously eggs had to be imported from Uganda, an arrangement that had made the product difficult to access and that had heightened its price. The project was professionally run by a veterinary doctor who had selected the participants and organised them into five cooperatives with six members in each, several of whom were women and young people. Participants had been trained and provided with the inputs required to produce the eggs. But by the time of our visit, one main problem remained: that of getting proper food to the hens, as this had to be imported from Uganda.

The egg production still went very well, though, as did the sales. The project leader estimated that the goals of the project had been obtained “at plus/minus 90 percent”, yet still held that only approximately half of the participants would succeed in making a living out of this activity in the longer run. In his view this was due mainly to the problem of access to hen food, but also to the longer-term reduction in his own follow-up as well as the need for each member of the cooperatives to devote the “passion and patience” required for this kind of work. Our assessment is, however, somewhat more positive: the project clearly filled a niche in the local market, and there were clear prospects that the food problem would be solved as other actors were becoming so keen on maintaining a local egg provision that they would help the producers to overcome this obstacle.

#### 6.1.4 The training project

The final project whose results we will assess before examining the Ituri project as a whole is the **training of partner organisations**. The two five-day training seminars were organised in late October and early November 2005, approximately two years after the Ituri project started. A Congolese NGO based in South Kivu was hired to conduct the training. Seventy-five persons representing UNDP’s partner organisations participated, including 19 women. Forty-six attended the Bunia seminar and the remaining 29 the other, which was held in Aru. Both seminars focused on three aspects of micro-project management: (1) the planning, implementation, and general management of such projects; (2) monitoring, evaluation, and auditing; and (3) participation of local communities in the management of the projects.

The training was well received by the participants. When asked about its usefulness, all the partner representatives that had participated, without exception, were positive. The results of the tests that the participants did at the beginning and end of the training (noted in the preliminary report from the seminars) suggest that participants had learned a lot, and this rather quickly. The participants’ and the trainers’ evaluation of the course indicate that the participants were very active and curious to learn, and that the language and level of prior knowledge had posed only minor problems. Yet it is also reported that participants and trainers regretted that some topics were not included in the training – topics such as financial management, human resource management, the organisational structure of a development association, and the logical framework approach. Partners had also expressed a wish to be able to meet with one another at later stages after the training, in order to exchange experiences on their tentative application of the lessons learned. To the evaluation team’s knowledge, however, hardly any such inter-partner meeting forums have been facilitated by UNDP following the training exercise.

Even though it came late and could have been better followed up, the training does seem to have yielded important results. Perhaps the most important effect of it is that it contributed to strengthening the basis for the local associations in Ituri to continue taking and implementing community development and reconciliation initiatives, independently of a continued presence of

UNDP or other international agencies in the district. The training has hence enhanced the viability of the Ituri project as a whole – yet it only made one step in this direction, with less than one hundred participants attending a one-off event. For the effect in terms of the building of community-based organisations to become more entrenched, the training carried out within the Ituri project has clearly not been sufficient.

### 6.1.5 Results of the micro projects: Preliminary conclusions

In this section we have presented our results for nine of the micro projects implemented within the Ituri project. The nine projects represent a varied sample in terms of geographical coverage (four of Ituri's five territories), thematic orientation (four thematic areas out of five), and budgetary size (covering almost the whole range, from USD 8,299 to 50,529). All were implemented by local NGOs, which is in line with the total sample of micro projects, of which less than ten percent were carried out by international agencies or local government bodies. Even though the nine projects reviewed make up only about one tenth of the total number of micro projects, they are therefore likely to be relatively representative of the entirety.

The micro projects showed good results. The partner organisations were generally able to fulfil their contractual obligations towards UNDP or UNOPS, inasmuch as activities planned within each micro project were realised and immediate goals were reached. With only a few exceptions, those among the intended beneficiaries that we met also expressed considerable satisfaction with the results of the initiatives. The nine projects reviewed were no exception to the general trend that micro projects took longer than planned for at the outset; however, the delays do not seem to have seriously affected the end results.

In order to get an idea of the end results of the projects, the nine projects we chose to focus on were all completed projects. We have therefore less evidence to conclude on the extent to which the process of implementing each project lived up to expectations, such as on the degree to which the participants experienced a sense of bonding across communal or ethnic gaps through participation in the projects. However, the impression left by partners and beneficiaries *ex post facto* is that the reconciliation effect of the projects has been relatively strong – albeit with geographical variations, as we return to below. What is beyond doubt is that all of the projects contributed to community development: through the provision of job opportunities, both during the project period (all projects) and afterwards (radio, hairdressing, egg production, micro credit); the provision of vital information (radio); of communication, interaction, and awareness-raising opportunities (radio, hairdressing, stadium, bridge); the reconstruction of physical infrastructure (bridge, water sources, stadium); as well as the development of human capacities (training project, and training components in the other projects). The experience of realising something useful together with people one used to regard as coming from “the other side”, and in very concrete ways of becoming able to make a living after war, will probably make it less likely that people will voluntarily join militia forces once again. The nine projects reviewed therefore suggest that the Ituri project has succeeded in contributing towards realising the key idea: that peacebuilding through community development is possible, even in the midst of recurrent violence.

## 6.2. Goal attainment of the Ituri project as a whole

Having got an idea of the results of the micro projects through an assessment of nine of them, we will now take a bird's eye view of the project as a whole – for which four general objectives were identified at the outset. In this section we discuss the extent to which each of the four objectives has been attained.

### 6.2.1 Inter-community reconciliation

According to the project document (UNDP DRC 2002c), the Ituri project would support local initiatives that were intended – as one of four aims – to “promote inter-community reconciliation, and help the communities to get involved in the peace process”. This aim is further specified both in the project document and the results framework (UNDP DRC 2003a), as follows: “to raise awareness about, and to mobilise the communities around peaceful coexistence and to support reconciliation efforts of the communities and thus contribute to restoring peace and security at community level”. Two expected “products” were to materialise as a result of the work towards realising this goal, namely:

- “Awareness is raised about, and communities are mobilised around the need for peaceful coexistence”, and
- “[There is] social and economic interaction between the different communities”.

These aims, related to inter-community reconciliation, are based on the assumption that the groups that needed to be reconciled in Ituri represented different “communities”. Two remarks deserve attention in this regard.

First, it is not always clear within the project whether a “community” is an ethnic group or a physical gathering of residents, in one rural village or the quarter of a town, for instance. Sometimes it seemed that “community” referred to both, but this interpretation suggests another assumption: that villages or smaller parts of a town would be populated by persons from one single ethnic group only. However, this is not always the case; in Ituri villages and town quarters could host persons from various ethnicities, as was the case before war broke out.

Yet, given that most of the violence in the early phase of the Ituri war took place between people of different ethnic groups, the most likely interpretation of “community” is “ethnic group”. Understanding “inter-community” as “inter-ethnic”, those people that the project sought to help reconcile were thus primarily individuals from different ethnic groups. This brings us to the second remark: during the war in Ituri the violence, which at first had an inter-ethnic character, increasingly became intra-ethnic. An example is the village of Mandro, populated mainly by Hema people. Here youngsters had first been recruited to fight people from the Lendu ethnic group, but eventually they also came to attack people from their own village and ethnicity as well. In Mandro, the main need as of 2006 was therefore not for inter-ethnic reconciliation, but for people from the same village and ethnic group to reconcile with one another.

In practice, the Ituri project has sought to promote reconciliation both between ethnic groups (inter-community) and within ethnic groups (intra-community). Even if the general objective was to promote reconciliation between different (ethnic) communities, this aim has thus not prevented the project from promoting reconciliation regardless of the ethnic identities of the groups that had found themselves on different sides of the conflicts. In this sense the goal of “supporting the reconciliation efforts of the communities” seems to have taken primacy over any particular view of who would need to be reconciled. In line with the spirit of the project – that of supporting local development initiatives aimed at peacebuilding – the identification of the “different sides” in each context would thus mainly be up to the local partner.

Across Ituri, two main types of “reconciliation content” can thus be identified in the project. In the territories of Irumu and Djugu that were most seriously affected by the conflict, the philosophy of reconciliation via local community development initiatives clearly made sense and was well understood and integrated in a number of projects. This, in turn, seems to have led to clear progress towards this aim of enabling people from different sides of the conflicts to live together peacefully.

The territory of Aru exemplifies the other dynamic, given that the effects of the war on this area had mainly been indirect, in the form of a massive influx of displaced persons as well as the formation of splinter militia groups with an inter-ethnic composition, FAPC primarily. FAPC was essentially a venture that used military means to reach economic ends, by exploiting the political vacuum created in Aru as a result of the main war in Ituri. Given its politico-economic rather than ethnic character, the violence it caused was relatively evenly distributed across various (geographical and ethnic) communities in Aru, and thus contributed little towards pitting the different communities against one another. Another reason why the situation did not degenerate in Aru to the same extent as it did in Djugu and Irumu was that no other armed group took up effective opposition against FAPC. It was therefore able to monopolise the border trade, tax collection and the local economy and polity for a certain period. The result was that in Aru, the conflict did not lead to serious divisions between different villages or ethnic groups. It merely made it more difficult for people in general to cope, due to the activities of FAPC as well as the increased scarcity of resources due to the immigration. There was a potential for conflict between the permanent residents and the IDPs in this situation, yet it is also interesting to note that some of the displaced people who came from the Bunia area, a town bigger than Aru, brought capabilities with them that Aru's people benefited from.

The result was that there was no urgent need for reconciliation in Aru. "Different groups" were included in the projects for which UNDP support was received (e.g. IDPs and permanent residents, people from different tribes), but without much reconciliation effect, since there were fewer severely divided "communities" to reconcile in the first place than in Djugu and Irumu, for example.

Hence within the Ituri project, the inter-community approach was interpreted differently in line with the relevant challenges in each geographical area. In areas where reconciliation took a different shape and was less of an urgency – such as Aru – the main effect of the Ituri project has been its contribution to community development, which also has the potential to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts in the future. Where peaceful coexistence had been more of a challenge, on the other hand, the effect of the Ituri project has been twofold: that of promoting reconciliation, and that of promoting community development.

To conclude on this first general objective: significant achievements have been made within the Ituri project in promoting reconciliation – within and between communities – through the improvement of the living conditions of the members of these communities by means of various micro projects. However, the "treasure" that this original method consists of – building peace by forging development – seems not to have been fully benefited from at the strategic level. Lessons learned from this approach were subject to little general discussion within UNDP. On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically, it seems that the partners and the participants in the micro projects came to "own" this idea and grasp its depth even more than UNDP. Yet the fact that the key idea of the project seemed better rooted on the ground than among UNDP staff is not necessarily a problem: indeed it can be regarded as the ultimate proof of the project's success. The only problem in this for the UNDP is that some potentially useful lessons for strategy development seem to have been missed, as a result of the predominance of administrative rather than strategic management during the implementation of the project.

### 6.2.2 Improved access to and quality of basic infrastructure and social services

The second aim of UNDP's support for local initiatives in Ituri was to "improve the access to and quality of basic infrastructure and social services, and by so doing to enhance economic opportunities and productivity" (UNDP DRC 2002c: 5, 10). Two "products" were expected to

materialise as a result of work towards achieving this aim, as specified in the framework of results (UNDP DRC 2003a). These were:

- “Local capacities to treat questions related to rehabilitation of basic social infrastructure are developed through local consultation mechanisms (ex.: committees for project selection);
- Basic social infrastructure, such as rural roads and basic social services (schools, health posts, community water fountains and sanitary systems) are rehabilitated, and maintenance mechanisms are put in place to ensure a more efficient and broader provision of the social services”.

Of the 85 micro projects supported by the time of the team’s visit, 23 were classified as rehabilitation projects, that is, projects that were to contribute towards achieving these aims. We studied seven of these.

With one exception, namely the water project in Ariwara, all the rehabilitation projects in our sample seem to have made clear contributions towards this second general aim of the Ituri project. We visited the construction sites of three primary schools and one maternity centre, and our conversations with partners and potential beneficiaries left little doubt that these institutions, once built, would clearly enhance the quality of the education and health services locally as well as people’s access to these services. As for the remaining three projects – the two water sources and the bridge – our above assessment of these showed that access and quality improved in two of the three cases. Signals received regarding other rehabilitation projects also suggest a similarly relatively high degree of goal attainment.

With regard to the goal concerning maintenance arrangements for the infrastructure and services, our evidence is limited to the three projects that were completed in our sample. With regard to the Matete bridge, the Bunia town council was formally in charge of the maintenance, and as for the two water projects, maintenance arrangements were impeccable in the one case and virtually non-existent in the other.

Finally, as noted in Chapter 4, it does seem that the first “product” introduced above has materialised. Via the LCPA in Bunia, the Ituri project has contributed towards developing local capacities to treat questions related to rehabilitation. One example is the instrumental role the LCPA played in broadening the Matete bridge project from one involving the construction of a walking bridge only to the building of a bridge that vehicles could cross as well. Yet, by contrast, the failure of the Ariwara project sheds light on the lack of LCPA involvement in the monitoring of micro projects, including of projects whose expected results fail to materialise. It is when projects do not go as planned that the “local capacities to treat questions” related to such projects will really be tested, and the LCPA in the Ituri project has not yet been subject to such “tests”.

### 6.2.3 Revitalisation of community development mechanisms and reinforced capacities of CBOs

The local initiatives to be supported via the Ituri project were – as a third aim – to “revitalise community development mechanisms and reinforce the capacities of community-based organisations” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 5). This aim was to be reached through the “promotion of the creation of economic opportunities for local communities” (UNDP DRC 2003a; 2002c). The two anticipated “products” that would result from the work towards reaching these goals were:

- “Communities are supported in the elaboration of plans for reintegration and development, identifying the zones with the greatest needs and the rehabilitation projects to be given priority;

- Sustainable revenues are generated on the basis of small enterprises or cooperatives that sustain the revitalisation and development of local economic activities” (UNDP DRC 2003a).

The main tool in achieving these aims has been the micro projects classified as income-generating activities. In total, 30 such projects had been supported by the time of this evaluation, five of which we studied in detail: the honey production, egg production, and micro-credits for women projects in Aru; reinforcement of women’s associations in Mahagi; and manioc cultivation outside of Bunia.

There is no doubt that the income-generating activity projects assessed helped in reinforcing the organisations that implemented these projects. This is also the case with the majority of micro projects with other thematic foci. Yet, as noted in Chapter 4, not all of the partners were “community-based organisations”; some were international and others were business firms that did not have a link to one particular community only. However, the contact between the partner and the communities and the involvement of the communities seemed to be strong in most projects, including all the five income-generating activities assessed. Whether this cooperation enabled communities to elaborate “plans for reintegration and development”, however, is doubtful. In several projects, not only among those that were classified as income-generating activities, local committees were created, called “management committees” or were titled in line with the sector of the projects, “health committees”, for example. Nevertheless, these committees do not seem to have reached the stage of elaborating plans for the community as a whole and its reconstruction and development – partly as a result of the fact that they did not, according to our evidence, receive training for this purpose.

Regarding the other expected “product” to materialise under this general objective, that of creating sources of revenue that would be sustainable; it is beyond doubt that the Ituri project has contributed towards creating new sources of income – but it is more uncertain how sustainable these will be. To illustrate the first and positive achievement: a report from the CTA of the Ituri project (Togola 2006a) suggests that as a result of the 85 micro projects supported thus far, approximately 14,000 temporary jobs have been created. Assuming that roughly half of Ituri’s 4.6-million strong population is of working age, this implies that the project has provided temporary jobs for approximately 0.6 percent of the labour force of the district. It can be debated how significant this proportion is, yet it does represent a real achievement by the project and shows that the degree of attainment of the goal of stimulating entrepreneurship is quite high. It is also likely that even though the jobs have been temporary, the fact that they have demonstrated that it is possible to create meaningful employment in a war-torn region is likely to have acted as a spur for the creation of more jobs and thus to bring the goal of “the development of local economic activities” within closer reach.

All five income-generating activities we looked at have enhanced, or are most likely to enhance<sup>39</sup> economic opportunities. Yet it is more uncertain whether the opportunities are enhanced mainly at the level of “local communities”, at the level of other groups (such as women or young people), or at the level of individuals. There is clearly a potential that the income generated by women or youth will in turn revitalise the development of the communities, but whether this actually happens will depend on how “community” is defined, and it will also demand an in-depth study that is beyond the scope of the present evaluation. We therefore conclude that certain groups in Ituri have clearly seen their economic opportunities enhanced and that the spillover effect of these in terms of community development appears to be positive.

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<sup>39</sup> The future tense here applies to the project implemented by FAO on manioc cultivation, which was yet to start at the time of our visit.



#### 6.2.4 Awareness-raising about HIV/AIDS

The final general objective of the Ituri project is not always presented as such. In the project document, the HIV/AIDS part of the project is first introduced as an add-on to the three general objectives, as it is stated that “in addition, special programmes will be developed ... to raise awareness in the communities about HIV/AIDS” (UNDP DRC 2002c: 5). However, in the ensuing elaboration in the project document as well as in the results framework the HIV/AIDS component is treated on an equal footing with the other three components. Its aim is “to promote the prevention of HIV/AIDS and to support affected persons”. In the results framework it is added that the aim is not only to prevent HIV/AIDS and help persons affected by this disease, but also to prevent sexually transmittable diseases in general and help persons affected by all such diseases.

The “products” expected to materialise as a result of the work towards reaching these aims also differ in different documents. In the results framework of the project document, two products are identified:

- “The communities have raised awareness of, and are mobilised around the prevention of HIV/AIDS,
- Affected persons are supported and taken care of medically”.

Interestingly, in the final version of the framework of results this last “product” is removed (UNDP DRC 2003a). It is probable that this is due to the fact that when the project started, UNDP was not aware of the difficulties involved in achieving this last aim given that anti-retroviral drugs have not yet become available in Ituri. As a result, the aim of the activities related to HIV/AIDS was limited to prevention only, and not to cure. In the same vein, the last part of the two-pronged general aim – “to promote prevention ... and to support affected persons” – seems to have been less emphasised throughout the project period.

The main aim has thus been to raise awareness about HIV/AIDS in order to prevent the spread of the disease in Ituri. Even though the prevention of other STDs is (sometimes) included as an aim, we have no evidence to suggest that the Ituri project has contributed towards achieving this aim. Activities have focused squarely on the immunodeficiency virus and syndrome.

Only four projects classified as HIV/AIDS-related initiatives have been carried out,<sup>40</sup> of which the evaluation team studied one. In addition, one project classified as a peacebuilding project – the blood bank in Bunia – had a clear link to this thematic field.<sup>41</sup> Persons coming to the bank had to get tested for HIV before they could donate blood, and the bank had found that more than 20 percent of the donors were HIV positive. It had therefore tried to increase its capacities and knowledge about the disease. This project has therefore also clearly contributed towards raising awareness about the HIV/AIDS situation in Ituri.

The one “HIV/AIDS micro project” studied by the team, implemented by FOSI, appeared to do useful work in raising awareness about the disease in Ituri. But it still seems that there is some way to go before local communities are “mobilised around” the need for prevention against HIV. The disease is still very much a taboo subject, and most HIV-positive persons whose status is revealed suffer from being stigmatised. The widespread stigma, the indications that the prevalence rate is so high, and the lack of effective treatment together make up what could effectively constitute a crisis

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<sup>40</sup> These were the ones implemented by, respectively, FOSI, APLCS, COOPI, and the radio station *Canal Révélation*. The APLCS project, implemented in 2003-2004, included three different contracts, yet is given only one project number in the lists of UNDP Bunia; hence we regard it as one project only.

<sup>41</sup> As already noted, this applied also to other micro projects as well: the hairdressing project based in Bunia and the community radio station in Aru, for instance, included awareness-raising about HIV/AIDS too, as a part of their activities. In the case of the blood bank however, the HIV/AIDS dimension was particularly visible and accentuated.

situation with regard to HIV/AIDS in Ituri – a crisis whose dimensions were not clear to UNDP as it started the evaluated project. Although the project has taken some steps towards the goal of raising awareness about HIV/AIDS, a whole lot more therefore needs to be done in order seriously to prevent the spread of the disease.

### 6.2.5 Goal attainment within the project: Preliminary conclusions

In this section we have reviewed the extent to which the Ituri project as a whole has reached the four overall objectives: inter-community reconciliation, improved access to and quality of basic infrastructure and social services, the revitalisation of community development mechanisms and reinforcement of CBOs, and awareness-raising about HIV/AIDS. We conclude that clear progress was made in the project towards all these aims.

Firstly, the project has definitely contributed to reconciliation, both within and between communities. The reconciliation effect was, unsurprisingly perhaps, strongest in the territories where the communities had been most divided and pitted against one another during the war. In our analysis, reconciliation came about primarily as a result of the method of enabling people from different sides to come together to realise very concrete tasks of common interest. The inclusion of ex-combatants as a target group and of projects aiming at reintegrating them into local communities was also an important tool to promoting inter- and intra-community reconciliation.

The rehabilitation work within the project also had a value in and for itself, independent of the reconciliation outcome. The construction of schools, health centres, a blood bank, bridges, roads, and sources of drinking water clearly has improved people's access to basic social services. The quality of social services and infrastructure has also improved. Some of the new schools, for instance, were far more conducive to efficient learning than previous buildings that had been used; the new Matete bridge was now available for cars and no longer only for people; and the water network in Logo became more user-friendly.

Community-based organisations have also undoubtedly been strengthened as a result of the project. More than 75 different local organisations received funding to carry out micro projects, and each has been closely followed up by UNDP staff. Seventy-five persons from partner organisations were also trained in project management. Some of the local organisations were not "community-based" in the sense of being linked to only one community or having a non-profit purpose. The capacities for community development were nevertheless strengthened, both in traditional CBOs and in the more company-like organisations. In order for the supported organisations to achieve an even stronger community orientation, however, they need to be trained at the level above micro-project management – namely, that of "scaling up" micro-project gains to the community level, and of generating more holistic perspectives for reconstruction and development, not only for particular target groups, but for the community as a whole. Members of the Local Committee for Project Approval (the LCPA) should also receive similar training.

Income-generating activities were also largely successful, but their sustainability as well as their outreach can be questioned. Yet it does seem that the jobs that were created contributed towards building confidence among the population that a peaceful future is possible; one in which they will not have to engage in violence to survive but can find other ways of making a living, in spite of the destruction brought about by the war.

Finally, the project has contributed towards raising awareness about the extent of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Ituri, and about the need and ways to protect oneself against infection. Yet for this awareness to be efficient in contributing to halting or reducing the spread of the disease, far more work needs to be done in the district.

### 6.3 Impact of the Ituri project

We round off this chapter by assessing the overall impact of the Ituri project. In fact, strategy documents do identify an anticipated impact at higher levels than that of the four objectives. The project document states that the project aims at “promoting the restoration of an environment that is conducive for human development” in Ituri (UNDP DRC 2002c: 5). In the results framework, three “strategic effects” are further identified:

- Accelerated economic recovery;
- Extended economic opportunities for the war-affected communities; and
- Successful socio-economic reintegration of the war-affected communities.

Throughout the project period, from 2003 to 2006, the level of armed conflict in Ituri has been reduced. The most significant improvement took place in 2004 and 2005, while the first months of 2006 saw a new spread of violent incidents, particularly in the Djugu and Irumu territories. Yet the overall trend over the three years was a reduction in armed violence. And as we know, when violence drops the scope for human development is broadened. But how much of this overall trend towards the “restoration of an environment that is conducive for human development” can be ascribed to the Ituri project?

As noted in section 4.2.2, within the project hardly any tools have been developed to measure the impact of the project – as distinguished from the impact of the virtually infinite number of other factors that may influence how a social, political, and economic situation in a certain area evolves. What we know is that the majority of the micro projects within the project have helped individuals and groups in Ituri to acknowledge the humanity of “the other”, to reconcile with one another and with the past, to address inter-generational issues, to make ends meet and make a living. Such processes, by which people in an impoverished and conflict-ridden region are assisted in generating income, doing meaningful work, and living together peacefully are indeed likely to promote the overall effect – of establishing an environment where human development is both possible and likely.

We should add, however, that while one part of the reason why the micro projects have had this overall positive effect is the way in which the actors involved have performed, the other part of the reason lies in circumstances that have been beyond the control of the Ituri project. It is virtually impossible to gauge the weight of internal versus external causes of relative success of the Ituri project. Yet it should be kept in mind that part of the success of the Ituri project is due to circumstances that “happened” to develop in a direction that was favourable for the project.

This brings us back to our previously suggested view of the Ituri project as a “success by default”. It is a success by virtue of the weight of its achievements in terms of reconciliation and community development. But this success materialised *in spite of* an operational framework that was not well fitted to the circumstances, and *thanks to* circumstances that developed the way in which the project needed. It also materialised thanks to partners and participants that appropriated and realised the key ideas of the project in spite of relatively weak strategic management by UNDP. We are therefore impressed by the achievements made within the project, but concerned about the sustainability of these achievements since they came about mainly as a result not of the implementation of agreed-upon strategies, but rather of factors beyond, strictly speaking, UNDP’s control. How can the gains of a project whose success has materialised first and foremost by default be maintained?

## 7. Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter sums up our conclusions regarding the management, coordination, results, goal attainment and impact of the Ituri project, and presents our recommendations as to how the project can best be followed up.

### 7.1 Conclusions

#### 7.1.1 Conclusions regarding management

In adopting direct execution as its intervention strategy for the Ituri project, UNDP made a wise choice. Government agencies were too weak to act as implementing partners; in Ituri they were not even functional when the project started. Local communities in Ituri, by contrast, were in strong need of material and moral support – and also proved worthy of such support. Direct execution was indeed quite an efficient strategy due to the good performance of the partner organisations in their carrying out of the micro projects.

The quality of planning, organisation, and implementation within the project has, nevertheless, been variable. We distinguish between two pairs of levels: Bunia versus Kinshasa, and the project as a whole versus the micro projects. Table 4 sums up our findings regarding management performance in line with these distinctions.

**Table 4. Management performance of key actors in the Ituri project**

<i>Management issue</i>	<i>Level</i>	<i>UNDP Bunia</i>	<i>UNDP/UNOPS Kinshasa</i>
<i>Conceptualisation and planning</i>	<i>Project</i>	n/a	Mixed
	<i>Micro projects</i>	Improved over time	n/a
<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Project</i>	Relatively good	Poor
	<i>Micro projects</i>	Good	n/a
<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Project</i>	Mixed	Poor
	<i>Micro projects</i>	Good, except for delays	n/a

*Note:* n/a = not applicable.

The vision that UNDP, the Government of Norway and the Government of the DRC had for the project – that of peacebuilding through community development – proved to respond very well to the needs on the ground in Ituri. However, the planning did not take sufficiently into account the rough terrain in which the project would be implemented. The organisational set-up, with the centralisation of key tasks to the Kinshasa level, which was difficult to access for Bunia staff and where resources made available for the project were scarce and not well organised, was unsuitable to the insecure and challenging environment in Ituri.

As for the micro projects, planning was quite poor in the beginning but clearly improved over time. The ways in which the projects were organised and carried out were also generally sound. The main obstacle in the implementation process was slowness in the disbursement of funding instalments from the UN system, which led to each micro project taking about four times longer than planned. Nevertheless, the partner organisations performed well in terms of financial, administrative, and strategic management.

Management of the project at UNDP Bunia level came to focus largely on the micro projects, given their high number, the volatile conflict situation and the limited experience most partners had in project management, all of which required tight monitoring of each project. But the micro-management style therefore adopted sent the overall idea of the project into the shadows, as project-related staff in Bunia and Kinshasa rarely verified the extent to which the project as a whole was moving towards its overall objectives. Monitoring of micro projects was relatively tight, although it suffered from a somewhat unclear division of labour within the Bunia team, as well as little analysis, as evaluation efforts were largely absent. Monitoring and evaluation of the project as a whole was weak: few monitoring visits were paid by Kinshasa to the Ituri project, and little was done to follow up on the missions' reports. Insufficient knowledge was produced on how the project was faring, and the actors involved were therefore not in a position to estimate reliably the impact of the project or whether it was moving towards its overall aims.

### 7.1.2 Conclusions regarding coordination

The staff of the Ituri project tried to coordinate with two main types of national programme in the DRC: the DDR programme, and more recently the action plan of OCHA. The fruits of the coordination efforts within DDR were few, even though UNDP has been the lead agency within DDR. The Ituri project has backed several projects to help ex-combatants reintegrate, but without coordinating this support with the UNDP project responsible for the reintegration of ex-combatants, COMREC. In spite of some efforts towards this end, throughout the period UNDP's Post-conflict Unit did not adopt a holistic approach to its different activities in Ituri. This complicated the efforts towards intra-UNDP coordination made by the staff of the Ituri project, which was smaller in budgetary and geographical terms than the other two UNDP projects in the district.

The most efficient type of coordination that has taken place has been through the regular OCHA-led meetings in Bunia. Here, personnel of the Ituri project have received important information about other actors' activities and the security situation, and also informed their peers about their own work and hence prepared the ground for cooperation. But if information exchange and networking worked well, this was still to bear fruits at micro-project level. The UNDP-supported micro projects did not relate in any formalised way with other programmes implemented or supported by other international agencies.

Coordination with relevant national programmes and other relevant activities conducted by UNDP or other international agencies has thus been relatively poor. Three factors help explain this: the uniqueness of the UNDP project in Ituri, given its community development focus while most other initiatives by international agents were of the humanitarian or military type; the insufficiency and failure of efforts made by UNDP Bunia staff to coordinate, for instance with the other UNDP projects; and the fact that relatively few national programmes were yet underway in Ituri, still considered by many to be an emergency zone.

With regard to the government agencies, the project facilitated a meeting place in the form of the Local Committee for Project Approval (the LCPA), of which local administration officials in Bunia were members. While the LCPA functioned as a door opener and a trust-builder between the two sides, little coordination took place between the activities of the project and those of the local government authorities. The local administration benefited through the project's support to various micro projects, but even though its presence was strengthened from 2004 onwards, it has not yet been taken on board by project staff in the sense of sharing of plans and searching for synergies between UNDP efforts and government efforts.

Overall, given weak coordination with other national programmes or other relevant activities implemented by international agencies or local government agencies, relatively little ground has been prepared to “scale up” the achievements made within the project to a higher level in a subsequent phase.

### 7.1.3 Conclusions regarding results, goal attainment, and impact

In spite of an unsuitable operational framework, weak strategic management, weak coordination with other relevant activities, and continued violence in the Ituri district, significant positive results have still been achieved within the project, and much progress has been made towards the four overall objectives. People have been reconciled, jobs have been created, infrastructure and social services improved, and awareness about HIV/AIDS has been heightened. This is, essentially, why we coin the project a “success by default”: the success has come about in spite of a number of problems, and is therefore both thrilling and puzzling. Why this success?

We ascribe a large part of it to the qualities of civil society in Ituri. In contradistinction to other African societies which have received more aid from external and state agencies, Iturian communities and individuals have become used to “fending for themselves”. These human capacities were not lost during the war; on the contrary they were revitalised as people had to find ways of survival in the midst of severe crisis. So when these communities got the chance to build peace by means of realising small projects with a community development focus, they embraced this opportunity and made the most of it, based on their already quite advanced and well articulated consciousness of their own needs and priorities.

We also ascribe the success to the key idea of the project, which in spite of a planning process that had its gaps responded very well to challenges on the ground in Ituri. The idea of letting local communities build peace through the implementation of small development projects – which would reconstruct parts of the district, provide jobs, and bring people from different sides together in activities of common interest – matched the needs and perceptions held by Iturians themselves. The Ituri project has, in other words, tested out an innovative method for peacebuilding, and the method has been proved to work. This match between idea and reality came about, paradoxically perhaps, in spite of the relatively limited participation of Iturians in the process of conceptualisation and planning the project as a whole in 2002.

Finally, part of the success should also be ascribed to the systematic efforts by UNDP project staff in Bunia to select and monitor the partner organisations. Without this tight follow-up, the results and degree of goal attainment are likely to have been far poorer.

The positive results of the project were felt for some groups in particular: youth, women, local authorities, and ex-combatants. The extent to which the project has benefited the other designated target groups, such as the displaced, children, and the handicapped is more uncertain. People living with HIV/AIDS have been helped less than was aimed at, due to the unavailability of appropriate cures for the disease in the Ituri district. Yet beyond and above these target groups a primary aim was to strengthen one type of social entity, namely, local “communities”. The idea that the micro projects were to have a positive spill-over effect for the social environments in which they took place, and not only for the participants or members of the partner organisation, was well understood and seems to have been realised in most micro projects. Some people in the communities benefited more than others, but a positive collective effect was detectable in most projects.

Whether the project as a whole contributed towards improving the security situation in Ituri is hard to say, because no tools had been developed or applied within the Ituri project to assess the impact of the project, and because good such tools are in any case difficult to find. The security situation

improved in Ituri in 2004 and 2005, but has worsened in 2006. At the same time, the project has increasingly found its form and improved its performance, including into 2006. This is just one indicator, but it does suggest that the overall conflict situation seems to have evolved quite independently of the Ituri project. The project's positive impact can be seen at community level, but probably not at the level of the district as whole. Some groups and some communities have benefited, and these benefits have contributed towards reducing the likelihood of violence – there, but not necessarily elsewhere in Ituri. Moreover, the possibility remains that actors using violence may get into even these communities to recruit persons forcibly or simply to kill, loot, and rape – if they have the motivation and the means. Therefore, the achievements made within the project are contingent upon a continued macro-level improvement of the situation, and risk being lost if the conflicts get out of hand.

## 7.2 Recommendations

### 7.2.1 General future perspectives and recommendations

The project “Support to peacebuilding and community development in Ituri” has rich potential that has yet to be developed to the full. It has been well timed in relation to efforts to bring peace to the district, but as of 2006 the prospects for peace and development remain uncertain. There is therefore reason to doubt the wisdom of closing down the project at this stage. Our doubt is based on the following considerations.

The DRC and the Ituri district are now going through crucial moments in their history. At the time of writing, the country's first national elections for more than 40 years are underway; and while this surely is a step forward the polls also entail a risk that peace consolidation may be derailed. In the period after the polls, Congo's new constitution is supposed to come into force and in line with it a new territorial division, which for Ituri's part will imply an upgrading from district to province. As the constitution sets the stage for the decentralisation of power and for elections in the new provinces, over the coming years the local authorities in Ituri will need to prepare not only to take up new tasks but also to be subject to electoral competition. In a few years' time Iturians will thus be given the chance to elect persons to represent them in the governance of their own area; a process which will expose the conflict-ridden zone to significant opportunities – but also to risks. Moreover, it is unlikely that MONUC will be there to oversee these processes: the force is expected to withdraw or significantly downscale its presence in late 2006 and 2007. Prospects for continued support from the international community are also uncertain, even if threats to Ituri's peace still loom large, not least from militias such as the MRC.

It is against this backdrop that we think that letting the Ituri project close down now would represent a missed opportunity. Given the considerable challenges Ituri faces at this juncture, combined with the substantial achievements that have been made so far within the project, the project will in our view continue to have an important role to play in the coming one to two years. If the project is to continue, however, key changes should be made in its management and coordination – changes to which we return below.

If the project cannot continue in its current form, it will still be important to learn the main lesson from it, namely, that peacebuilding and reconciliation can take place through community development, and that the participation of the local population is crucial for peace to take root. We will illustrate this lesson with an anecdote from the project. In one village where micro projects had been implemented with UNDP support, militia members had recently arrived to recruit people. But the village chief, to whom they had addressed themselves to ask for permission, had refused, saying

that people in his community now had ways to make a living and therefore neither needed to nor should go back to the war. Yet the previous time a recruitment effort had been made in the same village, the same chief had accepted on a note of resignation, saying that he had no other income-generating opportunities to offer to his people.

The episode clearly suggests that the Ituri project has assisted local communities in a very tangible way to resist the forces that have an interest in maintaining armed conflict. And if these forces do not gain recruits, they will not be able to continue to destabilise the district. However, the anecdote also sheds light upon the fragility of the achievements made within the Ituri project. The fact that militias are still active illustrates the most serious threat to the gains made, namely, that violent conflict might intensify. Given the fact that some militia reportedly have money to offer those who join it, youth and adults in Ituri face a very concrete choice: to join the militia, join the army, or make a living as a civilian? In order for this last option to remain attractive, it is crucial that opportunities are created for income generation, and that the population remains sensitive to the need to resist the forces of war.

The Ituri project has contributed towards both of these ends, but its contribution has so far been modest. It is also worth remembering that during the evaluated period, there was no other project of this type in the district. If the project continues, it will reach even more of the district's population and thus consolidate the community development effect, and it will also be able to stimulate new initiatives of the same kind to be taken up by other actors. All of this will in turn make armed conflict a more distant possibility.

Even though we therefore recommend the continuation of the project, we still wish to highlight a dimension that is important to keep in mind for its continued success. This is the need not to quell the initiative of the Congolese population. The spirit of entrepreneurship is strong among the Congolese. For instance, in two of the school projects the team visited local villagers had – prior to UNDP's intervention – built the school they needed themselves. In Poni they had built a secondary school but not been able to complete it; in Katanga two primary school buildings had been built and put into use, but they were not ideal. In both cases the communities had realised that UNDP could help them get what they needed, learning from their own experience of having tried to satisfy their needs for basic services, and thus knowing quite well what their priorities consisted of. This community-level awareness and capacity for collective action are extremely valuable assets, and the challenge for intervening agencies is simply to nourish this, and not to overwhelm it.

We make this point in light of the general risk that foreign aid might render the recipients passive. Ituri's people have not received much foreign aid in the past, nor have they been well served by a state apparatus. As a result, they have become "experts" in fending for themselves. But this expertise is in fact crucial, and it is largely thanks to this capacity that the Congolese have been able to translate the aid they have received through the project into tangible development and reconciliation results. If the project is continued, the project staff in Bunia and Kinshasa should therefore be aware and take strategic steps to make sure that the local communities remain the prime movers of the project, that it is their initiatives that are supported and that they are supported in a way that leaves the local actors with ownership of the project.

### 7.2.2 Two future options

We therefore recommend that the project be given more time, beyond the end date that at the time of our fieldwork was set for September 2006. We see two alternative options for a continuation of the project: a short-term continuation or extension of the current phase, or a longer-term continuation or a new phase. The short-term option we present involves a 6-9 months' extension of



the project; the longer-term one 18-24 months. Below we present each option as well as our advice as to what measures they should involve.

#### Option 1: Extension/short-term continuation

A short-term continuation of the Ituri project will consist simply of giving the project more time to complete properly the work project staff are already doing, and to prepare well for the project's exit from Ituri. As noted earlier, by April 2006, only about half of the around one hundred micro projects were completed. Thirty-four projects were still ongoing, and up to 17 were yet to start upon their approval by the LCPA. Assuming that these 17 projects will share the average duration of micro projects found in this evaluation – 11-13 months – we may assume that if the projects start in mid-2006, they are likely to be completed at the earliest at the beginning of 2007. While it will be possible to try and speed up the process of disbursement and implementation in general for this last batch of some 50 micro projects, a rush is not ideal, particularly not in the winding-up phase when it is important to learn lessons and prepare for closure. Given the testing and uncertain times Ituri is currently undergoing, UNDP Bunia should continue to provide proper follow-up to each partner organisation and project it supports. To do so, it is now in a position where it needs more time.

Time will also be needed to prepare partner organisations, the LCPA, and the local authorities for a post-project phase. Such preparations should include at least one new round of training of partner organisations and LCPA members with a focus on community development management. Training of local actors will also be needed on micro-project management, but for a post-project phase priority should be given to strengthening the community-level awareness of the inheritors of the project.

In a short-term continuation phase, UNDP and UNOPS staff in Bunia and Kinshasa should also spend time together to learn from the project, both its achievements and problems, with a view to improving the record in similar projects in the future. It is also crucial that in an extended phase the project staff discuss with other UN and international agencies and local government agencies in Ituri how the lessons from the project can be learned from and even possibly transferred or pooled into other relevant actors and programmes.

In our view, all this will require that the project continues through the first or second trimester of 2007, i.e. for another 6-9 months after September 2006. Funding will hence be needed for the following purposes, at least: to run the Bunia office and pay the employees until the new set end date, monitoring of still ongoing projects, training of partner organisations and LCPA members, and facilitation of meetings between Bunia staff and (1) Kinshasa staff, (2) local government authorities, and (3) other international agencies in Ituri.

#### Option 2: New phase/longer-term continuation

A longer-term continuation of the Ituri project will enable support for more micro projects, as well as reforms within the project itself. To ensure that the project will succeed in a new phase, the system of management within the project must be thoroughly reformed. Continuation of the project beyond an extension of the current phase will therefore require that willingness and resources are in place at both the Kinshasa and Bunia levels for the following key tasks to be realised: (a) to set up an organisational framework for the project which is more conducive to the challenges it faces; (b) to improve coordination between the project and relevant actors and programmes in Ituri; and (c) to improve the strategic management of the project, at both the Bunia and Kinshasa levels.

The UNDP's Post-conflict Unit in the DRC has prepared a strategy for the period 2006-2007 (UNDP DRC 2005d). The internal discussions to prepare for a longer-term continuation of the Ituri

project should not only address the gaps identified in the project, but also attempt to devise solutions that are consistent with this overall strategy. Beyond this strategic level and in more concrete terms, a longer-term continuation of the project should include the following management and coordination components.

The main management challenges are to improve the operational framework and the strategic management. A new phase of the project will provide an opportunity to address both of these challenges. A first step in the right direction will be to pool the project's resources together with the other UNDP project(s) in Ituri in the new regional office to be set up in Bunia. The tasks of signing contracts with partners implementing micro projects and disbursing finance to them should further be decentralised from Kinshasa to the Bunia level.

In light of the new tasks and ways of organising the project in Bunia, UNDP's Post-conflict Unit and UNOPS in Kinshasa should also go through what the Ituri project requires from them in terms of human and other resources in the new phase of the project. These considerations should include the making or updating of plans for (a) monitoring and evaluation, (b) training of project staff in evaluation skills and the workings of the UN system, and (c) adopting tools to assess the project's impact. A key overall goal of the restructuring process should be to improve the strategic management of the project, by making sure that progress towards overall goals for the project as a whole is regularly assessed. Another essential goal of the reforms should be to set up an operational framework that enables a project implemented through direct execution in a conflict zone to succeed. Decentralisation of power, smooth communication, and giving higher priority to serving than to supervising the field from the central level are key challenges, challenges we believe the Post-conflict Unit will face up to if it provides the human resources and the new organisational set-up required for the project.

With regard to coordination, project staff in Bunia and Kinshasa should first clarify what kind of coordination they wish to have within the project in a new phase – with what kind of actors, what actors to give priority to, and what the coordination should involve: exchange of information (what kind, with whom), networking (with whom), cooperation at micro-project level (what kind, with whom), and so on. Based on our evaluation, we have some recommendations to make with regard to the project's relations to three types of actor in particular: other UNDP projects, the LCPA, and local government authorities.

Between the different UNDP projects in Ituri, mechanisms for a regular exchange of information about activities and plans should be put in place. The establishment of the regional UNDP office in Bunia is likely to facilitate this exchange. However, given the imbalance in size between the different current projects, the Kinshasa level should also assist in making inter-project coordination at Ituri level a reality. As far as the reintegration of ex-combatants is concerned, the staff of the project subject to the present evaluation and of the COMREC project should work out ways by which reintegration work within both projects can be coordinated. In general, UNDP should also benefit from the many new opportunities that arise with the new regional office for pooling together resources and creating synergies in terms of administration, management, monitoring, evaluation, and training. It is also possible to foresee that a UNDP leadership at Bunia level, over and above each of the projects, can assist the staff of each of the projects in seeing "the forest" and not only "the trees" and hence enable the vision of the project as a whole to be brought back into the spotlight.

With regard to the LCPA, a longer-term continuation of the project would enable much more of the rich potential of this committee to be realised. The goal should be to use the committee as a tool (a) to strengthen capacities among local actors in Ituri for community development, and (b) to generate a greater sense of accountability and responsibility for this by the local actors involved. As far as

the last point is concerned, inasmuch as the UNDP delegates authority to approve projects to local actors, this is a practical exercise of accountability, as local government authorities participating in the forum get a sense that any activities taking place in the district need to be presented for and discussed with local actors. However, local authority officials participating in the LCPA do not necessarily learn such lessons automatically. Indeed, given the current fast-track modus of each LCPA meeting, the long period of time between meetings, as well as their concentration in Bunia, much more needs to be done in terms of training and awareness-raising among LCPA members of the accountability and democracy functions of the work they do in this committee.

In order for the community development capacity of LCPA members to be strengthened, they should participate in the monitoring of micro projects. The current deadlock in which LCPA members claim they need pay to do this and UNDP says they do not should be overcome, since LCPA's monitoring will have several important functions. It will contribute (1) towards checking UNDP's and partners' own monitoring, (2) to reinforcing the sense of ownership by LCPA members of the gains and challenges of each micro project; and (3) to improving local capacities for community development, inasmuch as the persons doing the monitoring stand to learn from the discoveries they make when visiting the development initiatives in the field.

LCPA members should also be trained in community development management. Many of them have such knowledge already, but training will enable gaps to be filled and shared responsibility to be generated for community based development in the district. The training should also cover the accountability functions of the LCPA as DRC is preparing for the application of the new constitution. UNDP should therefore work out strategies, partly in consultation with LCPA members, on how the LCPA can develop from its current largely administrative function of rubber-stamping micro projects into becoming a strategic partner with which UNDP co-manages the project. The possible transformation of the LCPA into a local development committee (as alluded to in the Post-conflict Unit's strategy), as well as the relationship between the LCPA of the Ituri project and LCPA-like mechanisms in other projects in Ituri are also issues that need to be addressed – internally within UNDP in Bunia, and in consultation with LCPA members.

The LCPA should, in any case, be seen as less important than the local government authorities. In order to support the democratisation process underway in the DRC, the UNDP in Ituri should in a new phase of the project change its approach to the local administration in the district. While its approach has been reasonable so far, given the administration's weakness, local government in Ituri is currently strengthening, and in line with this UNDP should start bringing it on board in new ways. Over time more influence over local decision-making should indeed be transferred from international actors to local government officials, in parallel with the democratisation process. The project has contributed towards fortifying local government so far, but the method for strengthening it will have to be changed in a new phase of the project.

UNDP should therefore consult with local government officials to a greater extent regarding plans for and the implementation of the project. The local administration needs to be regularly and well informed about what the international agencies are doing in their district, not least to render their own planning and interventions successful. Mechanisms for regular information exchange between local government and international agencies need to be put in place. As for the Ituri project, such consultation mechanisms would enable local officials to give feedback on UNDP's plans, to learn from achievements and problems faced within the project, and to give advice to UNDP as to how problems can be resolved. Furthermore, if UNDP becomes more open about its own project management, this will set a precedent for information-sharing and enable learning among local actors in anticipation of the local-level democratisation processes to come.

In the longer term, the strengthening of local authorities should also enable UNDP to combine the direct execution modality with execution via government agencies – or even to gradually move from direct to indirect execution. In light of the urgent need for statebuilding in DRC, such a gradual increase in support to local authorities in Ituri is vital. Furthermore, this does not have to work against the approach of supporting local initiatives: indeed, the building of local state structures and the continued strengthening of community-based organisations are complementary and should go hand in hand.

Finally, given the number of new elements entering into the equation if the project is brought into a new phase, and the relatively different project that might result, we recommend that the project be re-evaluated at the end of the coming period by independent consultants. That evaluation would reconsider the needs for future measures to be taken within or beyond the project, in light of Congo's, Ituri's, and UNDP's challenges at that future point in time. The evaluation might also, to a greater extent than the current one, adopt a participatory approach, by which partners and beneficiaries of UNDP are enabled to contribute more directly to the evaluation, discuss the findings and learn from the exchanges made.

In our analysis, if project actors are to get a realistic chance to reform the project in line with the above recommendations a new phase will have to last for at least one and a half years beyond September 2006. A new period of 18-24 months, until some time around mid-2008, will probably be required. New funding will be needed for the project's staff and administration until the new end date, as well as for the following purposes, at least: new micro projects, training of partners and LCPA members, training of project staff, facilitation of meetings between staff in Kinshasa and Bunia, and more resources for monitoring and evaluation. In contrast to the first option, however, a new phase is likely to involve more financial gains through benefiting more fully from the "reintegration" of all UNDP projects in the regional office in Bunia.

### 7.2.3 Final remarks

In the evaluation team's analysis, closing down the project as planned in September 2006 is not a good idea. We have therefore presented two options for the continuation of the project: its extension for 6-9 months, or a new phase that could last for 18-24 months. No middle way or compromise should be made between the two options. The two alternatives require that entirely different processes start relatively soon within UNDP, in cooperation with partners: either simply enabling the project to get a bit more time to wind up in a way that allows for learning lessons and preparing well for exit; or setting up a reformed operational framework, new guidelines for coordination, and new systems for better strategic management. In our view, no "wait and see" approach of, for instance, choosing the extension option but keeping the door open for a continuation of the project after the extended period should be considered. If the project is to be continued beyond the completion of all the currently approved micro projects in 2007, preparations for this must start soon. If a system is not swiftly put in place for a more suitable operational framework, better coordination and strategic management, the continued success of the project in a new phase will still be largely up to non-UNDP actors to create. Given the volatile situation in Ituri this is a too big chance to take.

It might be asked whether the project could continue in another way, without UNDP. Our analysis of the ways in which UNDP has managed the project may suggest that it would have been a better idea to leave a project like this to another organisation, such as an international NGO. There is one negative and one positive reason why we do not identify any such option. The first reason is that there are few other agencies in place in Ituri that could take over the running of the project. Within the UN system UNICEF runs similar projects in Ituri and has an office there, but they as well as other UN entities have a narrower thematic focus than UNDP and have also worked less on forging

the transition from emergency to development. Within the UN system UNDP is therefore undoubtedly the most suitable organisation. With regard to other international peers, no other agency that operated in Ituri has a similarly broad outlook as UNDP. As for the local government authorities, these may be entrusted to take over the project at a future stage – but not yet, as their institutions are still too weak. Hence the range of other agencies that would be both able and willing to realise the peacebuilding-through-development idea in Ituri is very limited.

Our positive reason is the fact that in spite of the shortcomings of UNDP in DRC in this project so far, the organisation is clearly moving in the right direction. Indicators of this include its openness to organisational learning, the recent shake-up and strengthening of the Post-conflict Unit, progress in the DDR programme, the setting up of regional UNDP offices, and the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation capacities. The UNDP is indeed a pool of strongly resourced people; its challenge is, however, the complexity of its systemic requirements as well as sometimes rather high ambitions, which in turn may lead to a mismatch between the tasks it takes up and the resources and structures it puts in place to fulfil them.

The UNDP now has the opportunity to make a more systematic effort to contribute more directly to the success of the Ituri project, if it will give the project the priority it needs in the future. The project has great potential, but to realise it reforms must be carried out, and it is mainly up to UNDP to decide whether it will give what is needed to undertake that task. In our view UNDP in DRC, more specifically the Post-conflict Unit, is indeed up to the task. We therefore recommend that UNDP and its partners take up the challenge of continuing the project longer term, because we believe the stakeholders involved will succeed in doing this, and because the project has such a crucial role to play in contemporary Ituri.

## Addendum

Some comments to the draft report from UNDP in the DRC were provided after the main editing of the report had been completed. In this addendum we take note of those comments that would otherwise have led to changes in the main text or footnotes of the report.

**1: Re. executive summary and sections 5.4 and 7.2.2.** In the second-last paragraph of the summary and in these sections, the report mentions the new offices to be set up by UNDP in DRC. While the report identifies these offices – one of which was to be located in Bunia – as “regional UNDP offices”, the correct designation is “UNDP sub-offices”.

**2: Re. section 3.1.2.** COMREC, the UNDP’s project for community recovery, reintegration of ex-combatants, and small arms reduction in DRC introduced in this section; covers the following areas in the country’s east: Ituri (in the Oriental province), the North and South Kivu provinces, Maniema province, and the northern part of Katanga province.

**3: Re. section 3.2.2 on the LCPA and its functions.** The functions of the LCPA identified here are based on data collected during interviews in the Congo, in response to questions to project stakeholders about the LCPA. The functions hence do not derive from a particular written source.

**4: Re. section 3.2.2 on the LCPA and micro-project information.** One reason why Bunia project staff members hesitated to make information more available to LCPA members about the projects to be presented for possible approval at the meetings was the possibility that the ideas presented by one local organisation might be plagiarised by another organisation. In the evaluators’ view however, the worry about possible plagiarism seems exaggerated. One reason is technical. Given that there was only one operational LCPA for this project and that the project was quite unique in Ituri, if a local association would attempt to steal an idea from another both ideas would eventually have to be presented to the LCPA to get UNDP support. The LCPA would then be able to discover the duplication. A second reason why plagiarism may not necessarily be a problem is that several projects that are similar might indeed be worthy of support: Given the similarity of the challenges faced by many Iturian communities, it should not come as a surprise if several of them would devise relatively similar solutions to their problems in the form of project proposals. Thirdly, if project proposals by different associations may resemble one another, that may also be because many of the organisations have little experience in formulating such proposals. For these reasons we do therefore not see it as a good solution to restrict LCPA members’ access to information about the project proposals before each meeting. Better informed LCPA members will carry through more well-founded approvals or rejections of project proposals. At the same time however, local associations should certainly get more training in formulating proposals. We identify this as a recommendation in Chapter 7.

**5: Re. section 4.1.2 on plans vs. realities.** Here we discuss the extent to which the implementation of the micro projects has corresponded to the plans that were made for that implementation at the outset. The discussion is part of the chapter about the quality of implementation of the Ituri project, and to assess that quality we need to understand the extent to which implementation corresponded to plan. But the comparison between project plans and project realities is not normative in nature: if there were deviations from the plan there may be a number of reasons for this, some of the reasons may also have been good. If deviations occurred, this does therefore not necessarily imply that they were results of deliberate actions intended to undermine plans. There is, in other words, no moral judgement in the plan-reality comparison; the section 4.1.2 simply gives an overview of the gaps there might have been between the plans set for the project and how it was carried out. The word

“deviation” should therefore be understood not in a moral or derogatory sense but purely in a technical sense.

**6: Re. section 4.1.2 on plans vs. realities, target groups.** We note in this paragraph that ex-combatants were not explicitly mentioned as a target group in the initial plans of the project. Still, they eventually became an important target group of the project. While they were not explicitly identified as a target group at the outset however, their eventual inclusion may be justified on various grounds. One of these is the initial plans’ identification of “people affected by the conflict” in general as a target group. In the broader sense therefore it may be argued that the inclusion of ex-combatants as a target group of the project is compatible with initial plans.

**7: Re. section 4.2.2 on monitoring and evaluation.** In this section we state that at the time of writing (July 2006), our sources suggested that altogether four monitoring visits had been paid by UNDP or UNOPS Kinshasa staff to the project in Ituri. After this was written however, the team has received information which suggests that two more such missions were conducted by UNDP staff, visits reportedly paid in, respectively, December 2003 and May 2004.

**8: Re. section 7.2.2, third paragraph from the end.** Here we suggest that UNDP in the future might transform the execution of the Ituri project from the mode of direct execution, which was used during the evaluated period, to a mode of indirect execution. The term “indirect” execution of a UNDP-initiated project by the local government of Ituri is meant to highlight the effort made by UNDP to assist the local government to recuperate its full governing responsibility.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1: Map of the DRC



Map No. 4007 Rev. 0 UNITED NATIONS  
January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section



## Appendix 2: Terms of Reference for consultant recruited by Norad

### **Terms of Reference for an independent review of UNDP-Peace Building and Development in the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).**

#### **Background**

In 2003, the UNDP, with the support of the Norwegian Government launched a project in support of peacebuilding and community development activities in the most affected areas of the DRC, especially in Ituri (Oriental province), where the population is caught in between internal conflicts. The project aims to support local initiatives which promote inter-community reconciliation, improve access to, and quality of basic social infrastructures and services, revitalise community development mechanisms and build the capacity of community based organisations. In addition special programs are developed for hiv/aids awareness-raising campaigns. The government of Norway has contributed NOK 22 million to the project, which was designed for a two-year period.

The project is expected to be finalised by September 2006. In exchanges between UNDP and the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, it was agreed that the project would be evaluated by a team of two independent consultants. One consultant will be provided by UNDP and one will be appointed by the Norwegian Government. The review will be organised and managed by the Norwegian Embassy in collaboration with the UNDP. Logistical and administrative support will be provided by UNDP Kinshasa and other partners, as appropriate.

#### **Objectives**

The purpose of the review is to assess the project with regard to:

- Progress towards, and achievements of the project's stated goal and objectives, taking into account prevailing political and security conditions;
- The coordination with relevant national programs and other relevant activities undertaken by the Government, UNDP or international community;
- The quality of planning, organisation and implementation;
- If possible, describe impact on the ground, and the perceptions of beneficiaries and communities.

The evaluation will analyse the above with a focus on the following:

- Intervention strategies: what were the strategies used? Were they relevant and efficient?;
- In what ways did the project affect the ability of key institutions in Ituri to uphold or strengthen their performance, and gain legitimacy?;
- Participation of beneficiaries and national structures throughout the project cycle: what actors/national structures were strengthened and/or weakened as a result of the project, and what were the implications on the conflict?;
- How did the project affect the security situation in the area, and vice versa?;
- What resources were brought into the area (e.g. funds, personnel, logistical supplies), and what effect did this have on the conflict situation?;
- Implementation/management issues: what were the main management and implementation issues raised? What solutions were found to overcome problems? Which recommendations could be made for the future?

The review should provide concrete recommendations to UNDP and the Embassy describing actions needed to adjust the project.

**Responsibilities and outputs**

The responsibilities and outputs of the consultants include:

- A review of all relevant documentation;
- The preparation of a review work plan, setting out activities, deliverables and a timetable;
- Discussions with key stakeholders, informants and beneficiaries in Kinshasa and in the field;
- Field visits to project sites;
- An outline of preliminary findings and recommendations, for observations by UNDP, the Norwegian Embassy, and Norad;
- A briefing to UNDP-Kinshasa and the Norwegian Embassy on these preliminary findings, and;
- Submission of a final draft review report in English including an executive summary. The review report should not exceed 30 pages (appendices not included).

**Effort, timing and qualifications**

For this effort, it is estimated that two consultants would be required for a period of four weeks. While the UNDP provides an internal consultant, Norad has recruited an external consultant on behalf of the Embassy. The evaluation will be preceded by a preparatory phase with preliminary desk review and meeting of key stakeholders and informants in Kinshasa.

The evaluation team will then organise collective/individual interviews/meetings with beneficiaries, Norway's representatives, UNDP staff, Government representatives, and eventual technical partners. Field visits on the project implementation sites will be organised in Ituri for about 2 weeks.

After having conducted the evaluation, the preliminary results will be presented to the Norwegian Government, UNDP and Norad. The final report shall be submitted within 1 week of the end of the mission.

The timeframe includes the necessary preparations, field visit, writing of the draft report and final report.

Ms Ingrid Samset, a researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), was chosen as the consultant provided by the Norwegian government. Ms Samset has extensive knowledge of both the DRC in particular and the wider region, as well as of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. She is an experienced researcher with good skills in review and evaluation techniques. Ms Samset also speaks French fluently.

## Appendix 3: Terms of Reference for consultant recruited by UNDP

### **EVALUATION PROJECT PEACE BUILDING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN ITURI**

#### 1. Introduction

The project seeks to foster an environment favourable to human development activities in the most affected areas in the Eastern DRC, in particular in Ituri (Oriental province) where the population is caught in between internal conflicts. The project aims to support local initiatives which promote inter-community reconciliation, improve access to and quality of basic social infrastructures and services, revitalize community development mechanisms and build the capacity of community based organizations. In addition special programs have been developed for HIV/AIDS awareness-raising campaigns. The government of Norway has contributed NOK 22 million to the project, which was designed for a two-year period.

The project is expected to be finalized by September 2006. In exchanges between UNDP and the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, it was agreed that the project be evaluated by a team of independent consultants .

The review is expected to provide valuable information and lessons learned for the continued implementation of post conflict and peace building initiatives. The evaluation report will be shared with partners.

#### 2. Objectives of the evaluation

In 2003, with the support of the Norwegian Government, UNDP launched a project in support of peacebuilding and community development in DRC's most affected areas, specifically Ituri. This project is due to be close by mid-2006 and it is thus important to review results achieved and draw lessons of this early stage intervention implemented in a difficult security situation.

The purpose of this evaluation is to :

- assess the extend to which the project has achieved its stated goals and objectives, taking into account prevailing political and security conditions,
- the coordination established with relevant national programs and other relevant activities undertaken by the Government, UNDP or international community,
- the quality of planning, organization and implementation
- perceptions of beneficiaries and communities
- if possible, the impact on the ground
- evaluate the need to pursue the support in order to define the hand over to another structure.

To do so, the evaluation should provide information on :

- the degree of progress towards the expected result

- the subjacent factors which are out of the project's control and influence its interventions (threats and opportunities)
- the strategic dimension and relevance of the intervention
- UNDP's added value
- Outline of current and future needs.

In addition to these central issues, the evaluation will also analyse the following issues:

- intervention strategies : what were the strategies used? Were they relevant and efficient?
- local capacity building: how has the project contributed to build local capacities?
- participation of beneficiaries and national structures throughout the project cycle: to what extent have beneficiaries and national structures been implicated in the project's interventions?
- perception of the beneficiaries about incidence of the project: how do the beneficiaries feel about the incidence of the project's interventions?
- implementation/management issues: what were the main management and implementation issues raised? What solutions were found to overcome problems? Which recommendations could be made for the future?

The evaluation should also analyse the partnership strategy, and more specifically following issues:

- has the partnership approach been efficient and what type of partnership has been established (political, technical, financial, knowledge sharing), with whom and what has been its strategic importance to reach the outcome?
- has the partnership strategy created synergies (i.e. other partners, other UNDP projects, Government, etc.) and in which sense?

### 3. Scope of the evaluation

This final evaluation will analyse the project's intervention from start of the project until currently. It will help to highlight the relevance, performance and results of the project.

### 4. Products expected from the evaluation

The major outputs expected from the outcome evaluation are:

- The preparation of a review work plan, setting out activities, deliverables and a timetable
- An outline of preliminary findings and recommendations, for observations by UNDP and the Norwegian Embassy ;
- A briefing to UNDP-Kinshasa and the Norwegian Embassy on these preliminary findings and
- Submission of a final draft review report in English and French including an executive summary, results and lessons learned and best practises. The review report should not exceed 20 pages (appendices not included).

### 5. Methodology and evaluation approach

The evaluation be preceded by a preparatory phase with preliminary desk review and meeting of key stakeholders and informants in Kinshasa.

The evaluation team will then organise individual and collective interviews / meetings with beneficiaries, Norway's representatives, UNDP staff, Government representatives and eventually technical partners. Field visits on the projects implementation sites will then be organised in Ituri for about 3 weeks.

After having conducted the evaluation, the preliminary results will be presented to the Norwegian Government and UNDP. The final report should be submitted 1 week after the end of the mission.

For this effort, it is estimated that two consultants would be required for a period of four-five weeks. The timeframe includes the necessary preparations, field visit, writing of the draft report and final report.

## 6. Evaluation Team

The joint evaluation team will be composed of two international consultants, one appointed by the Norwegian Government and one by UNDP. The team should have the appropriate balance of background, skills and experience in program review and evaluation techniques, knowledge of and experience with post conflict and peace building initiatives, knowledge of the Great Lakes conflicts, as well as experience with UNDP processes and procedures. They should be fluent in English and French (writing and speech).

The UNDP consultant should have following profile:

- Master degree in social science, international affairs or similar
- Strong experience in post-conflict and development program and project evaluation,
- 2 years experience with post conflict and peace building initiatives in Africa (experience in the Great Lakes region will be considered as an asset)
- 6 – 8 years experience with UN, with a sound knowledge of UNDP processes and procedures
- fluency in English and French (writing and speech).

## 7. Implementation Arrangements

The review will be organized and managed by the Norwegian Embassy and UNDP with logistical and administrative support provided by UNDP Kinshasa and other partners, as appropriate.

## Appendix 4: Timeline of evaluation

<i>Time (in 2006, if not otherwise indicated)</i>	<i>Activity</i>
February-March	Recruitment of evaluation team
March-early April	Preparations for fieldwork
April 18	Evaluators arrive in Kinshasa
April 19-20	Meetings and document review in Kinshasa
April 21	Evaluators travel from Kinshasa to Bunia
April 21-23	Meetings with UNDP staff in Bunia, selection of micro projects to study, preparation of project visits, document review
April 24	Meeting with representatives of most of the UNDP's partner organisations on the project based in the Bunia area (Irumu and Djugu territories)
April 24-25	10 micro projects in Bunia area visited, partners and beneficiaries consulted
April 26	Travel Bunia-Mahagi by evaluators and a staff member from UNDP Bunia
April 26	Meeting with representatives of most of UNDP's partners on the project in the Mahagi territory
April 26-27	5 micro projects in Mahagi area visited, partners and beneficiaries consulted
April 28	Travel onwards Mahagi-Aru
April 28	Meeting with representatives of UNDP's partners in Aru
April 28-30	7 micro projects in Aru territory visited, partners and beneficiaries consulted
May 1	Further interviews and document review in Aru
May 2	Travel back from Aru to Bunia
May 2-4	2 remaining micro projects in Bunia area studied. Meetings with partners, local authorities, and interviews with UNDP Bunia staff and others
May 5	Evaluators travel back from Bunia to Kinshasa
May 6-11	Document review, interviews with UNDP staff in Kinshasa, drafting of report, preparation of debriefing
May 12	Presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions to UNDP in Kinshasa
May 13	Evaluators travel from Kinshasa to Luanda
May 14-15	Further document review and drafting of report
May 16	Presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions to the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda
May 17	Departure of evaluators from Luanda
Mid-May to mid-June	Writing and submission of first draft of evaluation report
Late June, early July	Comments by stakeholders, revision by authors
July 9	Submission of final draft of English version of report, not language edited
3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter	Language editing of English version. Translation of report from English to French. Submission of final version of report in both languages.
4 <sup>th</sup> quarter	Additional comments to report by UNDP, extension of addendum. Stakeholder considerations on distribution of report.
January 2007	English version of report formatted into CMI Report. Both versions printed, sent to commissioners and made publicly available.

## Appendix 5: Micro projects selected for study

Location (in Ituri)	Time of visit to project	Budget line	Project code	Partner	Name of project	Budget (in USD)	Status of project (per 31.03.06)
Bunia town and surroundings	24.04.06	Roads and bridges	A5	Groupe Syabo	Rehabilitation of the Matete bridge	29,786	Completed
		Peacebuilding	A61	ISJ	Rehabilitation of the judicial inspection building in Bunia	27,681	Ongoing
		Peacebuilding	A1	Bunia town council	Bunia stadium	50,529	Completed
		Peacebuilding	A51	ADAPE	Promotion of brick production and of socio-economic reintegration in Mudzipela	12,310	Ongoing
		Peacebuilding	A53	ADVSE	Promotion of a blood bank for Ituri	27,510	Ongoing
	25.04.06	Health centres	A46	COSAMA	Maternity centre in Mandro	28,580	Ongoing
		Peacebuilding	A47	PAMA	Socio-economic reintegration in Mandro	25,450	Ongoing
		Peacebuilding	A3	ISCO	Training of hairdressers	20,626	Completed
		HIV/AIDS	S3	FOSI	Support to the fight against HIV/AIDS in Ituri	24,237	Ongoing
		Peacebuilding	A10	ACSA	Dialogue with the population of Ituri	24,000	Ongoing
<b>Total</b>						<b>270,709</b>	
Mahagi territory	26.04.06	AGR*	M18	FOMMA	Reinforcement of women's associations	17,204	Ongoing
		Peacebuilding	M19	ADSSE	Building of a peace tribunal in Mahagi	40,764	Ongoing
	27.04.06	Water sources	M16	CIDRI	Rehabilitation of the network of drinking water in Logo	8,299	Completed
		Primary schools	M17	AMEPCO	Rehabilitation of the Adju primary school	27,000	Ongoing
	Peacebuilding	M07	BDD	Support to functional literacy	15,235	Completed	
<b>Total</b>						<b>108,502</b>	
Aru territory	28.04.06	AGR*	AR30	AFAGR	Micro-credit to women in Aru	21,574**	Completed
		AGR*	AR35	FLEVICA	Promotion of honey production (apiculture)	14,050	Ongoing
	29.04.06	Primary schools	AR31	CODEKA	Rehabilitation of the Katanga primary school	27,020	Ongoing
		Primary schools	AR32	GRODEPRON	Rehabilitation of the Poni primary school	21,580	Ongoing
		Water sources	AR23	AGEP/AER	Three water pumps and boreholes in Ariwara	26,300	Completed
	30.04.06	Peacebuilding	AR1	Radio Océan	Support to the Ocean community radio station	11,000	Completed
		AGR*	AR9	SAD-Congo	Promotion of egg production (aviculture) in Aru	12,118	Completed
<b>Total</b>						<b>133,642</b>	
Bunia area	04.05.06	AGR*	A57	FAO	Clean cuttings of manioc to 1200 households	29,850	To start
		Training	A58	DIAS-GECEO	Training seminar for partner organisations	12,808	Completed
<b>Total</b>						<b>53,584</b>	

\*Income-generating activities (*activités génératrices de revenus* in French).

\*\*Given that this is the budget of a micro-credit project, a part of the amount disbursed by UNDP (USD 16,000) was to be reimbursed by the partner organisation. Our presentation and calculations are made, however, on the basis of an estimation that the budget of this micro project is to be considered as a donation, and not as partly a donation, partly a loan as it is in reality.

## Appendix 5B: Representativeness of micro projects selected for study

*Introductory note.* In this appendix we provide further details of the 24 micro projects we selected for investigation in this evaluation, and compare the profile of these projects with that of the overall micro-project portfolio on the five dimensions identified as selection criteria, namely: thematic and geographical distribution of projects, their budget size, whether they are ongoing or ended, and type of partners. The main source of the information on the overall portfolio is two lists provided by the project team in Bunia, which gives the status of the micro projects as of 31.03.2006.

### 1. General overview

Total number of micro projects selected for investigation: 24

Total number of micro projects: 85<sup>42</sup>

Conclusion: The micro projects selected for scrutiny constitute 28.2% of the total number of micro projects.

### 2. Thematic distribution

**Table. Distribution of micro projects across budget lines**

Budget line	Micro projects in sample		Micro projects in project		Conclusion for this budget line
	Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion	
Peacebuilding	10	41.7%	27	31.8%	Over-represented
Income-generating activities	5	20.8%	30	35.3%	Under-represented
Roads and bridges	1	4.1%	5	5.6%	Under-represented
Water sources	2	8.3%	5	5.6%	Over-represented
Primary schools	3	12.5%	9	10.6%	Over-represented
Health and maternity centres	1	4.1%	4	4.7%	Under-represented
HIV/AIDS	1	4.1%	4	4.7%	Under-represented
Training	1	4.1%	1	1.2%	Over-represented

Conclusion: In the sample of selected micro projects there is a bias in favour of peacebuilding projects in particular, while projects of the income-generating activity type are the most under-represented.

### 3. Geographical spread

**Table. Distribution of micro projects across geographical areas in the Ituri district**

Location	Micro projects in sample		Micro projects in project		Conclusion for this location
	Number	Proportion	Number	Proportion	
Bunia	12	50.0%	46	54.2%	Under-represented
Mahagi	5	20.8%	11	12.9%	Over-represented
Aru	7	29.2%	17	20.0%	Over-represented
Kasenyi	0	0%	5	5.6%	Under-represented
Djugu	0	0%	2	2.4%	Under-represented
Mambasa	0	0%	4	4.7%	Under-represented

<sup>42</sup> This is the number of micro projects that had been supported by 31.03.2006. This count includes: (a) the one micro project that was still to start but that had been approved (the FAO project) as well as (b) the micro project that had been stopped (the pigsty project); and it collapses into one project the three contracts concluded with the APLCS on activities to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS.



Conclusion: There is a bias in the sample in favour of micro projects located in Mahagi and Aru territories, while projects in the Kasenyi, Bunia, Djugu, and Mambasa areas are under-represented.

#### 4. Budgetary size

##### 4.1 Share of total micro-project budget made up by the projects in the sample

Total budget of the micro projects in the sample: USD 555,511.

Total budget of all the projects supported within the Ituri project by 31.03.06: USD 1,637,964.

Conclusion: The selected micro projects made up 33.9 % of the total budget for the micro projects.

##### 4.2 Average budget size of micro projects

Average budget size of the selected projects: USD 23,146.

Average budget size of all the projects: USD 19,270.

Conclusion: A bias exists in the sample in favour of micro projects with bigger budgets.

##### 4.3 Variations in budget size

Among the selected projects, budgets vary between USD 8,299 and USD 50,529.

Among all the micro projects, the smallest budget is USD 2,986 and the biggest USD 50,529.

Conclusion: The selection excludes the smallest micro projects in budgetary terms.

#### 5. Completed versus ongoing projects

**Table. Distribution of micro projects across different statuses**

<i>Status</i>	<i>Micro projects in sample</i>		<i>Micro projects in project</i>		<i>Conclusion for this status</i>
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	
Completed	10	41.7%	49	57.7%	Under-represented
Ongoing	13	54.2%	34	40.0%	Over-represented
To start	1	4.1%	1	1.2%	Over-represented
Stopped	0	0%	1	1.2%	Over-represented

Conclusion: The sample is biased in favour of ongoing projects.

#### 6. Type of partner

**Table. Distribution of micro projects across types of implementing partner**

<i>Type of partner</i>	<i>Micro projects in sample</i>		<i>Micro projects in project</i>		<i>Conclusion for this type of partner</i>
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	
Local NGO	22	91.2%	79	92.9%	Well represented
Others:	2	8.3%	6	7.1%	
Government agency	1		1		
International NGO	0		3		
Bilateral development cooperation agency	0		1		
UN agency	1		1		

Conclusion: The sample has roughly the same distribution as the portfolio as a whole of projects implemented by local NGOs versus projects implemented by other types of agency.

## Appendix 6: Bibliography

*Introductory notes.* This list includes sources that were explicitly referred to in the text of this evaluation. The evaluation is, however, also based on a review of a number of other documents, of the following five types in particular: (1) news and analysis of the current situation in Ituri and the DRC; (2) contracts, interim and final reports from the micro projects studied in the evaluation; (3) evaluation methodology; (4) various documents from or about the UNDP and UN system in DRC; and (5) reports commissioned by UNDP in DRC from independent consultants related to projects beyond the Ituri project. Sources of these types are not included in the list below.

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## Appendix 7: List of informants

*Introductory notes.* The list identifies the name, position, and organisational affiliation of persons who provided information to the evaluation team about or related to the UNDP peacebuilding and development project in Ituri. In cases where we met one informant several times, the time and place of the first meeting is noted. With the exception of Luanda, Angola all meetings took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo. During our visits to the micro projects in Ituri we were in several cases not able to identify all the persons who provided relevant information, such as beneficiaries of the project met at the project site. The list is therefore not entirely exhaustive. For the significance of acronyms we refer to the list of acronyms in Appendix 8.

<i>Last name</i>	<i>First name</i>	<i>Position and organisational affiliation</i>	<i>Date of (first) meeting</i>	<i>Place of (first) meeting</i>	<i>Team members present*</i>
Abipenjongga	Innocent	Representative of <i>Centre des jeunes – espoir de demain</i> (Youth centre – tomorrow’s hope)	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Abubakaré	Assani	Representative of COSAGR	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Adheribo	Archange	Representative of the organisation that had provided materials for the construction of the water pumps, ADEP-AER project in Ariwara	29.04.06	Ariwara	YM, IS
Adjuli	Monseigneur	Co-manager of a mini-cooperative within the egg production project of SAD-Congo	30.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Adubonglo	John	Representative of CESADEMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Adyoko	Désiré	<i>Chef de collectivité</i> (local leader), Ariwara town, Aru territory	29.04.06	Ariwara	YM, IS
Agasuru	Célestin	Leader of FOSI	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Aliango	Lourence	Representative of CESADEMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Alimacon	Joseph	Representative of RIMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Alirachi	Rose	Co-manager of a mini-cooperative within the egg production project of SAD-Congo	30.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Apamba	David	Director of the Ocean community radio	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Aredibho	Pete	President of ACBE/AGEP-AER	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Aromborac	Sophie	Manager of water source, CIDRI water network project, Logo	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Awacango	Monique	Representative of AMAPAD	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Azaro	Azazo	Representative of FLEVICA Aru	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Bako	Sévérin	Representative of GRODEPRON	29.04.06	Poni	YM, IS
Bhayo Debho	Isaac	Coordinator of SBES	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Bidra	Madeleine	Social assistant of AFAGR	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Borve	Jacqueline	Representative of PAMA	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Budza	Jacqueline	Representative of FOMI	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Bulati	Jean-Pierre	Project assistant, the Ituri peacebuilding and development project, UNDP DRC	21.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Chandujo	Richard	Representative of BDD	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Cissé	Babacar	Country director, UNDP DRC	19.04.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Danailov	Silvia	Emergency officer, UNICEF DRC	09.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Djuza	Busu	Brick production worker and participant in the ADAPE reintegration project in Mudzipela	24.04.06	Mudzipela	YM, IS
Dolan	Chris	Reintegration consultant, UNHCR DRC	11.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Drudra	Philippe	Coordinator of CERAD	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Duka	Simbilio	Mayor/ <i>chef de la cité</i> , Bunia	03.05.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Durand	Jean-Robert	Focal security officer, MONUC Bunia	22.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS

Dzaringa	Michel	Agronomist, FAO's Bunia office	04.05.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Edeti	Ena	Director and teacher at Katanga primary school	29.04.06	Katanga (Aru)	YM, IS
Edmond	Richard	Journalist at the Ocean community radio	30.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Fiama	Sylvanusa	1 <sup>st</sup> deputy magistrate of the Bunia tribunal	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Gadio	Drura	Teacher at Katanga primary school	29.04.06	Katanga (Aru)	YM, IS
Gashor	Claude	Representative of ADVSE	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Gatelli	Zenaide	Reintegration expert, the COMREC project, UNDP DRC	22.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Geilimo	Robert	Community development expert, the Ituri peacebuilding and development project, UNDP DRC	21.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Gomis	Charles	Director of political affairs, MONUC headquarters	20.04.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
González	Gustavo	Special advisor to the post-conflict programme, UNDP DRC	10.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Gutru	Pauline	Coordinator of AFD	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Hermine	Akumu	Representative of FOMMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Hoksnes	Håvard	First secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Luanda	14.05.06	Luanda	YM, IS
Hulgich	German	Coordinator, Central Management and Coordination Unit, UNOPS DRC	20.04.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Jachnik	Clive	Principal technical advisor, the MRR project, UNDP DRC	12.05.06	Kinshasa	IS
Kabasebe	Christope	Representative of COSAGEM	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Kandole	Jean-Pierre	Head of FAO's Bunia office	04.05.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Kashangabuye	Joseph	Representative of Fraternité	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Katanabo	Jean	Representative of COSAGEM	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Kerovi	Justine	Representative of BASADI	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Kirero	Arsène	Liaison officer, OCHA's Bunia office	22.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Kpada Walo	Cléophas	Representative of AJPPR	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Larrauri	Fernando	Team leader, Post-conflict Unit, UNDP DRC	19.04.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Leloup	Bernard	Political analyst, Platform of Belgian NGOs	10.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Leni	Dradebho	Teacher at Katanga primary school	29.04.06	Katanga (Aru)	YM, IS
Liengu	Aimé	Representative of the peace tribunal, Mahagi	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Likambo	Avone	Territorial administrator, Mahagi territory	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM, IS
Likambo	Jados	Journalist at the Ocean community radio	30.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Lipochi	Anyolitho	Representative of LIGAO	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Liripa Banga	Téléspore	President of ADAPE	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Lofoli-Keka	John	President of CDJ	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Lotsovo	Josée	Representative of AMAB	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Madhira	Jean-Pierre	Leader of FLEVICA Aru	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Manzima	Gilberte	Representative of FOMI	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Manzima	Gilberte	<i>Animateur</i> (social worker) for FOSI	25.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Mapa	Charité	Representative of ISCO	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Mawa	Tshandi	Teacher at Poni primary school	29.04.06	Poni	YM, IS
Mazio	Jean-Marc	Representative of CONDIFFA	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Mbibi	Jean-Paul	Representative of ADSSE	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Mbo	Paboli	Representative of AGEPE-AER	29.04.06	Ariwara	YM, IS
Michaud	Jean-François	Head of office, Oxfam Québec Aru	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Mpabenda	Faustin	Director of ADVSE	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Mugisa	Lokana	Brick production worker and participant in the	24.04.06	Mudzipela	YM, IS

		ADAPE reintegration project in Mudzipela			
Mukoko	Daniel	Senior economist, Policy and Strategy Unit, UNDP DRC	12.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Musango	Paul	Representative of ADSSE	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Mweru	Walter	Representative of ADVSE	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Ndrujuo	Joseph	Technician, CIDRI	01.05.06	Aru	YM
Ngandru	Innocent	Coordinator, CIDRI	01.05.06	Aru	YM
Ngendo	Joachim	HIV/AIDS expert connected to the blood bank project implemented by ADVSE	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Ngiana	Makanda	Deputy territorial administrator, Aru territory	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Noli	Albert	Manager of group of construction workers, the judicial inspection building project implemented by ISJ	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Nongo	Jean-Paul	Representative of AJPDI	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Nshombo	Lovy	Head of the UNDP office and manager of the COMREC project, Aru	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Nyamamba	Jeanne	Representative of FOMMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Obedi	Charles	Teacher at Poni primary school	29.04.06	Poni	YM, IS
Odhipio	Obatre	Participant in the honey production project of FLEVICA Aru	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Odradebho	Audrice	Rehabilitation expert, the Ituri peacebuilding and development project, UNDP DRC	21.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Okua	Boniface	Coordinator of IDR	28.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Olima	Edouard	Teacher at Poni primary school	29.04.06	Poni	YM, IS
Pelo	Cécile	Peacebuilding and reconciliation expert, the Ituri peacebuilding and development project, UNDP DRC	21.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Pironga	Baudouin	Representative of CTONGD	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Pituwa	Richard	Representative of the Revelation community radio station, and of <i>Jeunesse espoir</i>	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Rodriguez	Muriel	Political affairs officer, MONUC headquarters	20.04.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Rwabona	Mugabe	Deputy district commissioner, Ituri district	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Schaefer	Caroline	Specialist in monitoring and evaluation, Post-conflict unit, UNDP DRC	08.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Songa	Urombi	Representative of BASADI	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Suminwa	Judith	Programme advisor, Post-conflict unit, UNDP DRC	19.04.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Tanguay	Marie-Pierre	Social work <i>animatrice</i> , Oxfam Québec Aru	02.05.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Thomdabo	Rémy	Representative of COSAMA	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Togola	Sekou	Chief technical advisor (project manager), the Ituri peacebuilding and development project, UNDP DRC	03.05.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Traoré	Modibo	Humanitarian affairs officer, OCHA's Bunia office	22.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Tshibamba	Pierre	Executive director, SAD-Congo	27.04.06	Aru	YM, IS
Tshibangu	Augustin	Administrative and financial secretary, the Ituri peacebuilding and development project, UNDP DRC	21.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Udaga	Jean	Representative of AFAEJ	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Ukerdogu	Jalukol	Representative of AMEPCO	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Umika	Lokwa	Representative of AMEPCO	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Unegi	Joachim	Representative of LIPADHO	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Unyutha	Jacques	Representative of the Colombe community radio station	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Usumange	Immaculée	Representative of AMAPAD	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM

Utengi	Pascal	Representative of UGAO	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Utshinda	Dénise	Representative of FOMMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Uwira	Asandra	Representative of BDD	27.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Valent	Roberto	Deputy resident representative, and UNDP programme coordinator, UNDP DRC	12.05.06	Kinshasa	YM, IS
Veit	Alex	PhD student, Humboldt University, Berlin	03.05.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Vzele	Marc	<i>Animateur</i> , CIDRI	01.05.06	Aru	YM
Waissala	Delvin	Leader of ACSA	24.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Wathum	Veircan	Representative of RIMA	26.04.06	Mahagi	YM
Yaspi	Ramazani	Representative of ISCO	25.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Yuma	Umudi	Deputy leader of ACSA	25.04.06	Bunia	YM, IS
Øyen	Arild R.	Ambassador of Norway, Luanda	16.05.06	Luanda	YM, IS

\*YM: Yvon Madore; IS: Ingrid Samset.

## Appendix 8: List of acronyms and abbreviations


<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Significance</i>
ACSA	Association des communicateurs en santé
ADAPE	Association des démobilisés amateurs de la protection de l'environnement
ADSSE	Association pour le développement social et la sauvegarde de l'environnement
ADVSE	Association de développement pour la vie sociale et l'environnement
AFAEJ	Association de formation artisanale et encadrement des jeunes désœuvrés
AFAGR	Association des femmes pour les activités génératrices de revenus
AFD	Association des femmes pour le développement
AGEP-AER	Adduction gravitaire d'eau potable – Aménagement des espaces rurales
AGR	Activité génératrice de revenus
AIDS	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AJPDI	Association des jeunes pour le développement de l'Ituri
AJPPR	Association des jeunes pour la promotion de la paix et pour la reconstruction
AMAB	Association des mamans Anti-Bwaki
AMAPAD	Association des mamans pour la paix durable
AMEPCO	Association médicale pour l'éradication de la pauvreté congolaise
BASADI	Bureau d'appui et des soutiens aux actions humanitaires pour le reclassement des déplacés en Ituri
BDD	Bureau diocésain de développement
CBO	Community-based organisation
CDJ	Cercle de développement des jeunes
CERAD	Centre d'étude et de recherche d'action pour le développement
CESADEMA	Centre de santé pour le développement communautaire de Mahagi
CIDRI	Centre d'initiation du développement rural en Ituri
COMREC	Projet de reconstruction communautaire, réintégration des ex-combatants, et réduction des armes légères
CONDIFFA	Condition féminine et famille
COOPI	Cooperazione internazionale
COSAGEM	Comité de santé du groupement de Mandro
COSAGR	Comité de santé du groupement de Rwampara
COSAMA	Comité de santé de Mandro
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
CTB	Coopération technique belge
CTONGD	Collectif territorial des organisations non gouvernementales de développement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEX	Direct execution
DIAS-GECEO	Diagnostic Ingenierry
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
FAPC	Forces armées populaires du Congo
FLEVICA	Le fleuve d'eaux vives qui coulent aux autres
FOMI	Forum des mamans de l'Ituri
FOMMA	Forum des mamans de Mahagi
FOSI	Forum SIDA
GRODEPRON	Groupe pour le développement et la protection de la nature
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
IDP	Internally displaced person
IDR	Initiatives de développement rural
ISCO	Initiative pour le sauvetage des coiffeurs
ISJ	Institut saint Joseph
LCPA	Local Committee for Project Approval



MONUC	Mission de l'organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo
MRC	Mouvement révolutionnaire du Congo
MRR	Mécanisme de réponse rapide
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOK	Norwegian kroner
Norad	Norwegian agency for development cooperation
OCHA	United Nations Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Oxfam	Oxford famine relief
PAMA	Programme Amkeni Wamama
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RCN	Réseau citoyens – Citizens' Network
REMMA	Réseau des mamans de Mambasa
RESCO	Renforcement de stratégies communautaires
SAD-Congo	Secours et aide aux déshérités – Congo
SBES	Service de bien-être social
SIDA	Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)
UGAO	Union des groupements agricoles organisés
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States dollars
WHO	World Health Organisation

### Appendix 9: Organisational framework

*Explanatory note.* Boxes identify actors at the national level based in Kinshasa; circles actors based at the local level in the Ituri district.



## Appendix 10: Micro-project duration

### Duration of selected micro projects that had been completed\* as of 31 March 2006

*Note.* We present here information regarding six of the micro projects in the Ituri projects; namely those among the 24 in our sample (1) that had been completed by 31 March 2006, and (2) for which we dispose of sufficient data regarding duration details.

Micro-project code	Name of project	Estimated duration, in number of months	Signing of contract (last date of the two)	Disbursement of 1 <sup>st</sup> instalment ( <i>date de démarrage</i> )	Disbursement of last instalment ( <i>clôture effective</i> )	Submission of final report from partner organisation	Number of months between 1 <sup>st</sup> and last instalment (excluding the months when instalment was disbursed)	Number of months between signing of contract and final report (excluding the months when contract was signed, and when report was submitted)	Deviation from estimated duration: extra months spent
A5	Matete bridge	3	5 Mar 2004	22 Apr 2004	20 May 2005	Sep 2005	12	17	9/14
A3	Training of hairdressers	6	28 Jun 2004	20 Sep 2004	28 Feb 2006	25 Mar 2006	16	19	10/13
M16	Drinking water in Logo	2	30 Nov 2004	17 Dec 2004	21 Sep 2005	Sep 2005	8	9	6/7
AR30	Micro-credit for women in Aru**	3	22 Mar 2005	3 May 2005	17 Aug 2005	10 Jan 2006	2	9	-1/6
AR1	Community radio station in Aru	3	26 Nov 2004	5 Apr 2004	12 Aug 2005	28 Nov 2005	15	11	12/8
AR9	Egg production in Aru	4	Nov 2004	16 Feb 2005	10 Mar 2006	20 Apr 2006	12	16	8/12
<b>Average</b>		<b>2.8</b>					<b>10.8</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>7.3/10</b>

\*Completed in the sense of UNDP Bunia having transferred the last funding instalment to the partner organisation.

\*\*The partner organisation has yet to pay back the loan it received from UNDP within this micro project. In the strict sense the project is hence not yet completed.

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## SUMMARY

Building peace through community development: this was the key idea of the evaluated project, which was run in the war-torn Ituri district of the DRC from 2003 onwards. The planning of the project did not take sufficiently into account the difficult conditions under which it would be run. Centralisation of project management tasks to UNDP and UNOPS in Kinshasa, and the shortage of resources that were made available for the project at this central level, complicated implementation efforts on the ground. Strategic management was also weak. Still, many positive results materialised as the local partner organisations welcomed the idea of building peace through community development and acted on it in their micro projects. Thanks to many skilful local partners and a dedicated UN project team in Ituri, and despite considerable delays, the micro projects came a long way towards reaching the aims of reconciliation, reconstruction, local capacity building, and HIV/AIDS awareness raising. As a whole the project contributed to launching the processes of peacebuilding and community development in the district. But given the uniqueness of the project and its weak coordination with other agencies, little ground was prepared for a scale-up and a transfer of results in a subsequent phase.

The peacebuilding and community development project was hence a success – but a success that materialised in spite of an unsuitable organisational framework, weak strategic management, insufficient coordination, and continued violence in Ituri. It was in other words a “success by default”; one that came about despite choices made within the project that were not the most amenable to goal attainment. Yet given the project’s positive results, its still unrealised potential, the need for such a project in Ituri, and the learning of lessons within UNDP; the report recommends that the project continue and proposes a number of reforms that should be made within it in a new phase.

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