

## Opposition Parties and the Upcoming 2008 Parliamentary Elections in Angola

Inge Amundsen  
Markus Weimer

**WP 2008: 9**



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## Acknowledgements

This study gives a background to the upcoming parliamentary elections in Angola on 5<sup>th</sup> September 2008. The purpose of the study is to provide an overview of the political situation, the election system and last, but not least, the opposition parties of Angola.

Please note that this study was completed in August 2008, during the election campaign and before the elections were held.

We are grateful for all information and inspiration provided by our main Angolan research partners, Dr Nelson Pestana and Mr Rui Seamba. We also thank all the party leaders, spokesmen, and other party officials who were so willing to answer all our questions.

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Any factual errors, mistakes and possibly biased presentations are solely our responsibility. Please inform us about any serious inaccuracies. This is work in progress.

Bergen, August 2008

**Inge Amundsen**

**Markus Weimer**

Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)

## Introduction

Parliamentary elections will be held in Angola on 5<sup>th</sup> September 2008, as the first elections in the country since 1992. There are now 138 political parties registered in Angola, and 14 parties (including four party coalitions) have recently been approved for the 2008 elections,<sup>1</sup> but no comprehensive study has been made on these party organisations.

A well-functioning party system is a prerequisite for political democratisation, and a real and realistic opposition is a prerequisite for a representative democracy. As Schattsneider formulated it, “political parties created democracy and (...) modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties” (Schattsneider 1942:1). Political parties are the main channel between citizens and political decision-makers. Besides, people also have a fundamental right to choose their political leaders, and basic human rights include the political rights of association and representation, and ultimately the right to change the government peacefully, through elections.

Under certain conditions, the upcoming Angolan parliamentary elections can positively add to the country’s process of democratic consolidation. This will partly depend on the ability of the political parties to fulfil the necessary functions and roles of parties in a liberal democracy. One of the structural factors that can cause weaknesses in party organisations (and a weak opposition in particular) is a long history of authoritarianism and one-party rule, which is the case for Angola. Here, a single party has dominated by law and by force. Furthermore, there is a weak social basis for political parties in Angola, and few organic links between parties and civil society. A weak civil society and a lack of interest organisations lead to structural weaknesses also in political parties.

Another inhibiting factor for party and opposition development in Angola is a weak funding base for political parties. The state subventions for party organisations are poor, and the parties have little regular income from membership fees, property, publications and other activities. Of the large number of political parties in Angola, a high percentage are little more than a post-box address, a group of friends, or an ad hoc vote-for-me association for the election of a particular candidate. Most parties have a very thin organisational structure and little complexity. They are weak in terms of organisational elaboration, have few members and few sub-units or secondary organisations, and have developed little “bureaucratisation” or formal procedure.

The weak party organisations also indicate that parties have no or incoherent political programmes and flawed or limited reporting on revenues and spending. They tend to exhibit poor strategic planning and ad hoc decision-making. Internal democracy can also be a problem for many political parties in Angola.

This descriptive study of the political parties of Angola will assess the quality of the political parties along a number of indicators. The study is based on interviews with party officials of the most important political parties, newspaper articles and a review of the few reports available on politics and political parties in Angola.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Comissão Nacional Eleitoral at <http://www.cne.ao/partidos.cfm> (19 Aug 08). See appendix 1 and 3.

## Angola's political history

Angola is formally a multiparty democracy, but with a Freedom House rating of six (with seven as the absolute bottom),<sup>2</sup> Angola cannot be regarded as neither free nor democratic, yet. The upcoming 2008 parliamentary elections can, however, be a step in the right direction.

### From civil war to oil

Angola gained independence when the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed in 1974, but power struggles ensued between the three liberation parties/armies MPLA (backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union), the FNLA (with some support from Congo/Zaire), and UNITA (backed by apartheid South Africa and the USA). Fifteen years of civil war followed, a civil war linked to the control of the state and its resources, with strong international links. It lasted until the cold war ended, until the ruling MPLA formally abandoned Marxism-Leninism, and peace accords were reached in 1991.

Democratic reforms were introduced in Angola in 1991-92 as a part of the negotiated peace accords at Bicesse. This political liberalization coincided with similar democratic developments in a number of other African countries. Political reforms included two constitutional revisions, new laws on associations, the press and political parties, and led to the establishment of a number of new organizations, some independent media, radio stations and a large number of political parties. The first, watershed elections in 1992 brought Angola formally from a (communist) single party rule to a democratic, multiparty political system.

However, as Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, could not accept defeat in the first round of the 1992 presidential elections, and returned to the bush and the armed struggle, Angola was brought back into civil war. This war lingered on until 2002 when Savimbi was finally located and killed by the Angolan army. The last round of civil war was, however, even less "ideological" than the first, it was basically a fight over resources by the ruling MPLA, which controlled the capital and the oil production, and UNITA, which controlled the highlands and the diamond producing areas. Diamonds kept UNITA going, but rapidly increasing oil production determined the final outcome.

The economy of Angola is now growing at an extremely high rate (World Bank estimates are in the range of 26 % growth in 2005 and an expected 41 % in 2007). However, this growth is mainly related to the oil sector and the high oil prices, and no statistics can demonstrate any "trickle down effect" of this oil income windfall.

Although exact figures on poverty are disputed, there is a widespread consensus that the vast majority of people in Angola may be defined as poor. About 70 % of the population lives in poverty and 30 % in "extreme poverty". Maternal mortality is extremely high and life expectancy is low with just over 40 years. Angola has the 17th worst Human Development Index ranking (which is far below its income rank) and the 5th worst Corruption Perceptions Index score. Besides, 2001 data suggest that Angola is one of the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income distribution, and that the differences are increasing (Isaksen et al. 2006:6, UNDP 2005:5).

At the same time, Angola has recently taken over Nigeria as Africa's largest producer of crude oil,<sup>3</sup> and the country is the third largest exporter of diamonds (after South Africa and Botswana). In 2005, the Government's oil revenues rose to ten billion US\$, and oil revenues will probably double in US dollar terms from 2005 to 2010 (IMF 2006). Angola is one of the better resource bestowed countries in the world, because in addition to the large oil reserves, there is gas,

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<sup>2</sup> Freedom House 2006 ratings, available from [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)

<sup>3</sup> Source: [www.businessdayonline.com/national/11066.html](http://www.businessdayonline.com/national/11066.html) (15 Aug 08).

diamonds and a good development potential for a number of other resources like different minerals (gold, iron ore, copper, manganese), as well as timber, fish, and a varied agricultural base.

The large resource base and the relatively small population (roughly 15 million in a country the size of France) make Angola one of the potentially richest countries in the world. As noted, however, the income distribution is highly biased. The majority is poor, living in an economy destroyed by war and without access to even the most basic services. There is almost no middle class, as wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small elite.<sup>4</sup>

## Presidentialism

According to the constitution, Angola is a multiparty democracy, with power separated between the executive branch (the President), the legislature (the National Assembly or Parliament), and the judiciary. However, Angola is a presidential system to an extreme degree, even by African standards.

In formal terms, the President of the Republic is not only Head of State but also Head of Government, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and President of the ruling party. Besides, the Parliament has a very weak mandate, little autonomy and a weak institutional capacity; there is little to no Supreme Court influence on the Government; and civil society and media influence is insignificant. Also, the legacy of one-party communism and a command economy, the civil war and the war economy, as well as the current electoral system, the party constellation in Parliament and political culture factors are rendering support to presidentialism in Angola.

Presidentialism is displayed in the fact that the Government with its prime minister, line ministers, and vice ministers are all nominated (appointed) and can be dismissed by the President. The President is effectively the Head of Government (presiding over the Council of Ministers), he has the exclusive right to dissolve the Parliament and call for new elections, and neither the Government nor the President can be voted out of office by parliamentary vote of no confidence or censure. The Parliament, and thus parliamentary elections, has no direct impact on the composition of government.

This constitutional fact is the basis for labelling Angola formally in the group of presidential systems (contrary to the official Angolan claim that the country is semi-presidential by pointing to the fact that there is a prime minister). Besides, the Prime Minister is constitutionally weak, and the country has been without in periods. The President can in other words dissolve the Parliament, but not vice versa. The President's power of dissolution is neither relative nor restricted.

Furthermore, there are few other constitutional means by which the executive power can be held accountable. For instance, the initiative for new legislation emanates largely from the presidency, which is also the case of the state budget. The President can, through his Council of Ministers, enact laws, decrees, and resolutions; which is to assume most functions normally associated with the legislative branch.

The Parliament is weak in terms of resources, administrative and technical expertise and in terms of internal organization (see below), and since 1992 the ruling party MPLA has been in full control of the parliamentary process through its absolute majority (129 of 220 deputies).

It should be noted, however, that the constitution of Angola dates back to the single party communist era. There were two rounds of constitutional amendments (March and September 1991) that aimed at changing Angola into a multiparty democracy with fundamental political rights and freedoms and the basic principles of a market economy, but the constitution still grants the president virtually unchallenged powers.

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<sup>4</sup> In 2003, "ten Angolans had fortunes exceeding US\$ 100 million (...), while another 49 had more than US\$ 50 million. Topping the rich list was President José Eduardo Dos Santos (...), followed by a parliamentary deputy, two officials in the president's office, an ambassador, a former army chief of staff, and the minister of public works. The seven richest Angolans were all in the government." (McMillan 2005:1).

## The Parliament

The history of the Angolan Parliament is quite short. Prior to the establishment of the National Assembly in 1991-92, there was a very passive Peoples' Assembly. It was passive because it operated in a single-party system and was subjected to the dominance of the single ruling communist party MPLA, which placed itself above all state institutions. The political role of this People's Assembly was completely overshadowed by the MPLA Party Congress, Central Committee and Political Bureau, and indeed the President of the Republic (who was – and is – the MPLA President).

The new Angolan Parliament was established through constitutional changes in 1991, which made it into a multiparty, 220 member unicameral National Assembly. It was elected in September 1992, but with the resumption of civil war shortly after the election, the majority of the 67 deputies elected from the second largest party UNITA did not take up their seats until 1997, five years after their election. At this time, a new agreement between the belligerents formed a *Government of Unity and National Reconciliation*, GURN, which also included UNITA members.<sup>5</sup>

From its election in 1992 until 1997, the reformed National Assembly therefore worked almost as under the Peoples' Congress period, totally dominated by the MPLA. Then, the parliamentary process was again interrupted by a second war period from late 1998 to early 2002.

The recent political history of Angola is thus one of political centralisation and recurring civil war, which has contributed little in terms of democratic traditions on which to build a consolidated Parliament. A political culture of conflict, of administrative secrecy and confidentiality, of clientelism and favouritism (including co-optations: the buying off of political rivals) has given a weak basis for a democratic parliament in Angola.

One example of executive dominance and a lack of respect for formal rules took place during summer 2004. When officially not in session because of holidays (the Angolan Parliament is in session from October 15 to 15 July), two important laws were passed. According to the Constitution no major debates should take place and no important piece of legislation should be passed when the Parliament is not in session; only extraordinary sessions can be called for (Article 96). What happened over the holiday period of 2004 was that the Parliament approved the Land Law and the Petroleum Law, not in plenary but in the Permanent Commission, "because of its importance to the country". There were no real discussions, earlier consultation input from civil society organizations was ignored, and UNITA was even boycotting the session (because of disagreement to that year's postponement of elections) (Amundsen et al. 2005:11).

The economic situation of the Angolan Parliament is not good, and its financial autonomy is weak. In formal terms, the budget of the Parliament is approved by the Parliament itself, but the actual size of the operating budget is a result of allocations made by the Government (Ministry of Finance). According to one survey, the parliamentarians claim the financial resources attributed to the Parliament are limited, and that it even prevents the Parliament and Deputies from accomplishing their mission. (Amundsen et al. 2005:13).

There is also a lack of administrative support for parliamentary work. The deputies expressed their dissatisfaction concerning existence and adequacy of administrative support, in terms of administrative personnel, secretarial staff, availability of expertise on juridical, financial and other technical matters, library etc. Several MPs point to the fact that the number of secretarial staff was sufficient, but that their competence and efficiency is inadequate.

Thus, the right of citizens to elect their representatives is abridged. There are nevertheless two structural factors that can give some parliamentary independence if conditions allow. One is that the Parliament is elected in separate elections (and not simultaneously with the presidential elections). The other is that there is no fusion of people of the two institutions. Unlike the

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<sup>5</sup> The Lusaka protocol gave UNITA four ministers, seven deputy ministers, three provincial governors and more than 70 district and community administrators, plus two ambassadors.

Westminster model, members of the parliament cannot at the same time be ministers of government (Amundsen et al. 2005:11).

Besides, there is a tendency of more pride, self-esteem and independence among the deputies, as the institution is gaining experience. Some commissions are gaining strength, and initiatives and debates are increasing (although setbacks occur). Despite the weaknesses of its mandate and its questionable legitimacy, there is a process of socialisation and familiarity going on, and deputies are finding their role increasingly valuable and personally beneficial (Amundsen et al. 2005:17-19).

## Elections

Disregarding the faulty elections of the one-party communist regime, there have been no elections in Angola since 1992. In these first (and only) Angolan multi-party and multi-candidate legislative and presidential elections, the National Assembly and the President were elected by popular vote. As such these founding elections were very important, even when the UNITA deputies refused to take up their seats until 1997 and despite the fact that the second round of the presidential election – like in the French system – was cancelled.

Already in 2001 did President dos Santos announce that new elections would be held in less than two years (and that he would not himself seek re-election). In 2003 and 2004 this was repeated, and elections promised again. Among the reasons given for the recurring postponement of the elections were the return to civil war, of course, but after the war was over, other reasons have been forwarded; a new constitution may be required, a complex voter registration exercise must be done (most of the adult population have no identity cards, further complicated by population displacements), the security situation in remote areas must be better, local administration and electoral commissions must operate satisfactory, and land mines must be cleared.

These practical excuses for postponing the elections are nevertheless losing weight as time passes, and the needs for democratic credentials and the internal and external pressure for elections have been increasing. Thus, a new electoral law was passed in 2005, a National Electoral Commission was established the same year, the state budget for 2007 and 2008 has provided for the funding of the elections, and a broad voter registration process has been accomplished. Today, parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2008, and presidential elections will probably be held in 2009 (although no dates have been decided as yet).<sup>6</sup>

An additional point is local elections. There are currently no elected local authorities, as local elections have never been held. Local elections prior to legislative and presidential elections would have been a good idea, because local elections tend to defuse conflicts, ensure a better representation, and it is a good school in democracy. The idea of 'local elections first' is also in line with the majority of the opinions expressed in a 2003 survey (IRI/AIP 2003) and by the NGO Election Network (*Rede Eleitoral*) amongst others. Unfortunately, the Government of Angola does not seem to be of the same opinion, and no date is set for local elections.

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<sup>6</sup> One story can illustrate the manoeuvring and positioning behind the postponement of the presidential elections; As the constitution stipulates that the president can be elected only twice successively, some MPLA dignitaries claim that because the second round of the presidential elections in 1992 was aborted (the round-up between dos Santos and Savimbi never happened as the latter realized he would not win and returned to the bush to resume the armed struggle), the mandate of the President stems from his election by the People's Assembly in 1979. This means that dos Santos can stand for the next two presidential elections, and that he will most probably serve as the President of the Republic of Angola until 2019 (given elections in 2009); which will be a tenure of 40 years (or until the rumours of his ill health prove true).

## Structural conditions

The election system is relatively liberal in Angola, but regulations are quite new. The electoral system is legally regulated by the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Angola (Constitutional Law of 1992 and revisions), the Electoral Registration Law; the Electoral Act; and the Electoral Observation Law of 2005, as well as the Political Parties Law of 2005.<sup>7</sup> There is also a Code of Electoral Conduct and various other decrees regulating political parties, candidates, CNE, the media, electoral officials, the security forces, voters, observers, party agents, religious and traditional bodies and civil society organisations.

The National Assembly elections are multiparty, proportional, party list elections of the 223 Members of Parliament. 130 members are elected nationally and 5 members are elected by each of the 18 provinces (all of them on one, national party ticket). The law also provides for the election of 3 Members of Parliament elected by expatriates, but the 2008 elections will not give expatriates the right to vote, due to “practical problems”. This decision is much criticized by parties with a presumed following of expatriates.

National Assembly elections are held every 4 years, whereas direct absolute majority presidential elections (with a runoff/second round if necessary) are held every 5 years (restricted to two terms). This means that French-style “*cohabitation*” (different party majority in parliament and presidency) is theoretically possible in Angola.

The 2008 parliamentary elections will be held on one day (September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2008; although two days were initially decided but abandoned when met with resistance), and the voting will take place in 12.400 election stations (“*assembleias*”, booths) all over the country. These should have a maximum of 1000 voters each.

## CNE, CIPE and election management

There are two government bodies assigned with the task of arranging elections. One is the National Electoral Commission (*Comissão Nacional Eleitoral*, CNE, including Provincial Commissions, Municipal Offices and Communal Electoral Offices). The other is the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Electoral Process (*Comissão Interministerial para o Processo Eleitoral*, CIPE). In addition to the two, the Constitutional Court (*Tribunal Constitucional*) has the role of approving parties before elections.



The CNE was established as an independent body by the electoral law governing the conduct of elections and voter registration (Electoral Law 2004, Article 154). It is composed of eleven members, of which two are nominated

by the President, three by the ruling party and three by opposition parties in the National Assembly, a Justice of the Supreme Court, a representative of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and one elected by the National Council of Social Communication. The National Assembly elects the President of the CNE from these members. Members of the CNE may not be candidates for the Presidency or National Assembly of the Angola (Electoral Law 2004 A156).

The current CNE president, António Carlos Pinto Caetano de Sousa, is also deputy Supreme Court president, which is in violation of the rule that the CNE president cannot hold a senior public position. This, and the fact that the majority of the CNE members are effectively appointed by the ruling party, is much criticized by the opposition.

<sup>7</sup> All these laws with regulations are available at the CNE website at [www.cne.ao/legislacao.cfm](http://www.cne.ao/legislacao.cfm) (18 Aug 08) including the Political Parties Law (Law 2/05) which can also be found in English in Appendix 4 below.

The CNE has the functions of organising and directing the elections and ensuring that the elections are free, fair and transparent. This includes voter and civic education; supervision of the conduct of voter registration and compilation of voter registers; ensuring the respect of rules and the equality of opportunity and treatment of candidates; distribution of broadcast times for radio and television for the candidates; determination of the location, set up and operations of polling stations; approval of the format of the ballot papers (including seals, symbols and ballot order); accreditation of observers; and the collection, tabulation and publication of the results (Electoral Law 2004 A155).

CIPE is an administrative body charged with voter registration and other election practicalities. Representing several government ministries, the CIPE is chaired by the Minister of Territorial Administration (MINAT), Virgílio de Fontes Pereira, who is a senior MPLA candidate in the election and by the ruling party MPLA in general.<sup>8</sup>

Voter registration is compulsory in Angola (according to the law), and the register is in principle permanent and updated annually. The registration, in which voters must present an identification document (or be identified by officials or institutions) and provide basic personal information, is conducted by local authority public officials under the supervision of the CNE. Political parties may monitor the voter registration process. About 8.3 million voters were registered in 2007-08.<sup>9</sup>

The 12,400 electoral districts (“*assembleias*”) will have a maximum of 1,000 voters each. A recent law amendment proposal by the MPLA in Parliament, to extend the election period from one to two days and the number of days from the casting of votes to the publication of results from 10 to 15 days, caused many discussions in the media and drew criticism from the opposition. Fears of what could happen to the ballots during the night were voiced, and with references made to events in Zimbabwe and Kenya.<sup>10</sup> The proposal was therefore withdrawn, and voting shall take place on one day (i.e. on the 5<sup>th</sup> September 2008) and the election results shall be announced within 10 days after the ballot (i.e. on the 15<sup>th</sup> September 2008).

The EU has decided to send 40 long-term and another 60 short-term observers to the Angolan parliamentary elections.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, international observer missions from SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of the Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and other international organizations will be sent (when formalities allow). The deployment of African Union observers is uncertain.

In addition to these foreign observers, the political parties and national organisations will be observing the elections. The civil society platform on elections, the *Rede Eleitoral*, will for instance deploy around 2,500 observers and 500 civic educators. Other national observers include *Busca de Entendimento Comum*, *Plataforma Eleitoral*, *Universidade Católica de Angola*, *Development Workshop*, *Open Society*, and the *Centro Nacional de Aconselhamento*. Their ambition is to cover at least 50% of all voting booths.<sup>12</sup> Also, the political parties have the right and will observe the elections. UNITA has an ambition of sending out 80,000 observers, which is very important although the figure seems to be inflated (it is doubtful whether the party has the organisational and financial resources to reach this number).

## Party registration and regulation

Parliamentary elections in Angola are party-list elections, in which people vote for parties, and they have no influence on the candidates (unless they join a political party and take part in its party

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<sup>8</sup> Source: Human Rights Watch at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/13/angola19584.htm> (15 Aug 08).

<sup>9</sup> The population is perhaps 18.5 million. Official figures say between 12.5 and 17.5 million. No population census has been made and no statistics exist on the number of people above 18 years of age.

<sup>10</sup> Source: Reuters at [www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0490098620080604](http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0490098620080604) (13 Aug 08)

<sup>11</sup> Source: Reuters at <http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN224384.html> (13 Aug 08)

<sup>12</sup> Source: VOA Multipress at [www.multipress.info/viewnew.php?id=475](http://www.multipress.info/viewnew.php?id=475) (18 Aug 08)

candidate selection process). The political parties nominate their candidates, and the parties must provide the CNE with supporting documents demonstrating and affirming their eligibility.<sup>13</sup>

The system also opens up for party coalitions (or associations, alliances), which has made it possible for quite a number of very small parties to join the contest. The coalitions are treated equal to political parties proper; i.e. the same requirements apply for a coalition and a party to register for elections; government subventions are for the coalition and not the individual coalition member; coalitions have the same airtime as registered parties; etc

Political parties (and coalitions) are registered with the Electoral Commission (see appendix 3) and approved by the Supreme Court (*Tribunal Constitucional*) for taking part in elections. Among the legal requirements for both is a formal application, which must be accompanied by a party constitution and a programme, endorsed by a duly announced party assembly. The application for registration (legalization) must be supported by a minimum of 7500 petitioners with at least 150 from each province (Law on Political Parties, Lei 2/05, A 14), whereas the approval for taking part in elections must be supported by 5,000 to 5,500 voters for the national constituency plus 500 to 550 voters for each of the provincial constituencies (Electoral Law 7/2004, A 62). Parties cannot promote tribalism, regionalism, or discrimination, and they cannot be anti-democratic, militaristic or subject to foreign control (EISA 2008).

The requirement that parties (and coalitions) have the support of at least 14,000 signatures from voters altogether (with documentation of identity and residence) and at least 500 from each of the 18 provinces, in order to take part in the elections, has been a problem for many of the smaller political parties, and for parties with a regional basis and little outreach beyond this. Some opposition parties argue that it should be unnecessary to re-submit the full number of signatures for approval of the party for elections when it is already established as a legal party.

There are now 138 political parties registered in Angola as the threshold for party registration is low<sup>14</sup> and there are some financial incentives for establishing parties (though an irregular and inconsistent state subvention scheme for parties).

The revision of the party list for the parliamentary elections in 2008 brought the number of officially sanctioned parties contesting the parliamentary election down to ten parties and four coalitions (see appendix 3). 34 parties/coalitions applied and 20 were rejected.<sup>15</sup> (Please observe that this July decision is not final. The rejected parties have the right of appeal, and a



<sup>13</sup> Presidential candidates must also be nominated by a political party or by a group of at least 5,000 citizens (registered voters).

<sup>14</sup> The requirements are that 7,500 people must endorse the application for registration, and that these endorsements must include at least 150 residents from each of the 18 provinces. Until the 2005 law amendment only 3 000 endorsements were required, and most parties were registered before 2005. Furthermore, the application must be accompanied by the party constitution and programmes (with proof of their endorsement by a representative assembly of the party). (EISA 2008).

<sup>15</sup> The following parties were *not* approved: *Partido Social Democrático* (PSD) and *Partido Nacional Democrático Angolano* (PNDA), each with one deputy in the outgoing parliament, CPO, PDUNA, MPR/SN, UDNA, PDPA-NTO BAKO, PDA, PSA, PCCA, PADEPA (Carlos Leitão), FNLA (Lucas Ngonda), PSPA, PREA and the coalitions *Partidos da Oposição Civil* (POC). Coligação CPO, Coligação CVP, Coligação FP, Coligação UTPA, and Coligação ADA. Source: [www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=20443](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=20443) (15 Aug 08).

few more parties could perhaps be approved. Final decision will be announced on 22<sup>nd</sup> August.<sup>16</sup>

Approval to take part in elections requires almost the same criteria met as for the registration of new parties, but most important was the expanded requirement of 14,000 signatories with at least 500 signatories from each of the provinces. The political parties or coalitions of parties must compete in all of the electoral constituencies (present candidates for the national constituency and five candidates for each province).

The parties taking part in the 2008 parliamentary elections now include most of the parties of the outgoing legislature, except for the PSD and the PNDA (which were rejected), and the FDA (which is defunct). Five are new entrants to the contest; the two parties *Partido Apoio Democrático e Progresso de Angola* (PADEPA) and *Frente para a Democracia* (FpD), plus the three coalitions *Nova Democracia* (ND), *Plataforma Política Eleitoral* (PPE) and the *Fórum Fraternal Angolano Coligação* (FOFAC). With the 14 parties/coalitions, a total of 5,198 candidates will contest the elections.

The ballot is simply a list of the 14 parties and coalitions approved, with their full name, initials and symbols (the party flag), as well as a space for vote marking. The appearance order was chosen by a lottery system.

## Party financing

Political parties in Angola are financed through four main channels. The first is public funding, which is made available by the state and is disbursed by the CNE to parties and candidates “in an equitable manner” (Law 7/04 on the Financing of Parties, article 40). Some funds have been made available to all registered parties without parliamentary seats, at certain occasions. A once-off provision of about US\$ 120,000 for each of the extra-parliamentary parties was made in 2006 (EISA 2008). State funding is released more regularly to parties with parliamentary representation (according to the number of seats), and to parties approved for elections and their election campaigns. The Government allocated 170 million dollars for this purpose in July 2008.<sup>17</sup>

The second funding channel is “donations” from party members. Membership fees for ordinary party members are small for most parties (i.e. one US\$ a year in the case of FNLA), but can be substantial for cadres and party members elected or nominated to public positions. The parties of the GURN government do for instance have this as their main income; UNITA officials will pay between 5 and 10% of their income as a “tax” to the party.

The third funding channel is donations from private businesses. Although donations to political parties from state owned enterprises and foreign entities are prohibited, private Angolan companies are sometimes supporting political parties. No limits are placed on the amounts candidates or parties may receive.

The fourth channel is income by parties from their properties, investments and businesses owned by the party.<sup>18</sup> For some of the bigger and well-established parties, this can be substantial. MPLA has for instance interests in airport handling in Luanda and UNITA has interests in the diamonds sector.

## Party structures

There are some provisions in the law governing political parties on the party structure (on the composition and competence of the party organs), and a provision that there shall be periodic election of the holders of the central and local party offices by all members or by a representative assembly (Law 2/2005 A8). There are also some provisions on the party leader (who shall be an

<sup>16</sup> Source: *Tribunal Constitucional* webpage, <http://www.tribunalconstitucional.ao/Default.aspx?IDM=2&IDLang=1> (15 Aug 08).

<sup>17</sup> Source: RTP at <http://www1.rtp.pt/noticias/index.php?article=354518&visual=26&rss=0> (15 Aug 08)

<sup>18</sup> Parties could also take up bank loans. In practice, however, no bank gives loans to political opposition parties.

Angolan citizen), on the party headquarters (must be in Luanda), and that the party charter must contain rules and criteria regarding the observance of internal democracy.

Usually, the highest organ of a political party in Angola is the Congress, which meets at least every five years in an ordinary session, and can also meet when necessary in extraordinary sessions. The next leadership organ of the party is usually the National Committee. Among other duties, the National Committee elects the Political Council, the secretary-general and the party president.

In addition, there are normally some national leadership organs, such as the Political Council and National Executive Secretariat. The Political Council is the deliberative organ of the National Committee that guides the day-to-day functioning of the party and assures liaison between the party and state organs and departments, as well as between other political, social, national and international organisations.

The National Executive Secretariat is the executive organ of the party consisting of the president, the secretary-general and secretaries of departments elected by the Political Council. The president is usually elected by congress and the National Committee elects the secretary-general. They can be re-elected, but party statutes rarely mention any limit to the number of mandates for a party president.

## The 2008 election campaign

Officially, the election campaign period for the 2008 parliamentary elections starts one month before the election, i.e. on the 5<sup>th</sup> August. This is well after the approval of the parties for the election. Meetings and demonstrations require 48 hours notice to the Provincial Governor or area Administrator. Opinion polls are prohibited during the campaign period (Election Law 06/05, A 81), but polls are not common in Angola anyway.

Several parties have complained well into the campaign period that the state subvention funds from the Government have not been paid out. According to the Election Law 2005, A 95, the funds are to be released 90 days before the election, and according to the CNE the 14 approved parties/coalitions will receive about 1,3 million US\$ each. This delay has made it difficult for them to produce, print and spread election material and increase their visibility and public exposure.<sup>19</sup>

It also makes the playing field unlevelled when the ruling party, because of its control of most of the local administration, can ensure that state administrators facilitates their campaigns, and when state property is used by the party (for instance public transport).

Another accusation is that the state media has favoured the MPLA to an extreme degree prior to the elections. According to a report of the *Observatório Político e Social de Angola* (OPSA), the state media has “positioned themselves clearly on the side of the MPLA”. For instance, in the 91 issues from April to June 2008 of the *Journal de Angola* (the Government owned and only daily newspaper in Angola), the MPLA had appeared in the headlines 22 times whereas UNITA and FNLA had only been mentioned once. According to OPSA, “the government press gives more space to an event of a MPLA district committee than to the leader of any other party”.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, “intimidation of opposition parties and the media ahead of parliamentary elections in Angola, as well as interference in the electoral commission, threaten prospects for a free and fair vote in September” according to a recent *Human Rights Watch* study (HRW 2008).

Media coverage is, however, secured by law and the CNE recently published a list of airtime allocations for the political parties in the state TV and radio. The time is distributed equally between the parties, and the time slots were decided through a lottery system. Each party/coalition

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<sup>19</sup> Source: <http://sic.aeiou.pt/online/noticias/mundo/20080804Partidos+queixamse+de+falta+de+verbas+do+Estado.htm> (14 Aug 08).

<sup>20</sup> Source: [SIC online at http://sic.aeiou.pt/online/noticias/mundo/20080806Observatorio+critica+imprensa+e+elogia+Governo.htm](http://sic.aeiou.pt/online/noticias/mundo/20080806Observatorio+critica+imprensa+e+elogia+Governo.htm) (14 Aug 08).

will have 5 minutes each on Canal 1 of the *Televisão Pública de Angola* and 10 minutes on the *Rádio Nacional* during the campaign period.<sup>21</sup>

### MPLA pre-campaign rally



Although the official campaign period for the 2008 parliamentary elections is from 5<sup>th</sup> August, the ruling party MPLA has held several rallies before this time. The picture is from a free concert with overt political campaign messages in Luanda (Vila Alice square) on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2008. Similar rallies were held by the MPLA throughout Luanda and in other cities.

<sup>21</sup> Source: *AngoNoticias* at <http://www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=22114> (14 Aug 08) and [http://www.angonoticias.com/full\\_headlines.php?id=20553&b](http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=20553&b) (18 Aug 08).

## Political party overview

The party spectre in Angola emanates from the three nationalist movements that developed in the late colonial period, in the 1950s. The nationalist movement split into three streams, each with their armed wing and various external supporters and varying ideological affiliation. The three were characterised mainly by their geographical location (foreign support and external headquarters) and their ethnic affiliations.

The FNLA (*Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola*) was based in the north, in the three Kikongo-speaking provinces Zaire, Uige and Cabinda. The MPLA (*Movimento para a Libertação de Angola, Partido do Trabalho*) was based in the central *mestiço* and Mbundu communities in the Luanda-Malanje area, and UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*) won the allegiance of most Ovimbundu people in the populous provinces of the central highlands (FES 2005:3).

The FNLA was the first nationalist movement, founded by Holden Roberto and his uncle in 1956, and had support from the Mobutu regime in Congo-Zaire. The MPLA was founded a little later by a small group of people including Manuel Pinto de Andrade and Eduardo dos Santos, with a clear Marxist orientation and the support of the non-aligned countries and Tanzania first, and later by the Soviet Union and Cuba. UNITA was founded by Jonas Savimbi in 1966, with support from Zambia and eventually the USA and apartheid South Africa (Newitt 2007:74-75, 81-82).

In addition to the three nationalist movements, there was also a separatist movement in Cabinda (the enclave to the north). The operations of the *Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (FLEC) has remained confined to the Cabinda province, which has a very small population. It has split into various factions and never been a serious threat to the government, although it has remained a constant nuisance.

At independence in 1975, MPLA defeated the FNLA (and FLEC) with the help of Cuban soldiers, and took control of the capital Luanda and consequently the government. They set up a socialist one-party government that lasted until 1991. UNITA took control of large parts of the countryside after the departing Portuguese, and the scene was set for 15 years of civil war.


Today, these three “historical” parties still play prominent roles in the political spectre. The MPLA was from the beginning and still is the ruling party, while UNITA is the single biggest opposition party. The quality of UNITA as an opposition party can be questioned, however, as it is (with some smaller parties) a part of the *Government of Unity and National Reconciliation* (GURN). In 1997, as a consequence of the peace agreement, the President appointed an enlarged (and large!) coalition government, which is formally still in place. It includes four ministers from UNITA and about ten non-MPLA vice-ministers. Although this was reasonable from the (then) peace and reconciliation point of view, it makes the status of UNITA and the two other (small) parties (PRS and PDP-ANA) as opposition parties doubtful. To the extent they are opposition parties, they are formally in opposition to themselves.

Furthermore, the opposition beyond GURN is very weak. Some opposition parties are prone to factionalism, like the Roberto and Ngonda factions that has split FNLA for several years and reduced this nationalist movement to a small party that struggles to uphold the proud legacy of Holden Roberto. Other parties are also split; for instance do the PRS and PADEPA all have contesting factions, and the Constitutional Court approved the Ngola Kabangu (FNLA), Eduardo Kwangana (PRS) and Silva Cardoso (PADEPA) factions, respectively.<sup>22</sup> Some parties are newcomers, quite un-known to the broader public, and some are coalitions of even smaller and weaker parties. When it comes to coalition member parties, party programmes and real policy differences and permanent organizational structures are hard to find.

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<sup>22</sup> Source: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200807150419.html> (14 Aug 08)..

In terms of people's knowledge of the political parties, a survey from March 2008 covering six provinces is rather illustrative (BBC 2008). The results in the table below are the responses to the question "Can you tell me the names of the political parties you are aware of in Angola?"



The knowledge of the three "historical" parties is extensive, according to this survey. Nearly everyone has heard of the MPLA and UNITA, and 80 % have heard about the FNLA. Peoples' knowledge about the other, smaller parties in Parliament is not very good, but much better than the votes they received back in 1992. Interestingly, 8.6 % of the sample has heard about the non-represented FpD.

Angola's political parties include some radical parties (i.e. system challenging), some moderate opposition parties (accepting the rules of the game and the legitimacy of the current government), and some parties siding with the ruling party and the president.

The political parties of Angola today can be arranged in four categories on formal grounds. The ruling party MPLA is in a category in itself, being the ruling and presidential party since independence, with the far strongest party organisation (not least because of its access to state resources, including oil revenues). The second biggest party, UNITA, is the historical rival of the MPLA and the biggest opposition party (although in the GURN government). Then, there are the other 10 parties in Parliament (including one coalition), which can be sub-divided into "presidential majority" parties (parties that will ask their followers to vote for the MPLA president in the presidentials), the GURN members, and "pure" opposition parties. Some of the parties that were rejected for the elections (PAI, PADEPA/Carlos Leitão, have joined in alliance with the aim of supporting the UNITA in the coming elections.<sup>23</sup> Finally, there are a number of parties without parliamentary representation in the current (1991-2008) Parliament. Some are "presidential majority", most are not. Five of these extra-parliamentarian parties have been approved for the upcoming elections (two parties and three coalitions). Some of these have a real prospect (not only a project) of becoming represented in the new Parliament. We will look at all these opposition parties in reversed order.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Source: *Angola24horas* at [www.angola24horas.com/?pg=noticia&id=1624](http://www.angola24horas.com/?pg=noticia&id=1624) (19 Aug 08).

<sup>24</sup> The ruling MPLA is beyond the scope of this presentation of the opposition in Angola. For two excellent exposés of the MPLA, see Chabal and Vidal 2006 and Anthony Hodges 2004.

## Parties outside of Parliament

Of the parties without current parliamentary representation, two parties and three party coalitions were approved for the coming 2008 parliamentary elections. These were the parties PADEPA and the FpD, plus the coalitions ND, PPE, and FOFAC. In addition to these, there are more than one hundred other registered parties altogether, and several party coalitions, of which ten applied without success for approval for the elections. Only two of the unsuccessful coalitions will be mentioned here.

### PADEPA (Partido para o Desenvolvimento e Progresso de Angola)

PADEPA was registered as a political party in 1995, and now approved as a contestant of the 2008 parliamentary elections. In its governance programme, the party gives priority to the sector of maternal-infant health, as well as the technical-professional training of Angolans. It calls for the implementation of a sustained and balanced economic development project in the country.

PADEPA used to be a radical opposition party, but since an internal split that led to the expulsion of its founding president Carlos Leitão in 2007, the party line is more unclear. Luís Silva Cardoso currently chairs the party.<sup>25</sup> The supporters and followers of Leitão are now instructing their party members and others to support UNITA instead of the Cardoso faction of PADEPA, claiming that the Cardoso faction is illegal and that Cardoso himself is being “irrigated” by the MPLA.<sup>26</sup>

### FpD (Frente para a Democracia)

The Constitutional Court approved the FpD for the parliamentary elections in July 2008. Earlier, the party was a member of the coalition *AD-Coligação* and the coalition *Partidos da Opção Civil* (POC), but withdrew in order to stand alone for the elections. The FpD is an “intellectual” opposition party, and stands strongest in the opposition and intellectual milieu of Luanda (support is, according to the party, restricted mainly to urban areas in Luanda, Cabinda and Benguela). The party program is focused on basic services such as health and education, but also on the Angolan economy. It lobbies for a participative approach to the state budget, with real debate, bargaining and openness being key features.

The party president is Filomeno Vieira Lopes, who is related to but not the same man as João Baptista de Castro Vieira Lopes, who is the FpD Member of Parliament elected on the ticket of the *Angola Democrática* (AD-Coligação) coalition in 1992. FpD has very strong links to civil society, with the FpD president and other of the party leadership being members and activists in a broad range of civil society organisations, petitions and other initiatives. Characteristically, one of the closest allies of the FpD within civil society is the independent and activist union of professors and high school teachers, the *Sindicato dos Professores* (Sinprof), whose vice president is also part of the FpD leadership. It is a political strategy of FpD to unite and direct civil society forces against the MPLA regime and the MPLA-UNITA conflict.

The political line of the FpD is characterized by a strong commitment to democracy, ‘citizenship’, political pluralism and the protection of citizens’ and human rights. It can be characterized as a radical opposition party in that it uses strong language against the “totalitarian government” of Angola and the “quasi-democracy of the single party MPLA”. They see the MPLA

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<sup>25</sup> The Constitutional Court ruled in July 2008 in favour of Silva Cardoso, stating that the legitimate leadership of the party is the one that resulted from the party's latest extraordinary congress. Source: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200807150419.html> (14 Aug 08).

<sup>26</sup> Source: <http://www.angolaxyami.com/Politica-angolana/Carlos-Leitao-PADEPA-imolado-no-interesse-eleitoral-do-MPLA.html> (14 Aug 08)

regime as ultimately undemocratic, with a high degree of formal control over the population, and since the war also firmly in control of the country's economic gains.<sup>27</sup>

The FpD can be characterized as a radical opposition party also by its many efforts at changing the political system in a democratic direction. For instance, the FpD participated in an opposition parliamentary platform in order to change the electoral law, and in connection with the upcoming parliamentary elections it tries to unite the opposition to better control and supervise the electoral process at all stages. According to the FpD, the current election law and election process are stacked against small parties such as FpD; the laws are created on the basis of political convenience for the ruling party and the laws are constantly violated.

The FpD differs from most other parties in its strong insistence on internal party democracy and participation. All party organs are elected, and this extends to the secretary general positions on the national as well as the provincial levels. The democratic outlook extends further in that party members can participate in all meetings if they so wish, decisions are always adopted as majority decisions, and even citizens from outside the party can participate in meetings and raise ideas. As a matter of principle, every party member also has the right to state his or her personal opinion publicly regardless of party line. Only the lack of information, capacity for dialogue or communication reduces this in practice, but the use of internet debate can somewhat reduce these shortcomings.<sup>28</sup>

The difficulties of the FpD are manifold. Like most other parties, it raises the question of financing as a basic problem, which makes outreach, secretarial help, office space etc. difficult. Furthermore, the FpD claims to be subjected to more sinister and violent forms of pressure; bugging of phone lines, pressure on family members of the FpD (to withdraw from positions for instance in the state radio), burning down houses of party members, arrest of members who distribute leaflets and take part in legal strikes, politically motivated thefts (of computers), physical violence against members, spies ...

According to FpD, the party's strengths lay in the facts that they have over 30 years of experience, they have successfully resisted cooption, and have a good coherence of principles. FpD also prides itself on using modern processes and techniques to influence politics in Angola. Despite the Angolan press and media being under the aegis of the MPLA, FpD's message seems to get out. Their aim for the upcoming parliamentary election is to be represented in all parliamentary commissions, which will require a minimum of 10 deputies.

Their outlook for the elections is sombre. According to the FpD, there is no doubt that the MPLA will try fraud, and they claim the voter registry indicates this (with a high level of registered voters in areas where the MPLA can count on electoral support, and *vice versa*). In addition to this kind of fraud, the FpD points out the increasingly divisive rhetoric of the MPLA, with incendiary speeches about the past and the instrumentalization of violence in Zimbabwe to either scare voters to vote for the MPLA or to abstain. In addition FpD claims that churches and local authorities (*sobas*) are politicised by the MPLA, and that the space for public debate and dialogue is constrained and restricted to the MPLA. FpD calls for all political parties to commit to non-violence.

## ND (Nova Democracia – União Eleitoral)

The ND is a recently established coalition of parties, which was only registered with the Constitutional Court approval of June 2008. The coalition is a coalition of six parties (MPDA, PSIA, UND, PSL, UAPDD and CIA). Most of these are parties that used to belong to another coalition, the *Partidos da Opção Civil* (POC), but quit due to internal disagreement.

The coalition's president is Quintino de Moreira, who is also president of the member party *Movimento para Democracia de Angola* (MPDA). According to him at the coalition's campaign

<sup>27</sup> Terminology from interviews with FpD leaders. See also the party website for similar expressions.

<sup>28</sup> The party has a good website ([www.fpd-angola.com](http://www.fpd-angola.com)) and blogs where the internal debate is picking up.

opening, the objective of the coalition is to “give jobs and bread to all” and to put “the people in first place in all actions of the Nova Democracia”.<sup>29</sup>

The ND coalition is quite new, very unknown to the public, and stands very few chances of gaining a parliamentary seat (unless it is seen and understood as the legitimate custodian of the POC alliance, which was not granted the right to take part in the 2008 elections).

### PPE (Plataforma Política Eleitoral)

The PPE is another recently established platform or coalition of parties, which was formed in 2004 and only registered with the Constitutional Court approval of June 2008. The PPE is a coalition of nine political parties, including the *Aliança Nacional Democrática* (AND), the *Partido Democrático Unificado de Angola* (PDUA) and the *Partido Nacional Independente de Angola* (PNIA). It is chaired by José João Manuel.

The PPE has a strong social profile in its political programme, emphasising industrial development, monetary policies, government structures and service delivery (energy and water).<sup>30</sup>

Like ND (above) and the FOFAC coalitions (below), the PPE is quite new, very unknown to the public, and stands very few chances of gaining parliamentary seats.

### FOFAC (Fórum Fraternal Angolano Coligação).

FOFAC is the third, small party coalition that was established in 1997 and approved by the Constitutional Court in July 2008. The coalition president is Artur Quixona Finda, and the four member parties are the *Partido Angolano Conservador do Povo* (PACOPO), *Frente Nacional de Desenvolvimento Democrático de Angola* (FNDDA), *Partido Democrático dos Trabalhadores* (PDT) e *Juvenil da Social Democracia* (PRESA/PJSD).

In its programme, the coalition prioritises “the various cultural, political, social and historical problems facing Angolans today”.<sup>31</sup> It will also fight for greater economic equality and the restructure of public/political institutions, and can thus be seen as a radical reform party.<sup>32</sup>

### POC (Partidos da Oposição Civil)

POC is one of the parties and alliances that were *not* authorized by the Constitutional Court to take part in the 2008 parliamentary elections. It was rejected (probably) because it was unable to present the required number of signatories. POC is now openly supporting UNITA in the elections and has entered a cooperation agreement with this major opposition party.<sup>33</sup>

POC is an alliance of six radical, extra-parliamentary opposition parties with Manuel Fernandes as the coalition president; CNDA, PSCA, PALMA, PNSA, PPA and PAR. The FNLA and FPD used to be members, but have with several other parties withdrawn from this coalition, in order to stand as independent parties at the elections, to join other coalitions, or because of disagreements within the coalition.

Originally the POC alliance was formed 1994, and included 13 parties committed to peace in times of war. The 13 original members and one new party signed a declaration of principles and

<sup>29</sup> Source: Journal de Angola at [www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89880&Seccao=politica](http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89880&Seccao=politica) and <http://allafrica.com/stories/200808060810.html> (15 Aug 08). In addition, ND wants an “efficient and free education for all national citizens” and “the respect for the basic freedoms of the citizens, where each one feels Angolan and participates in the project of society”.

<sup>30</sup> Source: Journal de Angola: [www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89417&Seccao=politica](http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89417&Seccao=politica) (16 Aug 08).

<sup>31</sup> Source: Journal de Angola: <http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89724&Seccao=politica> (18 Aug 08)

<sup>32</sup> Source: Radio Nacional de Angola, Canal A: [www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=22279](http://www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=22279)

<sup>33</sup> Source: AngolaPress: [www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt\\_pt/noticias/politica/Unita-POC-rubricam-acordo-cooperacao.bed40d19-8f65-4cfd-8166-9d1da6aa36a6.html](http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt_pt/noticias/politica/Unita-POC-rubricam-acordo-cooperacao.bed40d19-8f65-4cfd-8166-9d1da6aa36a6.html) (18 Aug 08) and VOA Multipress, [www.multipress.info/viewnew.php?id=514](http://www.multipress.info/viewnew.php?id=514) (18 Aug 08)

registration was achieved in 2005. Of the six parties that are now members of the POC, only two participated in the 1992 elections – CNDA and PSCA<sup>34</sup> – the others were formed later.

On average every party in the POC coalition has 7000 registered members, which makes a total of 42000 for the POC. It is however doubtful that members are paying any membership fees. It should be noted that the majority of the leaders of the parties that are represented in POC are from the northern provinces of Zaire and Uije.

POC project themselves as the defenders of the disfavoured, vulnerable and poor. Since there is no middle class in Angola, this is a party of the poor, and ‘the poor’ includes most people: teachers, mechanics, and others. Apart from having meetings with some of the trade unions (teachers and architects) links to organised civil society seem to be rather weak. The POC aims to give every person the possibility of achieving its potential, and priorities are on health and education, as well as housing programs. POC are campaigning against the current state policy of ‘condominiums’, which POC sees as neo-apartheid policies and for the modernization of the city of Luanda. Other core themes are the introduction of a ‘year-zero’ for all university students to assess their suitability for higher education, as well as the de-concentration of health services from the major cities. The aim is to have a large (state) hospital in every province.

Regarding the prospect of peaceful elections in September 2008, POC are cautiously optimistic, but like FpD would like to see some form of peace pact between the Angolan political parties (and especially between UNITA and MPLA). According to POC there are reasons why many people will chose to leave the country during election time, with the fear of a 1992 post-election scenario still looming large. POC also perceives the discourse between the two main contestants as increasingly hostile and divisive.

### CPO (Conselho Político da Oposição)

CPO is another coalition of extra-parliamentary parties that was *not* authorized by the Constitutional Court to take part in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Its leader is João Mateus Jorge (who is also the leader of the ADPA) and the member parties are the PPDLA, PADDA, PADS, PLUN and ADPA. Public information on this coalition is very scarce.

### The smaller parties in Parliament

The 1992 elections resulted in 12 parties in Parliament (1992-2008), of which the MPLA has 129 deputies, the UNITA 67 deputies, the PRS 6, FNLA 5 and PLD 3 deputies. Then there are 7 parties with one deputy each (of which two parties are defunct, the PRD with its deputy now “independent” and the FDA with its deputy deceased and the party dissolved) (see appendix 2).

### PRS (Partido de Renovação Social)

The PRS is the biggest and oldest of the smaller parties in Parliament, with 6 deputies (but only 2.6 % of the votes) and the vice-presidency. The PRS was established in 1990, and was easily approved by the Constitutional Court for the 2008 parliamentary elections (although with a rival faction also vying for approval under the same name). The PRS party leader is Eduardo Kuangana.

The PRS is an opposition party, but also a part of the current coalition government. It was in government from 1992 (when UNITA left Luanda and the civil war re-started) with one vice minister (fisheries) and the vice-governor of Lunda Sul province, and it became a partner of the GURN government (formed in 1996 after the new peace agreement) with two government portfolios: the Ministry of Science and Technology and the vice-ministry of Industry. The PRS deputies have voted with an otherwise cooperated with the ruling MPLA on many issues, and

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<sup>34</sup> PSCA was part of the AD coalition (Coligacao Angola Democratico) which also included FpD amongst others.

supported the candidacy of dos Santos for president in 1992. It is therefore a moderate opposition party and it will remain a government party until (eventually) a new government is formed after the 2008 elections.

Historically, the PRS is not one of the “liberation movements” of the decolonisation period, but it has a background as a platform for people of the northeast of the country – in the Lunda provinces in particular. This is still their regional stronghold, where most people of the party leadership come from, and where the PRS gained most in the 1992 elections. The party has consequently been described as a regional and regionalist party, although it has now a somewhat better national outlook and presence.

In addition to a traditional (in the western sense) social democratic platform, the PRS posits itself as a centre – left party. According to PRS, the state has an important role to play especially in regard to health, education, the elderly and the young. Some central aspects of the PRS program are strong accountability and transparency approaches, which are reflected in their demands for democracy on all levels of government, and their opposition to corruption and nepotism.

Decentralisation, and in particular local elections and a federal system of government, is important to the PRS. Federalism is at PRS’ heart, and has been since the late 1990s when there was a big push from the main opposition in Parliament, by the UNITA, FNLA and PRS to make the new constitution grant more decentralisation and autonomy to the provinces. In the words of Vidal, “the intention was obviously to enlarge autonomy in the core zones of these parties – FNLA in the North, UNITA in the central plateaux and PRS in the North-East” (Vidal 2007:161).



The federalist project of PRS suggests that Angola is transferred into a federation of six states, the biggest one of which would be a merger of the strongholds of the PRS – the Lundas and Moxico – and possibly also Cuando Cubango into one federal state called *Estado da Lunda*. The other states would be *Congo* (which would include Zaire, Uije, and possibly Cabinda), *Dongo* (including Malanje, Bengo, Luanda, and Kwanza Norte), *Planalto Central* (Bie, Benguela, Kwanza Sul, and Huambo), *Mandumbe* (Cunene, Huila and Namibe) and a *Região Sul* (Cuando Cubango). As part of this federalization, the capital of Angola would be shifted from Luanda to Luena in the northwest of Moxico province, and the future economic centre would be Huambo. Part of this project is a fiscal decentralization effort, which would make 50% of the local tax revenue to remain where it was raised, and the rest going to the next higher level. The

division of revenue would continue in this way, with half of the tax at each level remaining locally until the national level is reached.

The PRS is a relatively well-funded party, not least because of the 6 deputies and their contributions to the party. PRS also owns some property (real estate) and of its own; for example a PRS conference centre is under construction in Viana just outside of Luanda, which will also become the party headquarters. The president of the party was born in the diamond rich area between Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte, and people there trust him and the party. This trust translates into political as well as financial support. In addition, all party members employed in the government, state, or civil service are paying 10% of their salary to the party. The member fee for other party members is 3% of their salary (when employed; unemployed members pay whatever they can afford). Voluntary work and contributions also exist. According to the party spokesman, the members of the party shoulder the bulk of the finances.

The PRS is also a relatively well-organised and structured party, with few splits or factions.<sup>35</sup> There are some problems with internal discipline, and the PRS accuses the MPLA of meddling and co-optations. PRS leaders fear the same fate as the FNLA, a total split, which was according to them created by MPLA underground interference. As a matter of principle and caution, the PRS therefore keeps all confidential documents and materials away from their offices in secret locations.

PRS claims that the number one problem for the party is the intense pressure brought to bear upon its members by the MPLA. This extends to infiltration of the party structure, the party management and the party security personnel, and unfounded media reports about internal PRS splits.<sup>36</sup> Financial and material difficulties come only in a distant second behind these issues.

The internal party structure reflects the fact that the PRS emerged out of a period of democracy in Angola. There are elections for every post on every level of the party structure, and in addition to party organs, all strategic decisions are put to the vote from the base up. The national committee of the PRS counts 191 members of which 45 are also members of the political council. Of these, 25 members form the party executive.

PRS is present in all the provinces. It is strongest in the Lundas (Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul) and in Moxico, where the party has a strong regional implantation along ethnic lines (party allegiance is primarily along lines of culture and language and only secondarily along religious, economic or ideological lines). However, the PRS claims to have secretariats or local leaders (*lideres de núcleos*) in all provinces and all the municipalities, and that their organisational implantation even goes down to the level of the communes in most provinces. Compared to the other small parties, PRS is actually rather deeply and relatively widely implanted.


## FNLA (Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola)

Founded in 1972, based on the armed liberation movement formed in 1956 by the nationalist hero Holden Roberto under the name of UPNA and later the UPA, the FNLA is one of the historical liberation movements in Angola. With 5 deputies it is the fourth biggest party in the outgoing Parliament. Mainly due to its role in the struggle for Angolan independence from the Portuguese it is well known and represented in all the provinces. Their strongest provinces in the 1992 elections were, however, the Northern provinces of Uije and Zaire, the historic strongholds of the FNLA.

The party has seen many splits and much fractionalisation, and the Constitutional Court received two applications for approval for the 2008 elections. The court ruled that the faction led by Ngola Kabangu was legitimated to represent FNLA; whereas the other faction (of Lucas Ngonda) was rejected. This party split has hit the party hard, with their youth branch JFNLA alienated, their assets blocked, and state subventions frozen for years.

As one of the historical liberation movements in Angola, that fought for but did not win control of government at independence time, the FNLA has also a long tradition of rivalry with the victorious MPLA. In 1976 the MPLA defeated the FNLA in battle and the FNLA retreated to Zaire and became an underground movement until it was registered as a political party in 1991 and took part in the 1992 elections.

The FNLA was part of two governments; from 1992 it was in the GURN 1 government with the vice-minister of health, and in the GURN 2



Holden Roberto

<sup>35</sup> Except one reported incident more than ten years ago about a violent row over the party leadership, and (more importantly) the attempt at setting up a party coalition between PRS and the PDPS (the so-called ADA coalition) for the 2008 elections. The Constitutional Court rejected this “coalition”, however, and ruled in favour of the candidature of the PRS led by Eduardo Kuangana. To the court, the other faction’s leader, António Muachicungo, had no legitimacy to submit a coalition application on behalf of the PRS. (Source: <http://allafrica.com/stories/200807150419.html>).

<sup>36</sup> Our informant provided us with documents that seemed to provide evidence of MPLA strategies to destabilize and split the PRS. He also claimed that there had been two unsuccessful attempts on the PRS president’s life.

until it laid down its vice-ministerial responsibilities and retracted into opposition. The reason was the fact that there was no common program, only the program of the MPLA. According to our informant, this angered the leadership of the MPLA and brought down their wrath on the FNLA. The situation of the FNLA now is seen as a direct result of these events. Now the FNLA will categorically not coalesce with the MPLA. According to the FNLA, the MPLA has waged a ten-year campaign of subversion, co-option and destruction against the FNLA and its deputies in the Parliament.

For historical reasons the FNLA is strongest in the North; in Cabinda, Zaire, Uije, Malanje, Kwanza Norte, but also Moxico and Luanda. It still draws upon the legend of the Kingdom of Congo and of Holden Roberto. Politically, its outlook is more pragmatic, vague and populist, but also radical (system changing). The program of the FNLA is centred on the building up and reform of institutions for the development of the country. This includes multiparty democracy, rule of law, human rights, free markets and an open economy, as well as reforms of the president's office. According to the FNLA, the current President of Angola is ruling more like a feudal lord than a democratically elected public servant. Other important institutions that need special attention are the Parliament, which could be re-invigorated through elections, as well as the judiciary. FNLA's major aim is to reduce avoid an absolute majority of the MPLA in Parliament. The FNLA describes itself as 'Christian-Nationalist' on the centre-right of the political spectrum. Links exist to similar parties in Portugal (PDS), France (Sarkozy's UMP), Belgium and Spain.

According to the FNLA, the state and the MPLA are practically the same and "the MPLA acts as if they are still in 1966/67 – in the single party era". The FNLA in particular criticizes the opaqueness with which the MPLA conducts its affairs, and also questions some of the recent foreign policy moves of Angola. In particular the cooperation with China is cause for concern for the FNLA. According to our informant, payments are made directly from Chinese investors (i.e. the Chinese state and state companies) to the MPLA coffers, bypassing the Angolan Parliament and treasury. In addition, the Chinese bring everything themselves, including own labour, experts, engineers, etc. Those kinds of investment thus bring very little for Angolan citizens.

The FNLA party structure is rather old-fashioned, with a Central Committee, a Politburo and a General Secretariat, as well as local cells. The party structure runs rather deep. On the provincial level alone there are 6 levels: provincial secretary, municipal secretary, communal secretary, district secretary, cell secretary, and base representative.<sup>37</sup>

The finances are strenuous for the FNLA. It has a right to the state subsidy for parties, calculated on the basis of their representation in parliament, but these funds have been frozen due to the 'internal conflict' for the past eight years and are still inaccessible to the party.<sup>38</sup> Member contributions have kept the party afloat. Every member is supposed to pay a monthly membership fee of 1 US\$, but in most cases the actual sum is lower due to people's inadequate means. In addition, some FNLA members and sympathizers abroad are a source of funds.<sup>39</sup> Apart from members' contributions, there are few other sources of funds.

Regarding the upcoming parliamentary elections, the FNLA is "very afraid". Like other parties, the FNLA was worried about the proposed extension of the voting period from one day to two days, and the extension of the period between the casting of votes and the publication of results. Both these changes were seen as opening the door for fraud to take place (and were withdrawn by the MPLA in Parliament). The FNLA further pointed out that CIPE is nearly 100% MPLA and

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<sup>37</sup> (*Secretario Provincial, Municipal, Comunal, do Bairro, da célula, and representante da base*).

<sup>38</sup> Our informant denies such a reading of the facts. According to him, three candidates were contesting freely for the leadership at the party congress. Currently, the FNLA is waiting for investigations and ruling by the Constitutional Court to settle the matter regarding allegations of irregularities by one of the losers of the party leadership contest at the last FNLA party congress. The freeze of the funds is rather a part of the continuous pressure on the FNLA by the government and the ruling party.

<sup>39</sup> There are substantial numbers of active FNLA members and sympathizers in Switzerland, Germany, Portugal, Canada, France, and England, according to the party.

claimed that the head of CIPE is also the head of the MPLA election campaign. Also, despite having official observer status, the technical meetings of the CIPE are closed for the FNLA.

The FNLA also drew attention to the fact that the MPLA had already started their campaign and were distributing cars and other goods while the official elections campaign period had not yet begun. At the same time the FNLA pointed to allegations that there is an increase in the intimidation and imprisonment of journalists who are critical to the MPLA.

Regarding the risk of violence after or during the elections, the FNLA claims that there is high tension in the country and no one can really know what can happen if cases of real or perceived fraud are reported.

## PLD (Partido Liberal Democrático)

The PLD is the fifth biggest party in the outgoing Parliament, with three deputies. It was established by exile Angolans in Lisbon, registered as an Angolan political party in 1992 and was approved as a contestant of the 2008 parliamentary elections. The party founder and president is *Anália Maria Caldeira de Victória Pereira Simeão*, the most visible female politician in the country. The PLD is a full member of the *Liberal International*<sup>40</sup> and the *Africa Liberal Network*.

The PLD program and the strategy are strongly committed to liberalism and see this as the only option. According to PLD, the Angolan people – i.e. the individual Angolans as persons have been ignored for too long – only liberalism can re-instate their personhood, improve their quality of life and endorse the humanity of each person. PLD argues that the ‘left’ and ‘right’ political spectrum does not apply anymore, and especially not in Angola. The PLD sees the liberalism of Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal as an example to follow for Angola. The liberalism of the PLD is a ‘doctrine’ that is derived from Christianity and the reality of Angola, and a ‘practice’ that is lived by the party and its members every day.



The PLD is not a radical opposition party, but a liberal reformist party. This can be seen for instance by their role in Parliament, where the views of the PLD deputies have often been included into and accepted by the MPLA. But, there are also differences of opinion, like the PLD argument that the MPLA should change its current flag (which closely resembles the flag of Angola), and PLD believes that more freedom of the press is needed in Angola. More recently, PLD was one of the opposition parties signing a press release condemning the proposed changes of the election law to prolong the period between the ballot and the publication of election results.

The PLD's stated strongholds are Bie, Huambo, Kwanza Sul, Malanje, Moxico, Lunda Sul, and Uige. Unlike many other parties in Angola, the PLD does not rely on an ethnic or regional support base. Furthermore, there seems to be no internal party divisions and splits.

Regarding party finances, the PLD receives its bulk from the allowances of each of their members of parliament. The PLD receives 940.000 US\$ per year for their three deputies, paid out monthly. Payments are regular although sometimes late. For the election campaign, the party is expecting to receive the government allowance. Despite these funds, funding is a big problem for the PLD. The members are not a great source of funds as they are often poor themselves and there is not yet a culture of contribution instilled amongst them, and the businesses and corporations prefer to make their donations to the ruling party. The PLD's funds are not enough to upkeep their administrative structure in all provinces.

PLD supports the Supreme Audit Court (*Tribunal das Contas*) in its initiative to audit political parties and their use of public funds.

Regarding their links to civil society, PLD states that civil society in Angola is highly compartmentalized, and that there are very few links between the various compartments. Thus, the PLD finds it very hard to establish contacts, for example with trade unions. PLD would like to have

<sup>40</sup> See the *Liberal International* at [www.liberal-international.org/editorial.asp?ia\\_id=588](http://www.liberal-international.org/editorial.asp?ia_id=588)

stronger links with business organisations, women's groups and religious groups, but there is a problem of 'approximation' and very little trust.

PLD also raised with us the point that despite the election campaign not having officially started yet, the MPLA has already begun campaigning in earnest. Another factor that tilts the playing field against opposition parties is the fact that press coverage of opposition parties is very low and subsequently few people know what the opposition is actually doing. In addition, there are intimidations of party members and activists, as well as a lack of independent state organs. The PLD is also concerned with the fact that there are less than four senior members of government (governors or ministers) who do not have an army background. Throughout the ranks, from the lower levels to the central committee, the administration is permeated with former soldiers.

Concerning electoral fraud, the PLD claims that it takes place regularly, for instance in many *bairros* one can only get access to water and electricity if a copy of the voter registry card is presented or if the person is a member of the MPLA. Also, the choice of auditors of the electronic IT system to be used for the elections is neither transparent nor public. The PLD strongly argues for a publishing of electoral results on a local level, at each polling station, instead of the current setup in which votes will only be counted in the Luanda.

Another problem facing all parties is that MPLA is turning many traditional leaders (*sobas*) into ruling party adherents and activists through bribery and preferential treatment. The result is that some parties' flags and symbols are ordered to be removed, rallies and meetings are not allowed, and the opposition is *de facto* banned from some municipalities.

## AD (Angola Democrática - Coligação)

The AD is the only party coalition (alliance) of the outgoing Parliament. It was a coalition of seven formed in 1992 under the name of *Aliança Democrática - Coligação* and has one parliamentary deputy in the outgoing Parliament, João Baptista De Castro Vieira Lopes.<sup>41</sup> In 2004 the driving force of the alliance, FpD, withdrew from the AD to join the POC alliance instead (before withdrawing from this one in 2007 to present the FpD as an independent party).

The AD is still registered and was approved in July for the 2008 elections.<sup>42</sup> The coalition now has five member parties (UDA, PAL, PDPA, PNEA e MDIA-PCN) and the president of AD (who is also president of the member party *União Democrática de Angola* (UDA), is Kengele Jorge.<sup>43</sup>

Alongside health (guaranteed primary health care to all citizens), other equally important elements of AD's political program include the rule of law, right to shelter, right to work, and social security as well as education. The AD also prioritizes more state intervention in the economy as a proposition to make economic development and satisfy the basic needs of the population. This is seen as the only way to redress the current regional differences existing in the country, and the pre-condition for any subsequent human development of the Angolan citizens. Part of this mission also includes the "full integration" of the rural populations in the national territory. Secondly, the AD wants to "restore the legality of power" in Angola.<sup>44</sup>

This political program seems to appeal to the PSDA which did not fulfil the Constitutional Court's threshold requirements to participate in the parliamentary elections on September 5<sup>th</sup> 2008. The PSDA has pledged its full support to the AD-Coligação.

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<sup>41</sup> Source: *Assembleia Nacional* at [www.parlamento.ao/deputados.php?partido=A.D.%20Coligação](http://www.parlamento.ao/deputados.php?partido=A.D.%20Coligação) (19 Aug 08)

<sup>42</sup> Another coalition, ADA (*Aliança Democrática de Angola*) presented too similar name and symbols and was for this reason rejected by the Constitutional Court. Source: *RNA Canal A* at [www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=21822](http://www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=21822) (19 Aug 08)

<sup>43</sup> Source: *RNA Canal A* at [www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=7007](http://www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=7007) (19 Aug 08) and *Jornal de Angola* at [www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=84560](http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=84560) (19 Aug 08)

<sup>44</sup> Source: *Jornal de Angola* at [www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=90406](http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=90406) (19 Aug 08) and [www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89342](http://www.jornaldeangola.com/artigo.php?ID=89342) (18 Aug 08).

The AD appears to be a coalition of relatively young, modern political activists, with democracy and ecology on the agenda. Although the AD is an old coalition and supported by the PSDA, there is no reason to believe it will make any significant impact in the elections.

### PAJOCA – PP (Partido da Aliança da Juventude, Operários e Camponeses de Angola – Partido Popular)

PAJOCA-PP was formed in 1991 and had their first party congress in 1998 and their second in 2006. Initially the party was just called PAJOCA, but the PP (Popular Party) was added to better describe its political goals. PAJOCA-PP was able to win one deputy seat in Parliament in 1992, which is held by the party president Alexandre Sebastião André. The Constitutional Court approved the PAJOCA-PP for the parliamentary elections in July 2008.

PAJOCA-PP is a group of former soldiers that split away from the MPLA when they turned from a worker's party towards "turbo-capitalism". The party initially included many officers from the army (and still does). Many relatives of the initial PAJOCA founders were affected by mass-firings and the impoverishment of agricultural workers (and this is reflected in the party name). Originally, the party also had strong links to the '*Mãos Livres*' movement, which is a humanitarian organization with the aim of giving a voice to the poor.<sup>45</sup>

The party locates itself on the centre-left of the political spectrum and campaigns on a platform of social solidarity and social justice. PAJOCA-PP is a party born out of the dissolution of the cold war blocs and the global fall of communism. PAJOCA-PP was created in an attempt to make the break with Marxism, but also in an attempt to fight against 'rule-less' (and ruthless) capitalism that the party founders foresaw. The party was formed around the aim to protect the weaker strata of society (youth, workers, farmers) and to combat inequalities in Angola.

PAJOCA-PP never was a radical opposition party. It defended and kept open the Parliament in 1992 as the UNITA left the capital for the civil war from the bush. Our informant told us that the party always was fighting for peace and democracy: criticizing UNITA for continuing the war in the name of 'democracy', and pressuring the MPLA for peace. Today, it says PAJOCA-PP is relatively similar to the MPLA in terms of program content, but not in terms of procedure and process. Besides, PAJOCA-PP supported the candidacy of the MPLA president dos Santos in the elections in 1992, and PAJOCA-PP is a member of the GURN government, with the Minister of Fisheries.

The party 'stronghold' is in former MPLA controlled areas of the country, as the UNITA never allowed opposition parties to operate in their areas during the war. The provinces where PAJOCA feels strong are Benguela, Malanje, Kwanza Norte, and Luanda. They are also trying to penetrate Cabinda and to capture some of the protest votes against the MPLA.

The aim of PAJOCA-PP in these elections is to break the absolute majority of the MPLA in Parliament. The party argues that this absolute majority is bad for the country. One way to reduce this absolute majority would be for all opposition parties to join in coalitions and to form two or three blocks. This would solve the problem of swing voters. However, if a coalition of opposition parties should win the elections, new problems would arise: The distribution of government portfolios, the program, views, goals, etc. According to PAJOCA-PP these problems outweigh the commonalities amongst parties, and as a result, PAJOCA-PP has no plans for alliances or coalitions and will contend the elections on its own merit.

PAJOCA-PP emphasises education in its election campaign. It will "rescue of the Angolan teachers' dignity", and will create a digital network in every school of the country. PAJOCA-PP

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<sup>45</sup> *Mãos Livres - Associação de Juristas e Jornalistas na Defesa e Difusão dos Direitos Humanos e da Cidadania* (ML, "Free Hands") is a human rights defence NGO established by a lawyer and a journalist in April 2000, initially backed by the UN Human Rights Division. It is to a large extent an organisation that offers free legal assistance, and aims to defend and spread information about human rights and access to justice in Angola. It has now around 300 members and activities in 7 provinces, and approximately 90 employees. Members are mainly lawyers and law students, including what is called "para-legals", working on a voluntary and part-time basis (Amundsen and Abreu 2006:21).

also promises to guarantee health services free of charge for students, so that they can feel healthier and physically and mentally comfortable. Amongst the other promises, this political party announced that it is going to guarantee electricity to all citizens, in order to enable the use of new information technologies in all public establishments of the country.

PAJOCA-PP calls for a high degree of loyalty, fidelity and the complete dedication to public service. In the case of a PAJOCA-PP victory, government would be reduced, and dynamic personnel who are dedicated to public service would be brought into government positions. In addition a conflict of interest law would be enacted. PAJOCA-PP campaigns on a platform strictly opposed to any sort of conflict of interest in public office.

The campaign message is furthermore one of peace, especially in areas that are highly contested, like the '*Planalto central*', which includes Huambo. The campaign strategy is to position the party especially in these areas as a real alternative that can overcome the "mortal hatred" of UNITA and MPLA. PAJOCA-PP foresees vigorously contested election campaigns, both by UNITA and MPLA, which may be "violent"<sup>46</sup>. PAJOCA fears that especially the youth, bribed with beer and t-shirts, will be engaged in election violence. In PAJOCA's estimation, in such an environment it will not matter whether one belongs to UNITA or MPLA.<sup>47</sup>

The party strategy is furthermore not to try to engage with the traditional leaders (the *sobas*, which it claims are all bought by the MPLA), but with the '*seculos*' or '*mais velhos*', the elders of society, and with people directly. According to PAJOCA-PP, the age groups below 25 and above 50 are the party's target group. The party sees itself as the defender of the poor and vulnerable, and bases their election campaign on direct communication with the poorest members of society.

In terms of geography, PAJOCA-PP will not focus on the urban (elite) population, which it predicts to either vote for the MPLA or to abstain. Instead PAJOCA-PP will focus their efforts on the semi-urban populations. It is in these areas the grievances are strongest, according to PAJOCA-PP, especially when it comes to infrastructure like electricity and water. PAJOCA-PP feels it has a real pull on voters on these issues, because the MPLA just does not deliver.

Regarding campaign funds, PAJOCA-PP is like most other opposition parties in financial trouble. No one knows when the campaign funds are released; credits from commercial banks are impossible to get; tax exemptions (e.g. for new cars) are impossible to get; and alternative sources of funding are meagre. PAJOCA-PP feels that these are all government measures aimed at weakening opposition parties.

The party finances are made up of the state subsidy for parties of 10.000 US\$ per month, from which 300 US\$ are distributed to each of the 18 provinces and the youth wing of the party every month. In addition, members pay undisclosed membership fees directly to the party headquarter.

PAJOCA-PP foresees that they will not win the elections, and base this prediction mainly on the fact that their access to the media is severely limited. Knocking on doors does not have the same impact and reach as TV and radio appearances. The party also predicts for Angola a democracy of two speeds: reasonable in the urban centres (esp. Luanda), and very bad in the interior.

## PDP-ANA (Partido Democrático para o Progresso – Aliança Nacional Angolano)

The PDP-ANA was founded in the democratisation period of 1991, and initially led by Mfulumpinga Landu Victor, a former FNLA cadre. He was also the PDP-ANA's single Member of

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<sup>46</sup> Our informant called these areas "zonas da violencia" (zones of violence).

<sup>47</sup> It is worth mentioning that PAJOCA-PP sees it as one of the major problems in Angolan politics that the FAPLA/FAA (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola; the country's army, now the Forças Armadas de Angola) was originally the armed wing of the MPLA before it became the official armed force of Angola. There is still a widespread belief that this is not the army of the state, but the army of the state party. This not only ensures the MPLA the votes of the army but potentially also their allegiance if there were any 'complications'.

Parliament, until he was shot dead outside the party office in 2004. The party president is Sediangani Mbimbi and the deputy is Pedro Afonso Sibo Sapi.

The PDP-ANA is won one seat in the 1992 elections and took up its seat whereas UNITA resumed to the civil war. The PDP-ANA is also a GURN member party but it supported UNITA's Savimbi for the presidency in 1992,<sup>48</sup> and can be considered as a moderate opposition party.

The founding president of PDP-ANA was initially a member of the FNLA and was based in Zaire (now DRC). The party has its strength amongst the Bakongo ethnic groups along the border to the DRC, and is close to the Protestant and Baptist churches. Due to their ethnic support base, the PDP-ANA came to feel the repression of the Bakongo, the FNLA, and the "French-speaking" northerners, when the government accused the Bakongo for an attempted murder on President dos Santos in 1993 (with the help of Zairian troops).

Today, the PDP-ANA claims to be represented in all the provinces of Angola, and according to the party spokesman "everywhere where there are Angolans in the world". In the election campaign, the PDP-ANA talks about national reconciliation, education and the family as an important institution.

The PDP-ANA maintains that in the contest between the Portuguese colonizers, the FNLA, UNITA, and the MPLA, the latter succeeded in gaining control of Angola, and in their minds became the proprietor of the Angolan economy, people and country. With the help of the Soviet and Cuban military might and assistance, the MPLA was able to transform itself into a state party, and permeated all spheres of life and society with its cadres. According to the PDP-ANA it is because of this history that the elections in Angola in 1992 were un-free and unfair.

According to the PDP-ANA there is also a very big problem of co-optation of opposition party members by the MPLA. PDP-ANA, however, deems their members immune to MPLA's advances.

Regarding the upcoming elections, PDP-ANA accuses the MPLA of structural fraud, based on the lack of access to the media by opposition parties, the make-up of the *Comissão Nacional das Eleições* (CNE), which it claims is heavily stacked in favour of the MPLA and bears no representation by the smaller parties (only MPLA, UNITA and PRS). The most important point regarding the CNE however is that Caetano de Sousa holds the office of president of the CNE while at the same being the vice president of the Supreme Court.

According to the PDP-ANA there is also a lack of opposition party representation in the *Comissão Interministerial para o Processo Eleitoral* (CIPE), with both UNITA and PRS absent from that body. PDP-ANA also accuses MPLA of "gerrymandering" (the drawing of electoral district lines in order to fit political purposes). For instance, out of 87 offices for voter registration in Luanda only 67 actually function as such. According to the PDP-ANA most of the offices that do not function are in the semi-urban areas and the urban periphery where the opposition parties are expected to win the bulk of their support. The PDP-ANA also criticizes the decision by the government to exclude and disenfranchise the Angolan diaspora.

PDP-ANA is reluctant to give up their symbols and identity in any coalition, but accepts that any alliance or coalition will ultimately depend upon the wishes and interests of their voters.

## PRD (Partido Renovador Democrático)

The PRD is a party founded by a group of MPLA break-away renegades (who were purged and exiled after a failed coup in 1977). They have one deputy in Parliament (Rui Augusto Ribeiro da Costa), but the party has itself been subject to several splits and break-aways.

The chairman of the party, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade left in 1992, and later the same year the general secretary and parliamentary deputy, Vicente Junior, broke away. In 1996 the party tried to remove him from Parliament, but because parties cannot remove their own deputies (deputies

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<sup>48</sup> Thus, the PDP-ANA was on the receiving end of various anti-UNITA purges by the MPLA during the war, including Dr. M'Bimbi, who was accused of being a UNITA supporter, arrested and tortured.

have to resign but will lose the seat if they join another party), the PRD ended up excommunicating their deputy in 1998. Since then he is in Parliament as an independent. Add to this the problems with the party president's health,<sup>49</sup> and the PRD has a serious leadership impasse.

The party is however approved by the Constitutional Court, and is preparing for the 2008 elections. PRD is also represented in government, as the party secretary general is also the vice-minister of transport. The party holds this post since 1992, when it was invited by the MPLA to join the GURN government.<sup>50</sup> PRD will not leave government before the elections.

The PRD's internal structure is quite similar to other parties of the same size, but there are some special features: The party statutes foresee permanent secretariats for financial administration, economy, human rights and elections. These are repeated on the provincial level. Also, every party member can run for all party offices.<sup>51</sup> They claim to have about 40.000 members.

In terms of regional implantation, PRD is represented in all the 18 provincial capitals of Angola and in some municipalities. Provinces with the strongest support include Benguela, Malanje, Cuando Cubango, Uije, and possibly Luanda, but this strength is relative. The party gets its main support from urban and semi-urban areas, and has only recently tried to penetrate the countryside. There is no PRD victory predicted or expected in any province.

The party ideology has only recently (this year) become clear. The PRD is an urban party, which sees itself at the centre left of the political spectrum. The program is based on the redistribution of wealth from major investments to the population. The party does not have any international links, although some attempts have been made. It is a party that to a large extent relies on the personal networks and relationships of its leaders, but it is looking forward to a political situation in Angola that is marked by more democracy and where this may not be necessary anymore.

The electoral strategy in the short term, apart from participation in the elections is to avoid the absolute majority of the MPLA in Parliament. According to the PRD, it is only without an absolute MPLA majority in Parliament that Angola can become more democratic. In the longer term, PRD wants to position itself in municipalities in order to do well in future local elections.

Like most other opposition parties, the PRD is weakened by a lack of funds. Aside from the state subsidies and membership fees there are no sources of income. Private business donors would go bankrupt if they financed a political party other than MPLA. Despite this, the PRD has received some help, for example for a fax machine and a copier.

PRD membership fees are 100 US\$ per month for the party leadership, 50 USD per month for party functionaries, and 1000 Kwanza per month for each member. This seems to be more than most of the other parties. PRD insists on the regular payment of the fee and believes that this 'buy-in' creates a strong relationship between party and members.

Regarding the current elections, PRD raise serious doubts about the IT systems which are to be used for these elections<sup>52</sup>. PRD demands an audit of these systems by an independent international organization. In terms of coalitions and alliances, PD recognizes that it would be best if the opposition was united, and fighting together to avoid an absolute majority of the MPLA in Parliament. In practice, however, the PRD is more sceptical due to a lack of trust between opposition parties. They claim that the MPLA has the capacity to co-opt many and thus bust any coalition.

PRD notes that election violence is unlikely due to the inability of UNITA to wage a war and the likelihood of an MPLA victory.<sup>53</sup> The PRD is more concerned with the verbal violence and

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<sup>49</sup> The party president Luis da Silva Dos Passos is suffering from prolonged illness.

<sup>50</sup> The party accepted the position on pragmatic grounds, arguing that a rejection would achieve nothing and joining may win something. The most important reason was, however, that due to the civil war, joining the government was a matter of life and death, also for the party members in the provinces.

<sup>51</sup> The formal requirements are to be a paid up member, to have no criminal record and to be older than 18 years of age.

<sup>52</sup> The system is to be supplied by Valleysoft (<http://www.cne.ao/noticias.cfm?id=216>)

<sup>53</sup> If however the MPLA would lose the elections, violence is much more likely.

the associated violence against individual persons. The discourse of the MPLA is very divisive and systematically demonizes UNITA. This also affects other political opposition parties.

Despite having participated in the 1992 elections, the PRD has only recently developed a party line, a Government programme and coherent policies. Due to internal problems, the party will probably find it very hard to compete successfully in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

### PSD (Partido Social-Democratico)

The PSD is one of the oldest in Angola (except for the “historical parties”), founded in 1989. It had one deputy in the outgoing Parliament, but its application to take part in the 2008 elections was declined. They could not establish the necessary signatures.

The party president is Nzuzi Nsumbo. Now, the PSD has joined, and is leading, a group of other parties that were rejected from participating at the September elections (and some that never applied) in an alliance called the *Group of Seven* (PREA, UTPA, PSA, PSD, FPA, CVP and PCCA). Their aim is to support the MPLA in the 2008 parliamentary elections.<sup>54</sup>

### PNDA (Partido Nacional Democrático Angolano)

The PNDA has one deputy in the outgoing Parliament, Gaspar Dominago da Silva, and the chairman of the party is Geraldo Pereira João da Silva and the general secretary is Pedro João António.

The party raised some eye-brows when the party leadership claimed in 2005 that for any elections to be free and fair, populations displaced by the civil war should return to their areas of origin. Despite the relative age of the party (it has been in Angolan politics to a greater or lesser degree since 16 years) and its presence in the current outgoing Parliament, the PNDA was *not* authorized for the parliamentary elections in 2008.

The somehow subdued message from the party before the Constitutional Court ruled out its participation at the upcoming parliamentary elections (and to some extent after the Courts decision as well) was focusing mainly on a lack of accountability of state organs. The party president has stated on occasions that the state and figures within it are misappropriating funds which legally belong to the Angolan people to conduct investments abroad. This fits into a wider party rhetoric about the need to distribute wealth more equitably within Angola.

After the decision of the Constitutional Court not to allow the party to submit a list of candidates for the parliamentary elections, the PNDA leadership is focusing all their focus, initiative and their resources on the next electoral contest – whenever that may be.

### FDA (Fórum Democrático Angolano)

FDA participated in the 1992 parliamentary election, and the party obtained 12 038 votes (0.3%) and one seat in the National Assembly; Miguel Nzau Puna.

When Puna was nominated ambassador of Angola in Canada in 1997, his Parliament seat was taken over by António Dias da Silva. In 2006, Dias da Silva was expelled from the Parliament, and FDA ceased to function and did not apply to take part in the 2008 elections.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Source: [Angola24horas](http://www.angola24horas.com/?pg=noticia&id=1624) at [www.angola24horas.com/?pg=noticia&id=1624](http://www.angola24horas.com/?pg=noticia&id=1624) (19 Aug 08) and VOA at [http://club-k-angola.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=710&Itemid=61](http://club-k-angola.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=710&Itemid=61) (19 Aug 08).

<sup>55</sup> Source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Democratic_Forum) at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan\\_Democratic\\_Forum](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angolan_Democratic_Forum) (18 Aug 08).

## UNITA: The power rival

The UNITA has come a long way from being the armed liberation movement struggling to control the country in open contest with the MPLA, to become a modern, democratic political party.

The UNITA was established in 1966 and led by Jonas Savimbi, conducted a clandestine collaboration with the Portuguese military against MPLA before independence, was supported by the USA and apartheid South Africa in the civil war, was in control of large parts of the country (including the diamond producing areas) during the civil war, took part in the 1992 elections but did not accept defeat in the presidential elections and resumed to war until Savimbi was killed and the war ended in 2002.

With peace settled in 2002 through the *Luena Memorandum*, the decapitated and militarily defeated UNITA entered a completely new phase by joining the second GURN government and by taking up their 70 seats in Parliament, for real. The party held its 9<sup>th</sup> Congress in 2003, and appeared as renewed, transparent, and democratic with its new leader Isaiás Samakuva.

## Outlook and programme

The UNITA claims to be an opposition party, and it definitely is, despite being a coalition partner in the current GURN government. In government, UNITA does not have any real power; the Government programme is the same as the MPLA programme, the Head of Government is the MPLA president (the President of the Republic) and non-MPLA government ministers and vice-ministers have their authority downgraded through internal government controls and procedures.<sup>56</sup> UNITA claims that it does not really participate in the governing of the country, that its ministers are powerless.<sup>57</sup>

It is indeed a problem for the party to be in opposition and at the same time a member of the Government, both to outside observers, voters and internally in the party. The majority sentiment inside the UNITA is that it would be preferable for UNITA to retreat from the GURN. This issue was discussed internally in UNITA, which reached the decision in 2004 that the presence of UNITA in the GURN was a factor of stability. Besides, there is the question of influence and finances (see below).

Today UNITA is committed to democracy, the defense of human rights, good governance, and the rule of law. This includes the fair contests of ideas, and also means that it is not the absolute goal to gain power through winning elections.



<sup>56</sup> In cases where the UNITA has the ministerial post, the MPLA vice-minister is mostly in charge of political issues.

<sup>57</sup> One example presented by UNITA is when a former UNITA Minister of Health, Dr. Carlos Morgado, was very popular not least because of his cleaning up of corruption in the health services and firing lots of corrupt officials in the process. However, when he asked the President of Angola to approve some of his further suggestions, he was instead fired and all the people he expelled on the grounds of corrupt behavior were re-instated. His evidence of corruption was ignored.

## Organisation

UNITA is a well-organised party, with a deep and broad organisational structure. The party has had its share of splits and factionalism, with for instance the MPLA induced establishment of the *UNITA-Renovada* to replace the real UNITA, the “disobedience” of the parliamentary group led by Abel Chivukuvuku, the faction of the militaristic old-timers of the *General Gato* faction, and a hardliner opposing the far more moderate and reconciliatory Samakuva at the last congress. Despite these challenges the UNITA leadership was able to drastically reduce, if not completely overcome the internal conflicts and splits. The party now appears to be a united, radiant and well-organised one.

At the top of the party structure is the party congress, which meets every 4 years. The delegates of the congress are elected at provincial conferences. The only members who access to congress without being elected are the members of the political commission. The congress elects the party president. There have been 2 party president elections since peacetime, and both times there have been more than one candidate.<sup>58</sup>

The party congress also elects the political commission of the party, which currently includes 425 members. In order to be eligible for membership in the political commission, members must show 15 years of membership, good behaviour, no criminal record, they must have paid their membership fees and carry a valid UNITA membership card.<sup>59</sup>

75 members of the political commission make up the permanent party committee. The permanent committee is a deliberative body that gives direction to the party and meets at least every three months, but more often if necessary. The party president is also the leader of the permanent committee. The various secretaries are also members of the committee by right. This includes national and provincial secretaries as well as the presidents of the women’s organization (*Liga da Mulher Angolana*, LIMA) and the youth organization (*Juventude Revolucionaria de Angola*, JURA). The other members (around 35%) are appointed by the president, and include among others the party elders.

It is UNITA policy that in all leadership organs (*Orgaos de direccao do partido*), women should have 30% and the youth 20% of all posts.

The executive body of the party is made up of the party president and the vice-president, the secretary general and the national secretaries who are all appointed by the president. The president’s office also heads or houses the following portfolios: executive secretariat of the permanent committee, the general inspector of the party, the national juridical council, the national secretariat for political direction, the national secretariat for the demobilization and re-insertion of former soldiers, the secretariat for foreign affairs, and the parliamentary group.

The secretary general’s office is the ‘house’ of policy. This is where policies are developed, formulated, defined, and promulgated. The secretary general’s office is also very close to the membership base and deals with the administration of the party. The secretary general’s office contains the national secretariat for political organization and mobilization, the national secretariat of marketing, the national secretariat for elections, the national secretariat for membership fees, and the national secretariat for social issues. The presidents of the LIMA and JURA also fall under the accountability of the general secretariat, as do the 18 provincial secretaries.

The Vice-president’s office deals with the bulk of the administrative burden, such as salaries or financial affairs. This office contains the national secretariat for finances and the national secretariat for the management of the party patrimony.

The various secretariats, including the provincial secretaries meet on a weekly basis. There are, however, also *ad hoc* political committees, which meet daily (for example the electoral committee).

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<sup>58</sup> Three and two candidates, to be precise.

<sup>59</sup> Before the last congress these stringent requirements were overlooked on some occasions.

On the provincial level, the hierarchy is headed by the provincial secretary and his assistant, and followed by the advisors for policy, communication and marketing, finances, elections, LIMA, JURA, and inspection.

Despite the high level of party organization and discipline, independent non-UNITA members can apply for positions within UNITA, and even enter Parliament as an independent on a UNITA ticket.<sup>60</sup>

## Membership

During the war, a lot of cadres were associated to the party. These included teachers, nurses, administrative staff, and other personnel who helped UNITA govern in the areas it controlled. Of all the teachers and nurses and other personnel of the UNITA areas, only about half were brought into the public service when the peace deals were made and the second GURN were formed in 2002. In addition, only 5000 of 90.000 former UNITA soldiers were taken into the Angolan armed forces (FAA), and another 5000 into the Angolan police force. UNITA still has a responsibility towards these cadres and supports them. The Angolan Government only pays pension benefits to soldiers above the rank of major. This support which UNITA extends to former cadres is a huge challenge on the party and its finances, and shapes the social character of the party to a large degree.

## Financing

UNITA receives funds from the state budget according to their success during the last elections and their representation in Parliament. Currently, UNITA receives 1.200.000 US\$ per month. Secondly, every member who gained a public office through membership in the party has to pay between 150 and 200 US\$ per month, and there are additional and high (but unspecified) obligatory and extraordinary membership fees for all members of the party leadership. Both these incomes go directly to the central party. Thirdly, membership fees are important, but most remain at the provincial level. Donations to the party make up an irrelevant amount of money.

UNITA claims not to have any businesses of its own. In the peace accords, however, it was agreed that some companies should be in UNITA's control. A diamond mining company was amongst these (but has not been handed over, according to UNITA). It is impossible to obtain precise information regarding the ownership and actual mining concessions controlled by people close to UNITA (former UNITA high-ranking military people have been mentioned), as well as information on their interests and profits made from the diamonds mining industry in areas formerly controlled by UNITA, or the amounts which are transferred to the party.

UNITA also claims to be the first party to hand in fully audited accounts for the period from 2003 to 2008 (handed in to the *Tribunal das Contas* in March 2008). Furthermore, according to the party, the administrative council of UNITA, which oversees financial accounts, control, planning, etc., has a very high capacity and competence that they also bring to bear on the management of the party patrimony.

The party patrimony (real estate) is substantial. UNITA owns a lot of property all over the country, although some of it was destroyed during the war and the MPLA and various state institutions occupy much of it. In the peace accords it was agreed that all UNITA property should be returned to it, but in Luanda alone 82 buildings are still not yet handed over, according to UNITA. The Ministry of Public Works (*Ministerio das Obras Publicas*) has the ultimate responsibility in this matter, and UNITA claims that the lack of progress in the return of property is a criminal act.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Professor Jorge Pinto de Andrade, for example, was invited by UNITA to head the electoral commission for UNITA. This was also to show that this particular post should not be politicized.

<sup>61</sup> According to UNITA, all the relevant documents have been signed, but no transfers have ever been implemented. They argue that this is a part of a wider strategy to weaken UNITA, to drain their capacity to run an election campaign and to

## Media outreach

UNITA currently operates *Rádio Despertar*, which broadcasts only in Luanda.<sup>62</sup> *Socitel* is an independent communications company, which gets the bulk of its contracts from UNITA. Because of this, very few other companies or parties will use their services. *Socitel* publishes the UNITA magazine '*Terra Angolana*', maintains the UNITA website,<sup>63</sup> and produces TV programs and broadcasts for UNITA. *Terra Angolana* first appeared in 1982 but only turned commercial in 2002. Currently the national circulation runs at 7.000 copies, fortnightly, of which 2.000 editions are distributed in Luanda. Although few companies in Angola use *Terra Angolana* to advertise, the production costs are nearly recovered through the sale of advertisements.

## Election campaign 2008

According to UNITA the current electoral process running up to the parliamentary elections in September, is marked by political intolerance against all opposition parties in general and against UNITA in particular, and that this has resulted in the destruction of property and the loss of life.<sup>64</sup>

UNITA claims that this intolerance extends to the infringement of the right of every party to campaign in public. Opposition parties simply have their events prohibited, usually by local authorities, which are again controlled by the MPLA.<sup>65</sup> Practically in every province, the 1<sup>st</sup> provincial secretary (i.e. state representative) is also a member of the MPLA. Furthermore, the MPLA is actively co-opting or substitution the traditional leaders, the *sobas*. Those who reject the advances of the MPLA and do not want to become members are simply removed, and agents of the ruling party installed in their place.<sup>66</sup>

According to the UNITA, the MPLA's control of formal and traditional authorities is backed up through a *de facto* secret police force, the CADCs (*Celulas Armadas para a Defesa Civil*, Armed Cells for Civil Defence). These cells are at the local level and include 4-5 agents in every locality. They are omnipresent throughout the country, even in Luanda. In terms of administration they are rooted somewhere between the regular police force and the MPLA committees, and they are used to gather intelligence and engage in violence, in particular in political violence. The existence of the CADCs has always been denied by the MPLA, but in the recent state budget there is, according to UNITA, a line for exactly these cells. In addition, the Chief of Civil Defense (a former army colonel) has allegedly admitted their existence.

The fourth element in this toolkit of control is, according to the UNITA, the distributive nature of the MPLA-controlled state. Not only do traditional leaders receive gifts and goods in return for their allegiance (e.g. King Ekuikui VI of Huambo); cars, houses, cash bonuses are distributed by the government; but critics of these practices are punished. Opposition deputies have also been targets of these distributions, and UNITA has lost 2-3 deputies to MPLA through co-optation (the prize were houses in the new suburb of Luanda Sul).

Furthermore, according to UNITA the electoral law opens the doors for "procedural fraud". Article 134 of the electoral law states that if there is a discrepancy between the number of voters

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govern. Other issues underline this, for instance the lack of employment of UNITA personnel in administrative positions (like the position of administrator for the Ingombotas area in Luanda), which was agreed upon in writing and signed by MPLA.

<sup>62</sup> At the time of writing the radio station was shut down due to broadcasts beyond their licensed radius. [http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id\\_article=27807](http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=27807)

<sup>63</sup> [www.unitaangola.org](http://www.unitaangola.org)

<sup>64</sup> One example given is from Huambo-Xipipa, where a UNITA office was burned down with two people inside it.

<sup>65</sup> The MPLA, on the other hand, is treated favourably by local authorities. For example, during a MPLA assembly in Huambo in April 2008, the governor (from the MPLA) decreed a public holiday for all, and ordered all public officials to attend. Attendance was verified at the actual assembly. The streets and squares in the city were closed off for traffic, and public transport was made available for the MPLA.

<sup>66</sup> According to the UNITA, at a conference of traditional leaders in 2007, the MPLA politicized and changed a large number of the *sobas*. In particular, old fighters from the FAPLA were given posts of *sobas*.

(who were recorded voting at any given polling station) and the number of ballot papers inside the ballot box at that same polling station, the number of ballot papers should be counted. According to UNITA this may lead to stuffing of ballot boxes, precisely because the counting does not take place at the locality where the votes are cast, but centrally.

Another important issue of concern for UNITA is the possibility of fraud when it comes to the actual number of Angolans who are eligible to vote. There are many citizens who have no identity cards or other documents, and there is no recent census data or statistics because the last national census was conducted in 1968. For UNITA, the problem with this is that the official number of voters can be manipulated to a larger degree and changed according to political advantage. Furthermore, if a person has no personal document for identification, two options are valid as alternative proof to acquire an ID card or a passport; the affirmation of identity by either the traditional authority (*soba*), or a public official (teacher, etc.). Both these authorities are firmly in the hands of the MPLA. A valid ID is required to register as a voter and acquire a voting card.<sup>67</sup>

In UNITA's views, the political environment now leading up to the elections is highly polarized. Criticism of government policies or the pointing out of flawed government action is immediately countered with accusations of anti-patriotism.

UNITA does not put too much hope in the parliamentary elections. First, because the MPLA is still omnipotent and omnipresent, and secondly, because of the uneven playing field. Taking all factors into account, UNITA feels that it would "be easier for UNITA to win a majority of votes than to have a UNITA victory confirmed".<sup>68</sup> The ambition for UNITA is a stable transition to democracy through repeated elections. For UNITA it is impossible to go back to the bush. In the case of a UNITA victory, they will try to form a government of national unity.

Despite the 'procedural fraud' that the MPLA is allegedly conducting, and despite the complaints by UNITA at every step, UNITA is likely to accept the outcome of these upcoming elections. Even if there was direct fraud at the elections, UNITA would probably accept the outcome although there will be huge complaints and calls for investigation. The understanding amongst UNITA is that if they accept the procedural fraud all the way up to the elections and participate in the elections, they also have to accept the outcome.

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<sup>67</sup> According to UNITA, the rates of registration are lowest in the localities where UNITA did well in the 1992 elections, although not too much weight should be put on this fact since the regional implantation of the party and the population can have changed over the past 16 years.

<sup>68</sup> The UNITA is therefore looking forward to the 'autarquias' (local elections) with great anticipation. This could be a way to break the vertical power hierarchy and increase accountability from the bottom up.

## Concluding notes

The outcome of elections is largely determined by the conditions set prior to the ballot. Structural elements like the mandate of the Election Commission, the voter registration process, the terms and conditions for registration of parties and candidates (and those excluded), the size and distribution of electoral districts, the vote counting system, etc. are mechanisms that, it has been claimed, can and will favour the ruling party MPLA. Furthermore, the three “historical” parties MPLA, UNITA and FNLA has the advantage of being better known than the other parties, although the very young average age of the Angolan population can offset some of this effect.

Ethnicity and regionalism will still play a significant role, as most parties have their regional strongholds. The close relationship between regions and ethnic groups is already broken, however, and ethnicity is not the strongest motivation for voting. The government – opposition cleavage and some political issues like decentralisation and more power to the regions are prominent questions.

Violence and intimidation is still a problem. Some people fear that the 2008 parliamentary elections will increase regional and ethnic tensions, and make the government – opposition split violent. The experience of the 1992 elections, which led to a new round of civil war, still looms in the background. The warnings by the Election Network (*Rede Eleitoral*, an NGO coalition in Angola) that civil society should do what they can to prevent conflict and violence is illustrative, and so is the fact that many people are leaving the country before the elections. The recently established MPLA paramilitary *Civil Defence Organization* and other armed party “militants” and “militias” (known from other African countries for inciting electoral violence) does not bode well. *Human Rights Watch* documented numerous incidents of political violence involving ruling party supporters during the voter registration and campaign period (HRW 2008).

Nevertheless, the 2008 parliamentary elections are good for the democratic process in Angola. For one thing, the fact that a number of parties different from the MPLA are allowed to stand for elections, that they are mentioned in the state media, and that political figures other than the dominating MPLA are heard, will reduce the supremacy of the ruling party. The tendencies of “*nomenklatura*” and “*berufsverbot*” (the privileged position of MPLA members and the pressure for people in government position to be MPLA members) can be broken, at least lessened somewhat.

There is, however, no reason to believe that the ruling party MPLA will be defeated the 2008 parliamentary elections, or that the dominance of the MPLA regime will be broken. The only serious contender, UNITA, has lost much of its organizational strength and legitimacy; it has downplayed its ambitions, and can end up winning only a few traditional strongholds. Besides, comparative experience from other African countries is that unless there is a deep economic crisis in the country, the majority of the rural population will rally behind ‘the power’ and give the ruling party a comfortable majority. It is important, however, that the ruling party does not win a 2/3 majority in the Parliament, because this will make the party able to change the constitution without consultation with other parties. It is also important for the consolidation of democracy that a few opposition parties win a decent representation in Parliament. The 2008 elections are only parliamentary elections, however, in a strongly presidential system, and will not change Angolan politics in any fundamental way.

## Appendix 1: Political parties registered (by Electoral Commission)

1	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola	M.P.L.A
2	União Nacional para a Independência de Angola	U.N.I.T.A
3	Partido da Aliança Juventude Operária e Camponesa de Angola	PAJOCA
4	Partido Social Democrata	PSD
5	Partido Renovador Democrático	PRD
6	Partido Renovação Social	PRS
7	Convenção Nacional Democrática de Angola	C.N.D.A
8	Partido Nacional Democrático de Angola	P.N.D.A
9	Partido Democrático Pacífico de Angola	PDPA
10	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola	FNLA
11	Partido Democrático de Angola	PDA
12	Partido Democrático para o Progresso de Aliança Nacional de Angola	PDP -ANA
13	Frente para Democracia	FPD
14	Partido Angolano Liberal	PAL
15	Partido Angolano Independente	PAI
16	Partido Liberal Democrático	P.L.D
17	Partido Social Democrático Angolano	PSDA
18	Partido Democrático Liberal de Angola	PDLA
19	União Democrática Angolana	UDA
20	Partido Renovador de Angola	PRA
21	União Nacional para a Democracia	UND
22	União Nacional da Luz para a Democracia e Desenvolvimento de Angola	UNLDDA
23	Partido Angolano Conservador da Identidade Africana	PACIA
24	União Nacional Patriótica para Democracia	UNPD
25	União Nacional para Democracia e Progresso	UNDP
26	Partido Progressista Democrático de Angola	PPDA
27	Partido de Solidariedade e da Consciência de Angola	PSCA
28	Partido Socialista Liberal	PSL
29	Partido Democrático Radical de Angola	PDRA
30	Partido Socialista Angolano	PSA
31	Tendência de Reflexão Democrática	TDR
32	Aliança Nacional Democrática	AND
33	União Democrática dos Povos de Angola	UPDA
34	Partido de Expressão Livre Angolana	PELA
35	Partido Social da Paz de Angola	PSPA
36	Partido Angolano para os Interesses Democráticos	PAID
37	Partido Frente Democrática de Angola	PFDA
38	Partido de Convergência Democrático Angolano	PCDA
39	União Social Democrática	USD
40	Partido Nacional e Progressista de Angola	PNPA
41	Partido Nacional Independente de Angola	PNIA
42	Partido para Unidade Nacional de Angola	PUNA
43	Aliança para Democracia dos Povos de Angola	ADPA
44	Partido Angolano do Desenvolvimento Social	PADS
45	Frente Nacional de Desenvolvimento Democrático de Angola	FNDDA
46	Partido Nacional Ecológico de Angola	PNEA
47	Partido Independente Renovador	PIR
48	Partido de Convenção Democrática e Progresso	PCDP

49	Partido da Comunidade Comunista Angolana	PCCA
50	Partido Congressista Angolano	PCA
51	Partido Democrático Unificado de Angola	PDUA
52	Partido de Apoio a Liberdade e Democracia Angolana	PALDA
53	Partido Angolano para Unidade Democracia e Progresso	PAUDP
54	Partido Democrático para o Progresso Social	PDSP
55	Movimento Democrático de Angola	MDA
56	Partido de Aliança Democrática para a Liberdade de Angola	ADLA
57	Partido Angolano para Unidade e Desenvolvimento	PAUD
58	Partido Republicano Social Democrático	PRSD
59	Partido de Aliança Livre de Maioria Angolana	PALMA
60	Partido Progressista Democrático Liberal de Angola	PPDLA
61	Partido Restaurador de Esperança – Partido Vede	PRE
62	Movimento para Democracia de Angola	MPDA
63	Partido Trabalhista de Angola	PTA
64	União Democrática Nacional de Angola	UDNA
65	Partido Nacional	PN
66	Partido Operário Social Democrático Angolano	POSDA
67	Partido Liberal para o Progresso de Angola	PLPA
68	Partido de Apoio Democrático e Progresso de Angola	PADEPA
69	União Angolana Pela Paz Democracia e Desenvolvimento	UAPDD
70	Partido Democrático dos Trabalhadores	PDT
71	Movimento Patriótico Renovador da Salvação Nacional	MPR/SN
72	Partido Social Independente de Angola	PSIA
73	Partido de Convergência Nacional	PCN
74	Partido da Comunidade Socialista Angolana	PCSA
75	Centro Democrático Social	CDS
76	Frente Unida Pacífica de Angola	FUPA
77	Partido Angolano Unificado para a Solidariedade	PAUS
78*		
79	Partido Nacional de Salvação de Angola	PNSA
80	Partido Republicano Conservador Angolano	PRCA
81	Partido Conservador	PC
82	Partido Liberal para a Unidade Nacional	PLUN
83	Aliança do Povo Independente e Democrático de Angola	APIDA
84	Congresso Nacional Angolano	CNA
85	Aliança Nacional	AN
86	União Nacional Angolano – Partido da Terra	UNA-PT
87	Congresso de Aliança Democrática Angolana	CADA
88	Partido Angolano Republicano	PAR
89	Partido Pacífico Angolano	PPA
90	Partido de Apoio a Liberdade Linguística de Angola	PALLA
91	Partido Democrático Nacional	PDN
92	Partido de Reunificação do Povo Angolano	PRDA
93	Partido de Massas Democráticas	PMD
94	Frente Juvenil de Salvação – Partido Juvenil da Social Democrata	FRESA/PJSD
95	Partido Republicano de Angola	PREA
96	Aliança Democrática Angolana Cristã	ADAC
97	Partido Democrático de União Nacional de Angola	PDUNA
98	Aliança Democrática Trabalhista de Angola	ADTA
99	Partido de Desenvolvimento Operário Angolano	PDOA

100	Frente de Esperança para a Democracia de Angola	FEDA
101	Fórum Integral Juvenil	FIJ
102	Frente Social Democrata para o Progresso	FSDP
103	Frente Unida para Liberdade Democrática	FULD
104	Movimento Nacional Democrático	MND
105	Partido da Aliança Pacífico Progresso de Angola	PAPPA
106	Partido Liberal Democrático para Solidariedade de Angola	PLDSA
107	Partido Popular Social Democrata	PPSD
108	Partido de Reconstrução Nacional	PRN
109	Partido da Classe Operária Camponesa	PCOC
110	Partido Unidade Democrática de Angola para o Desenvolvimento	PUDAD
111	Partido Unido para o Progresso	PUP
112	Partido Unido dos Renovadores Angolanos	PURA
113	Unidade Liberal Democrática Angolana	ULDA
114	União Nacional de Resistência Democrática	UNRD
115	Movimento Nacional para Estabilidade e Progresso	MNEP
116	Partido Nacional dos Camponeses Angolanos	PNCA
117	Partido para Unidade e Fraternidade Social	PUFRAS
118	Fórum Angolano Democrático	FDA
119	Frente Unida de Salvação de Angola	FUSA
120	Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola/P. de Consciência Nacional	MDIA/PCN
121	Partido Angolano Conservador do Povo	PACOPO
122	Partido de Apoio para a Democracia e Desenvolvimento de Angola	PADDA
123	Aliança Nacional Independente de Angola	ANIA
124	União do Povo Angolano	UPA
125	Fórum Juvenil Integral	FIJ
126	Movimento Independente Democrático de Angola	MIDA
127	Partido de Aliança Pacífica e Progresso de Angola	PAPPA
128	União Nacional da Resistência Democrática	UNRD
129	Unidade Liberal Democrática	ULDA
130	Partido Republicano da Juventude de Angola	PRJA
131	Partido Democrático Social	PDS
132	Partido da Unidade Democrática de Angola	PUDAD
133	Partido do Desenvolvimento Operário Angolano	PDOA
134	Movimento para Estabilidade e Progresso	MNEP
135	Partido Unido do Povo	PUP
136	Aliança Democrática Trabalhista de Angola	ADTA
137	Partido Comunista Renovador Angolano	PCRA
138	Partido Comunista Renovador Angolano	PCRA

Source: Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (CNE), Quadro dos Partidos Políticos: [www.cne.ao/partidos.cfm](http://www.cne.ao/partidos.cfm) (12 Aug 08).

\* Note: Party No 78 is missing from the official list, due to reasons unknown to us.

## Appendix 2: Political Parties in Angola's Parliament (1992-2008)

The political parties represented in the first Angolan Parliament from 1992-2008 (acronym, flag, name in Portuguese and English, leader of parliamentary group, % of votes in 1992 elections and number of seats in outgoing Parliament):

Party	Full party name	% of votes	# of seats
 <b>MPLA</b>	<b>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Partido do Trabalho)</b> (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) Mr. Bornito de Sousa Baltazar Diogo	53.7	124
 <b>UNITA</b>	<b>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</b> (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) Mr. Constantino Zeferino	34.1	64
 <b>PRS</b>	<b>Partido Renovador Social</b> (Social Renewal Party) Mr. Lindo Bernardo Tito	2.3	6
 <b>FNLA</b>	<b>Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola</b> (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) Mr. Benjamim Manuel da Silva	2.4	5
 <b>PLD</b>	<b>Partido Liberal Democrático</b> (Democratic Liberal Party) Mrs. Analia Maria Caldeira de Victória Pereira Simeão	2.4	3
 <b>PRD</b>	<b>Partido Renovador Democrático</b> (Democratic Renewal Party) Mr. Rui Augusto Ribeiro da Costa	0.9	1
 <b>AD</b>	<b>Angola Democrática (AD-Coligação)</b> (Democratic Alliance of Angola) Mr. Joao Baptista Vieira Lopes	0.9	1
 <b>PSD</b>	<b>Partido Social-Democratico</b> (Social Democratic Party) Mr. Nzuzi Nsumbo	0.8	1
 <b>PAJOCA</b>	<b>Partido da Aliança da Juventude, Operários e Camponeses de Angola</b> (Party of the Alliance of Youth, Workers and Farmers of Angola) Mr. Alexandre Sebastião André	0.4	1
 <b>FDA</b>	<b>Fórum Democrático Angolano*</b> (Angolan Democratic Forum)	0,3	0
 <b>PDP-ANA</b>	<b>Partido Democrático para o Progresso/Aliança Nacional Angolana</b> (Democratic Progress Party/Angolan National Alliance) Mr. Pedro Afonso Sibo Sapi	0,3	1
 <b>PNDA</b>	<b>Partido Nacional Democrático Angolano</b> (Angolan National Democratic Party) Mr. Gaspar Domingos Da Silva	0,3	1

Source: official web-site of the [Parliament of Angola](http://www.parlamento.ao/) (*Página Oficial da Assembleia Nacional da República de Angola*) at <http://www.parlamento.ao/> [Accessed: 7 August 2008].

\* Note: The FDA used to have one deputy (Mr. António Dias da Silva), but has now ceased to exist.

## Appendix 3: Political Parties approved by the Supreme Court

Party	Flag	Full party name
PRS		<b>Partido de Renovação Social</b> (Social Renewal Party)
PLD		<b>Partido Liberal Democrático</b> (Democratic Liberal Party)
FpD		<b>Frente para a Democracia</b> Front for Democracy
PDP-ANA		<b>Partido Democrático para o Progresso de Aliança Nacional de Angola</b> (Democratic Progress Party/Angolan National Alliance)
PPE		<b>Plataforma Política Eleitoral</b> (Platform for Electoral Politics)
FNLA		<b>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</b> (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
PAJOCA		<b>Partido de Aliança Juventude, Operários e Camponeses de Angola</b> (Party of the Alliance of Youth, Workers and Farmers of Angola)
FOFAC		<b>Fórum Fraternal Angolano Coligação</b> (Fraternal Forum of Angola Alliance)
ND		<b>Nova Democracia União Eleitoral</b> (New Democracy Electoral Union)
MPLA		<b>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</b> (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
UNITA		<b>União Nacional de Independência Total de Angola</b> (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
PADEPA		<b>Partido de Apoio Democrático e Progresso de Angola</b> (Party of Democratic Support for Democracy and Progress in Angola)
PRD		<b>Partido Renovador Democrático</b> (Democratic Renewal Party)
AD		<b>Angola Democrática – Coligação</b> (Democratic Alliance of Angola)

Approved July 2008 for the September parliamentary elections. Source: CNE at [www.cne.ao/partidos\\_c.cfm](http://www.cne.ao/partidos_c.cfm) (18 Aug 08).

## Appendix 4: The Law on Political Parties

### Law No 2/05 of 1 of July 2005

It being necessary to amend Law 2/97, of 7 of March - Law on Political Parties, in order to establish a party framework consistent with the Constitutional gravity and dignity that should be afforded the role of Political Parties within Angolan society; In these terms, pursuant to the combined provisions of article 88(b) and article 89(i) of the Constitution, the National Assembly approves the following:

#### POLITICAL PARTIES LAW

##### CHAPTER I General provisions

###### Article 1 (Notion)

Political Parties are citizen organisations, having a permanent, autonomous nature established with the basic objectives of: democratic participation in the political life of the Nation; free competition for the formation and expression of the popular will; the organization of political power in accordance with the Constitution, their own charter and programmes. Political Parties intervene, namely, in the electoral process through the nomination or support of candidacies.

###### Article 2 (Purposes)

For the realization of their objectives, Political Parties may dedicate themselves to the following activities, namely:

- a) Participate in the activity of the State offices;
- b) contribute to the determination of national policy, namely through participation in elections and other democratic means;
- c) contribute to the exercise of political rights by citizens;
- d) contribute to the formation of public opinion and of a national and political conscience;
- e) encourage the participation of citizens in public life;
- f) enable citizens so that they are able to assume political responsibility in State offices;
- g) contribute to the patriotic and civic education of citizens and their respect and collaboration in the maintenance of public order;
- h) define Government and administration programmes for the exercise of power;
- i) influence national policy in Parliament and Government;
- j) contribute in general to the development of the Nation's political institutions.

###### Article 3 (Political association)

1. Associations that carry out activities that are of a political nature do not benefit from the status of a Political party as established in this law.
2. The associations referred in the preceding paragraph are prohibited from prosecution of the purposes defined in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (h) and (i) of the previous article.

###### Article 4 (Freedom of association)

The establishment of Political Parties is free and shall not be subject to any authorisation, without prejudice to the provisions of articles 5 and 6 of this law.

###### Article 5 (National character and limitations)

1. Political Parties shall have a national character and scope and shall conduct themselves under the terms of the Constitution, this law and other Angolan legislation.
2. The establishment and exercise of Political Parties is prohibited where they:
  - a) have a local or regional character;
  - b) promote tribalism, racism, regionalism and other forms of discrimination against citizen and national unity and territorial integrity;
  - c) using unconstitutional means, have the goal of subverting the democratic and multiparty regime;
  - d) use or propose to use violence in the carrying out of their purposes, namely, armed struggle as a means of achieving power, military or para- military training and the possession of weapon caches inside or outside of the national territory;
  - e) adopt a military or para- military type of uniforms for their members;

- f) possess parallel clandestine organisational structures;
- g) utilize military, para- military or militarised organisations;
- h) subordinate themselves to the orientation of foreign governments, entities or parties.

**Article 6 (Legal personality and capacity)**

1. Parties acquire legal personality after their registration.
2. The legal capacity of parties cover all of the rights and obligations that are necessary or convenient to the carrying out of their objectives.

**Article 7 (Equality of treatment)**

Without prejudice to the provisions in this law, parties have the right to equality of treatment by all of the entities that exercise public power, namely, the possibility of the use of public installations, the grant of support and subsidies, access and use of the public service television and radio and access to State finance, in accordance with the terms of the law.

**Article 8 (Democratic principle)**

The organisation of parties shall be subject to the following terms and condition:

- a) Non-discriminatory access, namely, in function of race, sex, origin or religious preference;
- b) Approval of the party charter and programme by all members or by a representative assembly;
- c) Periodic election of the holders of the central and local party offices by all members or by a representative assembly.

**Article 9 (Public prosecution of activities)**

1. Political Parties shall carry out their activities publicly.
2. The public exercise of the objectives of political parties include:
  - a) the publication of the party charter and programme in the Diário of the Republic (government gazette);
  - b) the recognition by citizens of the identity of the members and leadership of the party;
  - c) informing the citizenry of the party's general activities at the local, national and international level.
3. Parties may distribute publications.
4. A specific law shall regulate the access by parties to broadcast time on radio and television.

**Article 10 (Freedom of affiliation)**

1. Affiliation with a Political party is free, no one may be obliged to join a party or to remain in a party.
2. No one can be deprived of the exercise of any civil, political or professional right because they are or are not affiliated with a legally established party.

**Article 11 (Headquarters and representation)**

1. The headquarters of Political Parties shall be located in the capital of the Republic de Angola.
2. Parties are forbidden to establish any delegation or any form of a representation abroad.
3. The provision in the preceding paragraph shall not prejudice the organisation of Angolan communities who are resident abroad within the basic structure of a party as defined in the party charter.
4. The institutional representation of party organisations within the structures of the State, in public offices and services, in public companies, the media, central and local governmental administration, companies with both public and private equity, as well as all those companies in which the State has a financial investment, such as a foundation, a public interest association and professional associations, is prohibited.

**CHAPTER II Establishment of Parties****Article 12 (Registration)**

Political Parties established under the terms of article 4 of this law, acquire legal personality by inscription in the registry kept for this purpose in the Constitutional Tribunal.

**Article 13 (Preliminary procedures for the establishment of parties)**

1. Anyone who wishes to register a political party, may, prior to requesting the inscription as provided for under article 14 of this law, appoint an Instalment Committee, composed of seven to twenty-one members, which shall be generally in charge of the preparations of the organisation of the party for the purposes of registration.

2. The Instalment Committee may, for the purpose of facilitating the preparatory requirements for the registration of the party with the relevant authorities, request the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal a credential. This request shall indicate the following:

- a) Indicate the objectives of the establishment of the party;
- b) present an outline or brief summary of the Programme, charter and proposed name of the party;
- c) annex a list of the names and a copy of the identity document and certificate of criminal record of the members of the Instalment Committee referred to in the preceding paragraph 1;
- d) indicate a certain address for the purpose of receipt of the notification;
- e) present documentary proof of the assets and financial resources that the Instalment Committee has at its disposal for the commencement of its activities.

3. Upon satisfaction of the formalities referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Chief Justice shall, in a period of 30 days, decide the request for the credential for the Instalment Committee and for the granting of a period of six months for the party in formation to request its registration.

4. If the request for the credential, as referred to in the preceding paragraph, is denied, the denial may, within the period of fifteen days counting from the date of the notification of the decision, be appealed by the interested parties, to the Plenary of the Constitutional Tribunal.

5. The Instalment Committee may publish and disseminate through the media information concerning the decision of the Constitutional Tribunal, together with the reasons for the establishment of the party and the proposals for the Programme and the charter.

6. On expiry of the period referred to in paragraph three without the registration of the party having been requested as provided for in the following articles, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal shall cancel both the credential of the Instalment Committee and the authorisation that was given for the preparation of the establishment and organisation of the party in question.

#### **Article 14 (Request for registration)**

1. The registration of a political party is carried out at the request of a minimum of seven thousand five hundred citizens who are eighteen years of age or older and who have full enjoyment of their civil and political rights. This number shall include at least one hundred and fifty residents in each one of the Provinces which make up the territory of Angola.

2. The request for registration is addressed to the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal accompanied by the following documents:

- a) the party charter and programmes, with proof that each has been approved by representative assembly of the party in formation;
- b) photocopy of the publication of the convocation in a newspaper of wide circulation and an extract of the minutes of the realization of the forum that elected the leadership bodies of the party;
- c) photocopy of the identity document, passport or voter card of the seven thousand five hundred citizen-applicants supporting the request for registration;
- d) express declaration of the acceptance of each subscriber.

3. The attestation of residence referred to in paragraph 2(d) of this article may be obtained by one of the following means:

- a) declaration issued by the competent administrative authorities of the local government offices certifying that the citizens whose identities are contained in the declaration reside in the respective municipality or province;
- b) the recording on the reverse side of the individual inscription card by one of the entities mentioned in the previous paragraph, that the citizen in question resides in the respective municipality or province;
- c) an individual attestation of residence issued by the competent State municipal administration authority.

4. The declaration, the recording and the individual attestation of residence mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be dated and authenticated by the issuing entities.

5. The names of the subscribers whose signatures were considered valid shall be published in edicts in all of the provincial capitals of the country.

6. The authorities involved in the process of registration shall conduct the procedures in an efficient manner.

#### **Article 15 (Competence of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal)**

1. The Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal shall have the competence to decide on the request. The decision shall review the identity, similarity or impact of the denomination, emblems and symbols of the parties, the compliance with the requirements established in the previous article, as well as whether the charter and the programmes conform with the provisions of this law.

2. The decision shall be issued in the period of 60 days.
3. Whenever the Constitutional Tribunal shall conclude, under the terms of the law, that there is a need to alter the denomination, emblem or symbols proposed or that there is the need to submit additional data regarding the items referred to in Article 14.2, the Tribunal shall, within the period of 15 days, inform the requesting party of the need to make the alteration or to provide the additional information required. The running of the period set in the preceding paragraph shall be suspended, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 16(b).

#### **Article 16 (Rejection of the registration)**

The rejection of the registration may only be based on the following grounds:

- a) violation of the fundamental principles established in Chapter I of this law;
- b) lack of the essential requirements established in article 14 where within the period of three months, the party has not completed the respective procedure, under the terms of Article 15.3;
- c) lack of essential requirements in the charter or programmes of previously registered parties.

#### **Article 17 (Publication)**

1. The decision of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal either to accept or reject the registration shall be published in the Third Series of the Diário of the Republic.
2. The decision that orders the registration shall also be published in the Third Series of the Diário of the Republic together with the charter, the programme, the emblem and of the graphic logotype of the party.

#### **Article 18 (Appeal)**

1. The decision of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal ordering or rejecting the registration of a party, may be appealed to the Plenary of the Constitutional Tribunal. The appeal must be filed by the interested party or parties or by the Attorney General of the Republic within the period of fifteen days counting from the date of the publication of the decision.
2. The appeal shall be decided within the period of sixty days and published in the Third Series of the Diário of the Republic.

#### **Article 19 (Denomination, emblem and symbols)**

1. The emblem and symbols of a party may not be confusing or have any graphic or symbolic relation with national symbols and emblems or with religious images and symbols.
2. The denomination, emblem and symbols of a party shall be clearly distinguishable from the denomination, emblem and symbols of the already existing parties.
3. The denomination of a party may not adopt or evoke the name of a person, church, religion, tribe, race, region, religious confession or doctrine and are not permitted to use expressions or arrangements that either result in or may result in confusing or misleading the electorate.

#### **Article 20 (Charter and programmes)**

1. The charter and programme is an essential document for Political Parties.
2. The charter shall obligatorily include the following:
  - a) denomination, emblem, symbols, headquarters and scope of activities;
  - b) rules regarding the admission and exclusion of members;
  - c) rights and duties of members;
  - d) disciplinary regime, including disciplinary measures, grounds for the loss of membership, acts which result in disciplinary procedures, bodies with disciplinary authority and member protective measures;
  - e) national, local and internal organisational structures of the party;
  - f) composition and competence of the party internal organisational structures;
  - g) areas of exclusive competence of the general or members' representative assembly within the party.
  - h) the competent bodies for the nomination of the proposals for candidates for the State representative bodies;
  - i) sources of funds of the party;
  - j) method of representation when dealing with third parties;
  - k) periodic realization of the election of the internal bodies based on democratic principle;
  - l) rules which encourage the promotion of the equality of opportunity and equity between men and women, as well as a gender representation of not less than 30%;
  - m) rules and criteria regarding the observance of internal democracy.

3. The programme includes at a minimum the purposes and objectives, as well as a summary of the political and administrative activities that the party is proposing to carry out, in the event that its candidates are elected to State offices.

4. The party shall notify the Constitutional Tribunal for the purpose of comparison and recording of the names and the certificates of criminal registration of the central party office holders, accompanied by the submission of the minutes of this election and the deposit in the Tribunal of the programme and charter, once established or modified by the competent bodies in the party.

5. Political Parties may establish specific requirements for affiliation, as well as their own specific structures and forms of organisation and operation, subject to the provisions of this law.

### **CHAPTER III Party affiliation and discipline**

#### **Article 21 (General requirements for affiliation)**

1. Only Angolan citizens, who are over the age of eighteen years and have full enjoyment of their civil and political rights, may be members of a political party.

2. The following persons are prohibited from having a party affiliation:

- a) Members of the Angolan Armed Forces in active duty;
- b) members of the Police Forces;
- c) Judicial Magistrates and Prosecuting Magistrates;
- d) Corporate persons.

#### **Article 22 (Single affiliation)**

No one can register as a member simultaneously in more than one party, nor subscribe to the request for registration of a party while affiliated with another political party.

#### **Article 23 (Rights of members)**

1. Affiliation in a political party does not confer any rights of a patrimonial nature.

2. Members of the party have equal rights and duties.

3. The principle of equality of rights is not considered to be prejudiced either by the fact that the right to vote on party matters may be made subject to the payment of monetary contributions as provided for in the charter, or by a charter provision that requires a minimum period of membership before a member can be a candidate for a leadership office in the party.

#### **Article 24 (Party leadership positions)**

1. Only Angolan citizens resident in the national territory may qualify for leadership positions in political parties.

2. Citizens who have acquired Angolan nationality may only qualify for leadership positions within political parties 15 years after the acquisition of Angolan nationality.

3. Only Angolan citizens who are Angolan nationals by birth may qualify for the highest leadership position in a political party.

4. For the purposes of the provision in the preceding paragraphs, a party leader is a member of a party who is part of the central leadership offices listed in article 20.4 of this law.

#### **Article 25 (Resident in national territory)**

1. For the purposes of this law, an Angolan citizen who has been habitually resident in Angola for at least three years is considered to be resident in the national territory.

2. An Angolan citizen's qualification as a resident in the national territory is not prejudiced by residence abroad for any of the following reasons:

- a) exercise of diplomatic and consular activities or the provision of services in Angolan commercial representations;
- b) exercise of activities State companies or branches located abroad;
- c) education;
- d) health.

#### **Article 26 (Oath and promise of loyalty)**

1. The taking of an oath or promise of personal loyalty by members of a party to their leaders is prohibited.

2. The provision in the preceding paragraph shall not prejudice the duty of the members and the leadership of Political Parties to act with loyalty, respect, courtesy and to allow for differences among themselves.

**Article 27 (Termination of affiliation)**

The cancellation of a party affiliation occurs in the following cases:

- a) death;
- b) becoming a magistrate;
- c) entry into the Angolan Armed Forces or the Police Force;
- d) renunciation;
- e) expulsion from the party;
- f) affiliation in another party;
- g) candidacy for a political office in the State on behalf of another party.

**Article 28 (Party discipline and internal conflicts)**

1. The disciplinary order to which party members are bound, shall not affect the rights and the fulfilment of duties prescribed by Constitution or by law.
2. The internal conflicts regarding the use of funds shall be reviewed by the Tribunal of Accounts, those conflicts that result from the application of the party charter or Convention shall be decided by the Constitutional Tribunal, and those that are of a civil or administrative nature shall be resolved by the ordinary courts.

**CHAPTER IV Nomination of candidates for election to state offices****Article 29 (Legislative and local office candidates)**

1. The nomination of candidates for the Parliamentary elections and for Local Authority offices shall be made by the competent party authorities under the terms of the respective charter.
2. The violation of the provisions in the preceding paragraph 1 shall result in the nonacceptance of the nomination of the candidacies.

**Article 30 (Sponsorship of a presidential candidate)**

Political Parties may support a candidate for the office of President of the Republic as they decide subject and without prejudice to non-party affiliation of the office of President.

**CHAPTER V Relations with other organisations****Article 31 (Organisation associates)**

Parties may organise or associate with other organisations such as those for youth, women and particular professions for the purpose of carrying out their purposes, without prejudice to the autonomy of these.

**Article 32 (International affiliation)**

1. Without prejudice to the provisions in the following paragraphs, Angolan Political Parties may affiliate with international party organisations which have a democratic structure and operation and which do not espouse objectives that are contrary to the Constitution and the present law.
2. A party shall give notice of the decision to make such an affiliation to the President of the National Assembly and to the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Tribunal.
3. The affiliation of Angolan parties with international organisations may not jeopardise the full autonomy and capacity for self-determination of Angolan parties.
4. Any allegiance by Political Parties to external norms, orders or directives, which are contrary to Angolan laws is prohibited.

**CHAPTER VI Dissolution, merger, split-up, incorporation and coalition****Article 33 (Dissolution)**

1. Political Parties may dissolve in the following cases:
  - a) voluntarily by decision of the competent internal party body as defined by the charter;
  - b) by jurisdictional decision.
2. The charter shall establish the terms under which a party may decide to dissolve voluntarily by the respective affiliates.
3. The party assembly that decides the dissolution shall designate the liquidators who shall decide the settlement and distribution of the assets in the event there is something to be distributed by the members.

4. A political party may be dissolved by decision of the Constitutional Tribunal when:
  - a) the party does not observe the limits established in article 5.2 of this law;
  - b) the party does not participate, twice consecutively, individually or in coalition, in any parliamentary or municipal election, with its own election programme and candidates;
  - c) the number of party affiliates becomes less than the number established in article 14.1 of this law;
  - d) the party does not submit for filing during a period of seven years the minutes which are proof of the periodic election of the leadership of the party;
  - e) the party receives, directly or indirectly, funds that are prohibited under the terms of the law;
  - f) the party is declared insolvent;
  - g) it is determined that the party's real purpose is illicit or contrary to public order or morals;
  - h) the party does not have delegations or representation in at least two-thirds of the provincial capital cities in the country;
  - i) the party has not attained 0.5 % of the total votes cast in the parliamentary elections at the national level.
5. The President of the National Assembly, the Attorney General of the Republic and legally constituted parties have the right to request the dissolution of a party by jurisdictional decision.
6. Political Parties may appeal to the Plenary of the Constitutional Tribunal any decision ordering the dissolution of a party.

#### **Article 34 (Merger split-up and incorporation)**

1. The party organisational body that is competent to decide on the dissolution of the party, may, subject to the same formal requirements, decide on the merger of the party with another, the incorporation of the party into another party or its split-up.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions in this law regarding the establishment of parties, the rules regarding merger, incorporation and split-up for commercial companies shall apply to the merger, incorporation and split-up regulated by the charter regarding any lacunae with the necessary adaptation.

#### **Article 35 (Coalition)**

1. The Political Parties may freely form coalitions, subject to the following terms:
  - a) approval of the coalition by the relevant representative bodies of the parties;
  - b) clear definition of the scope, of the purposes and of the specific duration of the coalition;
  - c) written notice of the decision to form a coalition given to the Constitutional Tribunal, for purposes of merely recording the fact.
2. When the coalition has electoral pretensions, namely, the joint nomination of candidates for election, the party coalition shall adopt their own emblems and symbols. The rules regarding the register of party denomination, emblems and symbols shall apply.
3. The coalition shall not be considered to have personality distinct from that of the parties that are part of the coalition.

### **CHAPTER VII Infractions and the respective penalties**

#### **Article 36 (Disobedience)**

Anyone who leads a Political party after the respective application for registration has been denied or the party has been judicially declared dissolved, shall be punished with a prison sentence of up to six months and the corresponding fine.

#### **Article 37 (Incitement to violence)**

The political party leader or activist who in writing, by acts, gestures or public declaration, in the exercise of or in connection with this position shall be punished in accordance with the terms of the Penal Law in force, commits the following acts:

- a) incites to violence or uses violence against the constitutional and legal order in force;
- b) encourage tribalism, racism, regionalism or any form of discrimination against citizens;
- c) incites to violence against members or supporters of a party or against other citizens.

#### **Article 38 (Force)**

Anyone who obligates someone to affiliate in a party or to remain in a party shall be punished with a prison sentence of up to six months and the corresponding fine.

### **CHAPTER VIII Final and transitory provisions**

**Article 39 (Party assets)**

The Angolan State shall respect and guarantee the protection of the assets of Political Parties, namely, their moveable and immovable assets, as well as, subject to the terms of the law, the rights acquired by the Political Parties in relation to assets connected with and destined for the development of the party's activities.

**Article 40 (Financing regime)**

The regime applicable to financing, financing prohibitions, benefits and exemptions, as well as infractions and corresponding penalties shall be established by law.

**Article 41 (Protocol facilities)**

1. The Presidents and other members of the executive leadership bodies of Political Parties that have seats in the National Assembly.
2. The other members of the national leadership of the parties that have seats in the National Assembly and the Presidents of Political Parties that do not have seats in Parliament are granted the right to the use of a service passport.
3. The competent State services shall establish the necessary procedures to provide for the protocol treatment of the entities referred to in this article.

**Article 42 (Pending proceedings)**

1. This law is applicable to the Political Party and Instalment Committee credential proceedings now pending in the Supreme Court that conform with this law.
2. Those items and documents submitted to the Supreme Court that conform with this law may be used as a basis for decision.

**Article 43 (Similarities with national symbols and emblems)**

The provisions in article 19.1 of this law regarding graphic or phonetic similarities or relationships with national symbols and emblems shall, given the scope of the broad and profound constitutional revision, be applied upon the approval of the new Constitution.

**Article 44 (Doubts and omissions)**

The doubts and omissions that may arise regarding the interpretation and application of this law shall be resolved by the National Assembly.

**Article 45 (Revocation)**

Law 15/91, of 11 March, Law 4/92, of 27 March and Law 2/97, of 7 March are revoked.

Seen and approved by the National Assembly, in Luanda, 20 April 2005.

(Source: ACE project webpages on Angola at

<http://aceproject.org/regionsen/eisa/AO/zz%20Law%20No%202%2005%201%20of%20July.pdf>.

The Portuguese version to be found at the same place:

<http://aceproject.org/regions-en/eisa/AO/Lei%20No%202%2005%20de%201%20de%20Julho.pdf>).

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## Appendix 6: Useful links and webpages

### Angolan political parties

MPLA	<a href="http://www.mpla-angola.org/">www.mpla-angola.org/</a>
UNITA	<a href="http://www.unitaangola.org">www.unitaangola.org</a>
UNITA (Samakuva)	<a href="http://www.samakuva.com">www.samakuva.com</a>
UNITA (Angoterra)	<a href="http://www.angoterra.com">www.angoterra.com</a>
FNLA (unofficial)	<a href="http://www.fnla.net/index.html">www.fnla.net/index.html</a>
PRS	<a href="http://www.prs-angola.com/">www.prs-angola.com/</a>
PLD	<a href="http://www.pld.ebonet.net/">www.pld.ebonet.net/</a>
PDP-ANA	<a href="http://www.pdp-ana.org/">www.pdp-ana.org/</a>
FpD	<a href="http://www.fpd-angola.com/">www.fpd-angola.com/</a>
FpD (blogspot)	<a href="http://www.fpdangola.blogspot.com/">www.fpdangola.blogspot.com/</a>
<i>(Not found: PRD, PAJOCA-PP, PADEPA, AD Coligacao, ND, PPE, FOFAC)</i>	

### News in English

AllAfrica.com on Angola	<a href="http://allafrica.com/angola/">http://allafrica.com/angola/</a>
EINNews newsfeed on Angola	<a href="http://www.einnews.com/angola/newsfeed-angola-elections">www.einnews.com/angola/newsfeed-angola-elections</a>

### News in Portuguese

Angola 24 Horas	<a href="http://www.angola24horas.com">www.angola24horas.com</a>
O Apostolado (Radio Ecclesia)	<a href="http://www.apostolado-angola.org">www.apostolado-angola.org</a>
Agência AngolaPress	<a href="http://www.portalangop.co.ao">www.portalangop.co.ao</a>
Africandidade	<a href="http://www.africanidade.com">www.africanidade.com</a>
Echos de l'Angola (UNITA)	<a href="http://www.echosdelangola.org">www.echosdelangola.org</a>
VOA Multipress	<a href="http://www.multipress.info">www.multipress.info</a>
Ango Notícias	<a href="http://www.angonoticias.com">www.angonoticias.com</a>
Notícias Lusófonas	<a href="http://www.noticiaslusofonas.com">www.noticiaslusofonas.com</a>
Nexus	<a href="http://www.nexus.ao">www.nexus.ao</a>
Journal de Angola online	<a href="http://www.jornaldeangola.com">www.jornaldeangola.com</a>
Seminário Angolense	<a href="http://www.semanarioangolense.net">www.semanarioangolense.net</a>
Rádio nacional de Angola, notícias	<a href="http://www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=22519">www.rna.ao/canala/noticias.cgi?ID=22519</a>
Ibinda.com, Cabinda Digital	<a href="http://www.ibinda.com">www.ibinda.com</a>
Luanda Digital	<a href="http://www.luandadigital.com">www.luandadigital.com</a>
Angola Xyami	<a href="http://www.angolaxyami.com">www.angolaxyami.com</a>

### Official sites

Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (CNE)	<a href="http://www.cne.ao">www.cne.ao</a>
Constitutional Court	<a href="http://www.tribunalconstitucional.ao">www.tribunalconstitucional.ao</a>
Parliament of Angola	<a href="http://www.parlamento.ao/">www.parlamento.ao/</a>
Parliament of Angola, notícias	<a href="http://www.parlamento.ao/noticias.php">www.parlamento.ao/noticias.php</a>
Portais da República de Angola	<a href="http://www.angola-portal.ao">www.angola-portal.ao</a>
Angolan Embassy in Washington D.C.	<a href="http://www.angola.org">www.angola.org</a>

### Election Databases and info

IFES election guide on Angola	<a href="http://www.electionguide.org/country-events.php?ID=7">www.electionguide.org/country-events.php?ID=7</a>
EISA pages on Angola	<a href="http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/angola.htm">www.eisa.org.za/WEP/angola.htm</a>
African Elections Database on Angola	<a href="http://africanelections.tripod.com/ao.html">http://africanelections.tripod.com/ao.html</a>
OSISA on Angola	<a href="http://www.osisa.org/node/4463">www.osisa.org/node/4463</a>
Wikipedia on Angola	<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola</a>
Human Rights Watch on Angola	<a href="http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&amp;c=angola">http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&amp;c=angola</a>

### Blogs and discussion forums

Club-k	<a href="http://www.club-k-angola.com">www.club-k-angola.com</a>
Pululu blog spot	<a href="http://pululu.blogspot.com/">http://pululu.blogspot.com/</a>

AfrikaGrupperna on Angola

<http://africagroups.org/ang/>

## Recent Working Papers

### **WP 2008: 8**

SUHRKE, Astri and Kaja Borchgrevink: Afghanistan: Justice Sector Reform. Bergen, 2008, 15 pp.

### **WP 2008: 7**

ANDVIG Jens Chr. and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad: Crime, Poverty and Police Corruption in Developing Countries. Bergen, 2008, 32 pp.

### **WP 2008: 5**

MAKARA, Sabiti, Lise Rakner, Rwengabo Sabastiano: Administering Uganda's 2006 Multiparty Elections: The Role of the Electoral Commission. Bergen, 2008, 16 pp.

### **WP 2008: 4**

ASK, Karin and Siri Lange: Kjønn- og likestillingsrettet utviklingssamarbeid. Kartlegging av kompetansemiljø i Norge. Bergen, 2008, 40 pp.

### **WP 2008: 3**

SKJÆVESTAD, Anne: The Mapuche People's Battle for Indigenous Land. Litigation as a Strategy to Defend Indigenous Land Rights. Bergen, 2008, 21 pp.

### **WP 2008: 2**

TØNDEL, Line and Tina Søreide: Bureaucratic Complexity and Impacts of Corruption in Utilities. Bergen, 2008, 16 pp.

### **WP 2008: 1**

FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge and Mick Moore: Revenue Authorities and State Capacity in Anglophone Africa. Bergen, 2008, 13 pp.

### **WP 2007: 13**

KNUDSEN, Are and Nasser Yassin (UCL): Political Violence in Post-Civil War Lebanon, 1989-2007. Bergen, 2007, 24 pp.

### **WP 2007: 12**

RAKNER, Lise, Sabiti Makara, and Lars Svåsand: Turnaround: The National Resistance Movement and the Re-introduction of a Multiparty System in Uganda. Bergen, 2007, 23 pp.

### **WP 2007: 11**

FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge and Mick Moore: Taxation and State-Building: Poor Countries in a Globalised World. Bergen, 2007, 22 pp.

### **WP 2007: 10**

SUHRKE, Astri: Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan. Bergen, 2007, 15 pp.

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## SUMMARY

Parliamentary elections will be held in Angola on 5th September 2008, as the first elections in the country since 1992. There are now 138 political parties registered in Angola, and fourteen parties (including four party coalitions) have recently been approved for the elections.

This study gives a background to the upcoming parliamentary elections in Angola and provides an overview of the political situation, the 'playing field', the election system and last, and most importantly, the opposition parties of Angola.

The study is based on interviews with party officials of the most important political parties, newspaper articles and a review of the few reports available on politics and political parties in Angola.

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