Rising Powers and the African Security Landscape

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Editor

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Preface

As the rising powers of China, Brazil, India and South Africa extend their economic engagement in Africa, they are also gradually becoming more involved in the African peace and security agenda. The four articles in this report describes and analyses how these rising powers are engaging with the African security landscape.

Elling N. Tjønneland provides an overview and comparative analysis of the role of China, India, Brazil and South Africa. He examines their approach and policies in relation to the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture. Each of these four countries has a distinct commercial and corporate approach to Africa, despite a shared political commitment to South-South cooperation. However, as they extend their economic engagement they are becoming more sensitive to insecurity and volatility. The Asian and Latin American countries, which traditionally have strongly emphasised non-intervention, are gradually becoming more involved in the African security agenda. They are increasingly concerned about their image and reputation and the security of their citizens and business interests, and are becoming more prepared to act multilaterally and to work with others in facilitating security and stability. As an African power, South Africa plays a more direct role and has emerged as a major architect of the continent’s evolving peace and security architecture.

Chris Alden examines China’s growing involvement with the African security landscape. China is on course to becoming more deeply involved in Africa’s security landscape. While the motivation behind Chinese involvement remains primarily economic, the growing exposure of its interests to the vagaries of African politics, as well as pressures to demonstrate greater global activism, are bringing about a reconsideration of Beijing’s approach to the continent. China faces threats on three fronts to its standing in Africa according to Alden: reputational risks derived from its association with certain governments; risks to its business interests posed by mercurial leaders and weak regulatory regimes; and risks faced by its citizens operating in unstable African environments. Addressing these concerns poses challenges for Beijing, whose desire to play a larger role in security often clashes with the complexities of doing so while preserving Chinese foreign policy principles and economic interests on the continent.

The result is increasing Chinese involvement in African security through greater activism in multilateral peacekeeping operations, which received further support with the announcement of the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security in 2012. This aspirational commitment to a more institutionalised form of involvement remains problematic, however, because of China’s uncertainty as to the implications for its established interests and an underlying ambivalence towards the normative dimensions of the African Peace and Security Architecture. These concerns reflect wider debates in China as to the implications of its role in existing regional and global governance structures.

In his contribution Anthoni van Nieuwkerk interprets South Africa’s contribution to the evolution and performance of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the African Union. He examines the evolution of APSA, provides an overview of the post-apartheid South African government’s Africa policy, and concludes with some insights derived from interviews with South African government officials and analysts.

The key finding is that the South African government displays paradoxical behaviour regarding APSA. On the one hand, it exercises considerable “soft” power and influence throughout Africa, which van Nieuwkerk describes as “peace diplomacy”. To a large degree it also shaped the establishment of the African Union and its APSA. On the other hand, South Africa underplays its current presence in APSA decision-making structures and processes, thereby undermining its ability to
influence the strategic peace and security agendas of key multilateral bodies such as the Southern African Development Community, the AU and, by extension, the United Nations. Several factors underlie this phenomenon, including a tendency to over-extend the country’s diplomatic role. However, the article suggests that this is because of the South African government’s inability to give effect to a comprehensive national security policy framework that ought to guide its choices and behaviour regarding the African peace and security terrain.

Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto examines the role of Brazil in their contribution. They note that although some studies have emerged on Brazil’s increasing economic and political relevance in Africa, relatively little has been written on the country’s involvement in peace and security on the continent. Their article helps to address this gap by focusing on Brazil’s role in African security, especially over the past decade – a period that brought about a surge in Brazil-Africa ties and, simultaneously, the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture. They find that Brazil’s involvement encompasses a wide range of state and non-state actors, and that it has been motivated not only by economic interests, but also by a greater prioritisation of Africa and the South Atlantic in Brazil’s foreign and defence policies. Topics covered in the article include Brazil’s role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, arms exports, military cooperation, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, positions on major crises, and institution-building efforts and a case study of Brazil role in relation to Guinea Bissau. Brazil’s initiatives, the authors argue, reflect not only the country’s quest to become a global player, but also its efforts to redefine its strategic focus to encompass the South Atlantic.

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The rising powers and African peace and security

Elling N. Tjønneland
1. Introduction

The rapid rise of emerging powers has left a strong mark on Africa’s economic development. China has been particularly important through its trade expansion and the sheer scope and speed of its engagement, but has been followed by India, Brazil and South Africa, who have all become more prominent on the African continent in recent years. A number of other emerging economies such as Turkey and several Arab states are also becoming more visible and engaged. This is leading to a situation where traditional Western economies, financial institutions, and development aid agencies have seen their positions and influence weakened. What are the implications of these developments for the evolving African peace and security agenda? How do the rising powers approach these issues? How – and to what extent – do they engage with the African Union (AU), sub-regional institutions, and African governments on peace and security?

2. Rising powers in Africa

The rising powers have become very visible in Africa in a short period of time, primarily through commercial and corporate expansion. China is by far the largest and most important mover in the economic sphere. The country is now Africa’s largest trading partner with total trade being nearly $200 billion in 2012 – up from $10 billion 12 years earlier. Direct investments from China are still relatively small – although growing – compared to traditional Western investments, but China has provided significant development finance through export credits and loans, some on concessional or soft terms. This in turn has become an important platform for the expanding establishment of Chinese companies – state owned as well as private – in Africa, through which China has become a significant player in the development of the continent’s infrastructure – energy, roads, railways, ports and more.

A similar pattern is evident linking Africa and the other emerging powers. India and Brazil have similarly expanded trade with the continent from a low level in 2000 to reach, respectively, $50 billion and $30 billion in 2011. South Africa’s trade with the rest of Africa reached $30 billion in 2011. However, South Africa’s trade figures are ahead of India’s if we exclude trade between India and South Africa. In a similar pattern to that of China, these countries are relatively minor investors, but – especially India and then Brazil – are providing other types of finance for development, mainly through commercial loans and export credits. This has reached a scale where they have made a significant difference. Most importantly, they have become dominant funders of infrastructure development in Africa. These mechanisms have also been important for companies from these countries: it has not only supplied such companies with contracts, but also provided a platform for further expansion in Africa (Tjønneland, 2012).

There are, however, important geographical variations in these countries’ engagement with Africa. China has a strong and expanding presence in nearly all African countries; all but eight of these countries have increased their trade with China in the past five years. However, trade and other types of Chinese presence are dominated by a handful of countries. Five African countries account for most Chinese imports and a similar number for Chinese exports. India has a similar pattern. Typically the dominant trading partners are African oil exporters and larger African economies. Brazil displays a similar picture, but its historical and cultural links to Portuguese-speaking African countries make these countries much more important to it. Angola is Brazil’s largest economic partner in Africa.

South Africa has a similar focus on a small group of countries. Its presence is overwhelmingly concentrated in Southern Africa, with a minor additional presence in Nigeria and Ghana in West
Africa and Kenya and Uganda in East Africa. Ninety per cent of its trade with the rest of Africa is with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) countries in Southern Africa. Investments follow the same pattern.

The trade and investment pattern of other new powers such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia is also expanding significantly, most visible in north-east Africa. Saudi Arabia together with Arab Gulf countries have also emerged as significant provider of development aid to – primarily to North and Northeast Africa. South Korea is also emerging as an important African trading partner as well as a provider of development aid. However, the volume and size of these countries’ expansion are still far behind that of China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Russia – which cooperates with China, India, Brazil and South Africa through the BRICS alliance – was an important partner for many African countries during the Cold War. It still commands political capital originating from those days. Today its engagement is primarily commercial. This is expanding, but the engagement is still mainly through mining companies and other businesses with the Russian state has been far less engaged compared to the states in the other BRICS countries (Arkhangelskaya and Shubin 2013).

The rising powers have different approaches to political development and peace and security issues on the continent. As an African country itself, South Africa is a key player in the evolving security policies on the continent. The three other powers discussed here have a more marginal role in relation to political developments in Africa. Political alliances and commitment to South-South cooperation have facilitated close ties between governments, but it has also been coupled with a reluctance to address internal African conflicts. This has been most clearly expressed in the case of China and its strong emphasis on “non-interference” as a guiding principle for engaging with Africa. However, these rising powers’ expanding commercial engagement on the continent and the pressure to demonstrate that they are undertaking global responsibilities, coupled with Africa’s own attempts to address internal conflicts, have led to increasing changes, and they are gradually becoming more involved in African security issues.

3. The African Peace and Security Architecture

During its first ten year of existence the AU suspended ten countries from its membership for violent changes of governments. It has also launched several peace support operations with two additional AU operations being mandated in 2013 (Mali and the Central African Republic) and a third (Somalia) being reinforced. By the end of 2013 the AU and its sub-regional organisations had more than 40 000 military and police and nearly 400 civilians deployed in peace support operations in Africa. This excludes about 26 000 uniformed and 4500 civilians deployed in the joint AU/UN mission in Darfur.

These operations and deployments illustrates the broader scope of the organisation compared to that of its predecessor – the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU came into existence in 2002, incorporating a wide divergence of member countries in terms of both democratic ideals and economic performance. The development of the AU was also driven more by a political than an economic agenda. In the peace and security field the AU has adopted an official policy that permits intervention in member states in "grave circumstances" (Vines, 2013).

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) provides the framework for the AU’s engagement and is the structure that seeks to provide for peace and security on the continent. It makes available a political decision-making body – the Peace and Security Council; an analysis centre – the Continental Early Warning Centre; an external mediation and advisory body – the Panel of the Wise; a multidimensional standby force comprising military, police and civilian components – the African Standby Force; and a special fund to cover costs – the African Peace Fund. Notably, each of these structures is replicated at the sub-regional level in each of AU’s official regions – West Africa,
Southern Africa, North Africa, Central Africa and East Africa. The role of the AU within APSA is also to drive the process, to provide guidance and policy directions, to act as a legitimising institution, and to provide coordination (Engel & Gomez Porto, 2010).

The AU’s achievements since 2002 have in many respects been remarkable. The problems and challenges inherent in moving from policies to implementation are, however, significant and have caused severe delays. There are major difficulties in operationalising the African peace and security architecture (Dersso, 2014). This is illustrated by the fate of the African Standby Force, which is supposed to comprise regional standby forces from each of the AU’s five regions. The deadline for achieving operational readiness has been regularly extended. According to the most recent and third “road map”, it is now set for 2015. This deadline is once again unlikely to be met. There are several reasons for the delays. They are partly linked to technical deficiencies, weak institutions and poor funding. More importantly, there are also political obstacles, with member states being reluctant and sometimes unwilling to commit themselves to implement policies and norms being developed at the regional or continental level. In particular, there is reluctance to limit their own national sovereignty. Internal political dynamics in the regions, rivalries between members and different geopolitical interests also constrain the implementation of APSA. The AU itself has also identified a number of challenges in preparing for a an operational capability by – although mainly focusing on technical deficiencies (African Union, 2013).

Financially, the African peace and security architecture remains heavily dependent on Western donors – mainly the European Union (EU), certain EU member states and the U.S. The United Nations (UN) is also an important contributor to the AU’s ongoing operations such as the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The new building (under construction) housing the AU’s Peace and Security Department is a gift from Germany.

However, despite the many shortcomings the revitalised AU and APSA are being consolidated. The AU and its sub-regional partners are developing common approaches to peace and security issues that are increasingly becoming the accepted norms for engagement. APSA is a bold effort to develop a holistic approach to peace and security that recognises the importance of prevention and mediation as much as peacekeeping. The AU’s ability to further develop APSA and its institutions will depend on the organisation’s ability to work with the sub-regional organisations and how it manages the self-interest of many of its powerful members. It will also depend on its ability to work with international partners, including the rising powers. How, then, do China, India, Brazil and South Africa relate to the evolving AU/APSA agenda?

4. China

The principle of “non-interference” is a keystone of China’s foreign policy. Internal stability and territorial integrity have been the mainstay of China’s own domestic policy and have been extended to foreign policies and bilateral relations with African countries. China also invokes a historical “South-South solidarity” involving a shared sense of unjust treatment and a history of colonialisation by the West. This was first and most clearly articulated at the 1955 Bandung conference that led to the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement and was reinforced by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Africa in 1963, when he outlined the eight principles for cooperation between Africa and China based on non-interference and peaceful coexistence.

However, these principles have come under pressure and led to emerging changes in China’s approach. This is partly linked to China’s global position and expectation that it must take a stand on critical political issues affecting African countries. The changing position on the conflicts in Sudan is a good illustration of this: China originally maintained a non-intervention approach and vetoed efforts to
impose sanctions and pressure on the regime in Khartoum, but gradually it become a key actor facilitating the deployment of peacekeeping missions in Sudan. China has also become a contributor of troops to the various UN peacekeeping missions; in fact, it has more peacekeepers in UN missions than any of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. In August 2014 China had nearly 2200 police and military personnel in UN missions in Africa (Jiaxiang Hu 2014). China has, however - and until recently - tended to stay away from contributing combat troops and engaging in “robust” peacekeeping. In 2012 China contributed infantry troops to provide mission protection to the UN Mission in South Sudan and a similar contribution in 2013 to the UN Mission in Mali. In the second half of mid-2014 China deployed more than 700 several hundred soldiers to the UN mission in South Sudan to provide military protection to the workers in the oil industry in that country (Lynch 2014).

The country’s expanding commercial engagement has contributed to new pressures on Chinese policies. The Arab Spring and the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya were important illustrations of the challenges that China now faces. While China had limited trade with and investment in Libya, 35,000 Chinese citizens were working in the country and Chinese companies had huge contracts with Libya. The Chinese in Libya had to be evacuated and billions of dollars were lost in contracts. Further south, in Zambia, strong opposition parties made criticism of the role of China in the country a strong mobilising card in the elections and in Angola – where China plays a more dominant role that in any other African country – Chinese companies have been denied important government contracts. The protection of business interests, concerns about the safety of Chinese workers and citizens, and growing worries about reputational risks have all contributed to an emerging rethink of Chinese policies (Anthony & Grimm, 2013 and Chris Alden’s article in this report.

The emerging rethink in Chinese positions is perhaps most evident in peace and security policies. China has found it relatively easy to engage more actively in peacekeeping issues and reconcile this with its traditional foreign policy imperatives. Chinese troops are deployed in UN missions in Africa. On a small but expanding scale China is also offering training to African peacekeepers. At the fifth ministerial meeting of the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2012 China also unveiled the new Initiative for a China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security. This seeks to deepen cooperation with the AU and African countries in areas related to peace and security in Africa, provide financial support for AU peacekeeping missions in Africa and the development for the African Standby Force, and train more AU peacekeepers and officials in peace and security affairs. China is now providing financial support – on a modest scale – to, among others, AMISOM, the AU peace support operation in Somalia. Furthermore, there is a growing interaction between China and several of the sub-regional organisations in Africa – the building blocks of APSA.

However, most of China’s gradualist engagement with these issues takes place through UN channels. This includes support to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, but most importantly involvement in the UN Security Council. While China is an important contributor of peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa, it has played a peripheral and cautious role in the reform of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (De Carvalho & de Coning, 2013). The evolving Chinese reflections and positions on post-conflict reconstruction and the Responsibility to Protect are in their early stages and may go in several directions. China is still grappling with reconciling the complexities of managing an expansive role in multilateral institutions and an accelerating economic presence in Africa.

The civil war in South Sudan which erupted from December 2013 is dramatic illustration of the China’s changing approach to African politics. China’s role in the two Sudans has undergone a transition from an ad hoc and emergent phase largely focused on protecting its own commercial engagement and staying out of political conflicts. Today, China has become an emerged power in the two Sudans and is now an established part of the landscape in the two countries. It has been forced to take a more involved and visible diplomatic-political role (Large and Patey 2014).
China has been active in “crisis diplomacy” since 2012 to stem hostilities from Sudan and South Sudan’s oil feud, but its brokering role has been limited. China largely left it to the regional negotiations in Addis to find a solution and did not push for a deal. This position has become increasingly difficult with the onset of the civil war. China moved quickly to support regional and international efforts to broker a January 2014 cessation of hostilities. The agreement was unsuccessful and China’s diplomatic efforts have now become increasingly focused on addressing conflicts with both countries. In mid-2014 – and following the revised mandate for the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan – China decided to deploy more than 700 soldiers to protect oil workers in the country.

5. India

Compared to China, India has a much longer history of engagement with Africa on peace and security issues. Together with its South Asian neighbours Pakistan and Bangladesh, India is the largest contributor of peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa (Beri 2008, 2014). Over the past decades thousands of African military officers have received professional training from India. India also has maritime security interests in the Indian Ocean, which has led to the emergence of defence agreements and joint naval training programmes with several countries in East Africa and Indian Ocean island states. This also includes defence assistance through the deployment of Indian naval vessels patrolling territorial waters and providing support to African coastguards, as well as an Indian radar surveillance and listening post in East Africa (Jamadhagni, 2013).

India’s parallel to China’s FOCAC is the Africa-India Summit, which has been held twice – in 2008 (Delhi) and 2011 (Addis Ababa). It has on a much smaller scale than FOCAC and with fewer participating African countries, but it is significant that peace and security (and governance) issues are highlighted in the communiqués and the frameworks adopted for cooperation. This includes support for the African peace and security agenda and highlighting the police and civilian dimension of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. The third Summit – and on much larger scale than the first two - was scheduled to take place in India in December 2014, but has now been postponed. This was, according to reports in the Indian press, because of the Ebola scare.

However, there has been limited concrete engagement with peace and security issues in this new phase. India’s current Africa engagement is primarily motivated by commercial interests and energy security and is largely driven by the private sector, although with strong government support. India’s approach to politics, peace and security in Africa is guided by a number of fundamental principles in its foreign policy. This includes respect for the sovereignty of other states, which informs the country’s default position of not intervening in the internal affairs of other countries. The principle of South-South cooperation is mainly manifested through its aid programmes. India’s alliance with Brazil and South Africa through the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) Forum has served to highlight the democratic credentials of these three countries, but this has barely been used to promote a model for political development or post-conflict reconstruction (Dupas, 2006; Soule-Kohndou, 2013).

The main manifestation of India’s efforts to grapple with reconciling its foreign policy objectives and commercial interests in the African context can be found in its participation in relevant UN agencies and its financial contributions to UN funds. India has generally tended to pursue a risk-averse approach to African conflicts, although its strong commercial engagement in Sudan and South Sudan forced it to appoint a special envoy to help mediate in conflicts there (Saferworld, 2013). It has encouraged a negotiated settlement to the political issues facing Sudan and South Sudan, but India has largely remained on the sidelines of international efforts to broker peace. This may be a sign, as suggested in recent study, of a low and diminishing priority of the Sudans in Indian foreign policy, and the relatively smaller and declining value of Indian oil investments there (Large and Patey 2014).
6. Brazil

“Non-intervention”, “respect for sovereignty” and “South-South cooperation” are key pillars of Brazil’s foreign policy. Development assistance and political dialogue have accompanied the country’s rapid commercial and private sector-driven expansion in Africa. And similar to the cases of China and India, there has been a gradual engagement with African peace and security issues. Security concerns and challenges arising from operating in fragile and post-conflict environments are contributing to evolving approaches. Political dialogue with African leaders, imperatives from Brazil’s efforts to play a global role and engagement with African issues in international organisations have also contributed to this process.

Brazil’s engagement with African peace and security issues is, however, still modest and limited (see also the article by Abdenur and de Souza Neto in this report). The one potential exception may be the country’s experiences with peacekeeping operations. Its newfound role as a rising power has led it to play an important role in Haiti and the UN mission there (Kenkel, 2010). In Africa this has been repeated on a more modest scale in the case of Guinea-Bissau (Abdenur & De Souza Neto 2014). In these contexts Brazil has moved beyond traditional peacekeeping and sought – at least partially – to link security and development objectives in addressing post-conflict reconstruction, but it is yet to bring lessons from this to discussions in Africa.

Brazil has, however, taken a strong interest in maritime security in the South Atlantic, where the current Brazilian defence doctrine explicitly addresses cooperation with Africa as necessary for ensuring Brazil's interests there. As a result, the country has embarked on an extensive campaign to strengthen bilateral military cooperation ties with African states on the South Atlantic coast. Expanding cooperation in this area covers, among other things, training programmes for officers and cadets, the provision of military vessels and equipment, and capacity-building. Brazil has revitalised the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone and is pursuing security issues in the South Atlantic through the IBSA Forum and other multilateral forums (Abdenur & de Souza Neto, 2013).

Brazil’s most active engagement related to African peace and security issues has been at the level of the UN. The most significant contribution may have been Brazil’s position on the UN’s Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Brazil has resisted this doctrine, since it can easily lead to a licence for military intervention, particularly when undertaken outside the framework of the UN. In 2011 Brazil introduced the concept Responsibility while Protecting, which endorses key aspects of the Responsibility to Protect, but also highlights a number of related principles and rules of international humanitarian law that focus on prevention, proportionate response, the imperative to do no harm and the use of force as a last resort (Muggah et al., 2013).

7. South Africa

South Africa is an African economic and political power and is thus in a different position to that of the rising powers from Asia and Latin America. Since the fall of apartheid and the country’s political reintegration with Africa after 1994, South Africa has been a significant actor in the evolving APSA. It has also been a mediator and peacemaker in several conflicts on the continent (Alden & le Pere, 2004).

South Africa has also been a prominent participant in several multilateral forums at the global level. It played an important role, for example, in the renegotiation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the ban on anti-personnel landmines, support for the Arms Trade Treaty and more. South Africa was also – through the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development initiative – a key actor in the
processes that led to the commitments from the G-8, the EU and other major donors to increase development aid to Africa from 2003 onwards.

South Africa’s main focus and its main contribution to African peace and security were the replacement of the OAU with the AU and the adoption of the African Peace and Security Architecture (see also van Nieuwkerk’s article in this report). South Africa was a major architect behind the shift from the old non-intervention approach to internal conflicts in member states towards a policy enabling engagement and providing guidelines for conflict prevention and intervention. South Africa was also instrumental in similar developments in Southern Africa through SADC; the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; and associated policy documents and instruments.

South Africa was also instrumental in facilitating the AU’s 2013 decision to set up a military rapid reaction force known as the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises – partly a response to the delays in getting the African Standby Force off the ground. South Africa has been a strong contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including a contributor of combat troops to missions with enforcement mandates such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2013. However, South Africa has a preference for non-violent modes of conflict resolution and has been involved in a series of mediations throughout Africa.

These mediation efforts have often been characterised by persistence, patience and comprehensive approaches. However, South African mediation efforts and “quiet diplomacy” have also sometimes been perceived to be biased against opposition parties and in favour of the government of the country in conflict such as in Côte d’Ivoire in 2005 and Zimbabwe in 2007-08. Procedurally, South African mediations appear little different from those of the UN, while the contents of the negotiated agreements are also little different from those favoured by Western mediators. South Africa does, however, have a tendency to encourage power-sharing arrangements, perhaps a result of its experiences in negotiating the end of apartheid (Nathan, 2013).

However, South Africa has had to grapple with several challenges and complexities in devising and implementing its foreign policy objectives. One is the tension between the strong corporate/commercial profiles of its Africa engagement and the policies of the African National Congress government. The role and behaviour of South African companies are generally not very different from those of any other foreign company operating in African countries. These companies pursue their own commercial agenda, which in many instances will pose reputational risks for South African government policies. This is a dilemma that South Africa also shares with the other rising powers moving into Africa on a large scale.

Secondly, South Africa is also very conscious of the implications of its apartheid past. This has led to a noticeable reluctance to impose or put pressure on other African governments and it has tended to pursue a very consensus-focused approach. An important turning point and lessons-learned experience was South Africa’s efforts to isolate the Abacha regime in Nigeria after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. This intervention isolated South Africa from the rest of the continent and marked the end of unilateralism in South Africa’s Africa policies. Ever since, South Africa has sought to seek African consensus on interventions, most evidently in its “own” region of Southern Africa. South Africa’s diplomacy in relation to the crisis in Zimbabwe is a major illustration here.

Thirdly, while South Africa remains committed to conflict prevention and interventions to secure peace, it is also heavily influenced by the weight of its own history. These historical experiences have provided the country with a special moral legitimacy that led to great expectations – especially in the Global North and West. However, this historical legacy also has another dimension with a strong focus on anti-imperialism, South-South cooperation, and the protection of national sovereignty that has tended to undermine human rights principles and Responsibility to Protect approaches (Nathan, 2009).
Fourthly, 20 years of foreign policymaking after apartheid have also highlighted that South Africa’s foreign policy machinery suffers from capacity constraints (insufficient trained staff) and inexperience in dealing with many of the continent’s challenges and the intricacies of regional and continental policymaking.

These factors combine to explain the rather mixed record of South Africa’s contribution to peacemaking and the African peace and security architecture (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). While the role of China, India and Brazil can be summarised as gradual engagement that of South Africa may be termed that of a “hesitant hegemon”.

8. Shaping the response: the role of Africa and multilateral institutions

Northern and Western foreign policy departments, defence establishments, and development aid agencies have been and are the main external political and financial supporters of the evolving African peace and security architecture. The new and rising powers from Asia and Latin America have primarily expanded their position in Africa through commercial and corporate power. While emphasising South-South cooperation and political dialogue, these powers have also approached Africa’s security challenges through the prism of non-intervention and have until now remained rather marginal in the evolving African policy discussions on these issues. Their main contribution in relation to political development may be more indirect – the rising powers have contributed to increasing the bargaining power of African governments in their foreign policies and international relations. More political space has been created enabling African countries to strengthen their ability to bargain and negotiate with traditional Western partners.

The new powers are conscious of their image in Africa. As they increase their economic engagement, they also become more sensitive to insecurity and volatility of African politics. They are also becoming more prepared to act multilaterally, primarily under the auspices of the UN and through various UN channels. Direct engagement with the AU and African sub-regional organisations is far more limited, but expanding. On the ground in Africa and in conflict-affected countries, the role of companies and commercial actors from the rising powers will often be very similar to that of companies from Western countries – they are equally concerned about the need for “stability”. This is well illustrated in a recent study of the Chinese engagement in the DRC (Curtis, 2013).

The UN is critical to understand where the rising powers are moving in relation to African security challenges. In 2011 all four powers discussed in this article were members of the UN Security Council. In this period they – and particular the three IBSA countries – developed a number of joint positions on critical issues affecting Africa. They are skeptical of and even opposed to key elements of what is perceived as a Western peace model for Africa. This is illustrated in the discussion of the Responsibility to Protect and efforts to modify this through, for example, Brazil’s policy of Responsibility while Protecting. This was illustrated when the 2011 UN Security Council Resolution on Libya authorising a “no-fly” zone and provided a mandate to NATO to take the necessary steps to protect civilians. China, India and Brazil abstained. South Africa voted in favour, but later de facto regretted this when it realised that the resolution implied support for regime change and not just the protection of civilians.

The discussion of the Libya resolution and other interventions in this period also revealed another important trend: the non-African rising powers are increasingly taking the lead from Africa and the African Union. They are far more prepared to approve interventions if they are requested by and emanate from African regional organisations. The deepening of working relations between the UN and
AU in peacekeeping and post-conflict resolutions is also likely to further stimulate direct engagement with the AU on these issues on the part of the rising powers.

South Africa can potentially play an important role in this process. It has been instrumental in developing the AU’s normative policies and new approach to interventions in conflicts, as well as facilitating closer relations between the AU and the UN. It has emerged as a major political and economic ally in Africa for China and India, as well as for Brazil. South Africa’s and the AU’s approach to security challenges and post-conflict reconstruction on the continent tends to be far more proactive and engaged than those of the Asian and Latin American powers. South Africa’s and Africa’s response to these rising powers will therefore also be important in shaping the future trajectory of the rising powers in terms of their approach to African security challenges.
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Seeking security in Africa: 
China’s evolving approach to the African 
Peace and Security Architecture

Chris Alden

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1. Introduction

China’s engagement in Africa, once characterised as decidedly non-interventionist in its pursuit of economic interests, is on course to becoming more deeply involved in the region’s security landscape. While the motivation behind Chinese involvement remains primarily economic, the growing exposure of its interests to the vagaries of African politics and, concurrently, pressures to demonstrate greater global activism are bringing about a reconsideration of Beijing’s sanguine approach to the region. In particular, China faces threats on three fronts to its standing in Africa: reputational risks derived from its association with certain governments; risks to its business interests posed by mercurial leaders and weak regulatory regimes; and risks faced by its citizens operating in unstable African environments. Addressing these concerns poses particular challenges for Beijing, whose desire to play a larger role in continental security often clashes with the complexities of doing so while preserving China’s abiding foreign policy principles and growing economic interests on the continent.

The result is increasing involvement in African security measured in terms of greater activism in multilateral peacekeeping operations, be it through cooperation at the level of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the African Union (AU), or in terms of deploying Chinese troops to and providing greater financial assistance for peace support missions. This impulse has received further support with the announcement in 2012 of the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, which promises the integration of security issues into the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) process. Linking this aspirational commitment to a more institutionalised form of involvement, however, remains problematic, in part because of China’s uncertainty as to the practical implications this has for its established interests, as well as an underlying ambivalence towards some of the normative dimensions of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). These concerns in turn reflect wider debates in China as to the efficacy of expanding its role in existing regional and global governance structures.

2. The African security environment

The seemingly enduring nature of African security problems and the various attempts to resolve them have been constant features of the post-colonial period, shaping relations among African states, their societies and the international community. At the heart of this situation is the condition of the African state and its weaknesses, variously diagnosed as rooted in the structural legacies of colonialism and neocolonial practices, and a fundamental disjuncture between an elitist state and diverse societies, or suffering from deficiencies ranging from deep-seated corruption to chronic policy mismanagement. While the notion of constructing a sustainable state apparatus featured to a degree in the independence struggle and colonial rationalisations for maintaining suzerainty, this debate was largely abandoned in favour of a swift withdrawal of formal European control in most of Africa. The phenomena of “juridical sovereignty” and the rise of “shadow states” and a host of other pathologies affecting the African state diagnosed by Western academics in the wake of independence were exacerbated by clientalist practices, the appropriation of the state for personal gain and the devastating impact of structural adjustment policies aimed at resolving these dilemmas. As a result, throughout much of this period African security was conceived and addressed by independence leaders whose focus was on

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2 For an overview of this topic see Williams (2011).
strategies aimed at dismantling colonial rule, engaging in post-colonial nation-building that was primarily given expression through the strengthening of authoritarian rule, and finding ways of accommodating foreign influence that were mostly framed within the terms of the exigencies of the cold war.

With the ending of the cold war and the concurrent onset of a democratisation process across the continent, starting in Benin in 1991 and winding its way across much of Africa, a new security agenda for the continent began to take shape. It was primarily oriented towards managing these potentially volatile transitions away from authoritarianism and conflict and, as such, emphasised peacekeeping and the building of liberal institutions. This was formalised through the UN secretary general’s Agenda for Peace (1992; amended 1995) and reflected influential initiatives of the day such as the Commonwealth’s Commission on Global Governance (CGG, 1995: 77-112). African leaders, led by Salim Salim at the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), attempted to revitalise the regional approach to security on the continent in the early 1990s, laying the basis of many of the normative changes through the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (Jeng, 2012: 157).

A turning point in the African security debate was finally reached with the massive failure of the international community and its African partners to stem the tide of instability, destruction and genocide in countries such as Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These “new wars”, said to be motivated by “greed and grievance”, exposed the severe deficiencies of some African states in managing complex claims to legitimacy and the effective allocation of national resources – deficiencies variously rooted in ethnicity, chronic deprivation and administrative corruption or failure (Kaldor, 1999; Collier & Hoeffler, 1999). The result was to spur on an expanded discourse that diagnosed the sources of African insecurity as rooted in governance failures and aimed to address these through a range of policy prescriptions that included external intervention on humanitarian grounds and built on past precedents of the comprehensive restructuring of the continent’s economic and governance institutions. Collectively characterised as “liberal peace” and given expression through processes that led to the UN Summit on the Responsibility to Protect and the establishment of the Commission on Peacebuilding in 2005, these plans were realised in UN-sanctioned interventions in the DRC and Sudan (Paris, 2004).

For Africa, these enhanced efforts at tackling security were integrated into the transformation of the OAU into the AU, a process that culminated in 2002 with the passage of the Constitutive Act. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that emerged from this process was a five-pronged system composed of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Early Warning System (EWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund and the eight designated regional economic communities (RECs) – although only five presently lead in this area. The RECs – the building blocks of a possible continental union – have begun to develop regional forms of the ASF and EWS (AU, 2010: 8). Notably, the AU provisions for intervention as described in Article 4 went well beyond the OAU’s defensive posture on sovereignty to one predicated on “non-indifference”, calling outright for intervention in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other forms of conflict where the state had abrogated its responsibilities to its citizens (AU, 2000). Coupled to this was a more robust endorsement of peacebuilding, democratic governance and institutional development through the issuing of the Common African Defence and Security Policy in 2004 and the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in 2009 (Vines, 2013: 90-91). The AU, unlike its predecessor, has demonstrated a willingness to be actively involved in continental security issues, having suspended nine member governments for constitutional violations, applied sanctions against six member governments and authorised several peace support operations in the last decade (Vines, 2013: 91-93).
Nonetheless, relations between the AU and the RECs are widely seen to be “imbalanced” and unclear, with some well-developed regional organisations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) able to field strong peace support missions, while others are effectively dysfunctional in terms of security matters (Vorrath, 2012; AU, 2010). Overall dependency on some key bilateral and multilateral partners, notably the European Union (EU) and UN, is evident: while African ownership of the APSA process is emphasised throughout, measured in financial terms this position is currently mostly rhetorical because Western governments supply the bulk of the financial requirements (98%) of the operational components of the AU (Vorrath, 2012). Particular peacekeeping operations, such as the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), have relied almost exclusively on funding support from EU sources (Engel & Porto, 2010: 4). Moreover, the promotion of formalised ties between the UN Security Council and the AU – the only such regional arrangement and one strongly driven by South Africa during its two-term tenure as a non-permanent member of the Security Council – ensure both that African security issues and AU involvement feature high on the global agenda. Finally, important security issues, such as the continuing spread of arms sales – still dominated by the Western armaments industry and its Russian counterpart, although Chinese small arms are making an impact (Bromely et al., 2013: 41-47) – remain largely outside of official processes of scrutiny.

Despite these changes to formal policy and greater international activism, improvements in African security still remain distressingly episodic, with regional leadership seen in peace support operations in West African conflicts and UN involvement limited to selective involvement in peacekeeping and monitoring operations in Somalia, the DRC and the Sudans. Given the low levels of development in Africa, which is characterised by states saddled with spiralling debt burdens that are incapable of providing domestic revenue and channelling investment into the public sector, and a foreign investment community that rarely looks beyond the extractive sector, the dire conditions in Africa seemed fixed in a cycle of insecurity. It is a situation ripe for change, and indeed, in the late 1990s a new robust actor entered the stage whose involvement was to set in motion conditions that would transform the continent’s economic fortunes: China.

3. China, risk and the African security environment

China’s contemporary phase of intensive engagement in African countries may have been instigated by a search for vital resources, coupled to a belated recognition of the need to bolster diplomatic links outside the West in the aftermath of the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, but its sustainability as a reliable source for China was always going to be predicated on building long-term stable relations (Taylor, 2007). China’s openness to economic engagement in all parts of Africa launched a period of rapid growth in bilateral economic ties, including multi-billion dollar concessional loans to energy- and mineral-rich African countries linked to provisions for the development of local infrastructure, followed by a range of smaller loans, grants and even investments by individual Chinese entrepreneurs. While traditional Western sources had shunned investment in some conflict-ridden, post-conflict or fragile states like Sudan, or World Bank and donors sought to make loans conditional on domestic policy changes in countries like Angola, the opportunity to gain access to untapped resources in markets viewed as closed to China was seized with alacrity.

3 Interview with South African diplomat, Pretoria, July 2013.
4 Much has been written about this; see Taylor (2007); Large and Patey (2011).
But in fragile countries where the very nature of regime legitimacy itself is contested and the regime’s ability to enforce its rule over the population and territory is limited at best, the security challenges are manifold. Under these difficult circumstances linking substantive investments and long-term loans to stability of resource supply was much more tenuous than Chinese officials had initially expected. Local criticism, once exclusively levelled at the cozy relationships between Western governments/firms and African elites, turned to the opaque package deals struck with Beijing. Moreover, the contracting of Chinese firms and their preference for Chinese labour in many of their projects have produced their own backlash among elements in host countries, who are quick to point to the dire need for local employment. Local and Western media have played their part in fueling negative perceptions of African exclusion from Chinese economic activities, as has the poor conduct of some Chinese firms operating outside of local laws and accepted practices, putting further pressure on Chinese economic interests. Chinese migration, starting as a trickle in the late 1990s, but growing steadily across the continent, introduced a new element of complexity into the local environment as individual Chinese citizens became exposed to crime. These security challenges in particular confronted the Chinese government in the wake of this growing economic exposure to the African environment.

The first, reputational security, refers to the local and global image of the Chinese state and its implications. In the local context the lack of transparency in deals and close ties with governing elites have meant that China has been increasingly exposed to accusations of collusion with the sitting regime. In fact, as has been demonstrated in a number of African states, Chinese interests have been explicitly targeted by opposition forces for their role in bolstering regime interests or in more benign cases as a proxy for mobilising domestic support against the regime. Linked to this was the potential damage to Beijing’s carefully cultivated global image as an emerging power whose intentions were attuned to African sensibilities and therefore should be viewed as benign. The uproar around Chinese support for Khartoum during the onset of the Darfur crisis in the 2000s in both African capitals and the West underscored the negative impact that Chinese engagement in one African country could have on both its African foreign policy and global manoeuvrability (Large & Patey, 2011).

The second, firm-level security, refers to the maintenance of China’s economic interests in the local environment and, concurrently, its impact on broader perceptions of Chinese foreign policy intentions in Africa. While government attention was firmly on the concerns of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in strategic areas such as energy, the growing number of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises operating across the continent meant that Beijing found itself drawn into local disputes with limited economic consequences, but inevitably with wider ramifications. For SOEs, the reversal of their positions in local energy sectors through the denial of licences and effective nationalisation seen in cases as diverse as Angola, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan conveyed a sobering message of uncertainty to their vested interests. Similarly, the widely publicised misconduct of some Chinese firms, symbolised by Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation in Zambia, where an unremitting series of fatal accidents, egregious violations of local labour laws, and acts of violence against workers and management (all of which finally brought about its closure by the Zambian government in 2013) sullied China’s business reputation in the country and beyond (Kwan Lee, 2011). The conscious emphasis on and rollout of corporate social responsibility practices by the State Council after 2006 reflected the state’s continuing anxieties about this sector.

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5 Botswana, South Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan and Nigeria are among a number of examples.
The third, citizens’ security, is linked to the previous concern, but manifested in incidents such as increasing hostage taking of Chinese nationals, crimes against the rising number of Chinese businesses and tourists in Africa and, in its most dire form, the collapse of state authority in countries like Libya. As one Chinese scholar admitted, “Chinese workers’ safety faces high risk in Africa” and the accompanying firestorm of criticism that Beijing faced from its assertive “netizens” whenever it failed to protect Chinese nationals in Africa was a growing source of anxiety for Chinese officials (Xuejun, 2010).

Sometimes all three security challenges were experienced at once (Clapham, 2008: 361-69; Large, 2009). Attacks on and kidnappings of Chinese workers in Sudan, or South Sudan’s oil shutdown and expulsion of a Chinese oil executive in early 2012, despite ongoing discussions with Beijing over large financial packages aimed at developing the country’s oil and agricultural sectors, are recent examples of this phenomenon. Even a carefully crafted “charm offensive” aimed at South Sudan did not spare Chinese interests there (Large, 2012: 14-18). A spate of protests by local communities supplemented by unlawful police actions starting in 2012 and carrying over into the following year targeted Chinese shopkeepers and miners in countries as disparate as Kenya, Senegal and Ghana. The beating and ultimately expulsion of Chinese miners provoked heated reaction by Chinese netizens, who declared: “When will our government wake up and rescue our fellow country men from Ghana?”6 Indeed, crime against Chinese citizens became an increasingly problematic phenomenon as the migrant community grew, replicating the apparent targeting of Chinese businesses in South Africa, home to the largest Chinese community in Africa. As a Chinese delegation to Tanzania declared during Xi Jinping’s visit in April 2013, “In the last three years, there have been a series of robbery incidents which targeted Chinese investors, including a woman who was killed last October. We think the government should consider this seriously to improve the business environment for Chinese and other investors in the country” (The Citizen, 2012).

But above all, it was the impact of the so-called “Arab Spring” in early 2011, which swept aside decades of authoritarian rule in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, that shook any remaining complacency that the Chinese government had about operating in a benign African environment. In particular, the loss and damages caused by the NATO-led intervention to Chinese interests in Libya imposed huge financial costs on the 50 Chinese projects there (with a total contract value of $18.8 billion) and exposed the limited ability of China to protect either its economic interests, the firms or even its 35,850 citizens in Libya (Global Times, 2013). These losses occurred despite the fact that, as the minister of commerce himself noted, China had no investments in Libya (China Wire, 2012). Worried officials mulled over the unexpected outbreak of unrest in other parts of the continent, including Angola, where a large Chinese presence (which some Chinese estimates claim to be as high as 250,000 people) was coupled to the country’s largest foreign source of oil.7 Internally, the Chinese State Council set up a parallel body to its State-owned Assets and Supervision Commission to regulate and monitor the assets and activities of SOEs operating overseas. Like U.S. analysts who sought to identify ways of safeguarding long-term U.S. interests in the wake of the Arab Spring, so too Chinese officials began a search for ways to accommodate the changes taking place while perserving their fundamental interests in the region (Larocco & Goodyear, 2013).

6 Weibo post, cited in Offbeat China (2013).
7 Interview with Chinese officials, February and March 2011. The estimate is derived from Ji Dongye’s report in Rule of Law Weekly, reposted in China Africa Project (n.d.).
4. China’s emerging African security agenda

The difficulties increasingly experienced at all levels by China in the once-inviting African terrain, from Chinese SOEs operating in the field encountering security threats to Chinese officials charged with addressing the fallout from the conduct of Chinese business practices and the accompanying diplomatic conundrums these circumstances produced, provided the context for a reconsideration of China’s involvement in some form of bilateral and multilateral intervention in Africa. The result has been a gradualist engagement in selective areas of African security, induced by problems confronting China on the ground in particular African countries, but shaped by Beijing’s privileged global position in multilateral security affairs. Reconciling this escalating involvement with the maintenance of its economic position and, concurrently, its established foreign policy principles formed the core challenge for Beijing.

Perhaps the most influential driver of its gradualist shift away from a studied distance from African security issues has been China’s role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. What this has meant in practical terms is that, with African issues representing over 60% of all issues coming before the Security Council, Beijing is unable to maintain a position of studied abstention without incurring either Western or African criticism. This is exacerbated by the UN-AU institutional relationship involving an annual consultation between the Security Council and the AU’s PSC, reinforcing the focus on Beijing’s position on issues that matter to African governments, and concurrently the number and size of UN peacekeeping operations on the continent. One response seen since 1998 has been a gradualist involvement in multilateral peacekeeping. China’s approach has evolved from disengagement to sponsorship of UN Security Council resolutions establishing peacekeeping missions, the founding of Chinese peacekeeping training centres, and direct participation in peacekeeping missions in Liberia, the DRC, Darfur and South Sudan (Zhongying, 2005). Chinese engagement in peacekeeping, which has involved an expansion of the number of troops and acting as force commanders of two missions, has been limited to non-combatant roles. This changed with the deployment of a People’s Liberation Army mechanised infantry brigade to Darfur followed by the deployment of 395 elite troops with a mandate to protect peacekeeping headquarters and ground forces in Mali. The professionalism displayed by Chinese peacekeepers in Mali caused the UN’s special representative to declare that “China’s important work has exceeded expectations” (The Diplomat, 2013; People’s Daily Online, 2013).

Experiences in Sudan and the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden produced similar expressions of international support for Chinese multilateralism. The reputational damage that ties with Khartoum produced in the build-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics was a harbinger of the challenges to come, as was the commensurate difficulties to ring fence that experience as a once-off form of Chinese intervention. China’s incremental approach to intervention in Sudan has taken it from being absent from the seminal Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 to acting as the key mediator between Khartoum and Juba in 2013. Concurrently, China’s involvement in the multinational naval task force off the coast of Somalia from 2009, itself the product of a shift in Chinese maritime strategy away from regional focus to one of “distance sea defence” and dealing with non-traditional security issues, also won it praise abroad and at home (Dehong, 2013; Christofferson, 2009: 3-4). Those in the

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8 According to one report, 75% of all UN peacekeepers were operating in Africa in 2013 (Paterson & Kudrat Virk, 2013).
9 This was cemented formally through the Chinese response to the Brahimi report and its subsequent inclusion in the Chinese Defence White Paper in 2000 (Zhongying, 2005; Lanteigne & Hirono, 2013: 48).
Chinese military favoring a wider security presence in Africa even envisage, albeit in the distance future, a permanent base on the continent.\textsuperscript{10}

All of this fits within the broader parameters of a more activist Chinese foreign policy, accentuated under the new presidency of Xi Jinping and aiming to pursue an agenda for responsible change. The belief that China’s rising great-power status requires a revision of international institutions to reflect changing systemic dynamics and a commensurate commitment on the part of China for the greater provision of global public goods has become an article of faith in the Chinese policymaking community. In this context, according to Breslin (2013), a key Chinese goal is to “empower the United Nations as the only legitimate decision making body when it comes to finding global solutions to either transnational problems or cases of domestic state failure”. The elevation of the UN, where China’s privileged status as a veto-wielding member of the Security Council acts as an ultimate guarantee of its interests, is increasingly framed in terms of the principle of subsidiarity, which sees regional organisations as gatekeepers of legitimate multilateral actions. The intellectual foundations for this evolving approach have received further support from the Chinese research and academic community. Liberal internationalists like Wang Yizhou have argued for a movement towards a foreign policy of “creative involvement” that introduces flexibility to Beijing’s approach to security questions, while Pang Zhongying offers a more cautionary interpretation of “conditional intervention”.\textsuperscript{11} An effort to articulate common Chinese and African values through joint academic work speaks to a mutual desire for a shift in the norms agenda that mirrors the shifting economic relationship away from the West.\textsuperscript{12}

Even with these gradualist changes to Chinese foreign policy practices towards African security, promoting greater multilateralism still introduces troubling dilemmas for Beijing. According to Dongyan (2012), the actual trajectory of peacekeeping and even more so peacebuilding into more substantive external involvement in African countries’ domestic affairs is “undermining the basic principles of the UN Charter and the fundamental rules of peacekeeping, and have already moved beyond those traditional peacekeeping agenda and tasks China is familiar with, i.e. peace and development”. The problem for Beijing is that, even if liberal peace is itself coming under criticism in Western circles, as Dongyan readily admits, it has already become institutionalised as “prevailing norms across the United Nations”. Efforts to address the matter of such liberal biases have inspired a Chinese formulation of the Responsibility to Protect, articulated by Ruan Zonghe with his notion of “responsible protection”, which may offer one way out of this dilemma over the longer term, but this is still subject to the reception and support of African and the BRICS\textsuperscript{13} countries (Zongze, 2012). Furthermore, as the overlapping claims of regional authority by the AU and the Arab League demonstrated in the case of Libya, as well as the slow and divisive response of the AU to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, seeking legitimacy for intervention from regional organisations poses its own set of problems.

\textit{FOCAC, the AU and RECs}

It was at the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) process, a tri-annual meeting that serves as the diplomatic cornerstone of official ties between China and the continent and the site for joint declarations of intent, that China’s new security policy towards Africa was officially unveiled in July

\textsuperscript{10} Discussions with People’s Liberation Army officials, October 2012 and May 2013.
\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Wang Yizhou, Beijing, May 9th 2013. Also see Yizhou (2012); Zhongying (2013).
\textsuperscript{12} Discussions at FOCAC Academic Forum meetings, October 2012, Addis Ababa and October 2013, Beijing.
\textsuperscript{13} Brazil, India, China, Russia, South Africa.
2012. Reflecting this “new thinking” on security, Hu Jintao launched the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, a much expanded spectrum of peace- and security-related engagement. Specifically, the partnership entails:

within the realm of its [China’s] capabilities, financial and technical support to the African Union for its peace-support operations, the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture, personnel exchanges and training in the field of peace and security and Africa's conflict prevention, management and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development (FOCAC, 2012b).

China’s ties with the AU are linked to the FOCAC process, where the obstacles to a formal diplomatic relationship (which involved the Western Sahara issue) were only resolved in 2012.15 While much publicity has been given over to the recent Chinese funding of a new AU headquarters, several visits to Chinese peacekeeping centres and ongoing Chinese language training of AU employees, of greater significance is the direct and indirect support for African peace and security missions.16 Specifically, the Chinese government has provided the AU Mission in Somalia with a contribution of $4.5 million worth of equipment and materials for use in combatting al-Shabaab. This builds on earlier support of $1.8 million provided in 2007 to the African Mission in Sudan, the predecessor of UNAMID. More recently, Chinese interest in cooperation with the AU has extended further to a call for greater involvement in its EWS. According to Xia Liping, this would assist Beijing in providing a higher level of consular protection to its tourists and businesspeople in Africa, who are said to be affected by 30% of all early warnings (Debay, 2012). Within the AU bureaucracy itself, however, there is lingering mistrust of Chinese intentions that need to be overcome if Beijing is to achieve a truly cooperative relationship with the AU.17

As the AU accords importance to RECs, so too Chinese scholars like Wang Xuejun acknowledge their important position in APSA. Nevertheless, to date actual Chinese engagement in peace and security issues is limited to support for disaster management and trumpeting the development implications of China’s involvement as being its contribution to conflict prevention. In fact, China’s relationships with the RECs are still fundamentally commercial and developmental rather than security oriented. Chinese diplomats operating in the respective subregions have been given official role as representatives to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS in 2007 and established the ECOWAS-China Business Forum in 2008 and the SADC-China Business Forum in 2011 (Alden & Chigumera, forthcoming). Similar arrangements have been put in place with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the East African Community. The latter in particular, although relatively new, has accelerated ties through a framework agreement signed in 2012 to promote greater trade, investment and infrastructure development.

More generally, the financial support provided by China to APSA has been either channelled through UN sources or otherwise on a more ad hoc or even bilateral basis. In 2012 Beijing announced that it would be providing RMB 600 million worth of “free assistance” to the AU over a three-year period

14 See FOCAC (2012a, paras 2.6.1, 2.6.3), which states that China and Africa will “strengthen cooperation in policy coordination, capacity building, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation on the basis of equality and mutual respect to jointly maintain peace and stability in Africa”.
15 Interview with a South African diplomat, Pretoria, July 2013.
16 Interview with senior AU researcher, Addis Ababa, May 2013.
17 Interview with senior AU researcher, Addis Ababa, May 2013.
for, among other things, peace and security (Qinglin, 2012). This ad hoc form of financial support is echoed at the REC level, where, for instance, the Chinese government signed a memorandum of understanding with IGAD in November 2011 that included $100,000 for operational costs (IGAD, 2011a). Contrast this with the German government’s comprehensive financial and technical support for IGAD announced at the same time, involving long-term bilateral commitments of EUR 3 million and EUR 20 million, and further embossed through multilateralist cooperation by the EU (IGAD, 2011b). Humanitarian assistance features in China’s multilateral and bilateral overseas engagement, including in post-conflict settings, especially in Sudan. Chinese financial support for the work of UN entities such as the World Food Programme gives meaning to its “peace through development” approach, seen in a range of humanitarian and recovery projects implemented by Chinese companies in Darfur. Even the UN Peacebuilding Fund, in spite of the internal Chinese debates on the underlying liberal norms that inform peacebuilding, has received $5 million from Beijing.

5. Conclusion: China and the African Peace and Security Architecture: architects, builders or subcontractors?

China’s gradualist approach to engagement in African security matters aims to address the complexities of an expansive role in international institutions and a significant economic presence on the continent. It remains, however, poised between what is at this stage a rhetorical commitment to deeper involvement in APSA and the realities of actually engaging these structures in a long-term sustainable manner. In this context, three speculative scenarios for China’s future involvement in African security are possible, i.e. the Chinese as architects, builders or subcontractors.

The Chinese can be seen as potential architects of African security in the sense of introducing new norms of conduct or revising existing norms aimed at diluting (if not replacing) the policy prescriptions of liberal peace, which are seen to be at odds with Chinese global perceptions and narrower economic interests. The sine qua non of such a process will be, of course, an ability to tap into African concerns surrounding these norms, especially pronounced after decades of Western-led military missions and structural adjustment programmes under the rubric, respectively, of humanitarian intervention and economic development.

The Chinese can be seen as potential builders in the sense of co-ownership of a process led by Africans and influenced by the seminal liberal ideas on intervention found in Article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act. Here Chinese engagement will be decidedly multilateralist and oriented towards capacity-building, and would be similar to the efforts of other external powers in extending the ability of African governments and civil society to act on security, while the operating assumption will be that this is the most realistic way of ensuring the safety of China’s own economic interests in Africa.

Finally, the Chinese can be seen as potential subcontractors in the sense of providing practical solutions to specific security problems facing China’s interests in Africa. Here the involvement in African security would be technical in content and selective in engagement, and would be aimed at supporting and fulfilling the narrowest form of obligations without incurring the costs of deeper

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18 “When African countries are hit by natural disasters or war, China always promptly offers humanitarian aid to them.” See China (2010).
19 See Large (2012). In January 2011, for example, Beijing supported the G77 draft UN General Assembly resolution on International Cooperation on Humanitarian Assistance in the Field of Natural Disasters, from Relief to Development, which stresses that “Emergency assistance must be provided in ways supportive of recovery and long-term development”.
20 UN Peacebuilding Fund (n.d.).
involvement. The focus would be on securing Chinese economic interests and attending to the diplomatic needs of China’s global reputation.

China is still in the formative stages of participation in global governance structures and, as such, needs to develop its capacity to provide the requisite international public goods expected of a major power. With this in mind, it is not surprising that Beijing’s policymaking towards African security displays aspects of all three scenarios for engagement. For instance, its research and policymaking community is theorising new norms on a host of foreign and security policies, reflecting the impulse towards becoming an architect of African security. At the same time, Chinese participation in multilateral security and peacekeeping operations is indicative of its role as a builder of African security. And although it has expressed a desire to play a greater role in African security affairs, in line with the subcontractor scenario, as it stands today its interests are still largely defined by its economic concerns and the impact of African issues on its global reputation.

As Iyasu (2013) points out: “Whether China likes it or not, it plays a significant role in peace and security in Africa; negatively, through its absence, and positively, through an increased partnership with African states and institutions working for peace and security”. The pressures to expand its role will continue to grow in line with its ever-increasing economic involvement on the continent. That being said, in the final analysis one can expect Beijing to demonstrate caution and adaptability as its policymakers balance the costs and necessities of becoming more involved in African security.
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South Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk
1. Introduction: the evolution of the African peace and security architecture

The African Union (AU) is an inter-governmental organisation managing the common affairs of 54 African states. It was established on 26 May 2001 in Addis Ababa and launched on 9 July 2002 in South Africa to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU has 14 stated objectives, of which the key ones are to achieve unity and solidarity between the countries and people of Africa, to defend the sovereignty of its member states, to accelerate political and socio-economic integration of the continent, and to promote peace and security, democracy and human rights, and sustainable development (www.au.int). The AU is made up of both political and administrative bodies. The highest decision-making organ is the Assembly of the AU, made up of all the heads of state or government of member states of the AU. The AU also has a representative body, the Pan African Parliament, the Executive Council, the Permanent Representatives Committee, and the AU Commission, the secretariat to the political structures.

The key driver of the emergence and evolution of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the understanding that “…ensuring peace and order is a prerequisite for the promotion of peace, development and the improvement of Africans’ livelihoods” (Murithi, 2012: 267). In Murithi’s view the AU can now be viewed as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ and the behaviour of its Peace and Security Council (PSC) as ‘interventionist’. However, he also points out that the limitations of APSA’s fledgling institutions have been exposed in complex humanitarian situations such as in the Darfur region of Sudan. Indeed, he concludes that there is a ‘security gap’ in Africa between what the AU wants to achieve and the reality of what it can realistically deliver (this corresponds with what is called a ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ (Williams, 2009: 113). In the view of several analysts, and as we found in this study, the AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary action to ensure successful peace operations.

This assessment raises the question of the role of Africa’s strong regional powers – Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Kenya and others – in shaping and managing the AU’s peace and security architecture. And the flipside of this coin is as important to consider – namely the impact of states that flout the AU’s rules of compliance (‘norm breakers’) – of which there are several, as pointed out by Aning (2013).

Before we consider the role of South Africa as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ in the affairs of the AU APSA, including its limitations in exercising its power and influence, we have to briefly consider the make-up of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Kwesi Aning uses a blend of regime and institutional theory to sketch the nature of the AU’s peace and security architecture. From this perspective the AU’s Constitutive Act and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol comprise a regime with rules, norms and principles that member states ‘should adhere to’ (clearly they do not always do that). This regime seeks to provide a framework for cooperation among its member states in order to accomplish a distinctive set of policy goals, which are expected to be governed by African norms and values. Non-compliance (behaviour that results from a narrow focus on the national interest, misunderstanding, or inability to adjust) can lead to coercive or diplomatic responses by the regime or individual regime members.

Overall then, the African peace and security architecture exists because of a convergence of interests shared by most AU member states in pursuing common interests (Aning, 2013: 27).
The AU’s security architecture is based on collective and human security issues to be operationalized by several institutional processes, including the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund. Overseeing these processes is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) (Engel and Porto, 2009). As Aning (2013: 29) points out, its powers are extensive in that it is mandated to deal with ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues ranging from peacemaking to peace-building and humanitarian assistance.

2. The Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force

The When it comes to conflict management, the African Standby Force is arguably the key intervention mechanism in the AU’s security architecture. When operational, it will consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their respective countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment as soon as required. The mandate of the standby force covers a wide range of actions, from observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian assistance, to more complex peace support missions, intervention in a Member State in grave circumstances, or at the request of a Member State, to the restoration of peace and security, preventive deployment and peace building.

However, there is little point in having an elaborate and costly instrument when the AU cannot afford (or agree) to activate it at times of grave crisis. This reality has led to a decision by the AU Summit in 2013 to establish a rapid reaction force (clumsily titled the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity or AICRC)\(^1\) under the guidance of volunteer member states to ‘close the gap’ – that is, to intervene until such time the African Standby Force and/or the UN are ready to take up position in a theatre of conflict (Fabricius, 2013).

Despite this additional measure, the establishment of the African Standby Force proceeds. To this end, the AU has been making use of so-called road-maps. Roadmap I (2006-08) provided for the development of the necessary basic documents (doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures etc.). Roadmap II (2008-10) prepared the African Standby Force for peacekeeping missions and resulted in a so-called Command Post Exercise called Amani Africa to test deployment and management of a peace mission. Lessons learnt from this exercise resulted in the adoption, by the AU in 2012, of Roadmap III. As reported by the Chairperson of the AU Commission (AU 2013), it envisions the readiness of the standby force to deploy by 2015, and has three main objectives:

(i) finalise pending actions in operational, legal, logistics and structural areas; (ii) review the ASF Vision to ensure its coherence with Africa’s needs, and (iii) highlight new priorities and challenges: RDC, humanitarian action, management of the Police component and coordination of the civilian component.

Over and above these challenges, the relationship between the AU and its regional partners – Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) – in the operationalization of the African Standby Force remain untested. As Williams (2013: 17) recently noted,\(^1\)

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\(^1\) There is some disagreement regarding the precise name: this is the one that appears in the document Assembly/AU/Dec.489(XXI) adopted by the 21st Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly.
Arguably the most unclear but potentially significant issues have revolved around the process of authorising and mandating missions for the various component parts of the ASF: Do the PSC and the AU have supreme authority to utilise the ASF? Do the RECs share this function? Can the RECs deploy the ASF regional brigades independently of the PSC? Should the PSC deal directly with the RECs or the individual member states comprising the regional brigades? And, can the regional brigades deploy to different regions?

Turning to the question raised by Williams – that of decision-making relating to peace and security – it is worth noting that the critical institutions include the AU Assembly (the meeting place of Heads of State and Governments of the AU), the AU’s Executive Council, the Peace and Security Council and the Commission of the AU. The political leadership of the AU, as represented in the Assembly of the AU makes the final decisions on important peace and security issues such as intervention in the affairs of member states. In reality though, the Peace and Security Council is empowered to take most decisions on security issues on behalf of the Assembly.

It is therefore important to understand the composition and mandate of the Peace and Security Council. It is composed of 15 members and its seats are distributed to ensure a geo-political balance: four to West Africa, three to Central Africa, three to Eastern Africa, three to Southern Africa, and two to Northern Africa, without any right of veto powers for any member state. The AU Commission, and its Chair, acts as the Secretariat of the Council and has a special role to play in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. Together with a commissioner of peace and security, the chair ensures that decisions of the Peace and Security Council are implemented and followed up. The chair must also prepare regular reports and documents to enable the Council to operate efficiently.

In Aning’s assessment the Peace and Security Council is arguably one of the AU’s effective bodies, although there is substantial scope for improvement of the Council’s supporting mechanisms, working methods and reporting mechanisms (2013). He also characterises the behaviour of the Council as ‘compromise and deliberate constructive ambiguity’ – a feature that enables African states to negotiate and build consensus between two contradictory principles: classical non-interference versus the ‘new’ right of the AU to intervene.

This ability to negotiate an intervention is put in broader perspective by a foreign affairs official, who believes the fundamental challenges of establishing peace and stability are similar all over the continent, despite the particularities of each situation. In his view, long-term stability requires substantial work on three fronts: the establishment of security on a regional basis (offering guarantees to neighbours and drawing them into a diplomatic process), the creation of a new political dispensation, with mechanisms for justice and political incorporation, and thirdly the promotion of a development dynamic that widens and deepens the stakes in peace (Cravinho, 2009: 199). Critically, these processes are advised to take place in a committed, concurrent and sustained manner, and it is Cravinho’s belief that “…it will not happen without external support” (2009: 199).

We now turn to an overview of the South African government’s Africa policies after which we will examine in more detail how it perceives its role in the AU and its peace and security architecture.
3. South Africa in Africa – the challenges of peace diplomacy

A key driver of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign and defence policies is the desire to contribute to Africa’s stabilisation and recovery, in the process gaining access to trade and business opportunities – and so demonstrating to its citizens the value of engaging the rest of Africa (Van Nieuwkerk, 2012). This role is not unique to this country – governments with ambitious foreign policy agendas tend to exercise power and influence abroad in order to gain domestically. This is true for the Western nations as it is for the BRICS alliance. It is also true that often, the return on the investment is less than satisfactory – as United States meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates. To what extent is South Africa contributing to Africa’s stabilisation and recovery efforts and how is it constrained in exercising this role?

4. Peace diplomacy

We view the South African government’s approach to Africa essentially as the exercise of peace diplomacy, defined as its involvement in continental peace-making (diplomatic interventions in the form of mediation or negotiation processes), United Nations mandated peacekeeping operations, and peace building (in line with the AU framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development). Peace diplomacy can also be equated to the exercise of soft power. Such an approach is by definition driven by multi-actor coalitions of decision-makers and implementers in government and state structures.

As expected, in the wake of its transitional experiences the post-apartheid South African government incorporated several ‘best practices’ in its foreign policy posture – peace diplomacy - and soon developed a reputation as an able conflict mediator, particularly in Africa, but also elsewhere, such as with the Lockerbie case, Northern Ireland, and Timor Leste (although there is doubt to what extent its mediation efforts outside Africa can be regarded as effective).

We can best describe post-apartheid South Africa’s behaviour as that of an emerging middle power. Indeed, since 1994 its government followed a pragmatic, reformist foreign policy agenda. This was not always the case. South Africa’s relationship with Africa evolved over time. This is because material conditions change, as do decision-makers (Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma illustrate that personalities matter). Furthermore, where interests of domestic actors (government, political formations, business, civil society) overlap, it produces a convergence of views (the ‘national interest’) but cannot be assumed to be static – it dynamically changes over time.

In the area of peacemaking and the promotion of governance and post-conflict reconstruction, South Africa undoubtedly made an impact. Indeed, for African politicians and rebel leaders eager to cut deals, Pretoria became the interlocutor – and destination – of choice. These efforts included bilateral and multilateral South African involvement in peacemaking, governance and post-conflict reconstruction processes in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
5. South Africa's peace interventions: a mixed record

Not all the conflict resolution interventions by the South African government can be regarded as successful. In what Peter Kagwanja called South Africa’s ‘age of unilateralism’ its nose got bloodied on a number of occasions (Kagwanja, 2006). South Africa’s mid-1990s foreign policy goals of contributing to stability and a return to democracy in Nigeria initially produced negligible results. Other factors contributed to a breakthrough in the crisis, including Abacha’s (and Abiola’s) unexpected deaths, events that opened the door for a reconfiguration of political relations and processes of bargaining and negotiation. As pointed out by a commentator (see Tjønneland’s article in this report), perhaps the most significant fall-out from this intervention was that South Africa became isolated from the rest of Africa and became reluctant to pursue unilateral actions, preferring instead to seek African consensus on interventions.

Elsewhere, the South African government failed in its attempts to persuade the Angolan, Mozambican and Congolese governments to shift their approaches away from military confrontation with rebel movements to that of a negotiated settlement and the adoption of a government of national unity. It also failed to prevent its fellow colleagues in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) from engaging militarily in the DRC war. And attempts to quietly influence the key players in Zimbabwe to adopt a power-sharing arrangement initially showed no signs of success. The violent 2008 elections in Zimbabwe produced a stalemate, which opened the door to a negotiated power-sharing agreement and a halt to economic disintegration. The so-called Inclusive Government was never a popular arrangement and over time became less credible. This – and SADC mediation – came to an end after ZANU PF trounced the opposition in the 2013 national elections.

This brings us to recent events in Libya. Many have expressed disappointment at the South African vote in favour of UN Security Council Resolution 1973. This is the now controversial decision by the Security Council on 17 March 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians ‘under threat of attack’. The resolution also expressly excluded ‘a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’. South Africa and Nigeria voted in favour, as did the US, France and the UK, while Brazil, India and China abstained.

Resolution 1973 was adopted after it became clear that Gadhafi was ignoring the requirements of Resolution 1970, adopted by the UN Security Council on 26 February 2011, which demanded an end to the violation of human rights in Libya.

The problem with the implementation of these two resolutions related to the extent to which the civilian population was to be protected. Was the bombing of Gadhafi’s military hardware enough, or was it to be extended to the man himself, including active support for the rebel forces in the East? It seems the members of the global South on the Security Council preferred action to protect civilians under threat of violence, and not for the mandate to be interpreted in favour of removing the Gadhafi regime, and sponsoring the creation of an armed political opposition. However, the power politics of the Council overrode such considerations.

Subsequent events demonstrated that a regime change agenda, as articulated by the Americans, French and British, and implemented by NATO, was driving the international intervention. Disturbingly, the AU intervention, by the Ad Hoc High Level panel led by president Zuma, made little impact on the ground.
The South African vote in favour of Resolution 1973 appears in hindsight to have been an error of judgment. NATO’s increasingly brutal bombing campaign, defiant rebel-supporting activities and Gadhafi’s targeted killing were seemingly not anticipated. An analysis of the South African decision-making process suggests weak decision-making by its foreign and security policy mandarins (Landsberg and Moore, 2012).

This apparent bleak record must be seen in the context of successful interventions elsewhere. The joint Botswana/South Africa military intervention – seemingly under the auspices of the SADC – in Lesotho in 1998 is criticized by many as a failure. Despite its shortcomings, *Operation Boleas* succeeded in stabilising the situation in order for a process of political negotiations on a new constitution and voting system to take off. In the case of the DRC, the South African government’s persistence in playing the role of peacemaker also paid off. Despite ongoing violence in the East of the DRC, the ‘Sun City’ talks in 2002 and the subsequent Pretoria Agreements of 2002–03 laid the foundations for a credible peace process and opened the door to post-war reconstruction of Congolese society. South African personnel continue to make up a large contingent of UN peace support and enforcement operations in the DRC. South African diplomats also play a key role in coordinating activities of the member states of SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in determining the nature of mediation in the DRC and Great Lakes region in the context of the UN Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for DRC and the Region (Khadiagla, 2012; SAFPI, 2013).

An assessment of South African mediation and participation in peace processes elsewhere in Africa yields mixed results. The record includes the Comoros (where an AU driven military intervention replaced South African mediation and brought an unstable peace), the Ivory Coast (where former president Mbeki’s role as mediator became controversial and was unceremoniously ended), and the more recent debacle in the Central African Republic, where fourteen South African National Defence Force members lost their lives in a fire fight with rebel forces. Arguably, this intervention became controversial for the same reasons we believe South Africa mismanaged the Libya crisis.

What about Darfur and South Sudan? On the latter, it is well known that the South African government spent much time and resources in support of the creation of this new state. Surely, this is an example of South African peace diplomacy at its best? The answer depends on how one understands the motives and actual contribution of the South African government.

A cynical yet perceptive analyst recently argued that South Africa’s approach to the Sudan reflects many of the core economic, political and ideological elements of South Africa’s foreign policy: growing commercial interests on the continent; a strategic need for energy; a desire to contribute to peace and stability in Africa, and an anti-imperialist paradigm, which leads to solidarity with regimes that are under Western pressure, regardless of their human rights performance (Nathan 2008). To further complicate the picture, commentators detect incompatibility between the policies of the ANC government and the interests of the South African private sector (Southall and Melber, 2012). Regardless of the South African government’s intentions, at the time of writing, news from South Sudan and the Central African Republic regarding the resumption of violent conflict and the spectre of genocide or civil war, casts a dark shadow over the assumed relationship between external intervention and stability.
6. Current and future prospects

The South African government’s view of the country’s continental role, initially infused with notions of national reconciliation as the way to solve violent conflicts and human rights activism, has been tempered by the realities of the African condition. This ‘reality check’ hardly made the ANC leadership reactionary or its foreign policy schizophrenic, as Habib and Selinyane (2004) suggested. Policymaking adjustments under the Mbeki administration allowed peace-making, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction to be implemented with modest yet growing success. Under the Zuma administration, these strategic objectives remain key – although a new cast of characters usually brings new nuances to established approaches, and as we have seen, a less coherent decision making style relating to crisis management. There are additional constraints. The South African government remains hampered by a relatively weak domestic base. Even though South Africa’s economy is much bigger than the combined economies of the Southern African region, resources are constrained by factors such as poverty and unemployment, the HIV and Aids pandemic, a fragile racial reconciliation, and the impact of the global financial crisis.

In addition, South Africa’s ‘emerging middle power’ role is exercised with close involvement of external powers. Whether this always happens to South Africa’s or the continent’s benefit is hard to determine. Self-interest drives the presence of external powers on the continent, and cooperation via so-called ‘trilateral cooperation’ has the potential to contribute to stabilisation, or even development. However the South African government’s close association with Western powers in pursuing peace and security agendas draws criticism from many quarters. Perhaps a good example of this dilemma is the recent joint exercise between South African and American military forces ostensibly in preparation for humanitarian interventions – but as we noted above in the case of Libya, such approaches run the danger of a slippery slide into regime change.

Is South Africa’s emerging middle power role on the continent and in the global South sustainable? Its power and influence depends on a number of factors. Given its position in the global political-economic hierarchy, South Africa is in need of foreign investors, markets and credibility. The EU was South Africa’s biggest trading partner (by all accounts now overtaken by China) but Africa is a rising export market. This is a key motivating factor for seeking to stabilise the continent. The continent in return benefits from South Africa as supplier of goods and services. As Daniel and Bhengu noted in 2009, “…the South African footprint in the African marketplace today remains considerable and grows each year” (Daniel and Bhengu 2009).

South Africa’s corporate ambitions in Africa seem to be one of the key motivating factors explaining its forays into African peacemaking. Others talk of a policy ‘contradiction’ whereby involvement in peacemaking and peacekeeping is motivated by a humanistic impulse in the ruling party and government (to alleviate suffering on the continent) as well as expectations of economic payback (whereby investment in peace processes is expected to reap benefits). Our interaction with officials and others involved in South Africa’s peace diplomacy leads us to conclude that these disparate impulses all mark the South African government’s decision-making processes and that choices are not easily constructed. It remains critical for South Africa’s foreign, security and economic objectives to be formulated and implemented holistically in the long-term pursuit of African peace and development – the keystone of its ambitious international relations posture. This requires a harmonised foreign and security policy framework that is complementary to government’s emerging trade and economic policy frameworks. For this to work, the South African government will have to establish a national consensus regarding the country’s national interests in order to determine its national security policy and strategic approaches.
This conclusion raises the question of the South African government’s relationship with the AU and specifically its peace and security arrangements. How has this relationship evolved and can we describe it as ‘supportive’? Or is the relationship one of neglect and withdrawal? Can we detect tensions as South Africa pursues an independent, national interest-driven international relations posture? What is South Africa’s view of the AU’s Peace and Security Council and its celebrated yet flawed peace and security architecture when dealing with matters of peace and security? We interviewed a small number of senior South African officials with intimate knowledge of the relationship. In the section below we summarise their insights in terms of our questions.

7. South African perspectives

This section aims to enrich the preceding academic overview of South Africa’s Africa policy approach and practice (dubbed ‘peace diplomacy’) by presenting the insights of various interviewees. The latter were selected on the basis of their intimate knowledge of the AU peace and security architecture and include officials from the departments of defence (DOD), foreign affairs (DIRCO), the State Security Agency (SSA) and an analyst in charge of a peace and security think-tank (Pax Africa). Several hours of interviews were recorded and a content analysis reveals a number of recurring themes. These include: South Africa’s contribution to the establishment of the AU and its peace and security architecture, South Africa’s motivations for engaging the AU and the peace and security architecture, South African perspectives on the AU’s decision-making dynamics in this area, and finally South Africa’s seemingly curious withdrawal from leading African peace and security architecture strategically.

Theme 1: South Africa’s contribution to the establishment of the AU peace and security architecture

Several interviewees – the state security official, the NGO Director and two defence officials – argued that the formation of the African Union was a critical development in the political history of Africa considering the fight against colonialism and later, neo-colonialism. Establishing the AU was also a significant moment in the international environment. South Africa played a determining role in the creation of the AU in 2002.

The state security official provided the necessary context. In his view, with the conclusion of the fight for liberation and colonialism in 1994, South Africa gained freedom, and a window of opportunity was opened for leadership in the continent to engage. This was made easier, a decade earlier, with the end of the cold war. It was those momentum that lead to the rethink of the way in which the Organisation of the African Unity was to be transformed and renovated to address the burning questions of the day. He added however that the undercurrents of the formation of the OAU continued into the AU. The first related to those favouring a big bang approach of a United States of Africa. This refers to the struggle between pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces in creating a security governance and management system. As defence official C notes, in preparing the peace and security architecture, “...everything we seemed to do was pushing against Gadhafi and his influence on other African states around the United States of Africa, the United Armed Forces and all those kinds of initiatives”. The second related to those who believed there must be agreed upon values, shared across the continent. The state security official believes the Big Bang approach was not a sustainable approach. For him, the gulf between the rich and the poor has been growing, despite some strides that have been taken to eradicate poverty in some of the countries.
The balance that had to be brought was that historically the OAU was working on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. The AU innovation was that learning from the experience of what happened in Rwanda and the genocide there and in other African countries. That principal of non-indifference, when there are human rights abuses, failure to exercise the responsibility to protect, was a very important innovation. Key in this entire process was the engagements of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa.

The state security official then reflected on the key thinkers who were driving the process, and noted that former President Thabo Mbeki played a critical role in both motivating and defending how those institutions were meant to be packaged, to ensure progress. This was echoed by defence official C, who commented that Mbeki was the real driving force behind this, together with Algeria and others – “the nucleus of energy in creating the AU and peace And security architecture”. He added that “we were expecting a lot out of it from a security perspective … from my observations not a lot happened”. This theme re-emerged in interviews with several other officials.

The NGO Director, who had been involved in the early deliberations around a continental peace and security design, pointed out that discussions started even before the AU was created. He reflected on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – an agency designed in the early 2000s by the input of the Heads of State of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa to assist with Africa’s development. NEPAD developed a democratic governance agenda: as he puts it, “peer review – that’s a new word in our African vocabulary, some reflection, taking ownership of your problems.” At the same time it developed a peace and security agenda informed by the human security concept: as he notes, the belief was that “…you can’t have sustainable economic development without peace, security and stability”.

The African peace and security architecture (APSA) was created and can be seen as the product of interaction between a number of policy makers and policy entrepreneurs at that time. As he explains, “APSA was first used as a concept at an informal brainstorming session of the AU Peace and Security Council in South Africa. The peace and security protocol was adopted in 2002; it was actually launched and came into force in 2004”. He then adds a significant addition:

*Technical experts prepared a NEPAD position on peace and security in preparation for a meeting with the G8...out of this there is a decision at the HSGIC level [the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee - author], given our decisions and Mbeki’s letter to Canadian PM Martin, to convene. And this was done in February 2003. Convene a meeting between the AU Organ, AU Secretariat, NEPAD peace and security sub-committee and the NEPAD steering committee. Out of this meeting comes APSA.*

*The principal question that is asked [at this meeting] is what are the critical success factors that will enable this partnership and development programme to succeed...that is how you arrive at eight initial areas: Standby Force, Early Warning, Early Response, Peace Fund, Small arms and light weapons, terrorism, exploitation of natural resources in areas of conflict, Security Sector Reform.*

In the view of the NGO Director, Africa needed a visionary leader like Thabo Mbeki and people around him to push this agenda, initiate fresh thinking and creating new structures, with resources and accountability. This, in his view, is what the NEPAD team had brought together and what the AU lacked at the time.
The state security official takes the story forward. In his view, with the way in which the AU was conceptualised, it became possible to task the African peace and security architecture with three responsibilities. The first was to be preventive, although in his view this has not actually been used to its full potential. There are a lot of challenges that the African continent faces still, that could easily have been dealt with had the early warning systems of the continent been up to standard and the leadership responsive.

The second area was when the conflict has actually broken out the capacity to intervene and make sure that corrective steps are taken – this has been the major preoccupation. The problem with this approach, in his view, is that it is brought in after the horse has already left the stable. So it becomes more difficult, more intensive for Africa to be able to find solutions. But there is value added if one looks at the way in which the situation in Sudan was handled. With all the challenges, Sudan had a very peaceful transition. Despite ongoing problems, the whole situation is still being dealt with:

There are elements of preventive diplomacy that have been deployed there and have worked fairly well because it has kept the parties continuing to engage on the ground, to fight, but the option of the negotiations table has always been there and has accompanied the conflict throughout. This in itself is an advantage.

The third is post-conflict reconstruction: where one actually focuses on matters of security sector reform and making sure that state structures are built that can ensure good governance. This has also been a very important innovation by the African Union and it is one of those areas where they have not been given the credit that they deserved. In a number of countries the situation improved: Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.

The state security official also mentioned East Africa, where he believed Somalia had been stabilised mainly by African efforts and continues on a very positive trajectory. For him, finally,

— this tells a story that with the requisite staying power, the requisite resources, requisite international collaboration, Africans can be able to deal with the challenges that they face.

**Theme 2: South Africa’s motivations for continued engagement with the peace and security architecture**

South In the preceding section we have established that South Africa was instrumental in shifting the original position of African Standby Force away from a continental standby force to five regional forces. Over time, given the difficulties with moving the peace and security architecture and the standby force forward, it is an intervention South Africa has perhaps come to regret. How else can we explain its seeming lacklustre support to SADC security policies and implementation practices? It remains unclear what South Africa is doing in relation to the SADC Standby Force: note our discussion above of its leading role in pushing the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC) agenda. Information relating to its pledges to the SADC standby force in terms of military and police contingents remains shrouded in secrecy. We sense a growing level of frustration amongst South African foreign and security officials with managing SADC contradictions: representing a powerful economic entity, they have to deal with the political sensitivities of fourteen member states as well as a logistically weak institution.
At the AU level, we also detect contradictions. The planning element (PSOD) in charge of African Standby Force and ongoing operations (AMISOM et al.) has always been headed by a South African. How has this engagement with the African Standby Force contributed to South Africa’s own thinking around peacekeeping? Again, note the role played by South Africa in attempting to establish the AICRC.

Below, we return to the interviewees for their interpretations of South Africa’s relations with the peace and security agendas of the AU and SADC.

The state security official explored the motivations for South Africa playing a determining role in the creation and sustaining of the peace and security architecture. He referred to the South African government’s broad policy framework and its ‘twelve priorities’ [a series of policy priorities determined by the South African Presidency and used as the basis for policy implementation across the civil service - author] and noted that one of these talks about South Africa in the context of an improving and developing Africa. In his view, that is a crucial element of South Africa’s foreign relations, for several reasons.

Instability elsewhere on the continent means more refugees are going to come in to South Africa. We are now the ‘second most attractive destination’ for refugees in the world – not just on the continent. So it is in our interest to ensure South Africans live in peace and security, that they are without fear and that they actually can enjoy the freedom they won in 1994. So that domestic policy must find expression in the way in which we engage with the rest of the continent...

Engage with SADC for starters because we have the most stable sub-region in the African continent and we must continue to maintain that. We’ve got some of the best performing economies, if you look at the developments in Angola...

And that’s why I am beginning to see maturity in the way in which we are engaging. The lesson we have learnt by having worked in the committee of intelligence and security services of Africa is that unless you own the platform of running continental affairs, you are not likely to make the progress you have to.

The state security official further reflected on South Africa’s role:

South Africa is expected to play a critical role in that process and we are expected to provide leadership... Obviously, you have to make sure there is a balance and a direct link between domestic priorities and being involved in those initiatives. And I believe that it is in the national interest that we are actually leading some of these initiatives on the continent.

The state security official believes that South Africa’s continental leadership depends to a large extent on a strategic relationship with Nigeria. As he points out,

– We’ve got a very good relationship. Everything that they do, they pick up the phone and say this has happened and some of the more recent developments really talk to that good cooperation. Since the President [Zuma] met President Jonathan things have really gone back to normal.

Let us pause for a moment and consider the views of the interviewees. One has to ask to what extent is South Africa speaking with one voice at the AU and does it shape AU peace and security agendas? Except for the potential opened up by the election of Madam Zuma to head the AU Commission, it
appears our interviewees are sceptical of the claim that South Africa presents a united front and actively shapes agendas.

Defence officials B and C reflected on the time South Africa was expected to lead in shaping the details of the emerging AU peace and security architecture, and in contrast to the picture sketched by the NGO Director, it emerges that often, South African officials – particularly those from defence and foreign affairs – are not sharing similar sets of understandings or even strategic objectives. For example, defence official C reflected on the creation of the AU Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and notes that although South African Ambassador Duarte was instrumental in the process, “the difficulty was co-ordination. As Defence we were called in last minute and then expected to produce.”

He also reflects on the way SADC developed a position on the standby force concepts by pointing out that South Africa played a significant role in creating consensus, despite some real opposition from the SADC Organ Directorate [the latter coordinates the collective security policies and implementation practices of the member states of SADC, a process often shrouded in controversy given South Africa’s dominant regional role – author]. The official adds “…unfortunately, two years ago when we were chair [of the SADC Organ] I did not see any activity…” And despite the establishment of a coordinating structure at the South African foreign ministry, defence official C laments “…nobody drives the strategic agenda”. In his view, South Africa currently lacks “leadership, co-ordination, integration and follow-up”.

The state security official pointed to the crafting of the AU’s security sector reform policy framework. In his view there was very little input by state actors. A team of African Security Sector Network (ASSN) experts drafted the initial policy. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) was invited [hence his insights into the process]. He explained that this activity arose from a resolution adopted by heads of state that this was needed and they therefore were trying to implement the decisions of heads of state and governments of the AU who had actually called for the development of the Security Sector Reform Paper. He notes: “So we worked through a Draft Zero; on the basis of that Draft Zero there was consultation with member states”. However he also notes:

I agree that we could still have had a bigger role as South Africa because during this period (2008) we had co-sponsored with Slovakia the discussions at the UN on Security Sector Reform and we had also brought the findings of the Cape Town Consultation to the AU…that was supposed to serve as an input into the process of drafting the security sector reform policy.

The AU Assembly adopted a policy framework on security sector reform in January 2013 and implementation will be undertaken in close cooperation with the regional economic communities (RECs).

In the view of defence official A, because of the fairly advanced nature of South African civil society, the South African government tends not to use much of its public servants for policy development. As he explains, “It would call, it would say – ‘NGO Director X, what is on your plate? Come and run this workshop so that at the end of the day the AU can have the material to kick-start projects’. The South African government then uses those institutions – to provide intellectual input.

However he points out – as the other interviewees did – that South African officials can do much more to shape policy agendas. It raises the question – not explored during interviews – of the analytical capacity of state officials engaged in foreign and security policy, which the author sees as weak, underdeveloped and often trapped in a dated liberation narrative.
As the official notes,

*Other guys take up the challenge, drive some of the agenda ... but we are not present in the room when they shape the document. Why don’t we put our strong intellectual contributors [unclear whether he meant from the state or non-state sector - author] in multi-lateral organisations where they can shape, make or contribute to the agenda in peace and security?*

Part of the problem for him is the domestic psychology in South Africa. He believes South Africans in general haven’t woken up to realise that they are part of the world. South Africans are not internationalists. As he notes: “You would ask yourself - how many South Africans, in a day, open an AU website to see what’s the news?”

For South Africa to make any meaningful contribution in the character in the working methods of the AU, its officials must be embedded in the process: “If you are there, that’s where the heartbeat of the continent is. You will learn things that you are not going to get from a textbook”.

Critically, from these mini-cases we observe a broad trend whereby South African state officials were able to envision, initiate, and lead processes but that the engagement was not sustainable. In addition South Africa does not necessarily ‘follow through’ with implementation. Several interviewees suggested that the South African government does not mandate or empower officials to play such a role.

Regarding the deployment of Madam Zuma, in defence official A’s view, the situation might change slightly, but she will also be very wary of being accused of favouritism. In his view, she is more of an AU civil servant. But there is an understanding and an expectation that much of her decision-making will also be informed by South Africa’s direction on certain issues.

**Theme 3: Decision-making dynamics at the AU**

Regarding the quality of security policy decision-making at the AU, defence official A was of the view that the quality varies because it depends on which country is in the Peace and Security Council at that time. They bring their own strength; the AU commission is not like the UN secretariat. In his view, member states in New York are in charge. They shape the resolutions. They negotiate what needs to be said in that resolution – the powerful do and then co-opt others.

Defence official A then reviewed the decision-making dynamics at the AU and noted the importance of relationships. In Addis, he noted, “… it’s the AU Commission who will say – let’s not look for too much debate in this session, let’s be general. Commend this and that, urge the international community, raise concerns.” That language, he pointed out, comes from the AU Commission. He believes Dr Zuma brought soberness into the thinking. He explains that usually she does not sit in Peace and Security Council meetings. But the Commissioner for Peace and Security would be the person delivering the report to the Peace and Security Council, influencing the way peace and security must move. As he notes, “It is the Commissioner who has the staff (capacity) under him to do those reports; and the commissioner would be speaking to the chairperson and saying – chairperson, this is the route I am actually going to sway member states”.

Defence official A then reflected on power relations amongst African decision-makers and between them and outsiders. From his perspective:

*The Commissioner for Peace and Security, fortunately, has a staff. He has staff that has an office in that region, they are sending reports – he might have people on the ground. Whereas
the member states who are in the Peace and Security Council, those ambassadors, some of them don’t get any reports from their home countries. Ambassadors rely on what the Commission brings to them. So the quality varies. Unless you have a South Africa that says – “hey-hey commission, that report, you are missing the point”. Some countries are prepared: Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, or Tanzania.

Whereas in New York – it’s the member states, whether the resolution is in favour of the French National interest but the drafting has not come from the Secretariat. They shape it, they lobby, they caucus. The membership of the Security Council has a lot to say on the resolutions as compared to the PSC. The UN does not necessarily want to take heed of much of what PSC says. Look at Libya – case in point. At the time when President Zuma was trying to put together a team (high-level panel) the resolution was in place, everyone was told – don’t fly on here, we are not going to allow you to land here.

The state security official pointed out that Africa’s dependence on donors was not in the interest of Africa’s peace and security agenda:

Africa has to ensure, as SADC has already decided, on critical projects we don’t want outside funding, we want to fund it ourselves. It is a very important culture that needs to be developed because in the peace and security terrain the AU is still getting sponsorship from the EU…close to 90% of the Peace and Security budget comes from the EU. And so if the money is not going to be given without strings attached your ability to implement the decisions you take on the continent has become a problem.

That’s why I welcome the recent decision that there would be rapid intervention capacity that is going to be wholly African owned and that African countries volunteer to put their boots on the ground when the situation demand.

On this latter point, Defence official C took a different view. For him, the danger with the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (AICRC) is that its creation and utilisation might bypass established multilateral decision-making rules and procedures and be deployed at the insistence of some and not in agreement with all, or even deployed at the insistence of outside forces such as the USA or the French.

Overall however, in defence official A’s view, the AU is an institution hungry for positive influence, and the continent looks at South Africa as the way to go.

However, the South African government can only improve its role if it makes its citizens conscious of how important the AU is. He proposed for the South African government to visit academic institutions: “…come to the politics department, look for and identify the young and upcoming undergraduates – we put them into entry levels into the AU”. Ironically, the official was simultaneously of the view that “…we don’t have enough presence. I have often found that the majority of academics that comment on African issues, they take too much of a Eurocentric approach in understanding of Africa.”

Regarding the performance of the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund, Defence Official A informed that “I was at the heart of this: this grand idea of an African Standby Force, constituted of regional brigades”. He reflected on its creation by pointing out that Libya came with a standing army. As he noted:

You see, love Gadhafi or hate him, he was a visionary but his ideas were too radical. Not informed by reality but he had a vision: a United States of Africa. He came with the ‘African
Army’. But then the AU commission said that this makes sense. We need to have some deployable capacity for peacekeeping. We’ve just gone through Rwanda; we’ve had the Liberia and Sierra Leone – let’s wake up!

However he points out

debate waters down ... because everybody’s saying that it’s unrealistic. You are not going to have sovereign states surrendering their troops to a multilateral institution to be used. A military, to start with, is an instrument of a country’s sovereignty. There are commanders in chief: domestically the commanders in chief are the presidents because the military is an instrument of the state. You are never going to take a section of this instrument and hand it over to a multilateral institution to form a standing army. That’s too radical and too expensive. In order for them to become a cohesive unit in the conceptualization of an army you need to have them in the same place at the same time; build the infrastructure to train, exercise and deploy, command structures, language.

Defence official A then concludes that the watered-down army idea evolved into the Stand-by (Standby Force):

It’s in your country; you identify the units that you can make available when they are needed, keep them busy at your own expense – when the member states need them they call the region and that region mobilises the unit.

Following a phase of developing doctrine, and field exercises, Defence official A reflected on the AU’s inability to deploy the African Standby Force and then spoke about the concept of rapid deployment, especially as it was discussed at the 2013 AU Summit. As he notes,

President Zuma is saying the ASF is taking too long, let’s test this thing now. It’s a bit of a complication – testing it now, it will not be regional based. It will be specific member states – South Africa, Tanzania – who are keen to volunteer.

Reflecting on the inability of the AU to intervene in the crises in Libya, Mali or Ivory Coast, Defence official B commented

...the issue of the non-response of the AU is not a reflection of the unwillingness or unpreparedness of the ASF. It is a reflection of the malaise with how the AU operates in response to crisis...when you have a crisis its intervention will depend on who is prepared to give you forces at that particular point in time.

Interviewees also commented on the challenges of operationalising the standby force. Defence official C focused on the SADC Standby Force in particular and identified a number of challenges, including technical expertise, but also of political will. He noted that “SADC is saying, we look to you to take the lead because you have the expertise”. Defence official A commented that in his view, for the Standby Force to work,

South Africa has to stand up and become the framework nation. The issue is that we are scared of being called the Big Brother and the Hegemon. We went to see Commissioner Ping. He said ‘guys, you are the US of Africa. You have to stand up and come to the party, South Africa has to play this role, and nobody else can play this role’. ‘And the issue is, we can’t even get people in there!'
For him, the issue won’t be resolved until government adopts the new Defence Review *[the revised South African defence policy, not yet approved – author]*, which in its draft format makes provision for such a strategic approach.

Regarding the Peace Fund, Defence official A thought the idea had great value, the idea being a ‘kitty’ where money could be thrown in for peace and security projects, for conflict resolutions. In his view, the problem was: why make it a volunteer contribution? As he notes:

> If I have money I will put something but if I don’t I won’t. Then what happens is the EU throw something in there and the Americans throw something in there and whoever else is sympathetic. Then general membership, because it’s volunteer, there is no obligation. It is South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria – the usual suspects will put something there. It will never be enough. The bulk has got to be ring-fenced for peacekeeping deployment but by the time peacekeeping deployment happens there’s nothing left because the money has been absorbed by mediation work.

**Theme 4: South Africa: the hesitant hegemon**

Many interviewees pointed to a paradox: South African peace and security leadership is needed on the continent but the government is hesitant (or perhaps unable) to provide it. This appears to be the case despite the election of Dr Zuma as the AU Commission Chair. Below, we offer some insights from our interviewees.

For the state security official, “South Africa has little choice in the matter” [leading on peace and security issues]. As he notes,

> The fact of the matter is South Africa can’t go to a conference thinking that it can just sit behind the flank. It doesn’t work. When you go to a conference, people will ask you to say something when there’s a deadlock, when there isn’t progress on particular issues. They want to meet with you and put issues on the table and whether you want to say yes or no, body language, sitting behind the flank – there are high expectations.

He believes that:

> – what has actually happened in the last 19 years has been the failure of South Africans (especially the people in the media) to appreciate and understand that whether we want to exercise the leadership or not we are in the leadership position. People, if we handle ourselves properly, would be ready and willing to accept our leadership but if we are not going to exercise the space we are occupying with a sense of responsibility then we will have problems that big powers like the US are faced with the rest of the world.

> If you are going to be confrontational, imposing and dictatorial in your approach then you are going to offend people, including people who really have good will towards South Africa. Avoiding rubbing people the wrong way, the way in which we engage with them. But leadership is expected from us and we must provide.

In the view of the state security official, South Africa cannot afford the on-going situation:

> – We have got less representation in the full-time personnel of the African Union; in fact in all the international bodies we remain under-represented.
Defence official C similarly reflected on this state of affairs. In his view – you have an assessed contribution, we pay the largest portion of SADC and AU membership, and therefore we should have the largest representation in that structure. If you fail to take up these positions then you have West Africans, East Africans, North Africans running these things. The problem is that we don’t pro-actively hunt this down...How we operate at the moment is on a re-active basis [responding to advertisements for positions]...and it is a voluntary system. This is where we are failing. There is a strategic gap. South Africa at one stage was the tenth highest UN troop contributor. How many people do we have deployed at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations that shapes the mandate of a peace operation? We have just about nothing at the UNDPKO determining the scope, the frame, the terms of reference, the rules of engagement of that mandate.

In his view, South Africa should be actively deploying people into targeted posts to influence the strategic agenda. It requires leadership, at the political, administrative and technocratic level. For him the issue is even broader, by arguing that it is in South Africa’s national interest to pursue a national security strategy – “where you mesh your foreign policy, your security policy and your defence policy” – and where you deploy your sharpest, brightest people working in our interest (at the AU PSC) and we are not doing it”. He adds, significantly, “you have got to find somebody – let’s take one step back, before we say what to do. You have got to decide, South Africa what is your foreign policy and what’s your national interest?”

Underneath these bleak assessments however, we detect glimmers of hope.

South Africa, it seems, is on a learning curve. Consider, for example, the experience of the state security official who was deployed to the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa [CISSA is an AU-mandated institution of African intelligence services, sharing information and providing support to the AU PSC – author]: “

- it made me grow by leaps and bounds. I was meeting heads of states from across the continent, engaging with ministers, engaging with international organisations so it’s a huge opportunity for growth but also you begin to understand the continent better because biographer people only know Africa from books and stories and anecdotal tales that have been told about the continent and they meet the refugees.

In policy terms, defence official C pointed out that the government was about to adopt a new Defence Review – this document argues that it is in South Africa’s national security interest to shape the strategic agenda of the African peace and security architecture: “It is no longer a nice-to-have; it has to be driven strategically as part of its national interest”. Several interviewees defined the national interest from a domestic, economic and developmental approach. Defence official C for example notes:

- development equals peace and stability therefore it is of strategic importance that we influence, as South Africa and Defence, the strategic agenda of the UN, AU and SADC.
8. Conclusions

There is little doubt that South Africa under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki has played a critical role in the founding of the AU and its nascent peace and security architecture. Foreign policy analyst Chris Landsberg describes Mbeki’s Africanist foreign policy as the country’s ‘golden age’ in international relations, only to be replaced by a compromised president with little appetite for the complexities of foreign policy in contemporary conditions.

Regardless of how one views President Zuma’s foreign policy style, on the formal policy level, the South African government remains committed to what it calls its ‘African agenda’ – a policy template whereby Southern Africa and the rest of the continent enjoys priority of place in the conduct of the country’s international relations. Policy-makers and government leaders regularly voice the ‘Mandela mantra’ – South Africa’s domestic growth and stability is directly linked to the fortunes of the African continent.

One would therefore expect this commitment to be on display at all levels of government’s interaction with Africa – whether bilaterally or multilaterally. Indeed, going a step further, one would expect government to enter into a partnership with civil society and academia regarding the promotion of its ‘African agenda’.

In truth, not enough of this is currently happening. Starting with civil society, there is no structured interaction between it and the defence ministry, and relations with the foreign ministry has ebbed and flowed over the years, whereby a weak policy unit in the department sustains an ad hoc relationship with a small number of NGOs, think tanks and consultants. At the time of writing, little has come of the mooted ‘Council on Foreign Relations’ idea. More disturbing, government has delayed the operationalization of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) – designed to play a critical role in South Africa’s trilateral approach to African affairs. In the same vein, there is little to show for years of preparation of a codified foreign policy.

Reading the South African government’s foreign policy intent, at least as far as Africa is concerned, has become more difficult over time. Few analysts have yet been able to explain, in clear terms, the South African government’s management of the Ivory Coast, Libya or Central African Republic crises (in the latter case it took an ‘embedded journalist’ to write up a first-hand account of the ‘Battle for Bangui’).

This disturbing pattern is evident when listening to interviewees explaining the South African government’s current approach to and role in the AU’s peace and security agenda. As reflected in the text, several (though not all) point to a curious ‘leadership withdrawal’ from engaging the cogs and wheels of the African peace and security architecture decision-making, in particular at the strategic levels: the AU Peace and Security Council and the SADC Organ Troika, and the operational level: the AU Peace Support Operations Division and the SADC Organ Directorate. The biggest lament seems to be that South African leadership is absent from critical decisions relating to African peace and security – that is, the ability to shape or influence the AU and SADC peace and security agenda, and moreover, the inability to provide concrete support for the implementation of decisions. Not all of this might be true, of course, given South Africa’s strong record in pursuing its ‘peace diplomacy’.

Explanations for this ‘hesitant hegemony’ ranges from inexperience (the South African government is only two decades into managing continental affairs, and is up against ‘old hands’ in Addis), to capacity constraints (a lack of properly trained, equipped and experienced government officials at all levels), and policy incoherence (lack of strategic intent). Coupled to this is the reality of an African
peace and security policy environment challenged by ongoing, recurring and emerging crises from across and even beyond the continent.

Although there are few immediate solutions, several suggestions can be made to improve the situation. All of these should assist, enable and enhance the South African government’s crisis management capacity.

Instead of calling volunteers, government must invest in human capacity building. It should develop a system whereby African tours of duty become part of the career development trajectory of appropriate officials. In the case of African peace and security, those associated with government’s diplomatic and security clusters ought to be targeted for exposure. Addis Ababa (seat of the AU) and Gaborone (seat of the SADC Secretariat) could become stop-overs for select officials aspiring to strategic management levels.

Secondly, peace and security-oriented civil society actors and academia (as well as the private sector) have much to offer in terms of hands-on experience, training and educational skills, and research and analysis, and government ought to develop a structured interaction with interested non-state actors. In this way it can build a reliable data base of skills and expertise, and use its partners to develop the analytical capacity of its decision makers. At the same time, the South African government must improve its dismal public diplomacy record – meaning its outreach to the public at home and audiences abroad to explain its choices and decisions.

Finally, perhaps most critically, the South African government appears currently unable to give effect to a comprehensive national security policy framework that ought to guide its choices and behaviour regarding the African and international peace and security terrain. This calls for the coordination and harmonisation of its (draft) foreign policy, (draft) defence policy, and (draft) national security policy frameworks, as well as harmonisation of such an integrated foreign and security policy framework with several domestic policy imperatives. The results could perhaps be released as an additional chapter in government’s ‘uber policy handbook’ namely the National Development Plan.
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Brazil and
African Security

Adriana Erthal Abdenur
and
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1. Introduction

Brazil’s relations with Africa have focused mainly on the economic and political dimensions, but Brazilian stakeholders have also paid increasing attention to African security issues. Both foreign policy, which has sought to deepen ties with Africa, and Brazil’s new national defence strategy, with its renewed focus on the South Atlantic, have made Africa one of the country’s top priorities abroad. Africa is also relevant to the Brazilian government’s broader foreign policy ambitions, including the desire to be recognised as a major global power. In January 2014 the importance of African security to Brazilian foreign policy was underscored by Brazil’s election as chair of the United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission. This report thus asks: how has Brazil’s approach to African peace and security issues changed over the past decade?

We argue that Brazil’s engagement with security in Africa is marked by a tension inherent in its status as a rising power: Brazilian policy elites’ desire to transform the country into a global player and their insistence on respect for national sovereignty. On the one hand, Brazil seeks to become more of a norms setter in international relations, for which a role in African security has become essential. On the other hand, the country’s burgeoning engagement with security issues in Africa is tempered by the emphasis it places on sovereignty and non-intervention, as well as by its own limited capacity to become directly involved in security matters outside its immediate vicinity.

However, Brazil’s involvement with African security issues is still piecemeal and occurring primarily through indirect channels. Its current military presence in Africa is limited to military observers in certain UN peacekeeping missions and to military staff participating in technical cooperation missions. Brazil does not provide troops to missions in Africa except for a small number of military officers, police and experts in DR Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and Guinea-Bissau. Thus, Brazil’s engagement with Africa on peace and security takes place predominantly in multilateral venues – primarily the UN Security Council and in the context of evolving UN peacekeeping operations.

While Brazil’s current security presence in Africa is limited, it is far from insignificant. Our findings illustrate the type of dilemma that a rising power like Brazil, caught between the desire to become a global player and the need to avoid overreach, must navigate in projecting its power trans regionally. For the country’s African partners, Brazil represents a consensus builder in multilateral forums in the security realm, a significant arms exporter and a growing cooperation partner in matters concerning non-traditional threats.

The article is structured in the following manner. First, we provide an overview of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, focusing on Brazil’s relations with Africa. Next, we examine Brazil’s relevance to the African Union and analyse its key security interests as they relate to Africa. Finally, we consider Brazil’s role in, and positions regarding, key African issues, including major security crises. The final part provides a brief case study of Brazil’s engagement with Guinea-Bissau, where the Brazilian government's involvement has grown through bilateral as well as multilateral channels. The conclusion points out some of the implications of this growing engagement, and it notes some directions for future research.
2. Current Brazilian Foreign Policy

2.1 Brazil as a rising power

Brazil is frequently identified in the international relations literature as a rising power—a state that seeks to ascend in the international order; broaden its economic, political and security opportunities; and assume a greater role in the global governance (Kahler, 2013). In the case of Brazil, this ambition is associated openly with a desire to accelerate the transition towards a more multipolar arrangement. Within the realm of security, Brazil’s status as a rising power translates not only into wanting to expand its participation in multilateral efforts, but also participating more directly within the global norms-setting process (Herz, 2011).

Although Brazil’s identity as an emerging or rising power has dates back to at least the mid-20th century, it was only after the country achieved macroeconomic stability, in the 1990s, and experienced economic growth, in the 2000s, that Brazilian foreign policy developed a rising power strategy closely associated with South-South cooperation. In particular, during the administration of Brazil's first Workers Party president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), the government pursued two broad objectives. Domestically, Lula’s administration started out by emphasizing the need to change the country’s political system as well as the need to develop policies that would go beyond mere economic growth and stability, benefitting the poor majority of the population. In terms of foreign policy, during his campaign and at the beginning of his mandate, Lula promised that his government would strengthen Brazil’s presence abroad by promoting a more sovereign and creative foreign policy, including through stronger political ties with states of the Global South. Although the degree to which Lula’s foreign policy constituted a break with the past, and particularly in reference to his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), is the subject of ongoing debate, Lula’s government made South-South cooperation into a new priority, deepening ties with South American and African countries, as well as strategic partners outside the region, including China, Russia, and India (Almeida, 2004). These relations were strengthened both bilaterally and multilaterally, not only through Brazil’s strong activism in UN agencies and the Bretton Woods Institutions, but also via coalitions such as the G20, IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum), and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).

Under Lula, some traditional principles of Brazilian foreign policy were preserved—including those of non-intervention, the emphasis on international law, multilateralism, and restrictions on the use of force—while Brazilian government officials adopted a more assertive language, positioning Brazil as a potential global player. The government also proposed new concepts to guide foreign policymaking; expressions such as “non-indifference” and “diplomatic solidarity” were incorporated into Brazil’s mainstream foreign policy vocabulary alongside its historical stress on respect for national sovereignty.

At the end of 2010, Brazilians elected another Workers Party candidate, Dilma Rousseff, who had been a political prisoner during the country's military dictatorship and who remains a political ally of Lula. The 2010 campaign presidential campaign included a noteworthy moment in Brazilian politics,

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1 Dilma Rousseff served as Brazil’s Energy Minister (2003-2005) and as Chefe da Casa Civil Chief of Staff of Brazil (2003-2010) at the Presidential Palace (Palácio do Planalto), under President Lula da Silva. As Chief of Staff, Rousseff was responsible for overseeing the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC-Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento), started under Lula and continued during her own administration as President of Brazil.
in that certain foreign policy issues-- which rarely appear in presidential campaign debates-- became a hot topic. Opposition candidates criticized the Worker's Party position towards human rights within foreign policy, especially in light of the government's deepening ties to Iran and Cuba\(^2\). They also questioned the heavy emphasis placed by the government on relations with the global South, arguing that these initiatives were sometimes being undertaken without clear commercial and political benefits for Brazil, and that these were sometimes pursued to the detriment of partnerships with the United States and Europe. Finally, the Lula administration was criticized for what some perceived as an “obsession” with securing a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)\(^3\).

Brazil’s contemporary international role should also be considered in light of the constitutional principles-- including those meant to guide foreign policy-- enshrined in the country’s 1988 constitution\(^4\), which was produced after the return to civilian rule (1985). These principles include national independence, the prevalence of human rights, self-determination, non-intervention, equality among states, the defence of peace, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the rejection of any form of racism and terrorism, cooperation for the benefit of humankind, and the concession of political asylum. Two of these concepts are particularly central to understanding Brazil's engagement with international security: the central role accorded to human rights and the idea of cooperation as benefiting all peoples. Some of the principles might sometimes appear to be in contradiction, such as the importance of human rights and the respect for non-intervention. Activists have stressed the importance of the recognition of human rights in the country’s constitution by affirming that the reference to human rights, far from a merely rhetorical device, is a norm that should guide and limit the country’s foreign policy options-- supersed ing other interests, especially because of the constitution’s role as a legally binding document (Asano, Nader & Vieira, 2009, p. 79). As we explain later in this article, these sometimes conflicting principles generate certain foreign policy ambiguities by the Brazilian government that help to explain Brazil’s behaviour regarding key international security issues, including those pertaining to Africa.

Over the past decade, Brazilian government has been working to boost the country's role within the global security architecture. For instance, it has increased its contributions to UN Peacekeeping, and it has led the MINUSTAH mission in Haiti. Brazil has also been proactive in calling for reform of key global governance structures, even as it also hopes to play a bigger role within this architecture. For instance, Brazil has criticized NATO countries for undertaking military interventions outside the established regime norms, and it revived its bid for a UNSC permanent seat within a reformed organization. Under Lula, Brazil also attempted to provide an alternative to the way the international community was dealing with Iran's nuclear program by negotiating the May 2010 Tehran Declaration; when the Council decided to impose further sanctions on Iran, in early June 2010, Brazil (alongside Turkey) voted against the resolution\(^5\). Brazil has also been critical of how the United States and its


\(^3\) Brazil’s desire for a permanent seat in the Council can be traced back to the end of the Second World War and the creation of the UN, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised that Brazil would be one of the permanent members of the Council. Instead of a permanent seat, Brazil was instead granted the right to open the debates at the UN General Assembly. The issue re-emerged in Brazilian foreign policy in the post Cold War period as part of discussions about Council reform. See Garcia, Eugênio Vargas, O sexto membro permanente: O Brasil e a criação da ONU. Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto, 2012. (in Portuguese).

\(^4\) The Brazilian Constitution is available in English, French and Spanish at: www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8755 (accessed on August 1 2012).

allies have used the term "terrorism" to label targets within the War on Terror and to carry out unilateral action. This disagreement has arisen in part due to concerns by Brazil that an excessively broad definition is used to legitimize certain initiatives, including military interventions and espionage, and renders solutions based on dialogue and mediation more difficult.

Even as Brazil calls for governance reform and questions the legitimacy of a multilateral regime that is based on the balance of power of the post-War years, it considers the UN as the foremost arena for the solution of violent conflicts. While Brazil has supported the creation of regional initiatives-- indeed, it participates in several security initiatives in Latin America and the South Atlantic, including the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) -- it insists that these regional efforts must complement rather than detract from or conflict with the UN system.

Brazil has also attempted to influence the debate regarding humanitarian intervention through its November 2011 proposal of the concept of Responsibility while Protecting (RwP). The initiative calls for greater oversight by the Security Council regarding interventions and the use of force on behalf of the Responsibility to Protect (Keating, 2013, p 183). For Brazil, the initiative is meant as a positive step beyond mere criticism of unilateral interventions by NATO countries-- a way to put on the table a new set of parameters to structure multilateral security efforts.

These general positions adopted by the Brazilian government over the past few years can serve as a lens through which to analyse how Brazil has behaved and responded to major security issues in Africa. In some instances, African crises have served as a litmus test for Brazil's positions regarding global security issues, both in terms of its norms-setting efforts and in terms of defining the extent of its own direct participation in security issues outside its own territory.

### 2.2 Brazil-Africa relations

Brazil has had formal diplomatic relations with African states for more than fifty years, prioritizing countries with Portuguese as an official language. Even during the early phases of these relations, the Brazilian government adopted a culturalist discourse that sought to promote solidarity among countries of the Global South, emphasizing notions of familiarity and shared history with African counterparts. Brazil’s foreign policy discourse for Africa has historically stressed the historic connections and shared culture that emerged from the transatlantic slave trade, through which millions of Africans from the Gulf of Guinea all the way down to Angola were forcibly taken to Brazil.

At the same time, Brazil has had economic interests in the region, especially given Africa’s role and potential as a source of raw materials and markets for Brazilian manufactured goods. During the "Brazilian miracle" period of high economic growth, under military rule in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazil depended heavily on oil imports from the Gulf. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar supplied almost 90% of the total value of Brazil’s oil imports. In order to diversify sources, the Brazilian government worked to deepen relations with African oil-producing countries. Thus, from their inception, Brazil-Africa relations have been motivated by economic as well as political considerations.

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Since then, Brazil-Africa relations have been marked by discontinuity, with periods of greater engagement alternating with periods of low activity (Saraiva 2012). After the 1970s, these ties weakened, when the foreign debt crisis and attention to other topics and regions led the Brazilian government to de-emphasize relations with Africa. Namibia is an exception here. Shortly after independence in 1990 Namibia requested Brazilian assistance to build up its navy. Starting in the 1990s, Brazil helped put together the Namibian navy through a series of cooperation programs.

Africa became once again a foreign policy priority for Brazil after the turn of the millennium. The Lula administration made the region one of the top concerns within a broader drive to enhance ties with the Global South. In addition to viewing Africa as a place where Brazil could garner support for its initiatives in multilateral settings such as the UN-- including its campaign for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council-- Lula’s government saw African countries as important for Brazil’s trade and investment strategy. With the onset of the global crisis, in 2008, Brazil’s economic exchanges with the advanced countries declined, and relations with other developing countries became more important than before. While Brazil’s overall trade decreased at first, fiscal and monetary measures helped the economy to remain relatively resilient. Brazil recovered from the initial hit of the crisis, and its trade with Africa also bounced back.

Between 2002 and 2012 trade between Brazil and Africa increased from just over USD 4 billion to nearly USD 27 billion. Although Africa remains a small market, its proportion of Brazilian exports increased from 3.91% to 5.03% in this period. Imports remain heavily dominated by oil and other natural resources and are limited to a small number of African countries, primarily Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa. In 2010, for example, 91% of Brazil’s oil imports came from Nigeria. Brazilian exports to Africa are composed mostly of agricultural products and processed foods, with a heavy focus on Lusophone countries (Angola in particular) and bigger economies (especially Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt). For example, in 2010, Brazil became the largest exporter of agricultural goods to South Africa. Bilateral trade between the two countries expanded from US$ 659 million in 2002 to US$ 2.53 billion in 2008\textsuperscript{8}. Trade with Angola expanded more than 20 times between 2002 and 2008, reaching US$ 1.4 billion\textsuperscript{7}. In addition to these major partners, flows between Brazil and other African countries also increased. For instance, bilateral trade between Brazil and Mauritania grew 400% between 2003 and 2012\textsuperscript{10}.

In terms of Brazilian investments in Africa, in 2009, 50.1% of its investments in international development projects went to the African continent, reaching 57.2% in 2010 (IPEA/World Bank, 2012 p. 43). In addition, according to the Dom Cabral Foundation, Africa is the fifth largest region in terms of Brazilian investments, with figures ranging between USD 10 and 20 billion. Brazil invests primarily in Lusophone countries, as well as in major partners such as Nigeria and South Africa. These investments are dominated by oil, construction, and mining companies\textsuperscript{11}. In addition, there is a recent trend of small to medium Brazilian firms establishing a presence in Africa to provide services and support for the major companies.

\textsuperscript{7} Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio (2013) Estatísticas de comércio exterior (DEPLA).
\textsuperscript{8} “Visita do Ministro Antonio de Aguiar Patriota à África do Sul-Pretória 24 de julho de 2011” 22 de julho de 2011, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 109, 2º semestre de 2011, p 82.
\textsuperscript{9} “Visita do Ministro Antonio de Aguiar Patriota a Angola-Luanda-21 de julho de 2011” 19 de julho de 2011, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n. 109, 2º semestre de 2011, p 81.
\textsuperscript{10} Visita do Ministro de Estado Antonio de Aguiar Patriota à Mauritània-Nouakchott – 25 a 26 de abril de 2012” 26 de abril de 2012, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n 110, 1º semestre de 2012, p 137
\textsuperscript{11} Source: African Development Bank (2011), ‘Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa’, p. 4
The government has launched several programmes to stimulate trade with Africa based on loans and export credits. In 2008, the Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) disbursed 265 million dollars to such efforts. This increased to 360 million in 2009 (IPEA, 2012, p.5). Under President Rousseff, Africa has been included in Brazil’s new commercial promotion strategy, which aims to diversify Brazil’s partners in the continent. In order to strengthen the commercial promotion capacity of its diplomatic representations in Africa, Brazil has decided to send additional diplomatic staff to 12 posts in Africa: Khartoum, Tripoli, Rabat, Cape Town, Dakar, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Lagos, Tunis, Addis Ababa and Dar es Salaam12. The Brazilian government also ramped up its discourse of solidarity, highlighting claims of horizontality and openly contrasting Brazilian cooperation to the aid provided by the former colonial powers. Brazil thus presented itself as a more sincere partner for cooperation development, devoid of the colonial legacies of Northern aid. In practice, ties with Africa were boosted by an active presidential diplomacy by president Lula (Hirst 2012), who made his first visit to the African continent within the first year of his first mandate: in November 2003, just 10 months after taking office, Lula visited São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, stating that strengthening relations with Africa would be a moral, political and historical obligation. The following month, as part of a tour of the Middle East, Lula also visited Egypt and Libya (FUNAG, 2007, 45). Between 2003 and 2010, President Lula made 12 trips to the African continent, visiting a total of 29 African states. Between 2003 and 2010, the Brazilian government received 48 visits by African heads of state and 67 visits by African foreign ministers (IPEA, 2012, p.115). These high-level exchanges helped to diversify and consolidate diplomatic ties across different sectors.

During Lula’s two terms, the Brazilian government opened 17 new embassies on the continent (out of a total of 41 new embassies created by Brazil from 2003 to 2011), including an embassy in São Tomé and Príncipe, the only Lusophone country in Africa that had no permanent Brazilian diplomatic representation. Some of these diplomatic representations had been created prior to the Lula administration but had been closed down for financial reasons13. The decision to reopen these diplomatic representations was an important political gesture, signalling not only a change in direction from the previous administration, but also a firmer commitment to Africa. In exchange, more African states opened up embassies in Brazil during the same period, reflecting the greater importance also accorded to Brazil by its African partners (Carrillo, 2010). Under Rousseff, Brazil opened its 38th embassy in Africa, in Malawi14. For many African nations, Brazil is the only country in South or Latin America in which they have resident diplomatic representation.

Brazil also strengthened its ties to multilateral institutions in Africa. Among the African embassies created under Lula, the representation in Addis Ababa, inaugurated in 2005, has served a particularly important function, being accredited both to Ethiopia and the African Union. Such multilateral ties have also grown through initiatives that bring together North African states, Middle East countries and observers or participants from outside those regions. For instance, in 2003, Brazil also became an observer state within the Arab League15, an organization that includes several member states from

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12 See Daniel Rittner “Governo usará embaixadas em ofensiva comercial” Valor Econômico, November 15, 2011.
13 The embassy in Cameroon was closed in 1999 and reopened in 2005 (Senado Federal, sd, 122). The embassy in Tanzania, opened in 1979 and closed in 1991, was also reopened in 2005 (Senado Federal, 132). The embassy in the DRC (former Zaire) was created in 1972, closed in 1997 and reopened in December 2004 (Senado Federal, 2011a, 214)
15 India is the only other BRICS nation to be an observer state.
Africa, and in 2005, Brazil hosted the First Arab States-South America Summit in Brasilia. The Summit included 22 Arab nations, including nine from Africa (Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia). In November 2006, Nigeria hosted the Africa-South America Summit, an initiative inspired by the Brazil-Africa Forum of 2003 and Lula’s visit to Nigeria in April 2005 (Puerari, 2012, p. 94). Brazil has also joined trans-regional initiatives such as IBSA (whose defence component is detailed later on in this paper), the G-20, and BRICS, all of which bring together Brazil and South Africa within broader coalition platforms.

These economic, cultural, and political ties are further strengthened through a rapidly expanding development cooperation program. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação- ABC), a division of the Ministry of External Relations, coordinates the country’s technical cooperation program. Although such initiatives are not a novelty-- Brazil has been offering South-South cooperation to Africa since the 1970s-- these programs have vastly expanded over the past decade, with Africa accounting for half of ABC’s cooperation program. With regards to overall cooperation—including not just ABC projects but also those outside of its scope—22.6% of Brazil’s official development cooperation expenditures in 2010 went to Africa, around 64.68 million reais (approximately USD 30 million) (IPEA 2013).

Cooperation has been particularly strong in agriculture, public health, and capacity-building, though it reaches beyond those fields, including education, public administration, and security. Official cooperation programs have followed the geographic and thematic priorities established by Brazilian foreign policy, and they are implemented by a variety of agencies that range from public institutions such as Fiocruz and Embrapa, to private contractors such as SENAC. In general, Brazil has sought to promote abroad those public policies that it claims as successful at home, including redistributive schemes such as the Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer program.

The geographic range of Brazil’s bilateral cooperation in Africa is quite extensive-- in 2010, Brazil provided official technical cooperation to 48 African countries (IPEA 2013). However, Brazil’s contributions are also channeled through multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, UN agencies, and the African Development Bank. Through the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), for instance, Brazil has a broad range of cooperation programs ranging from sports to electronic voting. Under Rousseff, the Brazilian government has indicated that it may align its development cooperation efforts more closely with its economic interests. During her 2013 trip to Addis Ababa, Rousseff announced plans to restructure ABC so as to decouple it from the Ministry of External Relations and make the agency more trade-oriented. As of this writing the fate of the agency has not yet been decided.

Broadly put, Brazil’s cooperation also serves to project Brazilian influence and to pave the way for trade and investment opportunities, as well as to garner support within multilateral forums. During President Rousseff’s visit to the African Union, Brazil also announced that it would cancel around US$900 million in African debt. The initiative covers 12 African countries: Côte D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Zambia and the Republic of the Congo (the country with the

16 Lisandra Paraguassu "Dilma quer agência de comércio para fortalecer balança" Estado de São Paulo, 15 de junho de 2013. Available at: www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,dilma-quer-agencia-de-comercio-para-fortalecer-balanca-,1042690,0.htm [Dilma wants trade agency to strengthen balance]

highest debt, a total of US$ 350 million). Rousseff presented this initiative as being a mutually beneficial arrangement, since Brazil cannot establish further investment, credit, and loan agreements with countries that have not serviced their debt to Brazil\(^{18}\). In the case of Senegal, for example, a country with a US$3 million debt, Brazil was able to sell military aircraft and boats with US$120 million in export credits from the BNDES (Fleck, 2013).

Debt renegotiation has been criticized from a human rights perspective because many of the countries are described as authoritarian and as human rights violators. Members of the opposition in the Brazilian Congress have asked for additional information in order to decide on the approval or rejection of future renegotiations requested by the Brazilian government. As of October 2013, the Brazilian Congress still had the cases of Tanzania, Zambia, and Côte D’Ivoire to decide upon (Fleck, 2013).

Brazil has also cooperated with African countries via the IBSA Fund, a program jointly funded by Brazil, South Africa, and India. This UNDP-managed fund is small, but has financed a number of projects in different African countries, including HIV/AIDS programs in Burundi, delivering safe drinking water, and refurbishing health infrastructure in Cape Verde, human development and poverty reduction in Sierra Leone, as well as rural electrification and agricultural development projects in Guinea-Bissau (UNDP, 2012). However, Brazil has far more extensive trilateral cooperation projects with traditional Western donors in Africa, as well as the Pro-Savana project in Mozambique, a collaboration with Japan's JICA. According to ABC, in 2010 its trilateral projects in Africa included partnerships with France, the US, Italy, Canada, and the UN.

Brazil often contrasts its cooperation program in Africa with aid provided by traditional Western donors and former colonial powers, for instance by stressing mutual benefit, solidarity, non-conditionality, and horizontality. For example, in her 2013 trip to Addis Ababa, President Rousseff argued that Brazil aimed at "non-oppressive" cooperation with Ethiopia – ties that would be "based on mutual advantages and shared values"\(^{19}\). Although such claims are sometimes disputed-- some scholars argue that Brazilian cooperation entails asymmetries of its own, and question whether Brazilian cooperation truly diverges from Northern aid (Mawdsley, 2012) -- this discourse has played a key role in Brazil's efforts to present itself as a desirable alternative to OECD donors.

Finally, the Brazilian government has made efforts to stimulate knowledge production about Africa in Brazil. A 2003 law made African history a mandatory part of the curriculum in Brazilian schools, and in 2010, Brazil created a university in the Northeast to promote integration between Brazilian and African students, especially from Lusophone countries\(^{20}\). The PEC-G academic exchange program has brought hundreds of African students to study at Brazilian universities, increasing the African presence on campuses around the country.

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\(^{20}\) Universidade de Integração da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira (UNILAB): www.unilab.edu.br/
2.3 Brazil and the African Union

The growing ties between Brazil and the African Union are an important dimension in Brazil’s Africa policy. Brazil has for a long time expressed political support for AU’s NEPAD programme (New Partnership for Africa Development), and the aim of reducing African dependency. Brazil has observer status within the AU, but relations began to intensify in 2005, with Brazil reopening its embassy in Addis Ababa. Since then, high level meetings have helped to cement ties. In February 2007, the President of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, visited Brazil and met with Brazilian authorities. A framework agreement for technical cooperation was signed during the visit.\(^{21}\)

In November 2007, the Brazilian Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs visited the AU and discussed with AU officials issues of common interest, such as the reform of the UNSC and South-South cooperation in health and agriculture. In November 2008, the head of the AU mission in Washington DC travelled to Brazil, where he expressed the organization's intention to establish an office in Brasilia (as of this writing, the office has not yet opened). Another important milestone in Brazil-AU relations took place in 2009, when President Lula attended the XIII African Union Summit of Heads of State and Government at Sirte, Libya, as the guest of honour. During the Summit, additional cooperation agreements were signed concerning technical cooperation in agriculture, social development and health (Senado Federal, 2011a, p.392).

In a 2011 speech during Africa Day celebrations, former Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota stated that Brazil valued Africa's capacity to provide creative solutions to regional questions and called the AU Peace and Security Council an inspiration for South American integration. Reflecting Brazil’s stance that regional security organizations should complement rather than contradict the UN, Patriota also stated that Brazil believed in the AU’s potential for cooperating with the UN in order to achieve growing responsibilities.\(^{22}\) In a September 2011 debate on preventive diplomacy at the UN Security Council, Patriota asked the Council to consider regional organizations as one of the instruments to peacefully resolve differences. He also asked the Council to take note of the statement by South African President Jacob Zuma that the AU had been side-lined when the Libya crisis had been brought to the attention of the Council.\(^{23}\)

Other efforts were undertaken in connection with the Rio+20 meeting. In 2012, a Brazilian delegation participated in the African Preparatory Conference for the Rio+20 meeting, which brought together AU, UN, and other multilateral initiatives. The diplomat heading the Brazilian delegation called for institutional reform of the UN Economic and Social Council to better meet the goals of sustainable development, and stating that Brazil was "willing to be an example and to continue to be a partner of Africa."\(^{24}\) This discourse drawing parallels between Brazil and Africa has continued under the administration of Dilma Rousseff, the Brazilian government has also reiterated its support for AU's regional security initiatives. During a 2012 speech, Patriota compared Brazil's efforts in South America with the AU’s initiatives in Africa:

\(^{21}\)A full copy of the agrément can be found in Portuguese at: www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Decreto/D6762.htm
Last accessed on October 18, 2013


\(^{23}\)Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n.109, 2º semestre de 2011, p 42.

\(^{24}\)MRE (n.d.) "Statement by the Head of the Observer Delegation of Brazil at the African Regional Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)."
"[...] as a country that is deeply involved in an integration effort in its own region, Brazil looks with respect and draws inspiration from what the African Union has accomplished on the eve of its 50th Anniversary on the institutional front."

Although Rousseff’s presidential diplomacy has not been as active as that of Lula, in May 2013, she visited Addis Ababa to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the AU’s founding. She was accompanied by a delegation of ministers including those from External Relations, Development, Industry and Trade, Education, and the Secretariat for Policies Promoting Racial Equality, as well as private sector firms—an indication of the diversity of actors interested and involved in issues related to the AU. Brazil was the only Latin American country to send a high-level delegation to the meeting. These gestures have served to give continuity to the efforts to cement ties with the AU and, more broadly, Africa in general.

3. Brazil and security in Africa

3.1 Bilateral security issues

Brazil’s expanding ties with Africa have also generated new security interests and concerns. For example, due to the growing the number of Brazilian organizations and companies active in Africa, the number of Brazilians residing in the continent has also increased. According to a ranking of major Brazilian multinational companies, over 30% of the top 64 Brazilian multinationals maintain a plant or office in the African continent, operating in areas such as oil, mining, construction, and agriculture. In addition to large multinational companies, there are a growing number of small and medium companies operated by Brazilian citizens that provide services to the large Brazilian companies, mainly in the Portuguese speaking countries. There are also Brazilian food companies (supermarkets, restaurants and clothing stores operating in some African countries.

While helping to cement ties with Brazil, these communities also generate concern for the Brazilian government, especially in contexts of political and social instability. According to 2012 figures from the Foreign Ministry, Brazilians in Africa are heavily concentrated in three countries (10,649 in Angola, 2,250 in Mozambique, and 914 in South Africa). These numbers are bound to increase as Brazilian companies and other entities expand their African operations, including beyond those three countries. Concern for the safety of Brazilians in Africa increased during the February 2011 military intervention in Libya, when Brazilian government officials in Tripoli and nearby European capitals had to arrange for the evacuation of 900 employees from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht, the Brazilian state oil company Petrobrás, and the construction company Andrade Gutierrez. This was the first time that the Brazilian Foreign Ministry had to use its Integrated Consular System-- implemented in 2012 to digitize and consolidate information about Brazilian citizens living

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27 “Parcerias com grandes empresas pode ajudar” Estado de São Paulo, 6 de agosto de 2013.
abroad so as to expedite the issuing of passports and evacuations during crises (FUNAG, 2012, pp 94-95).

In addition, Africa has become a relevant tourist destination for Brazilians. Between 2011 and 2012, there was a 44% increase in the number of Brazilian tourists visiting South Africa. Direct flights connect São Paulo and Johannesburg, and there is a new air route between Rio de Janeiro/São Paulo and Addis Ababa, operated by Ethiopian Airways, with a stopover in Lomé. A request for direct connection between Recife (located in Brazil's Northeast) and Nigeria, operated by Brazilian airline Gol, is also under consideration by Brazilian authorities. These links may help to boost direct commercial and tourist links between Brazil and Africa, also increasing the number of Brazilians exposed to risks abroad.

Brazil's interest in increasing security and defence cooperation with Africa has also fuelled greater interaction between Brazil's Foreign Ministry and its Defence Ministry. As of 2009, the Foreign Ministry financially supported prospecting missions by the Defence Ministry in Africa. These included a technical mission to scope out sites for the future Brazilian Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau, an Air Force and civil aviation technical mission to São Tomé e Príncipe, and a mission to discuss cooperation concerning peace support operations in Mozambique.

Security-wise, under Lula, Brazil also expanded its network of police attachés around the world, focusing on South America and Europe but also including a Federal Police representation in South Africa, established in 2010 to help combat international crime. The Brazilian government has intended to make this attaché representation a gateway for communicating with the police forces of other African countries. An official list of topics of interest includes international drug trafficking, money laundering, chemical products control, marijuana eradication, cybercrime, environmental crime, corruption and white-collar crime, illegal immigration and border control, human rights, and slave labour. The official work plan for 2010-2011 established that Mozambique and Botswana would be top priorities, with Tanzania, Nigeria, and Angola as second priorities, and finally Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Congo, Zambia, and Swaziland as third-tier priorities for the period. In addition to fostering collaboration between police forces in Brazil and South Africa, the attaché office in Pretoria is also meant to help enhance multilateral police cooperation through mechanisms such as IBSA and BRICS. Aside from the deployment of police officers to peacekeeping missions such as in South Sudan, Brazil’s most important police engagement in Africa may be its participation in the creation of Guinea-Bissau's police academy (detailed later on in this article).

In addition, Brazil might also be worried by transnational security problems affecting both Brazil and Africa. Although growing cooperation with Nigeria has boosted trade and investment relations, it has also strengthened international crime. Nigerian criminal networks have been operating in Brazil, mainly in São Paulo, since the early 2000s, purchasing cocaine from Bolivia and Peru and shipping the drug to European destinations, either via São Paulo or Salvador, in the Brazilian Northeast. Africa-based criminal networks have also been reported as operating illegal mobile phone services in São

32 www.istoe.com.br/reportagens/1369_POR-DENTRO-DA-CONE+AXO+NIGERIA
Paulo. As of 2010, Nigerians constitute the third largest group of foreigners in Brazilian prisons, only behind Bolivians and Paraguayans.

An additional Brazilian contribution to African security is provision of military training. In 2010, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and the Defence Ministry signed an agreement to improve the Brazil’s military cooperation, including the possibility of the ABC providing additional resources to foreign military officers to come to Brazil for training. The agreement reflects an interest on the part of the Brazilian government to increase the presence of foreign military officers, especially from Africa and South America, in Brazil. Between 2000 and 2010, Brazil trained 118 African military officers in the Brazilian Army and 696 officers in the Brazilian Navy, in the same period, a total of eight Brazilian officers were trained in African armies and 20 in African navies (Antunes, 2010).

Brazil is also an important destination for refugees from African nations, of the 4401 refugees in the country, 2824 come from African nations (a total of 64% of all refugees in Brazil), with 1686 coming from Angola (38% of all refugees in the country), 453 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (10%), and 258 from Liberia (6%). However, settlement and integration in Brazil have been complicated. With the recent end to the civil war in Angola and the economic reconstruction of the country, there might be a potential for these refugees to return to their country of origin.

3.2 Brazil’s Role in peacekeeping and peace building in Africa

Brazil views contributions to UN peacekeeping missions as an important mean to promote global security. The country’s participation in such missions began with UN missions in the Middle East in 1957 and the contribution of troops to UNEF I in the Sinai and Gaza Strip (a total of 6,300 men over a ten-year period). Brazilian generals served as force commanders between January and August 1964 and January 1965 and January 1966. Brazil’s contribution to that mission ended in June 1967. Between July 1960 and June 1964, Brazil contributed with crew and staff to operate airplanes and helicopters serving the UN mission in the Congo (Fontoura, 2005, p 214).

From 1967 to 1988, Brazil's military government distanced itself from the UN. From January 1989 to May 1991, it contributed 16 military observers to the United Nations Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM I). Between May 1991 and February 1995, Brazil contributed 77 military observers and 39 policemen, as well as medical staff, to UNAVEM II. Between January 1993 and December 1994, Brazil contributed 218 military observers and 66 policemen to UNMOZ (Mozambique), including the force commander. Observers were also sent to UN missions in Rwanda (1993-1994) and Liberia (1993). In addition, between August 1995 and July 1997, Brazil contributed a total of 4178 troops and 48 police officers to UNAVEM III. Between 1997 and 1999, Brazil deployed 35 observers and 39 policemen to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). Thus, while Brazil’s contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa concentrated in Portuguese-language countries, they also extended to crises elsewhere.

33 Marco de Castro “Nigerianos operam máfia do celular ilegal em SP” Folha de São Paulo
34 Eduardo Machado “Máfia nigeriana é uma das mais atuantes no país” UOL October 14, 2011. Available online at: ne10.uol.com.br/canal/cotidiano/grande-recife/noticia/2011/10/14/mafia-nigeriana-e-uma-das-mais-atuantes-no-pais-303535.php [Nigerian mafia is one of the most active in the country]
Between March 2003 and April 2004 Brazil contributed with liaison officers to the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI). In July 2003, Brazil contributed two transport aircrafts for the UN Multilateral Emergency Force in Bunia (DRC) (FUNAG, 2007, 32). Between April and the end of 2007, Brazil contributed with military officers and chiefs of staff for the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Between 2005 and 2007, Brazil sent a total of 69 military officers and policemen to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). In 2007, a Brazilian Colonel served as Military Advisor at the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) (Fontoura, 2009). In May 2013, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed Brazilian General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, a previous Force Commander of MINUSTAH, as Force Commander of MONUSCO.

As of July 2013, Brazil was involved in the following UN missions in Africa: MINURSO (10 experts on mission), UNISFA (2 experts on mission, 2 contingent troops), UNMIL (2 experts on mission, 2 contingent troops), UNMISS (6 police officers, 5 experts on mission and 3 contingent troops, and UNOCI (4 experts on mission, 3 contingent troops).

In addition, some Brazilian civil society entities have collaborated with African counterparts on peacebuilding measures. For instance, the Rio-based NGO Viva Rio has been cooperating with the Government of Mozambique, with support from UNDP, since 2006 in order to help Mozambican authorities develop the country’s national firearms registry, based on the NGO’s prior experience with disarmament efforts undertaken in Brazil. In late 2009, representatives from Viva Rio and the Rio de Janeiro Police Force visited Mozambique to map out the technical, human, and logistical requirements for designing and implementing a national firearms register. In March 2010, the Brazilian team took a second trip to Maputo for a three-week visit to collaborate with Mozambican judicial and police authorities in mapping management processes and licensing procedures. At the time of writing, Viva Rio is analysing the data and designing the database, as well as estimating the financing needed for the physical installation of the database, at both provincial and national levels.

In recent years, the Brazilian Foreign Minister has begun addressing the political and diplomatic implications of arms exports, denying export licenses when the situation in a particular country may pose a threat to Brazilian foreign policy interests. In addition, civil society organizations have increased their monitoring of arms exports, especially cluster ammunition, which Brazil continues to produce, export and stockpile. There is evidence of cluster bombs exports to Zimbabwe between January 2001 and May 2002, but no additional updated information is available.

Brazil signed the Arms Trade Treaty in June 2013, which regulates the international trade in conventional weapons, but the treaty has not yet entered into force.

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Despite its deepening relations with the African Union, Brazil has limited direct engagement with the AU Peace and Security Council and other AU institutions and projects of the African Security and Peace Architecture (APSA). However, the Brazilian government has shown growing interest in the subject of African peace and security. This is reflected, for instance, in the topics selected by the Ministry for the diplomatic corps theses in the past few years, which have included the theme of Brazil's relevance to the African peace and security architecture (see, for instance, Cardoso, 2011; Santos, 2011). Another sign of the Brazilian government's growing interest in the AU's role in African security was the participation, in February 2013, of representatives of the Defence Division of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos- SAE), which is part of the President's Office, in a seminar on AU-NATO relations that was jointly organized by the University of Brasilia and the NATO Defence College\textsuperscript{41}. These examples show that Brazil's engagement with the African peace and security agenda is still very limited.

It is worth noting that some Brazilian non-state entities (including some that are legally autonomous but that maintain close ties with the government) have begun establishing direct ties with the AU. For instance, in June 2013, the former president's São Paulo-based Lula Institute partnered with the AU and with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to organize a seminar on cooperation in eradication hunger in Africa\textsuperscript{42}. These initiatives are important also considering the growing importance of food security and link between hunger and conflict.

Much of the debate within AU on a standby force and peacekeeping is de facto derived from developments within the UN (multi-dimensional peacekeeping, the role of police and civilians in peacekeeping, protection of civilians, sovereignty/intervention, etc.). Brazil does not seem to engage directly with AU on these issues, but perhaps more indirectly in New York through debates and policy development with Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding Commission, and above all, the Security Council, where African security issues dominate the agenda. In Somalia, Brazil has praised the contribution of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and requested the Security Council to continue supporting regional and sub-regional efforts to bring peace to that country, as well as addressing the need for an integrated UN presence in the country. In addition, in 2010 Brazil asked the international community to contribute with funding for AMISOM and the Somali transitional government, arguing that funding was essential for the success of the security initiatives\textsuperscript{43}. While Brazil has recognized the importance of peacekeeping missions, as in the case of the DR Congo, it has stressed that the military component of the UN Mission must be part of a broad political strategy leading to dialogue and peace\textsuperscript{44}.

When addressing UN-AU cooperation, Brazilian diplomats have stated that this cooperation should focus not only on peace, but also include sustainable development, incorporating a peacebuilding dimension to peacekeeping. This argument is based on the idea that the promotion of security has to be accompanied by the consolidation of national institutions and the conditions for sustainable development. Brazil has also argued that the UN should discuss funding for African Union missions, not only within the Security Council but also through the General Assembly and the Special

\textsuperscript{41} Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos "Seminário discute relações entre União Africana e OTAN" February 21, 2013. Available at: www.sae.gov.br/site/?p=14935 Last accessed on August 20, 2013.


\textsuperscript{44} Statement by H. E. Ambassador Regina Maria Cordeiro Dunlop, Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 19 August 2013
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.\(^{45}\) Brazil has also supported the creation of the UN Office liaison office to the African Union, characterizing it as an important step towards promoting strategic cooperation between the two entities, including related on African Union peacekeeping. Finally, Brazil has acknowledged the need for the UN to incorporate the AU in its peacekeeping-related policy work by exchanging knowledge and lessons learned between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the AU\(^ {46}\). These examples show that the Brazilian government has taken a keen interest in and a stance on, the AU’s relations with the UN.

### 3.3 Brazil's South Atlantic strategy and military cooperation with Africa

Brazil's new security strategy places more emphasis than before on ties with Africa. This is due primarily to the interest in enhancing Brazil's role in the South Atlantic. This is reflected in key defence policy documents such as the National Security Strategy (2008) and the Defence White Paper (2011). These documents essentially elevate the South Atlantic to the same level of defence priority that Brazil has historically accorded the Amazon, stressing that Brazilian economic interests in this maritime space are growing. Not only does roughly 95% of Brazil's foreign trade transit through the South Atlantic, but it is also where some of Brazil's vital minerals resources are located—particularly its offshore and pre-salt oil deposits. This area is now referred to as the “Blue Amazon” by the Brazilian government. This renewed attention to the sea has yielded not only a proposal to expand Brazil's maritime borders through the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, but also efforts to upgrade its navy, including through vessel acquisitions and the development (in cooperation with France) of a nuclear-propelled attack submarine (Abdenur and Souza Neto, 2013).

These initiatives are relevant to security in Africa not only because many African countries are located on the South Atlantic, but also because current Brazilian defence doctrine explicitly addresses cooperation with Africa as necessary for ensuring Brazil's interests in the South Atlantic. As a result, Brazil has embarked on a campaign to strengthen bilateral military cooperation ties with the African coastal states of the South Atlantic. Expanding cooperation in this area covers, among other things, training programmes for officers and cadets, the provision of military vessels and equipment, and capacity building. These initiatives are, moreover, frequently accompanied by efforts to boost Brazil's defence industry exports to African states, with Brazilian companies viewing Africa as a promising market to expand sales of equipment and small arms. Brazil was among the world's top ten arms exporters during the 1980s, and revitalizing the industry has become one of the top priorities for the government\(^ {47}\). These companies receive state support, including through tax reliefs, because the development of a strong defence industry, with the broader goal of attaining greater military technological autonomy, is another priority laid out in the 2008 National Defence Strategy.

Brazil's defence cooperation efforts encompass both large and small countries along the South Atlantic. With South Africa, for instance, Brazil has a wide variety of initiatives, including the joint development of an infra-red guided short range air-to-air missile, the A-DARTER. The two countries

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\(^{47}\) FIESP “Indústria de defesa brasileira precisa aumentar exportações, afirma director” April 5, 2013. Available online at: http://www.fiesp.com.br/noticias/industria-de-defesa-brasileira-precisa-aumentar-exportacoes-affirma-director-da-abimde/ [Brazilian defence industry needs to increase exports, says director]
have discussed collaboration on drone development, as well as an oceanographic satellite with an exclusive focus on the South Atlantic. Brazil's ties with Angola and Nigeria have also grown, including through arms sales. As for smaller countries in the area, Brazil has been helping many to carry out their own continental shelf surveys, in preparation for their own proposals for maritime expansion in the South Atlantic.

On the multilateral side, Brazil has stepped up efforts to revive ZOPACAS, as part of its broader effort to construct a South Atlantic identity. The organization dates back to 1986, when it was first launched (at Brazil's initiative) in order to address the common concern of the region's coastal countries with nuclear proliferation. In the post-cold war context, the focus has been on jointly taking responsibility regarding the problems in the common maritime area so as to avoid interventions by outside powers. The ZOPACAS meeting held in Montevideo in January 2013, which included the presence of defence ministers, placed a strong emphasis on sharing Brazil's knowledge in search and rescue operations, maritime surveillance, and continental shelf surveys (a separate statement mentioning the situations of instability in Guinea Bissau and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was also issued during the meeting).

Aside from ZOPACAS, Brazil is part of other multilateral initiatives relevant to the South Atlantic, including the South America-Africa Summit and IBSA. An important recurring naval exercise is the ATLASUR series of simulations, which have been held every two years (off the coast of South America as well as South Africa) since 1993 by the navies of Argentina and South Africa, and which Brazil started joining in 1995 (Uruguay joined the same year). The exercises are meant to consolidate the presence of these countries in the South Atlantic and to strengthen the defence ties between both sides of this maritime space.

Through the IBSA Forum, which brings together India, Brazil, and South Africa, Brazil has been participating in the IBSAMAR trilateral naval military exercises, held since 2008 off the coast of South Africa. Although the trilateral grouping’s broader initiatives focus on economic, development, and political issues, Brazil's multilateral engagement with Africa sometimes touches on security issues as well. IBSA has set an ambitious defence cooperation agenda following the 2003 establishment of the Defence Working Group, although concrete initiatives thus far are limited to personnel exchanges and the trilateral naval IBSAMAR exercises.

IBSAMAR I was held in 2008 in South Africa's south-western coast, near the Cape of Good Hope, and it brought together two Brazilian, four South African and two Indian naval ships. Through the exercise, which focused on human security challenges such as safety of shipping, search and rescue, and casualty evacuation, the three naval forces collaborated on, and exchanged knowledge and practices related to, surface, anti-submarine, and anti-air operations. IBSAMAR II took place in September 2010, again off the coast of South Africa, with India taking the lead. In comparison to IBSAMAR I, this was a more complex undertaking, encompassing anti-air, anti-submarine and visit-board-search-seize operations, along with other naval warfare manoeuvres such as mid-sea fuelling. Brazil led IBSAMAR III, which took place in October 2012 in the international waters off the South African navy’s main naval base at Simon's Town. This exercise included a disaster exercise simulating a military incursion into a small coastal community. The exercise required the involvement of security personnel, firefighters, and medical teams from the three countries. The disaster exercise was followed by a combined special forces hostage-release demonstration and included anti-piracy operations, combating asymmetric threats with fast inshore attack craft, air attack, disaster relief, and

For further information see: thebricspost.com/brazil-sa-to-jointly-develop-satellite-for-south-atlantic/#.UhLH59L2_ZV
Date of last access: August 16, 2013.
humanitarian aid. Analysts believe that, given these three countries' common interest, the naval cooperation component of IBSA is likely to grow. IBSAMAR IV is scheduled to be held in 2014, also off the coast of South Africa, in an effort to further enhance operational compatibility among the three navies.

In addition to these exercises, there are efforts underway to expand IBSA trilateral defence cooperation through the Joint Defence Group, which resulted from the 2010 IBSA Memorandum of Understanding on Trilateral Cooperation in Science, Technology and Innovation. In November 2012 a delegation from Brazil joined its counterpart from India in a week-long "study tour" of South Africa's defence industry to explore possibilities for defence cooperation in the fields of military science, technology and in the defence industries. The delegations, which included high-ranking military officials, participated in industry panel discussions and visited facilities in Gauteng and the Western Cape. In addition to exploring trilateral defence ideas, the delegations had as a secondary objective the identification of opportunities for enhancing bilateral defence cooperation.

Within the CPLP, Brazil has also supported defence cooperation, participating in and hosting joint military exercises and working to strengthen state institutions in Guinea-Bissau. Brazil has also used CPLP to promote the idea that the South Atlantic needs stronger maritime security. Although the BRICS grouping does not yet have a concrete cooperation program in the area of defence and security, there are security discussions underway that might hold relevance to the South Atlantic. For example, in a January 2013 meeting of high-level security representatives from the BRICS, discussions covered terrorism, piracy, and cybersecurity. All of these efforts may signal the growing geostrategic importance of the South Atlantic within regional, trans-regional, and other multilateral platforms.

The Brazilian government has also been expressing concern that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea might affect Brazilian interests and spread into other parts of the South Atlantic. The Brazilian navy has sent observers to the US-led Obangame Express, which brings together mostly African and European countries in carrying out anti-piracy joint exercises in the Gulf of Guinea (planning is underway for the 2014 exercise, slated to be held in Ghana, and Brazil has also been part of the planning conference). Likewise, given the recent growth in trans-Atlantic smuggling of drugs, Brazil is interested in collaborating with African countries to stem the flow of illicit goods. As for violent acts by specific groups, in keeping with its broader stance, Brazil has been more cautious than the US in


51 DefenceWeb “IBSA Joint Defence Group studying SA defence industry”: webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:1ls002j6po01ww.defenceweb.co.za/index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_con tent%26task%3Dview%26id%2828503%28Itemid%283116%28&cd=2&h=ex&ct=clnk&client=firefox-a


54 In October 2012, the International Maritime Bureau published a report noting an increase in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region, especially the area between Nigeria and Togo, while at the same time there is a reduction in piracy acts in the horn of Africa (70 attacks in 2012 as compared to 199 in 2011). The report identified the Nigerian coast as the one with the highest incidence of attacks. Source: “Aumento da pirataria no golfo da Guiné” Africa21, n 69, November 2012.

55 Interview with Brazilian Defense Minister, Celso Amorim, Brasilia, August 6th 2013.

56 Marinha do Brasil (n. d.) "Marinha do Brasil participa do exercício Obangame Express na Nigéria".Brasilia, DF.
applying the term terrorism to specific groups. Instead, the Ministry of External Relations has often emphasized the need to understand the socioeconomic deprivations and structural instabilities that help fuel such movements. At the UN level, Brazil has supported resolution 2039 (2012) that recognized the importance of building national, regional and extra-regional capacity to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. It has also suggested that international efforts should be taken supporting the objectives of the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and that States within the region should take the lead in coordinating efforts to address piracy and armed robbery at sea. Brazil has also stated that piracy in the region is the result of problems found ashore related to economic hardship and lack of opportunities, especially among young people.

Brazil’s engagement with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also included security dialogues. For example, in 2010, a Brazil-ECOWAS Summit was organized in Cape Verde. At the meeting, Brazil discussed with West African nations the possibility of strengthening cooperation in several sectors, including security issues. A declaration issued at the end of the Summit mentions that these initiatives were being undertaken “to strengthen the political, social and economic institutions and the process of peace and stability-building, particularly in post-conflict countries.” There has been an increase in the number of defence cooperation agreements with ECOWAS members since 2011. These include Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal and São Tomé and Príncipe.

3.4 Brazil at the UN: positions on African security

Brazil had a broader involvement in African security issues during its terms as a member of the UN Security Council in 2004-05 and 2010-11. According to Brazilian diplomats, during discussions of African issues Brazil emphasised the role of regional actors and the sovereignty of African countries, stressing the need to address the social and economic problems faced by these countries.

When the country was elected for the 2004-05 term, Brazil’s UN representative stated that the country would prioritise African issues, especially those related to Guinea-Bissau. Brazil also supported the peace negotiations in Sudan and the creation of the UN Mission in Sudan. As for the crisis in Darfur, Brazilian diplomats expressed concern due to the urgency of the humanitarian emergency in the region, but stated that any action on the part of the international community should respect the absolute sovereignty of Sudan. In the same period Brazil also recommended that discussions related to instability and conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa should address development issues (Viegas, 2008, 33-34).

This last position reflects Brazil’s insistence upon the importance of addressing the underlying causes of violence by promoting social justice and fighting inequality in order to prevent the recurrence of violence.

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60 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação “Pesquisa de Projetos” www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/pesquisa
61 "Brasil dará prioridade à África no Conselho de Segurança" UOL Noticias, January 6, 2004 noticias.uol.com.br/inter/afp/2004/01/06/ult34a84148.jhtm Last accessed on October 18, 2013
Prior to serving on the Security Council, Brazil supported UN initiatives to address the 2003 crisis in Liberia, encouraging the parties involved to implement an immediate cease-fire. Brazil also supported mediation efforts by regional organisations such as ECOWAS. In August 2003, the Brazilian government, recognizing the serious humanitarian consequences of the conflict, supported UN Security Council resolution 1497 and encouraged all parties involved in the conflict to respect the cease-fire and allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (Barreto, 2012). Regarding the situation in Western Sahara, Brazil has supported UN Security Council efforts to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict and has asked both parties to build trust and to negotiate peacefully (FUNAG 2008). These positions are consistent with the Brazilian government's prioritization of humanitarian assistance and in keeping with its emphasis on respect for sovereignty.

In 2010, Brazil acknowledged the importance of the UN mission in DR Congo in protecting and guaranteeing the security of civilians in the Congolese conflict in light of serious violations of human rights, including sexual violence carried out in July and August of that year. In November 2010, during a visit by the Foreign Minister Amorim to the DR Congo, the Brazilian government donated USD 1 million to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to expand the program to protect victims of sexual violence (Barreto, 2012). The donation reflects Brazil’s recognition of the social impact of violence in society and the need to address social justice and strengthen state institutions, so that they call fulfill their human rights obligations. The donation also gave Brazil the opportunity to contribute to an initiative of high visibility, while working through a multilateral channel.

In March 2005, when Brazil was chairing the Security Council, the Council issued a statement supporting the work of the UN in Somalia and the efforts by the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In October 2009, the Brazilian government expressed concern with the increase in violence in the country, condemning the parties involved for not respecting the federal transitional government and for not participating in the negotiations. In response to violent episodes in Mogadishu in October 2011 Brazil expressed solidarity with the Somali people and its support for the political process in the country, condemning all forms of terrorism.

While Brazil is not directly contributing with ships and personnel to international efforts to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia it has supported UN efforts, including resolution 1918 (2010) and the establishment of a regional centre to prosecute suspected pirates in the Seychelles. However, Brazilian diplomats have stated that the solution to the piracy problem off the coast of Somalia can only be solved by addressing the root causes in the country. Such a strategy would include combining security and development measures so as to create the conditions for long-term development.

In addition, Brazil has been providing humanitarian assistance, especially food, to the Somali population by way of the World Food Program. In late July 2011, Brazil donated 38,000 tons of food for Somalia through the World Food Program, as well as 15,000 tons for refugees in camps in Ethiopia. In August 2013, Brazil donated USD 300,000 for a project run by the UN Population Fund

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65 “Doação de alimentos para países na região do chifre da África” Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil”, n 109, 2º semestre de 2011, p 94.
to address gender violence and reproductive health in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia\textsuperscript{66}. These donations allow Brazil to increase its role in security and humanitarian issues in Africa without compromising its official stance on sovereignty, relying on the logistical structure of UN agencies. In addition, supporting stability in Somalia might also reflect an interest in protecting Brazilian stakes in the region, particularly after the October 2011 attack\textsuperscript{67}-- reportedly perpetrated by Somali pirates\textsuperscript{--} on a ship serving Petrobrás off the coast of Tanzania\textsuperscript{67}.

In contrast, in response to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya, Brazil questioned the potential effects of external military action. The country’s representatives argued that the involvement of external military forces could reduce the chances of a stable resolution to the conflict (Williams, 2011, 258). Brazil’s position towards Libya expresses the country’s concern regarding the responsibility to protect, mainly the concern that the principle could be abused by countries willing to intervene in crises. When commenting on the Brazilian position, some academic experts argue that Brazilian diplomats recognize the importance of protecting civilians as a humanitarian imperative, but that the international community should be cautious about assuming “excessively broad” interpretations of the principle of the responsibility to protect civilians that could cause more damage than good and exacerbate the conflict (Bellamy, 2011, quoted in Keating 2013, p 183). In addition, Bellamy notes that, when Brazil explained its decision to abstain regarding resolution 1973\textsuperscript{68}, it stressed that this vote was not to be interpreted as condoning the behaviour of Libyan authorities, but rather as questioning whether the use of force would be the best way to guarantee the protection of civilians (Bellamy, 2011, p. 5). Brazilian diplomats called for diplomacy and dialogue.\textsuperscript{69}

### 3.5 Political stability, democracy and human rights in Africa

Although Brazil does not engage in explicit democracy promotion, some of its initiatives and positions actively encourage democracy in Africa. In IBSA, Brazil, together with India and South Africa, has stressed members’ identities as “vibrant democracies” that also seek the democratization of the international system, especially through multilateral institutions. IBSA’s founding document, the 2003 Brasília Declaration, prioritise policies that, among other goals, promote human rights and an end to all forms of racial discrimination. However, IBSA’s efforts in terms of democracy and human rights promotion remain timid, with the grouping focusing on development cooperation initiatives.

As for Brazil’s bilateral efforts, they have been limited and confined to assisting in implementing elections, specifically electronic voting. In December 2005 and July 2006, for instance, Brazil sent observers to the elections in the DR Congo, while an electoral judge was sent in April 2006 to provide training to Congolese officials. Brazil has also donated 2,950 ballot boxes and hosted Congolese electoral authorities (Senado Federal, 2011a, 215). In Guinea-Bissau, support for elections has been


\textsuperscript{67} G1 (2011) "Tanzânia prende 7 piratas após ataque a navio da Petrobras"October 4, 2011. Available at: g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2011/10/tanzania-prende-7-piratasapos-ataque-navio-da-petrobras.html [Tanzania arrests seven pirates after attack on Petrobrás ship]

\textsuperscript{68} The statement by the Brazilian representative, as well as the other statements by Council members regarding resolution 1973 are from S/PV.6498. March 17, 2011.

\textsuperscript{69} Statement by Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, The situation in Libya, 17 March 2011.
coupled with support to democratization as a precondition for stability, but elsewhere in Africa these efforts seem to be disconnected from a more comprehensive approach to stabilization.

In addition, Brazil has been promoting electronic voting system and equipment, drawing on lessons from the 1990s in expanding voting by handicapped and illiterate citizens. Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (SEC) has emerged as preeminent actor in electronic voting cooperation. Although cooperation programmes are coordinated through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, which is part of the Ministry of External Relations, the Court has developed significant expertise and there is a potential for additional cooperative initiatives. Through this programme, Brazil has helped several African countries with their electronic voting systems, including Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Tunisia, and Guinea-Bissau.

Cooperation with Africa on electronic voting has also taken place through events and training sessions held in Brazil. Brazil sent observers to national elections in the Sudan in April 2010 and also in January 2011 for the referendum about the status of South Sudan. In September 2012, a delegation of Sudanese lawyers that had been selected by the Sudanese Bar Association visited Brazil to get to know how the Brazilian legal system works.

The promotion of Brazilian electronic voting is also carried out through multilateral channels. On October 3, 2011, authorities of electoral courts from Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, East Timor, and Portugal signed the “Carta de Brasília”, which reaffirmed the states’ common "commitment to democracy and their confidence in the free, just democratic process based on the norms established through their legal systems and universally accepted human rights." Through the agreement, those countries also expressed their intent to improve the management and administration of their electoral systems in order to strengthen democratic institutions. This included cooperation programmes covering civic education, capacity building for judges and electoral officials, media coverage for elections, electoral legislation, guaranteeing accountability of political parties, and electronic voting. By assisting African states with capacity building, Brazil hopes to enhance stability and nudge them in the direction of democracy or good governance, without resorting to forceful or excessively abrupt regime changes.

Brazilian civil society organizations have also played a role within these debates, though not always aligned with the government position. For instance, NGOs in Brazil joined their Portuguese counterparts in opposing the proposed inclusion of Equatorial Guinea as a member of CPLP, because of the country’s democracy and human rights credentials (Equatorial Guinea was admitted in 2006 as Associate Observer). In response, the Brazilian government argued that bringing Equatorial Guinea closer to CPLP could contribute to democracy and human rights in that country. These arguments are based on the presumption that democratization, however cautiously induced, can contribute to political stability and peacebuilding. The Brazilian government makes a similar argument when it cancels or renegotiates debt by African nations, stressing that these measures demonstrate a willingness to invest in African countries and signal an important commitment to these partners.

Brazil has also taken illustrative positions on specific democracy issues, as in the case of Mauritania. In October 2007 the Brazilian government decided to open an embassy in Mauritania; however, due to the political crisis in the country and the coup in August 2008, the opening was postponed. Brazil supported the AU’s decision to suspend Mauritania and decided to only reinstate diplomatic relations...

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70 “Referendo sobre o status do Sul do Sudão” 8 de janeiro de 2011, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n 108, 1 semestre de 2011, p 71.
after the presidential elections in July 2009, when the AU lifted the suspension (Senado Federal, 2011b, p. 32).

In other instances, Brazil has used its political voice to encourage national reconciliation and peacebuilding. After the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, Brazil expressed its concern and called on all Kenyan political actors to participate in a national reconciliation effort. Similarly, when the president of Niger, Mamadou Tandja, was overthrown in a military coup in February 2010, Brazil joined the AU and ECOWAS in condemning the coup (Barreto, 2012, p. 267). In 2011, Brazil congratulated the Moroccan people for participating in legislative elections, praising the participation of women and young people as a symbol of the democratic consolidation in the country71. These initiatives illustrate Brazil’s willingness to publicly associate itself with measures that signal a strengthening of democracy.

Brazil’s support for regional initiatives aimed at stability and rule of law have also become a key part of its positions on African security crises. After the March 2012 coup in Mali, Brazil supported AU’s efforts in restoring constitutional order in the country, asking for dialogue, moderation, and a rejection of the use of force72. Brazil also expressed its support for ECOWAS’ mediation efforts73.

Brazil’s Foreign Minister visited Egypt in early May 2011 to discuss the possibility of cooperation and restart political dialogue with the new Egyptian authorities. Given Egypt's economic importance to Brazil-- it is Brazil's third largest commercial partner in Africa, and the main destination of Brazilian exports to the continent74-- this visit illustrated the political importance of Egypt to Brazil. The visit also reflected the Brazilian government's desire to preserve the commercial relationship that existed before the change in the Egyptian political regime. However, after the removal of Mohamed Morsi75 from power by the military, the implementation of these new cooperation initiatives was delayed. Brazil's engagement with the "Arab Spring" countries has also been extended to Tunisia. In April 2012, former Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota visited Tunis to affirm Brazil’s support for the democratic transition process in the country.

The next section of this article a case study: Brazil's relations with Guinea-Bissau. Although the specificities of the case mean that conclusions cannot be generalized to the rest of Brazil's engagement with African security issues, this case illustrates how Brazil's broader positions on security and development issues have been translated into specific actions.

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71 “Eleições no Marrocos” 29 de novembro de 2011, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n 109, 2º semestre de 2011, p 271.
73 “Situação no Mali” 05 de abril de 2012, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, n 110, 1º semestre de 2012, p 119.
74 Visita do Ministro Antonio de Aguiar Patriota ao Egito-Cairo-7 a 8 de maio de 2011” 6 de maio de 2011, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, 1º semestre de 2011, p 181-182.
75 In May 2013, former President Morsi became the first Egyptian head of state to visit Brazil.
4. Case study: Brazil in Guinea-Bissau

Brazil’s engagement with Guinea-Bissau is its most complex direct involvement in African security issues. The two countries have had diplomatic ties since shortly after the latter's 1974 independence from Portugal. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two was signed in June 1976. A list of agreements signed by the two countries since then shows that there were minimal initiatives during the 1980s and 1990s, but that contact increased dramatically after the turn of the millennium, when Brazil worked through multilateral channels, including the UN and the CPLP, to bring Guinea-Bissau’s recurring instability to the attention of the international community. It also sought to put the country on the agenda of the Security Council.

In addition to the Lula administration’s prioritisation of Africa within Brazilian foreign policy, Brazil’s specific commitment to Guinea-Bissau was boosted when Brazil in 2007 assumed the leadership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s Country-Specific Configuration for Guinea-Bissau. Since then, Brazil has stepped up its bilateral and multilateral involvement in Guinea-Bissau, despite the absence of significant economic interests (as compared with other African partners). Although the trade between the two countries is very small, it increased dramatically over the past decade, growing from US$181,000 in 2002 to 11,694,000 in 2009.

In March 2003, Brazil, as president of CPLP, expressed interested in finding ways to support Guinea Bissau through the political and institutional crisis that the country was going through (FUNAG, 2007, p 21). In 2004, Brazil assisted Guinea-Bissau with elections and Brazilian diplomats expressed concern with rebel forces threatening the democratically elected government. Brazil’s commitment to Guinea-Bissau was reinforced by President Lula’s visit in April 2005 and by the country’s participation in a CPLP electoral mission in June of the same (FUNAG, 2007, p. 58). President João Bernardo Vieira visited Brazil in November 2007. In March 2011, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau visited Brasília to discuss the strengthening of cooperation with Guinea-Bissau, including in security, rule of law, and fighting drug trafficking.

Brazil also coordinated with Angola in these efforts. The two countries set up military cooperation missions in Guinea-Bissau to cooperate with local authorities (Angola in March 2011 and Brazil in April 2011). ECOWAS and CPLP have cooperating through a special Program for the Reform of the Security and Defence Sector in Guinea-Bissau.

Brazil’s security interests in Guinea-Bissau are partly related to the fact that Guinea-Bissau is located on the South Atlantic, which Brazil’s National Security Strategy has made one of the top priorities of Brazilian defence strategy (Abdenur and Souza Neto, 2013). For instance, the Brazilian government has expressed concern about the growing role of Guinea-Bissau as a transhipment point for Latin America-based cocaine traffickers (Johansen, 2008). The UN Security Council has expressed concern that drug trafficking has continued to grow in the country and Guinea-Bissau's low capacity for public administration has enabled the trafficking to take root and expand. As a result of these factors, the country has been treated by the international community as a case of extreme institutional fragility.

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76 Due to financial restrictions, Guinea Bissau could only open a resident embassy in Brasília in 2011.
Within this scenario, Brazil has implemented several South-South cooperation programmes, some aimed at helping to strengthen institutions and build capacity. In some ways, Guinea-Bissau constitutes a "special case" for Brazil’s South-South cooperation, in that Brazil has worked to take over the void left behind by European countries (with the exception of Portugal), who have departed due to the country's instability (Hirst, 2012). This has translated into a varied mix of cooperation programmes, mostly channeled through the CPLP. In 2011, Brazil had 20 projects under implementation, involving 17 Brazilian institutions and 18 from Guinea-Bissau. These focused on professional training, agriculture, education, health, institutional strengthening, social organisation, security sector capacity-building and human rights promotion. There are also programmes specifically designed to build up government institutions. For instance, the ABC database shows that Brazil carried out a project component geared at helping Guinea-Bissau to consolidate its National Popular Assembly, justifying this project by stating that "due to Brazil having been chosen to coordinate the activities of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in the country, whose mandate includes, among other areas, public sector reform and the development of democratic accountability in preparing for the 2008 elections."80

In addition to the general effect that such institution building may have on the country's stability, some of Brazil's cooperation efforts are specifically geared at building up public security. The Guinea-Bissau police have historically served as a repressive institution (Ferreira 2004). Brazil is interested in helping to change the role of the police; the ABC database shows that, from 2006 to 2009, Brazil's Federal Police participated in a project to assist Guinea-Bissau's Training Centre.81 This was part of a broader effort to create a Security Forces Training Centre, which requires the formulation of a local public security doctrine, as well as capacity-building of a police force committed to the rule of law. According to the ABC, the objective of the project, originally slated for completion at the end of 2013, is to build capacity not only for maintaining internal order, but also to participate in international cooperation against organised crime.

More recently, Brazil has expressed concern that instability in Guinea-Bissau may generate threats for the broader South Atlantic. During a January 2013 speech at the ministerial meeting of ZOPACAS, in Montevideo, former Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota stressed that the conflict was "very close" to Brazil due to cultural and historic ties, and he called the crisis in Guinea-Bissau "an example of a situation with serious implications for the South Atlantic space, and to which we cannot remain indifferent."82 He also admitted that the efforts undertaken by the UN Security Council, ECOVAS, and CPLP had thus far not yielded satisfactory results, and called upon the countries involved to follow the parameters set by the Security Council. Finally, Patriota defended the role of the CPLP members in seeking a "convergence" for the return to stability.83

This is an example of Brazil's support for regional security initiatives, as long as they conform to the parameters established through the UN Security Council. As Rousseff and Patriota have stated numerous times, Brazil thereby supports "African solutions to African problems"-- even as Brazil assumes a greater role, both multilaterally and bilaterally, in African security.

80 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação "BRA/04/044-S103 - Fortalecimento da Assembleia Nacional Popular Bissau-Guineense"
81 ABC project BRA/04/044-S166 - Centro de Formação das Forças de Segurança da Guiné-Bissau
However, in April 2012 a coup d’état took place in Guinea-Bissau, creating significant setbacks. Brazil suspended its cooperation programmes until presidential elections are held. In the meantime, the UN Security Council imposed travel bans on the coup leaders and their key supporters, and the United States, which has labelled Guinea-Bissau as a ‘narco-state,’ set up offshore sting operations to nab military leaders suspected of helping the drug trade.\(^8^4\) In contrast, Brazil has avoided treating Guinea-Bissau as a failed state, preferring instead to mobilize support from multiple sources to address development alongside security sector reform. However, the recurring political violence and the 2012 coup have created new uncertainties for Brazil’s role in Guinea-Bissau.

5. Conclusion

Although the Brazilian government’s engagement with African peace and security issues is still in its early stages, the country’s relevance to African security has intensified over the last decade. There are three key factors behind Brazil’s growing engagement. The first is the ongoing quest to project influence globally, including in the international security architecture. Given Africa's importance to this system as a space in which norms regarding the use of force, protection of civilians, and humanitarian intervention are being applied and debated, the continent has become essential to Brazil’s quest to participate more directly in international security discussions. In addition, Brazil’s accumulated experiences in Africa, including its cooperation ties and the growing number of Brazilian actors in Africa, have generated new security concerns and interests for the Brazilian government. Finally, Brazil's changing national security policy, which places renewed emphasis on the South Atlantic, has required closer collaboration with African countries along the Atlantic.

The resulting increase in engagement with Africa's security is reflected in the proliferation of Brazilian actors playing a role-- directly or indirectly-- in the continent's security affairs. Broadly situated, Brazil's participation in African security issues has been predominantly state led. Through both bilateral and multilateral channels, Brazil has deepened its diplomatic and military cooperation ties, frequently relying on consolidated structures such as the UN and looser coalitions like IBSA. However, Brazilian non-state actors-- private sector companies and civil society entities-- are also becoming more active in African security, sometimes in close alignment with the government. For instance, defence industry companies have worked closely with the ministries of Defence and External Relations to boost exports of equipment and arms to African countries. Equally, civil society organisations have become involved, either by participating in official development cooperation, or by contesting such initiatives-- sometimes in collaboration with their African counterparts.

The limited capacity of these actors—whose involvement is still restricted by budgetary constraints as well as the prioritisation of issues close to Brazil’s territory—has forced the government to rely heavily on multilateral channels. As the case of Brazil’s involvement in Guinea-Bissau illustrates, Brazil’s ability to build consensus through multilateral forums such as the CPLP and UN agencies serves as a buttress to its more fragmented bilateral efforts. Apart from necessity arising out of economic constraints, this tendency towards institutionalism reflects a conscious option by the Brazilian government to uphold the primacy of multilateralism in addressing international security issues. The January 2014 election of Brazil as chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission will be yet another test of the country’s ability to mobilise support for its initiatives in Africa.

Brazil’s capacity to sustain or expand this degree of involvement will depend on a number of factors. Firstly, the internationalisation of Brazilian companies, and to some extent Brazil's capacity to project itself internationally, depends on the dynamism of the economy. In 2012, the country’s economic growth slowed down considerably. If this slowing becomes a trend rather than a temporary dip, it could compromise Brazil’s ability to sustain the scope of its role in Africa. The government has already announced budget reductions, including for the Ministry of External Relations. In addition, although Brazil's involvement in security issues abroad has so far not provoked significant popular controversies at home deeper engagement could generate more debate, subjecting Brazil's role in Africa to political oscillations.
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The last decade has witnessed a major economic expansion of China, India, Brazil and South Africa in Africa. This has mainly been driven by commercial and corporate interests, but the political profile of these rising powers has also become much more visible. They are becoming more sensitive to insecurity and volatility and gradually getting more involved in the African peace and security agenda.

The four articles in this report analyses the role of the rising powers in relation to the evolving African peace and security architecture. The Asian and Latin American countries, which traditionally have strongly emphasised non-intervention, are gradually becoming more involved in the African security landscape. They are increasingly concerned about their image and reputation and the security of their citizens and business interests, and are becoming more prepared to act multilaterally and to work with others in facilitating security and stability. As an African power, South Africa plays a more direct role and has emerged as a major architect of the continent's evolving peace and security architecture.

The four rising powers are faced with a number of challenges identified in these articles. The desire to play a larger role in security politics often clashes with the complexities of doing so while preserving foreign policy principles and economic interests.

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