ABSTRACT

This paper evaluates women’s representation in the 2019–20 peace negotiations and the extent to which their interests are reflected in the Juba Peace Agreement. With East Sudan as a case study, this article explores women peace builders’ experiences at and around the peace table in Juba. Building on interviews conducted in 2021, this article argues that women’s inroads to the peace negotiations were tokenistic. Women’s substantive representation was hampered by the structure of the peace talks, which were divided into different geographical tracks. In a patriarchal context such as the East, this track model did not provide a de facto political space for women to exercise meaningful influence. As cultural norms in this region domesticate women, the women from the East did not enter the talks with a political track record and they were isolated from important support networks. Added to that, the article suggests further that tokenistic inclusion may even lead to backlash effects as female negotiators have to bear the responsibility for a peace agreement that resulted in tribally charged conflict.

Keywords: Juba peace process, eastern Sudan, UNSC Resolution 1325, women and youth peacebuilders
UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 emphasizes the participation of women in peacebuilding. Despite the growing international awareness that women’s inclusion strengthens the legitimacy of peace processes and fosters durable peace, they remain largely excluded from formal peace negotiations (Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018; Tripp 2021). Exclusion of women from the peace table represents the historical trend in Sudan, including in the most recent Juba peace talks that culminated in the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in 2020. Women gained 10 percent representation in the official negotiations thanks to women’s movement mobilization, after their initial complete exclusion (Sudanese Women Rights Action 2020). With East Sudan as a case study, this article builds on original interviews with female peacebuilders conducted in 2021. The article argues that eastern Sudanese women’s inroads to the peace negotiations were based on a tokenistic approach that hampered their substantive contribution. The article identifies three interrelated factors that may help explain why eastern female peace negotiators became “tokens of peace.”

First, the structure of the talks impacted women’s opportunities to influence them (Sabala 2017). The Juba peace negotiations were divided into tracks that represented five regional entities: Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan (two areas), Central Sudan, northern Sudan, and eastern Sudan. This track model hampered women’s opportunity to build coalitions across delegations and regions which are seen as effective in gendering peace agreements (Aduda and Liesch 2022; Tripp 2015). The women of the East with the least political experience were isolated from other delegations that had accumulated experiences during previous peace processes in the country.

Second, the female peace negotiators from the East lacked political experience and awareness of gender norms, something that is highlighted in the literature as important for
women’s ability to engender the peace talks. Women with a voice and (inter)national standing are generally more likely to influence the talks (Aduda and Liesch 2022). The inclusion of provisions enhancing women’s rights and roles also tend to increase when these women are aware of gender-specific norms (Anderson 2016). In the East of Sudan, there are historically and contemporarily few female politicians, and although women’s civil society groups are emerging after the revolution, they remain weak.

Third, conservative and patriarchal gender norms justified women’s exclusion from the negotiating tables (Porter 2003). Gender norms, embedded in tribal and religious customs and beliefs, which suggest that women should not participate in peace talks specifically and politics more generally, are highly present in Sudan and especially in the East (Aziz and Alfaki 2021). When women are included in politics, they are often relegated to “women’s issues” (Abbas 2010). This is usually through the women’s or gender secretary within political parties, which are marketed as mechanisms to empower women within the parties but could easily backfire into isolating them from the larger political arena. During peace negotiations, such gender norms manifest through subversion of women’s participation in the talks (Ellersby 2016; Abusharaf 2005). Not only were all the mediators and top-level leadership male in the eastern track, but women got considerably fewer financial resources, meetings were organized without informing the female delegates, and women were even denied to speak during the talks. The environment, therefore, was not conducive to women’s substantive input.

This article adds an important contribution to the prevailing literature, which has increasingly differentiated between women’s presence and their substantive influence in peace negotiations (Paffenholz 2018). The mere psychical presence of some women does not appear to be enough when they feel silenced and/or do not identify as advocates for a women’s agenda
(Ellersby 2013; 2016). Added to that, tokenistic inclusion may even lead to backlash effects. The Eastern Track of the JPA became the most contested in its aftermath, following the outbreak of communal violence, which was the direct result of political disagreements on the outcome of the track (Radio Dabanga 2020a; Abbas 2021). Women peacebuilders who took part in the Juba talks were among those blamed for an agreement that has created political tension and resulted in ethnic violence; despite the marginal role that they actually played during the peace negotiations. This article contends that if women are included without being provided a de facto political space to exercise meaningful influence or provided with the capacity and support network needed, then they may get caught in the crossfire when peace agreements are contested.

The first section elaborates on women’s numerical representation in the official peace negotiations in Juba and compares it with previous peace processes in the country. Although women eventually gained representation in the official talks in Juba, women’s civil society groups were excluded from the formal negotiations and needed to mobilize around the table. The second section evaluates the qualitative inclusiveness of the JPA from a gender perspective. Although women’s numerical representation was disappointingly low, several gender provisions were included in the JPA. However, our analysis shows that these gender provisions were unevenly divided between the tracks. The Darfur Agreement stands out as the most gender inclusive, while the East Agreement has considerably less focus on women’s concerns.

The third section explores eastern Sudanese women peacebuilders’ trajectories in and around the peace table in the Juba peace negotiations. It builds on original interviews conducted with twelve female politicians and activists who were involved with Juba or are part of the larger political process in the East, as well as one male politician linked to the Forces of Freedom and Change and one male journalist. The interviews were conducted between May and October
2021. Some of the interviews have been conducted by telephone because domestic travel has been difficult, especially to Port Sudan, due to the COVID-19 wave in August 2021, escalating violence in September 2021, and then the closure of the region later in September 2021.

**WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN JUBA**

Symptomatic of the transitional period, Sudanese women were largely excluded in the Juba peace talks, which culminated in the Juba Agreement for Peace (Tønnessen and al-Nagar 2020; Al-Nagar and Tønnessen 2021). When the pre-negotiation process started in September 2019, women were not invited into the deliberations (Awad 2020). When women’s rights activists approached the Peace Commission to lobby for their inclusion, they were even met with sexist and racist slurs, including by the head of the commission (Sudan Women Rights Action 2020).

Thanks to the mobilization of women’s groups (Radio Dabanga 2019), women eventually gained 10 percent representation in the official negotiations that took place between the Transitional Government (seven women) and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (sixteen women) that was formed in 2011 to unite armed groups to fight Bashir’s regime (1989–2019) (Awad 2020).

Compared to previous peace processes in Sudan, available data on women’s inclusion suggests that women’s representation in Juba fared better than any other Sudanese peace agreement. There were no women represented as part of the official negotiation team that eventually led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (UN Women 2012). From the SPLM/A’s side, only two women participated as observers (Aldehaib 2010). In the two Darfur peace negotiations in Abuja (2006) women were only invited to the last round of
negotiations (Ellerby 2011; 2013; International Crisis Group 2006). In Doha (2011), no woman was represented in the official negotiations (Lounsbury 2016).

For the peace negotiations in the East, which culminated in the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) in 2006, there is little indication that women were included except for Amna Dirar, who played a critical role as the Deputy Chair of the Eastern Front at the time and was appointed advisor to the president and in several other high-level posts in the aftermath of the ESPA (Abbas 2007). Although the number of women in Juba represented an all-time high in a Sudanese context, the 10 percent women were accompanied by all male mediators and top leadership (UNSC 2021). The women present around the negotiating table did not represent the women’s movement or other civil society groups, which were largely excluded from the official negotiations. As such the peace negotiations in Juba represented a historical pattern in the country; they took place between armed actors, whether state or non-state, who are predominantly men (Itto 2006). This is reinforced by the fact that politics more generally in Sudan is seen as a male domain (Aziz and Alfaki 2021). The marking of politics as a male domain as explained in the course of the paper is largely because of authoritarian rule and armed conflict, which never gave the political scene in Sudan an opportunity to build a civil political structure that would enable women to be active participants. Women are often relegated to domestic responsibilities or the hoesh al-nisa, “women’s yard,” referring “to the traditional division of space in the Sudanese home where women have their own area in the house that they are meant to stick to” (Abbas 2010, 6). The hoesh al-nisa is replicated within the political parties through their women wings and secretaries in which women are pushed to narrow their horizons when it comes to what affects them as women in the larger context of Sudan.
This pattern is, however, not unique to Sudan. Women remain largely excluded from formal peace negotiations worldwide (Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018; Tripp 2021). In the overall literature, this underrepresentation of women is seen as mirroring traditional gender roles (Aduda and Liesch 2022). Because fewer women than men have leading positions in politics and the military apparatus, women are often not considered to be relevant actors for peace talks (Anderlini 2007; Ellerby 2016). Instead, they are often viewed as victims of war (Skjelsbaek 2001; Adjei 2019; Itto 2006). This exclusion is in reality what Westendorf (2018, 433) describes as a deliberate strategic tactic and “a highly visible marker of the broader exclusivity of such processes.” There are many examples from other African countries where women are excluded from official peace negotiations (Chitando 2021; Affi, Tønnessen, and Tripp 2021; Cheeseman, Onditi, and D’Alessandro 2017). In Somalia for example, women faced what Ladan Affi (2021) describes as a political backlash where clan elders, in collusion with male politicians, did their best to circumvent the political inclusion of women.

However, processes of excluding women have also ignited their mobilization outside of the existing power structures and been a pathway to influence, especially if it is accompanied by support from the international community (Affi and Tønnessen 2021; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Pepper 2018; Bah 2013). Such mobilization took place in Sudan to insist on women’s representation in the official negotiations as well as in the civil society delegation in Juba. Meetings were organized for women’s groups with an aim to develop strategies to put gender on the peace agenda and to understand the modern peace-making process known as the tracks model. The United Nations—African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) also organized a consultative conference attended by 120 women from Darfur to prepare a position paper, which was presented to the negotiating parties during the peace talks in Juba by the
Consultative Platform for Darfur Women known as the Darfur Women Platform (UNSC 2021). The nineteen female delegates from the civil society delegation present in Juba represented different women from displaced camps, NGOs, and political parties.

Being part of the civil society delegation presented an opportunity for different women’s groups to work together despite previous disagreements and splintering. The Sudanese Women in Civic and Political Groups (MANSAM), which is perhaps the largest coalition of women groups, took the lead together with the Sudanese Women’s Union and No to Women’s Oppression Initiative. However, there was no coordination between this group and the Darfur Women Platform, which manifested into disagreements in Juba that continue to polarize the relationship between the two. Although the concept of uniting women’s groups is constantly criticized as a patriarchal concept aiming to reduce the diversity of perspectives and de-radicalize them, the general literature within the field suggests that it becomes extremely difficult for women to gain access to patriarchal power structures without such collective mobilization (Tripp 2021; Affi and Tønnessen 2021).

GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT(S)

According to the University of Edinburgh Peace Agreements Database, between 1990 and 2019, 30 percent of the peace agreements in Africa (164 out of 554) had women’s rights provisions (Bell et al. 2019). The majority of those are related to political participation and the adoption of quotas for women in decision-making bodies (seventy-five references), development (sixty-six references), and sexual and gender-based violence (fifty-six references) (Tripp 2021). Compared to other peace and ceasefire agreements worldwide in 2020, the JPA stands out as the one with the most references to women and one out of three that specifically addresses sexual
violence (Wise 2021); this despite women being represented in the official negotiations at only 10 percent, which may suggest that critical voices are more important than the number of women. However, our analysis shows that the gender provisions are unevenly distributed across the different geographical tracks. It is the Darfur Agreement that includes the highest number of provisions related to women and girls, and it is also the most comprehensive (sixty-two pages). Whereas the East is among the tracks with the fewest mentions and among the shortest documents (nine pages).

In the preamble of the JPA, women’s equal rights are acknowledged and recognized as: “Responding to the role by women in leading the Revolution and their great presence in protests, processions, sit-ins, and in armed struggle areas with determination, boldness, and selflessness adding to the Sudanese women’s fight for equal rights.” However, the JPA views gender heteronormatively and there is no indication that those who identify as women (i.e., transwomen) are included as part of the category “women and girls” or that the group of LGBTQ+ more generally is recognized. In terms of references to women, most are within the category of political participation which thereby follows the international trend described above. As the agreements were integrated into the 2019 Constitutional Charter where a 40 percent women’s quota for legislative assemblies was already established, this did not emerge as an issue of contention. The 40 percent quota was repeated in the National Issue Agreement and a commitment was made to women’s political representation in most tracks. However, in the Darfur Agreement in particular, women’s inclusion and gender quotas were further specified for different types of commissions. When it comes to women’s development issues, the JPA has only a few mentions in the Darfur and the Eastern tracks specifically. For the East, the importance of girls’ education was mentioned, but not followed up with any specific plan of
action. It is only the Darfur Agreement that specifically mentions sexual and gender-based violence. This is a topic that is rarely addressed without women represented in and around the negotiation table (Klein 2012). However, if it is not regarded as a topic worthy of discussion, it may not be sufficient to have women physically present. Despite sexual violence being a challenge in many areas of Sudan, including in the East where reports of conflict-related sexual violence has appeared (Al-Nagar et al. 2021, 9), it is only prohibited in the Darfur Agreement (ch. 8, art. 18.4). The rights of both female and male rape survivors are recognized (ch. 4, art. 10.1), which is quite an achievement, especially for the males who are also victims of such crimes (Ferrales, Nyseth Brehm, and McElrath 2016).

Although sexual violence against women in war has been increasingly recognized in international resolutions, the fact that men can also be victims of rape has more recently emerged on the agenda. Only in 2019 did the UNSC recognize this in its Resolution 2467. The Darfur Agreement also promises to protect internally displaced and refugee women and children from sexual or gender-based violence (ch. 5, art. 2.3) and more generally from attacks, intimidation, and harassment (ch. 5, art. 4.1.11). Although this issue is prominent in the Darfur Agreement, there is no specific mention of it in relation to the “Special Court for Darfur.” The extent to which women in the other areas of Sudan are afforded the same protection from sexual and gender-based violence is unclear, as the National Issues Agreement is silent on it.

<a>WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS’ TRAJECTORIES: THE EAST SUDAN TRACK</a>  
Building on interviews, this section explores women’s experience at and around the peace table in Juba. It focuses on the East Sudan track. This is justified because the eastern Sudan agreement in the JPA has become the most contested in the eastern region, with wide protests
and ethnic polarization. The native administration demanded the cancellation of the East Sudan track during the Sinkat conference in September 2020 and began waving the self-determination card (Radio Dabanga 2020b). In the aftermath, several confrontations occurred in Port Sudan and Kassala between supporters and opponents of the Eastern Track as well as the appointed Kassala governor, Salih Ammar. In October 2020, bloody protests in Kassala against the appointment of a governor and the Eastern Track created a terrible situation. Roads were blocked, shops were burned to the ground, and people were killed in the worst outbreak of violence the city has seen since the 1990s (Abbas 2021). Eastern Sudan remained unstable throughout 2021, and by September 2021, the region went into lockdown as main roads and part of the seaports were shut down. This, alongside mobilization of the armed groups in the region, was seen as social and political cover for the coup d’état on October 25, 2021.

Clearly the inclusion of women did not create durable peace in the region, as the women, peace, and security literature predicts. Our findings suggest that women’s mere physical presence is insufficient when they are marginalized and excluded from substantial influence. Despite the presence of Zeinab Kabbashi in Juba, one of the leaders in the SRF, women peacebuilders interviewed for this study clearly stated that the women were marginalized in peace talks in various ways. They were ignored and not invited to key sessions. On rare occasions where they attended sessions, they were denied the opportunity to speak. Against this backdrop, it becomes extremely difficult to put women-specific (and largely taboo) issues like sexual and gender-based violence on the agenda. Additionally, they received less financial support compared to the men. The SRF and other groups financially supported many of their male members, meanwhile women who were considered leaders or close to the political scene were left to secure their own funding. This created an imbalance as men were given access to the Juba platform for weeks at a
time while women were tied down with small budgets and spent days in Juba, meaning they missed out on critical negotiation phases in a process that lasted months. A female participant at the Juba talks, one of the few women who took part as a civil society member, said that “Women were not part of the process from the beginning and were not given a real orientation on the status of the talks and the issues to be discussed which made them listeners at the talks.”\(^5\) The women interviewed for this study saw this as a purposeful, exclusionary strategy to safeguard misogynistic interests. Based on the interviews with female peacebuilders from the East, we identify three interrelated factors that explain women’s marginalization.

First, politics is a male domain in Sudan generally, and in the East in particular, where ethnically based power relations among the political actors entails the domination of men—compared with that of women—over political activities (Aziz and Alfaki 2021). This is related to gender norms embedded within customary/traditional beliefs of ethnic groups. The Beja, which constitute the biggest ethnic group in the area, have customary norms (*silif*) that largely domesticate women (Fadlalla 2007). In the Beja Club in Port Sudan, for example, women are not allowed entry (Abbas 2021). As far as public affairs are concerned, “women are excluded from public decision making and politics” (Pantuliano 2002, 5). Conservative gender norms, combined with being a region with continuous low-intensity armed conflict, even after the ESPA in 2006, have been a great disadvantage to women’s participation in public and political spaces and aborted prospects for organic growth of a localized women’s movement. This is manifested in the various ways women were excluded during the JPA talks. The sidelining of women in Juba becomes an expression of their broader marginalization in public and political spaces. A social activist from Port Sudan observed, “When you are active in our context, you have to rebel
and the more you do, the more it hurts and you carry a wound inside you because you are fighting the family unit, the society and the authorities.\textsuperscript{6}

The tight security grip in Sudan and especially outside Khartoum meant that even unarmed political parties failed to attract large numbers of women. Some interviewees within the framework of this study attributed this to fear. “People are scared of politics and for a long time, being in a party meant that you could get arrested and you cannot move around,” said a female political party member who took part in Juba.\textsuperscript{7} This created deeply embedded marginalization, especially for women, and distanced them from the political process, which was largely armed until the ESPA was signed. Women’s underrepresentation must therefore be viewed within the larger context of eastern Sudan where party politics was limited compared to other regions and especially so for women because of continuous insecurity compounded with conservative gender norms.\textsuperscript{8}

Secondly, because of the conservative gender norms that have largely excluded women from public domains, there were a lack of political experience among the women represented at and around the peace table. At the start of the peace talks, women’s civil society groups were few and still largely disorganized in the East. Many of the women’s groups and coalitions that now occupy the scene in the East formed as late as 2019 during the sit-in that ousted Bashir, such as the Women’s Forum in Kassala, and during the transitional period. This includes the Eastern Sudan Women’s Coalition, which has member organizations in the region; the Women Platform, which is limited to Red Sea state; and other small groups such as the She Initiative in Port Sudan.\textsuperscript{9} Although there are active traditional women’s groups such as the Sudan Women’s Union in Red Sea state, the women’s coalitions and groups were not organized enough to push for further representation as civil society actors. The few women who are active in political spaces
are consistently tasked by the predominantly male local and traditional authorities to work on mostly apolitical “women’s issues.” This includes women’s economic development in a region where women have been denied, for example, education. Against this backdrop, the interviewees shared narratives of harassment and blackmail from male politicians who coerced them into philanthropic work and away from politics.¹⁰

There were no clear criteria for the selection of women’s representatives to the eastern peace negotiations in Juba. One social activist interviewed said, “As far as I know, the women were selected based on nominations by the Sudan Revolutionary Front and they selected weak women with little political awareness and I also think they favored one ethnic component over selecting diverse women.”¹¹ The participant also added that the way that the appointments were made was linked to the fact that the role of women at the table was deprioritized.¹² According to the women interviewed for this study, political experience and awareness of gender norms should have been a criterion to enable meaningful access and leverage in a context where politics has been a male privy.

Thirdly, the structure of the talks was instrumental in sidelining women. The SRF was basically the main body in Juba although they negotiated in different geographical tracks, including regions that were not engaged in active armed conflict (northern and Central Sudan). This compartmentalization, based on the liberal peacebuilding models that focus on power and wealth sharing (Assal, Abdul-Jalil, and Egemi 2020), had consequences for women’s representation in the eastern track. The political landscape in the East views the JPA process through the lens of the 2006 ESPA and the 1995 Agreement, which was signed at the key issues conference and brought together political parties and armed opposition groups. Women did not effectively participate in the earlier peace and political processes, making them guests at the
table with no prior experience to rely on. The ESPA left lingering challenges related to ethnic divisions in the region, and one interviewee who was part of the Juba peace talk claims that it was a major point of contention during the talks.\textsuperscript{13}

Participation was limited to the eastern Sudanese political parties within the SRF, and this excluded other political parties as well as civil society. To be specific, the track was composed of the Opposition Beja Congress and the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice.\textsuperscript{14} This meant that only women “members of the ‘right’ faction of the participating political parties had the possibility to be officially included in the Juba talks.”\textsuperscript{15} Added to that, the lack of political experience further marginalized women in the East as they became isolated from the support network of other more experienced female peace activists from other regions of the country. For example, women from Darfur have been part of two previous peace processes.

\texttt{CONCLUSION}\texttt{/A}

\texttt{FL}The case study on the East suggests that women’s inroads to the peace negotiations were based on a tokenistic approach where they were not only marginalized in numbers, but also in substantive contribution and influence. Women were even denied speaking during sessions and marginalized in various other ways throughout the process. We have identified three interrelated factors, which echo the prevailing literature within the file of women, peace, and security, namely the structure of the talks into geographical tracks, patriarchal norms that dictate politics as a male domain and female peacebuilders’ political experience and awareness of gender norms, which are both important to be able to represent women’s interests. As a result, the environment was not conducive to women’s concerns, which is exemplified in the deficiencies of the Eastern
Agreement that did not include considerable articles to enhance women’s rights and roles in the region.

Following UN Security Council Resolution 1325, there has been an emerging international awareness of the importance of increasing the numbers of women in formal peace negotiations. Although this is indeed important and a first step to engendering peace agreements and creating durable peace, our case study shows that it is certainly not sufficient. In fact, tokenistic inclusion of women may even have backlash effects, something that has been largely overlooked in the prevailing literature on women, peace, and security. In the East of Sudan, as the political situation grew more complex as disagreements over the track escalated into ethnic violence and conflict over land, political activism became even more difficult for East Sudanese women because their new public role became linked to the highly contested agreement. In fact, it may very well isolate them from any further role in the peace process in the East, because they face a stigma within political circles and are held accountable for the failed peace process and agreement.

<NOTES>
1. In November 2019, MANSAM submitted a letter calling for the resignation of Suleiman Al-Dibelo of the Peace Commission for this reason. The letter was delivered to several civilian members in the Sovereign Council to no avail.

2. Interview with M.M from MANSAM, Phone, June 11, 2021.

3. The Sudan Women’s Union and No to Women’s Oppression Initiative were both part of MANSAM before leaving at different points in 2019 due to disagreements.

4. Interview with Dr. A.K, Phone, May 26, 2021.


7. Interview with N.O, Phone, October 17, 2021.


11. Interview with N.M, Phone, October 13, 2021.

12. Several members of the Women Platform did go to Juba, but it was before the platform was established. One of the reasons the Women Platform was initiated was to build the capacity of women; a need which emerged clearly in the aftermath of Juba.


14. The Beja Congress Party is perhaps the oldest regional political party in Sudan, and it began in 1957 by Beja intellectuals. It operated as one unit until the ESPA which led to a split. It split again in 2016 during the National Dialogue held by Bashir. Hamid Idris, a politician from Red Sea state, said that by May 2021, the Beja Congress Party had almost 10 factions with more factions appearing after the revolution. The United Popular Front (UPF) led by Al-Amin Dawood was also involved in the peace talks and it was part of the SRF, but the leadership had a disagreement during the peace talks.

15. Interview with N.M, Phone, October 13, 2021.

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Reem Abbas (reem.shawkat@gmail.com) is a researcher and communications professional based in Sudan. She is an MA candidate in Global Diplomacy at SOAS. She worked on research projects with International Crisis Group, Freedom House, USIP, Safer World, SIHA Network, and others. She contributed a chapter to *Voices in Refuge* published by AUC Press and is a coauthor in a forthcoming book on the cultural scene in Sudan (1989–2019).

Liv Tønnessen (liv.tonnessen@cmi.no) is a senior researcher at Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) and Director of Center on Law and Social Transformation in Bergen, Norway. She is a political scientist with a PhD from University of Bergen and has researched gender and politics in Sudan extensively, including women and peacebuilding. Tønnessen has recently published a book titled *Women and Peacebuilding in Africa* at James Currey that she edited together with Aili Tripp and Ladan Affi.