The Haitian National Truth and Justice Commission (Commission nationale de vérité et de justice, CNVJ) was established in 1994 by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to investigate the 1991 military coup that ousted the first Aristide government and the period of military rule that followed (1991-1994). The commission began its work in 1995 and submitted its final report to Aristide on his last day in office in 1996 (Chapman & Ball, 2001). The report was titled Si M Pa Rele, a contraction of the Haitian Creole expression Si m pa rele m’ap toufe, meaning “If I do not cry out, I will suffocate.”
The CNVJ sought to uncover the truth about human rights abuses committed by the military regime, led by General Raoul Cédras, end impunity, and reform the justice system in Haiti. The CNVJ was also the first of its kind to be explicitly mandated to investigate sexual political violence against women during the military regime, which were reported to have added political rape to its arsenal of weapons from 1993 (Rey 1999). The truth commission conducted a “special inquiry” in its investigation and issued recommendations to address sexual violence against women. In its final report, the CNVJ included a separate section to describe the sexual violence perpetrated by the military regime (see p. 91–103 in Si M Pa Rele (1996[1998])). While largely regarded a failed truth commission (Chapman and Ball, 2001; Quinn 2009), the mandate of addressing politically motivated and sexual violence against women places the CNVJ at the forefront of what has later been termed “the gender turn” in the field of transitional justice (Hayner, 2011).
2. Conflict and prevalence of SV
Haiti’s political history has been turbulent, and the military regime under investigation by the CNVJ is only one of many violent episodes in recent decades. Father and son, François and Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled as presidents-for-life in a non-democratic and repressive manner from 1957 to 1986 until the latter was ousted by popular revolt. This marked the start of a period in Haitian politics marked by fraudulent elections and repeated coups. For many, the 1991 election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide—a progressive Roman Catholic priest inspired by liberation theology—offered hope for democratic reform (Aristide, 2006, p. 283; Quinn, 2010, p. 57). However, that hope was short-lived. On 29 September 1991, just six months into his term, General Raoul Cédras staged a coup, forcing Aristide and his government into exile in the United States.
The military regime that followed lasted three years and installed several puppet governments. Closely linked to the former Duvalier regime, the army had long contributed to dictatorship and public fear (Mobekk, 2017). During this period, Haiti was engulfed in state-sponsored violence. At least 5,000 people were reportedly killed and over 1,000 beaten, tortured, or raped (Quinn, 2010, p. 57). Civil society gains were reversed (Charles, 1995; Fuller, 1999), and violations were particularly severe in areas known for support of Aristide (USAID, 1996, p. 8–9). Roughly 300,000 people went into hiding, while over 50,000 fled by boat to the US (Quinn, 2010, p. 57), contributing to a growing diaspora, especially in the US and Canada, driven by political violence and economic hardship (Quinn, 2019).
Although rape and other forms of sexual violence were already present before the 1991 coup, their nature changed drastically during the period of political violence. Sexual violence became a widespread and coordinated tactic of repression, used to punish and intimidate supporters of Aristide. It was so prevalent that it came to define the terror inflicted by the military regime, with most incidents occurring shortly after the coup. Forms of violence included rape by state agents and instances where family members were forced to rape one another. Rey (1999, p. 78) shows that rape was deliberately incorporated into the junta’s arsenal of repression by the summer of 1993, although the full extent and exact numbers remain uncertain. Estimates suggest the number of victims ranged from hundreds to thousands (Duramy 2014: 25, 45–51).
The CNVJ’s final report included a dedicated section on sexual violence perpetrated by the military regime (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], pp. 91–103), estimating 1,680 politically motivated rapes, primarily targeting Aristide supporters and their families (p. 43). While some acts of sexual violence appeared random and were committed by bands of thugs, the Armed Forces of Haiti, the police, FRAPH, and other attachés were also implicated. The CNVJ ultimately concluded that the Cédras regime had committed the greatest crime against womankind in the Caribbean since slavery.
Although the commission's mandate focused on political sexual violence against women, it documented such crimes against both women and men. In its recommendations, the CNVJ emphasized rape – particularly against women – as a structural problem in Haitian society (Selvik 2022).
3. Contributing factors around SV
Sexual violence, especially rape, has long been prevalent in Haitian society. From the colonial period to the present, French colonizers, U.S. occupying forces, criminal groups, and Duvalier’s paramilitary Tonton Macoutes have all perpetrated sexual violence against Haitian women (Charles 1995; James 2010; Renda 2001). As Duramy (2014, 18) notes, no analysis of gender-based violence in Haiti is complete without accounting for this deeply traumatic history.
During the French colonial era, rape and sexual abuse of enslaved women and girls were common on plantations, often committed by masters and overseers. These practices resulted in the birth of many mixed-race children (Duramy 2014). Following independence in 1804, after a successful slave revolt, Haiti faced numerous structural constraints, including a crippling “independence debt” to France, international diplomatic isolation, and a succession of unstable and authoritarian governments—all of which undermined the country’s democratic and economic development.
In 1915, after a popular uprising, U.S. troops occupied Haiti until 1934. During this period, U.S. Marines and allied Haitian gendarmes were frequently accused of sexual abuse, particularly in rural areas during anti-Cacos[1] operations (Trouillot 1990). Women were especially vulnerable during house raids, forced relocations, and reprisals against communities suspected of harboring rebels. In her study of the occupation, Renda (2001) highlights how Haitian women’s bodies were exoticized and violated within a broader imperialist ideology. She documents numerous instances of rape and exploitation, including coercive concubinage and exploitative arrangements involving domestic labor under conditions of duress.
Under the Duvalier dictatorships (1957–1986), sexual violence was used systematically to silence dissent, punish opponents, and reinforce patriarchal control. The Tonton Macoutes—a brutal paramilitary force loyal to the Duvaliers—were key perpetrators. Women activists, relatives of political prisoners, and women in communities suspected of anti-regime sentiments were particularly vulnerable. Rape, threats of rape, and sexual humiliation were commonly used to instill fear and reinforce social stigma (Fatton 2005; Charles 1995).
In other words, gender-based violence in Haiti has long been both normalized and politicized. This tradition of politically motivated rape became especially systematized during the 1991–1994 military regime (Magloire 2004; Merlet 2002, 160).
The normalization of sexual violence in Haiti must be understood in light of this history, as well as the country’s deeply entrenched patriarchy. Haiti ranks lowest in Latin America and the Caribbean on the Gender Inequality Index, with high maternal mortality, low education levels, limited female labor force participation, and minimal parliamentary representation (UNDP 2022). Extreme poverty increases women’s vulnerability, while a weak justice system contributes to a climate of impunity. Armed gangs have also employed sexual violence both opportunistically and strategically.
Until 2005, ten years after the establishment of the Truth Commission, rape was not even classified as a crime, but merely as “an offense against morals” (Jagannath 2011, 10). According to a 2018 national survey, one in three Haitian women has experienced gender-based violence (Institut Haïtien de l’Enfance 2018). In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, there was a sharp rise in SGBV in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, which helped place the issue on the agenda of both domestic and international actors (Jagannath 2011).
4. Transition and establishment of the TC
A joint peacekeeping effort between the United Nations and the Organisation of American States (OAS)—the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti, MICIVIH)—was deployed in 1993 to monitor and report on conditions in Haiti. Peace negotiations between Aristide and Cédras were brokered by the US government in 1994, involving key figures such as President Bill Clinton and former President Jimmy Carter. Although a UN trade embargo had been in place for several years, US policy shifted in 1993 with Clinton’s election, as he sought to reinstate Aristide to end the refugee crisis (Martin, 1999; Quinn, 2010, p. 57–58).
The resulting deal imposed strict constraints on Aristide’s government, which was pressured to make concessions to the bourgeoisie and the military. The US offered the military a generous settlement to ensure cooperation, undermining Aristide’s position, and granted amnesties to key actors (Quinn, 2010, p. 58). The Haitian diaspora also influenced the conditions for Aristide’s return (Laguerre 1997, p. 170–177, in Quinn, 2011, p. 267). Under the Governors Island Accord, Aristide was reinstated and resumed power on 12 October 1994. However, the agreement was controversial among his supporters, as it hindered efforts to hold the military legally accountable. Additionally, Aristide could only complete his original term, limiting his ability to follow up on the CNVJ’s recommendations and making him ineligible for re-election.
The initiative to establish a truth commission began a year before Aristide’s decree and originated in the Haitian diaspora in Canada. In 1994, a Haitian group in Montréal submitted a proposal—The Elements of a Truth Commission in Haiti—to Aristide’s government-in-exile (McCalpin, 2012, p. 144). This document formed the basis of the CNVJ (Quinn, 2010, pp. 76–77). The diaspora thus helped shape the commission’s mandate and later contributed members (Hoogenboom & Quinn, Unpublished).
Several observers have described the commission as internationally oriented in its focus areas, priorities, and legal frameworks (Chapman & Ball, 2001; Quinn, 2009, 2010). International actors were directly involved in the establishment and execution of the Truth Commission. These actors were the Organization of American States (OAS), American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the MICIVIH. Accordingly, international jurists made up three out of seven appointed commissioners. The OAS and MICIVIH were responsible for carrying out the work of the commission, including conducting interviews, finding and analyzing records, etc., and were heavily involved in the planning phase. Additionally, the Haitian diaspora in Montreal consulted the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, which was an organization established and funded by the Canadian government. (Quinn 2010: 59, 76-78; McAlpin 2012: 144)
Around the time of the CNVJ’s establishment, there was growing attention to documenting sexual violence. National and international women’s and human rights organizations collaborated to address evidentiary challenges and gather documentation. Domestic women’s groups received vital legal support from U.S.-based organizations like MADRE and the Boston Law Clinic. The Haitian women’s movement strategically framed sexual violence as a political tool used against women associated—directly or indirectly—with Aristide and the pro-democracy movement.
Haitian women’s organizations played an active role in documentation and framing efforts, collaborating with international allies and the diaspora, engaging the media, and organizing events to encourage victims to come forward. This strategic mobilization aimed to ensure sexual violence would be included in the truth commission’s agenda (Selvik and Tøraasen, forthcoming). The CNVJ became a focal point for women’s rights advocacy. When the commission began its work, women’s and human rights organizations continued campaigning, providing testimonies, documentation, and support for victims. They accompanied victims to the commission and highlighted the issue of sexual political violence (Selvik and Tøraasen, forthcoming; James, 2010). Their advocacy remained consistent throughout the commission’s mandate.
5. Mandate and scope of the TC in respect of CRSV
The Haitian truth commission was mandated to investigate sexual violence, conducted a dedicated “special inquiry” into such abuses, and issued specific recommendations to address sexual violence against women. Its mandate tasked it with contributing to national reconciliation and stated explicitly that “the Commission must pay particular attention to violations and crimes against humanity... committed by its officials [of the State] or by persons in its service... particularly against women victims of politically motivated crimes and sexual assault” (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. x). In its final report, the CNVJ included a dedicated section on sexual violence committed by the military regime (pp. 91–103). The commission estimated that 1,680 politically motivated rapes were carried out under the Cédras regime, targeting supporters or family members of supporters of President Aristide (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. 43).
Although the commission’s primary focus was on politically motivated sexual violence against women during the military regime, it also documented such violence against men. Importantly, in its recommendations, the CNVJ addressed rape and sexual violence against women as structural problems within Haitian society, rather than isolated incidents. A dedicated section of the recommendations chapter—titled “Rape and sexual violence against women”—outlined eleven recommendations directed at the Haitian state. These covered a wide range of preventive, protective, and accountability measures. While the commission’s full body of recommendations addressed broader reforms, particularly within the justice system, the issue of sexual violence against women cut across several thematic areas, including police reform (Selvik, 2022).
Although the CNVJ's mandate did not explicitly reference international or national legal frameworks relating to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), its creation coincided with the growing international attention to sexual violence in armed conflict, particularly in relation to the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda. This global momentum provided the Haitian women’s movement with a strategic opening to reframe rape not as a private or individual crime, but as a systematic form of political repression. They portrayed sexual violence as a crime against humanity central to the military regime’s campaign of terror. This framing resonated both nationally and internationally, helping to position sexual violence within the transitional justice agenda, and might have helped in getting politically motivated sexual violence into the mandate (Selvik & Tøraasen, forthcoming).
6. TC operations
The commission was initially composed of seven members, but this was reduced to six when one member resigned midway through its mandate. The diaspora community played a significant role in shaping the commission’s membership (Hoogenboom & Quinn, Unpublished, p. 13). In fact, many individuals who contributed to the CNVJ had also participated in the earlier truth commission initiative developed in Montréal—including two of the commissioners, the executive secretary, and a consultant on judicial reform (Hoogenboom & Quinn, Unpublished, p. 16).
Three foreign members were included under pressure from international donors, who argued that the commission needed a better balance between ‘national’ and ‘international’ representation. These international members were respected jurists, while the four national members represented both governmental bodies and key nongovernmental organisations (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 17). The international commissioners lived abroad throughout the CNVJ’s operation, visiting Haiti only occasionally for short meetings (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 18).
A common characteristic among the commissioners was their legal background: all were trained lawyers except for two social scientists, one of whom was Françoise Boucard—a sociologist who served as the commission’s chair (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 17). Boucard and Ertha Elysée were the commission’s only women members; the remaining five commissioners were men. Another notable feature of the national commissioners was their close ties to Haiti’s domestic political sphere. The Haitian intellectual community at the time was small and highly interconnected (Quinn, 2009, p. 269). As one international consultant put it, “[The commissioners] were all either friends, lovers, or associates of people in the Haitian government” (cited in Quinn 2009, p. 269).
For much of its existence, the CNVJ operated with only a small administrative team, consisting of analysts and support staff, while the commissioners themselves oversaw daily operations (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 19). According to Hayner (2006), the CNVJ employed between 50 and 100 staff to complete its mandate, whereas Chapman and Ball (2001, p. 35) estimate the number at approximately 75. During its peak data collection period in July and August 1995, the commission deployed 80 interviewers into the field for less than two months (Chapman & Ball, 2001, p. 19; Si m pa rele, 1996[1998], p. xv).
The CNVJ drew on a range of sources to document human rights abuses. In total, its final report was based on 8,650 interviews, identifying more than 8,700 victims and alleging 19,308 violations (Si m pa rele, 1996[1998]). Approximately 6,000 of these were semi-structured interviews conducted by the CNVJ itself. These were supplemented by materials collected by other actors, including MICIVIH, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organisations, and the National Commission for Justice and Peace (JILAP) (Si m pa rele, 1996[1998], pp. xiii, 16–17). The commission also sponsored forensic investigations of mass graves, conducted by a multinational team of experts convened by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Macilwain, 1995), and consulted morgue records from the University Hospital in Port-au-Prince. All reported violations were entered into a database, resulting in a cross-referenced and comprehensive list included in Annex III of the final report.
International organisations such as Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World) provided medical support to victims of abuse while also documenting violations. Victims reportedly also “sought assistance” from the truth commission itself, although the exact nature of this assistance remains unclear (James 2010, p. 24). Public opinion inside Haiti weighed heavily towards public trials, especially by victims of sexual violence. Though women and feminist organizations were involved in the country, the extent of their involvement is unclear. (Quinn 2009: 267-69; Quinn 2010: 76-78; Hoogenboom & Quinn 2020: 141-144). Victims were primarily consulted in interviews for the purposes of gathering information and evidence. It is unclear exactly how they affected any of the processes of the TC. the TC reports that, while they used a media campaign to reach out to victims that were still in Haiti, their concern for the safety of victims meant that they had to keep a low profile. After the commission completed its work, it faced public criticism—particularly from survivors of sexual and gender-based violence—over its failure to adequately document cases across all regions of the country. Civil society actors also faulted the CNVJ for a lack of transparency, the exclusion of civil society from public hearings, and for denying victims the opportunity to testify publicly “in order to establish personal and collective truths concerning the past” (James 2010, p. 202).
7. TC final report
Referring to “sexual violence perpetrated against women for political reasons,” the Truth Commission states that “acts of rape and sexual violence perpetrated by officials or agents of the State ... may be considered a violation of Haiti's obligations under articles 5, 7, and 3(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ..., the Covenant, and the American Convention” (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. 93). A close reading of the full section reveals that the report explicitly links sexual violence (SV) to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and politically motivated human rights violations (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. 94).
The section is titled “Rape and the sexual violence perpetrated against the women for political reasons” and centers on the experiences of women—particularly those affiliated with the political opposition—who were subjected to rape and other forms of SV. The report classifies these acts as targeted attempts to silence dissent and control opposition. It emphasizes how such violations threaten not only individual victims but also the rule of law, the stability of public institutions, and Haiti’s standing in international politics. While the primary focus is on women, the report does acknowledge that men and girls were also subjected to sexual violence (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], pp. 91–103).
The report places these politically motivated acts of sexual violence within a broader context of entrenched gender discrimination and social norms. As Selvik (2022, p. 430) notes, this framing informs the Commission’s recommendations, which approach sexual violence not only as a political weapon but also as a structural issue embedded in Haitian society.
The report’s references to specific legal instruments reflect a clear intent to demonstrate how rape and sexual violence constitute violations of national and international law. It cites, for example, article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 1 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, and article 5 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man. It also notes the influence of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women on Haitian legal reforms (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. 96).
Although the Commission calls for reforms to the penal code and improvements in the treatment of victims, its emphasis is more on documenting the function of SV as a tool of political repression than on ensuring criminal accountability (Selvik 2022). As the report notes: “The sudden appearance of a large number of politically-motivated rapes is a new phenomenon in the history of repression in Haiti. As early as 1991, numerous cases were observed, which had all the hallmarks of political orchestration in a context of intimidation and savage repression of opposition to the coup d'État. For the most part, these rapes were undoubtedly committed for political reasons, clearly expressed by the aggressors in their threats, insults and accusations.” (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. 91)
The Commission affirms the earlier findings of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, stating that “rape was neither random nor occasional, but widespread, open and commonplace.” It adds that it “considers that such use of rape as a means of terror also constitutes a crime against humanity according to international norms.” (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], para. 135)
The report describes in graphic terms the contexts in which sexual violence occurred: “Most rapes take place in the victim's home, in front of the family gathered in terror. In some cases, a family member is forced to rape another member of the family in front of everyone under threat of death. There have also been cases of rape in detention centers and a few cases of rape in the street.” (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], pp. 98–99). Police stations and interrogation centers are also mentioned as sites of perpetration. Crucially, the report makes no mention of accountability mechanisms. As the perpetrators were often police officers or armed forces—those who would ordinarily enforce justice—the absence of legal redress is unsurprising. This institutional complicity helps explain the low number of reported cases (Si M Pa Rele 1996[1998], p. 99).
8. TC recommendations
The CNVJ devoted a specific section of its recommendations—Section B—to the issue of rape and sexual violence against women. Additional recommendations appear in sections addressing the Haitian National Police and follow-up measures. Together, these address a broad range of concerns: the legal status of rape in the Penal Code, the challenges victims face in reporting and prosecuting rape, prevailing social attitudes toward sexual violence, and the lack of adequate services and support systems for survivors. The recommendations also highlight the need for legal reform, victim compensation, and ratification of relevant international conventions.
Although the CNVJ was primarily mandated to address politically motivated sexual violence during the 1991–94 military regime, the recommendations in Section B extend beyond this specific context. They treat sexual violence as a structural problem in Haitian society, rather than a phenomenon limited to the coup period. Instead of offering narrowly framed strategies to prevent future political sexual violence—an arguably impossible task—the CNVJ focused on legal reform and the broader status of women under Haitian law (Selvik 2022).
Recommendations includes modifications of the classification of rape; regulations concerning rape certificates to be modified in the sense of extending the competence of doctors/physicians to certain health workers in this domain; the teaching of legal medicine and the official restoration of the practice; the creation of programs designed to improve the behavior and working methods for all staff engaged in services to victims of rape; the creation of education programs and internships for all those working in the administration of justice, police officers as well as judges, in order to better understand the phenomenon of rape; the creation of specialized services for abused women, including counseling and care to victims and their families, especially children; the creation of programs and internships that provide female victims of sexual violence, opportunities to rehabilitate and fully reintegrate in the private, public and social life; the promotion of educational programs in the private and public sector in order to arouse the Haitian public’s attention on the problems and solutions related sexual violence against women; that judicial proceedings be commenced against the alleged perpetrator of rape cited in his report, and in the event that their guilt is established judicially, that they be punished in accordance with the law. It also recommended investigations and prosecutions of unnamed perpetrators of rape, and that all rape victims identified by the Commission's criteria should receive compensation. Lastly, The Commission recommends that Haiti ratifies the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, as well as the UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (1968).
9. Implementation of TC recommendations
Implementing these recommendations has been a long-standing goal of Haitian women’s rights organizations, often supported by international partners. The first recommendation in Section B called for a reclassification of rape in the Haitian Penal Code. After nearly a decade of sustained advocacy by feminist and human rights groups, the Penal Code was revised in 2005. This reform is widely regarded as one of the most significant legal advances for women in Haiti (Coté 2014; Selvik 2022). The reclassification shifted rape from being categorized as an offense against morals to one of sexual aggression, reframing it as a violation of physical integrity rather than honor or dignity (Duramy 2014; HRW & NCHR 1994). The penalty was also increased to ten years of hard labor. This success stemmed from extensive lobbying efforts within Parliament and close collaboration between the then-Minister of Women’s Affairs and civil society organizations, particularly those united under the National Coordinating Body for Women’s Rights (CONAP). While international actors have also taken credit for this reform—pointing to pressure from the UN and other international agencies—the change was largely domestically driven.
The final recommendation on sexual violence called for the ratification of three key international conventions: the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women; and the 1968 UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Of these, the first two were ratified in 2013 and 1997, respectively; the latter has yet to be signed or ratified.
Despite these important legal developments, many of the CNVJ’s recommendations remain unimplemented. Reporting rape remains a difficult process. A medical certificate is still required to legally confirm that a rape occurred, and access to such certification is limited. The CNVJ had recommended expanding the authority to issue these certificates and increasing awareness of forensic medicine, but such measures have not been fully realized. In response, Haitian and international NGOs have stepped in to support survivors—offering legal guidance, accompanying victims through the reporting process, and providing medical and psychological care. The Haitian National Police have received some training to improve their handling of sexual violence cases. Meanwhile, the Haitian NGO Unité de Recherche et d'Action Médico-légale (URAMEL) works to promote forensic medicine and health law, and other civil society groups continue to raise awareness and challenge prevailing attitudes about rape.
While these efforts have produced some improvements, the landscape remains fragmented. Actors working on legal, medical, and policing aspects of sexual violence often operate in isolation, making it difficult to assess the overall magnitude of change (Selvik 2022).
The CNVJ submitted its final report on the last day of President Aristide’s term, handing it over to his successor René Préval. The report’s limited circulation may have hindered the implementation of its recommendations. Since then, Haiti has faced chronic institutional fragility, economic hardship, devastating natural disasters—including the 2010 earthquake—and more recently, escalating political instability following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the expansion of gang control in urban areas. In such a context, implementing the CNVJ’s recommendations is unlikely to be prioritized.
References:
Aristide, M. (2006). A historical and dignity‐centred perspective on Haiti’s struggle for justice. International Journal of African Renaissance Studies: Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity, 1(2), 265–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/18186870608529721
Chapman, A. R., & Ball, P. (2001). The truth of truth commissions: Comparative lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala. Human Rights Quarterly, 23(1), 1–43. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2001.0005
Charles, C. (1995). Gender and politics in contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist state, transnationalism, and the emergence of a new feminism (1980–1990s). Feminist Studies, 21(1), 135–164.
Commission Nationale de Vérité et de Justice. (1996b [1998]). Si m pa rele. Annexes I et II. Reprinted in B. Freeman (Ed.), Si m pa rele: 29 sept. 1991 - 14 oct. 1994 (Occasional Paper No. 15, pp. xviii–245). University of Kansas. http://ufdcweb1.uflib.ufl.edu//UF00085926/00002
Côté, D. (2014). Anpil fanm tombe, n’ap kontinye vanse: Luttes féministes en Haïti. Possibles, 38(1), 209–223. http://hdl.handle.net/10625/54365
Duramy, B. F. (2014). Gender and violence in Haiti: Women’s path from victims to agents. Rutgers University Press.
Fatton, R. (2002). Haiti’s predatory republic: The unending transition to democracy. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hayner, P. B. (2011). Unspeakable truths: Transitional justice and the challenge of truth commissions (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Hoogenboom, D. A., & Quinn, J. R. (Unpublished). Transitional justice and the diaspora: Examining the impact of the Haitian diaspora on the Haitian Truth Commission. Conference paper presented at ISA. http://politicalscience.uwo.ca/research/docs/joanna_quinn/TransitionalJustice_Diaspora_haitian_truth_commission_2_.pdf
Human Rights Watch, & National Coalition for Haitian Refugees. (1994). Rape in Haiti: A weapon of terror. National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, 6(8).
Institut Haïtien de l’Enfance. (2018). Enquête mortalité, morbidité et utilisation des services – EMMUS-VI 2016–2017. Pétion-Ville, Haïti / Rockville, MD: IHE/ICF.
Jagannath, M. (2011). Barriers to women's access to justice in Haiti. CUNY Law Review, 15, 27–48.
James, E. C. (2010). Democratic insecurities: Violence, trauma, and intervention in Haiti (Vol. 22). University of California Press.
Macilwain, C. (1995). Forensic team digs up Haiti’s deadly past. Nature, 377(6547), 278.
Magloire, D. (2004). La violence à l’égard des femmes: Une violation constante des droits de la personne. Chemins Critiques, 2, 66–113.
Martin, I. (1999). Haiti: International force or national compromise? Journal of Latin American Studies, 31(3), 711–734.
McCalpin, J. O. (2012). Truth and freedom in Haiti: An examination of the Haitian Truth Commission. The Global South, 6(1), 138–155. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.6.1.138
Merlet, M. (2002). Between love, anger, and madness: Building peace in Haiti. In M. Turshen, S. Meintjes, & A. Pillay (Eds.), The aftermath: Women in post-conflict transformation (pp. 159–171). Zed Books.
Mobekk, E. (2017). UN peace operations: Lessons from Haiti, 1994–2016. Routledge.
Quinn, J. R. (2009). Haiti’s failed truth commission: Lessons in transitional justice. Journal of Human Rights, 8(3), 265–281. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830903110350
Quinn, J. R. (2010). The politics of acknowledgement: Truth commissions in Uganda and Haiti. UBC Press.
Renda, M. A. (2001). Taking Haiti: Military occupation and the culture of U.S. imperialism, 1915–1940. University of North Carolina Press.
Rey, T. (1999). Junta, rape, and religion in Haiti, 1993–1994. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 15(2), 73–100.
Selvik, L.-M. (2022). Haiti’s truth and justice commission: Forgotten recommendations, living demands. In E. Skaar, E. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, & J. García-Godos (Eds.), Beyond words, Vol. II: From words to practice: The fate of truth commission recommendations in Latin America.
Selvik, L.-M and Tøraasen, M. (forthcoming): The Unexpected Pioneer? The Haitian truth commission (1995-1996) addressing sexual violence against women
Trouillot, M.-R. (1990). Haiti: State against nation: The origins and legacy of Duvalierism. Monthly Review Press.
Notes
[1] Cacos were Haitian peasant militias and insurgents who played a major role in resisting foreign occupation and central government control