Dialogue or isolation?
We are facing a difficult choice: Should we speak with the Taliban or not? Some argue that the humanitarian crisis is so severe that one must ignore their strict regime and restraints on human rights. Others say that the only possible way is to isolate them and increase pressure on them to force change, even if it leads to significant civilian casualties and the continuation of armed conflict.
To consider the best possible approach, one must assess the situation in Afghanistan, what alternatives to the Taliban there might be, and what potential consequences each alternative may have on Afghans and on regional and international security.
All agree that Afghanistan is heading towards a severe humanitarian crisis. The country is dependent on humanitarian aid to provide 18 million people, half the population, with lifesaving assistance over the winter. The UN estimates that 97 per cent of Afghans could end up below the poverty line soon. Economic sanctions and pauses on aid delivery after the Taliban takeover have intensified the consequences of the severe drought, internal migration, and Covid-19. Humanitarian assistance is not enough to overcome the problems that Afghans are now facing. If the country is eventually going to be able to move forward, there is a need to restore the private sector and increase job opportunities. Experience indicates that this will require the absence of warfare and a degree of political stability.
Though it oversimplifies the situation there to say it this way, one is basically faced with three choices in Afghanistan.
Active hostility towards the Taliban regime
The first alternative is to refuse to recognise that the Taliban holds military and political authority and then set out to actively undermine and weaken them. This may include cutting off humanitarian aid, refusing development aid and implementing strict sanctions in hopes that doing so could increase public opposition towards the Taliban. Such an approach could also entail giving political, financial, and eventually military support to those who form an armed opposition.
This approach introduces at least a couple of dilemmas. The first is the immense humanitarian suffering and loss of lives that such an approach brings. The Western world is seemingly not ready to let this happen: they provide humanitarian support channelled outside the Taliban regime. However – as we noted in the statements from the Oslo meetings 23-24 January 2022 – further assistance is conditioned upon the Taliban agreeing to protect basic human rights and allowing for girls’ education and women’s access to jobs outside of the home. This demand stands in sharp contrast to what regional actors Russia and China emphasise.
The other dilemma is that no credible political/military opposition exists to challenge the Taliban, except for the Islamic State Khorasan group (ISK). Nobody wants the ISK to establish a lasting foothold in Afghanistan, nor does anyone want part of the Taliban to turn towards ISK. The military opposition to the Taliban lacks a foothold in Afghanistan and lacks leadership figures who enjoy wide popular support or who could serve to legitimise attempts to overthrow the Taliban. The elderly warlords, former corrupt ministers, and parliamentarians now in exile are as bad an alternative for many Afghans as the Taliban.
In short, active opposition against the Taliban is an alternative with few advantages and only a slight chance of success. The humanitarian and civilian costs of aid cuts and continued warfare would be colossal. Most military and political leaders who claim to be an alternative to the Taliban have for more than 40 years documented that they have little to contribute other than securing personal interests and building up their own fortunes.
Acceptance of the power dynamics and initiation of an active dialogue
The other alternative is to accept the Taliban as a de facto ruler, but at the same time go into dialogue to try to moderate their politics from there, to make them responsible for their people and accountable for what they have promised. Such an approach does not entail recognising a Taliban regime but rather rejects the idea that isolation is the only acceptable approach. One must not be naive: the approach of dialogue requires structured, consistent, and planned conversations at several levels. It must be done with the top leaders, including the Taliban representatives who are the furthest away from espousing what we would call a functioning state, democracy, and rights. They are the ones who possess the authority to implement change on a political (and religious) level. Dialogue must also occur in the districts and villages where humanitarian assistance can reach out and where teachers and health workers receive their salaries. The last time the Taliban was in control, there were local demands, pressure and negotiations that made them compromise and, for example, allow girls up to grade 12 to go to school in certain regions.
Should the Taliban eventually change their politics on education and jobs, establish a more inclusive government, prevent terror groups from operating from within Afghanistan, it could eventually lead to the group’s international recognition. Nevertheless, the Taliban has much to prove before this could happen. An old Afghan colleague recently reminded me that international recognition would arrive only when the Taliban regime achieves national acceptance.
The downside to such an approach is that the Taliban could perceive the invitation to dialogue partly as a form of recognition, hence allowing them to avoid the responsibility for their people or to moderate themselves. Therefore, it is essential to set clear and realistic demands and have in place mechanisms and a timeframe to follow up on agreements. The international society must have one common approach. I think that this is the most crucial achievement coming out of the meetings in Oslo.
The advantage, beyond addressing the humanitarian crisis, is that one can avoid a split within the country and the possibility of civil war. Dialogue with the Taliban could help prevent the country from becoming an arena for regional conflict, especially between Pakistan and India. It could also limit Russia’s and China`s playing field in a region made militarily and politically vulnerable after the US and NATO withdrawal. Russian and Chinese diplomats stayed behind in Kabul to maintain their interests when Western diplomats pulled out.
Termination of engagement
The third alternative is to close up the money sack, cut off all diplomatic channels and leave the Afghans on their own. This approach is tempting, especially in light of the limited results international support for the country has achieved and how many lives have been lost during the last 20 – or 40 – years.
The advantage of such an approach is that one saves money and the precious time of diplomats. The disadvantage is that this also effectively punishes the entire Afghan people, not merely the Taliban. Not only could it split up the country, a move from which the ISK would benefit, but it could also lead to a massive wave of migration. Some will flee to look for protection, others to survive. Many of these will not settle on searching for jobs in their neighbouring countries; they will try to move further on, towards the West. Unfortunately, there is little to no enthusiasm to receive a new wave of Afghan refugees outside of those already evacuated.
The aftermath of Oslo
If one agrees that negotiating with the Taliban is the best alternative, then the meeting with the Taliban delegation in Oslo in January 2022 was an important start. Here, Taliban representatives were introduced to new negotiating rules that challenge the Taliban on their capability and will to discuss with groups they disagree with. The participants were most likely not aligned on all demands. Nor was that the expectation: the distance is just too vast. But the Taliban received a clear message from the Afghan civil society and international donors detailing what is expected from them and what their responsibility is to assure the continuation of dialogue and support.
The conversations must be followed up both in Afghanistan and internationally if the balance between dialogue and demands is to be assured. Norway took the first step, but others also have to follow up. We need clarification of what role and mandate the UN will have in the country. But most importantly, the Taliban must show not only that they can handle negotiations and diplomacy as well as they use military power, but they also must demonstrate the will to search for compromises and solutions that all parts of Afghan society are able to live with.
This is an adapted translation of an op-ed by CMI senior researcher Arne Strand, written for Forsvarets forum.