Fifty Years Without Peace in Mozambique
By Helge Rønning, Professor of Media Studies, University of Oslo
Aslak Orre, Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute
(This is an opinion piece. The views expressed are those of the authors.)
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Since the start of the liberation war in 1964, has Mozambique ever truly known peace?
When Mozambique gained independence from Portugal on June 25, 1975, Samora Machel – the country’s charismatic first president and leader of the liberation movement Frelimo – addressed a packed Machava Stadium in Maputo. Until that day, it had been known as Salazar Stadium, named after the Portuguese dictator.
Exactly fifty years later, current president Daniel Chapo – “elected” by Frelimo through massive electoral fraud in 2024 – gave a speech at the same stadium, now renamed Independence Stadium. He stood before a sparse crowd, flanked by military officials. His words were met with utter indifference.
The contrast between these two moments symbolises how the people has turned its back on Frelimo .
From Liberation Movement to oppressors
Mozambique won its independence after a long war against the Portuguese colonial regime. After nearly 500 years of colonial rule, the country was among the least developed in the world – and it still is. Today, it ranks as the fourth poorest country globally by GDP per capita (World Population Review) and sits 182nd on the Human Development Index.
The reasons are complex of course, but a major one is that Frelimo itself (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), which has ruled the country for all fifty years, has degenerated or morphed from a liberation movement and into a corrupt and oppressive regime.
Despite its strategic location and vast natural resources – gas, coal, minerals, water, forests, and fertile farmland – widespread misery persists. The natural disasters such as floods and cyclones that continue to batter the country do not help, yet increasingly the government must take the blame.
On the 50th anniversary, Mozambican philosopher Severino Ngoenha reflected on the country's “50 years of turbulence” in an article in Savana, the leading independent newspaper in Mozambique. He wrote that it is uncomfortably obvious that a political and economic oligarchy now controls the state. A new state bourgeoisie has risen on the ruins of social justice. Mozambique is now one of the seventh most unequal country in the world.
The struggle today is not between colonisers and the colonised, but between Mozambicans who have everything and those who have nothing. Ngoenha’s article is an good example of the many critical voices in a small but insightful/knowledgeable civil society .
A Poor Starting Point
Mozambique’s independence in 1975 was partly triggered by Portugal’s own Carnation Revolution the year before, which overthrew its dictatorship. Some key figures in that revolution were white Mozambican officers in the Portuguese army – sons of anti-fascists exiled to Mozambique in the 1930s. But that’s another story.
Most Portuguese colonists fled the country in a panic after independence. Many were also expelled by the new regime, taking with them capital, skills, and commercial networks. Consequently, much of the existing infrastructure collapsed.
At independence, 95% of the population was illiterate. There was hardly any school system. No functioning healthcare. Agriculture was largely subsistence-based, except for colonial plantations. The civil service had been run by authoritarian Portuguese bureaucrats.
By 1975, Frelimo had become a radical Marxist movement, heavily influenced by Soviet-style communism during the Cold War. Two years later, it officially declared itself a Marxist–Leninist party and established a one-party state.
The government launched major programs in health, education, and agriculture. But they were plagued by extreme centralisation and a lack of understanding of local realities. Internal purges and repression soon followed. Opposition figures and “undesirable elements” were sent to so-called “reeducation camps” – documented in historian Benedito Luís Machava’s recent book The Morality of Revolution: Reeducation Camps and the Politics of Punishment in Socialist Mozambique, 1968–1990.
Wars Without End
Mozambique was surrounded by hostile regimes – apartheid South Africa and white-ruled Rhodesia. Just one year after independence, civil war broke out between Frelimo and the rebel group Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), which was supported by these regimes and other international right-wing forces.
The civil war lasted 16 years and was far bloodier than the liberation struggle. Renamo was more than just a foreign puppet – it gained support in rural areas by defending traditional social structures. For years, Frelimo controlled the cities while Renamo held the countryside. Under international pressure – especially after apartheid ended in South Africa – the war finally ended in 1992. A new liberal constitution was adopted, and Mozambique became a multiparty democracy. Frelimo won the 1994 elections, with Renamo as the main opposition.
The state was restructured and the economy liberalised – but the political system remained authoritarian and centralised.
Reforms, Resources, and Corruption
Following the war and a long decade during which Frelimo had promoted national production for import substitution, it embraced sweeping economic reforms in the 1990s, under pressure from the IMF, World Bank, foreign donors, and its own elite. These reforms involved privatisation and cuts to social services. Large-scale resource projects – coal, gas, hydropower – were prioritised over rural development. Now development was to be “export-led”. It was the same recipe and had the same results as in other parts of the world.
Frelimo’s dominance continued. Its leaders became oligarchs – among them Armando Guebuza (president from 2005 to 2015), likely the country’s richest man, as well as Joaquim Chissano (1986–2004) and General Alberto Chipande, reportedly the man who fired the first shot in the war against the Portuguese.
Corruption became systemic, undermining governance. The worst scandal – the “Hidden Debts” affair, revealed in 2016 – cost the country over $11 billion and plunged nearly two million people into poverty.
Although the civil war officially ended in 1994, armed clashes resumed after 2013, partly due to dissatisfaction among Renamo factions. In 2017, a new war erupted in the north – often described as a jihadist insurgency, though it is fundamentally driven by local grievances against a corrupt southern elite.
Since 1964, Mozambique has arguably never experienced real peace. Its post-independence history is a painful sequence: Portuguese exploitation, Marxist centralism, civil war, neoliberal reform, elite corruption – and new conflicts.
A Fraudulent Election in 2024
Frelimo has won every election since 1994 – none of which have been fully free or fair. The most recent, held on October 9, 2024, was likely the most fraudulent yet.
Just five months before the election, Daniel Chapo was nominated as Frelimo’s presidential candidate. Until then, he was virtually unknown, with no senior party experience. At 48, he is not part of the liberation generation. He had served as governor of Inhambane Province and district administrator in Palma, a gas-rich region. Renamo and the MDM (Mozambique Democratic Movement) fielded weak candidates with little support.However, the main opposition figure was Venâncio Mondlane, who initially sought to run for Renamo but instead stood as an independent with support from the new Podemos party (Partido Otimista pelo Desenvolvimento de Moçambique) – mostly made up of disillusioned former Frelimo members. Mondlane, a guest at this year’s Oslo Freedom Forum, is charismatic and has an evangelical background. His campaign focused on denouncing Frelimo’s corruption and authoritarianism, though his platform lacked detailed policy proposals.
He struck a chord with the youth by promising jobs and adopting the slogan “Povo no poder” (“Power to the people”) – also the title of a famous track by rapper Azagaia, who died in 2023. Azagaia's lyrics expressed young people’s anger over corruption, inequality, and police violence. A memorial march in his honour was brutally suppressed.
Final election results weren’t announced until December 23. Preliminary figures on October 16 gave Chapo and Frelimo a wide lead. Officially, Chapo received 65% of the vote and Mondlane 24% – but fraud was rampant. Civil society groups and EU observers confirmed widespread irregularities.
Mass protests followed. The government responded with violence. A popular uprising erupted in October 2024 and continues in parts of the country. More than 300 people have been killed. Two of Mondlane’s closest aides were assassinated in public. Government repression has intensified. In June, eight of Mondlane’s supporters were sentenced to long prison terms.
A Faltering State
Mozambique's 50th anniversary took place amid social unrest, political instability, and economic hardship. The gravest issue remains the ongoing war in the province of Cabo Delgado that thethe Mozambican army -ineffective and plagued by corruption- has been unable to suppress. The only force that has made progress is a 4,000-strong contingent of Rwandan troops – deployed under a bilateral agreement, mainly to protect foreign investments, especially the French energy giant Total.
Over one million people have been internally displaced. In late June, Relief Web reported that 120 children had been kidnapped by insurgents.
Frelimo clings to power. While the party has brought in a younger generation of elite cadres, they control both politics and the economy, enriching themselves and moving their money to offshore havens like Dubai. A tight-knit political–economic class is determined to maintain its grip on the country and its wealth.
There are tensions within Frelimo, but they have not yet threatened the system. Outwardly, Mozambique appears democratic – elections are held, and presidents step down after two terms. Unlike in countries such as Uganda or Rwanda, it is the party that holds power, not a single strongman.
But Mozambique has never had a truly democratic structure. Frelimo remains authoritarian – shaped by its roots as a military movement. Once, it fought colonial rule. Today, it fights a young, poor, and frustrated population – 20% of Mozambicans are aged 15 to 24 – who feel excluded.
In Mozambique, as in Kenya and other parts of Africa, a young, educated, and digitally connected generation is rising up against entrenched regimes.
Their anger will not be pacified by rigged elections. The current pause in unrest is likely only temporary.
Will the next wave be even more explosive?
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This is a translation of an article that was first published by Panorama. Translation and edits by Aslak Orre and Joshua Franklin-Mann with the use of AI translation tools.
