Is the United States going to war with Iran?
The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of CMI.
In many ways, the U.S. approach to Iran mirrors its build‑up to the attack on Venezuela. Iran’s clerical leadership is under stronger international and domestic pressure than Venezuela, but it also commands far greater military power.
A comparison of the United States’ objectives, strategies, and instruments employed towards Venezuela with the ongoing escalation involving Iran provides certain indications of what the Iranian population and the international community might expect. Yet, it remains uncertain whether President Trump – and the United States more broadly – assigns the same strategic priorities to the Middle East as to Latin America, and how any such differences may shape future developments.
The Venezuela Model
In Venezuela, the situation moved from vague negotiations with President Nicolás Maduro, to military operations targeting boats accused of smuggling drugs, to the repositioning of US naval forces near the country, along with threats of a possible military strike. It eventually resulted in a limited military operation and the capture of Maduro and his wife, who were taken to the United States to face charges of “narco‑terrorism”.
However, this did not lead to regime change or a transfer of power to the opposition, led by Edmundo González and fronted by Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado, whom the Biden administration recognised as the winners of the 2024 presidential election.
Instead, under President Trump, the United States chose to maintain the existing undemocratic and repressive government, with Vice President Delcy Rodríguez stepping in as the new president. A deal was struck that secured US access to, and revenue from, Venezuela’s oil sector.
According to Professor Benedicte Bull, this amounted to the United States ignoring both democratic principles and international law, effectively establishing a new form of colonial‑style rule. The US argument was that Venezuela needed stability, and that oil revenues would benefit both countries. Democracy and Peace Prize winner Machado were put on hold, with the idea that political change could come later.
Turning to Iran
The way the United States is approaching Iran so far shows several similarities to its earlier moves against Venezuela: threats of military force and the steady deployment of larger naval units towards the Persian Gulf. But the backdrop is different. The conflict with Iran is already more escalated, the structure of the regime is different, and US forces in the region are more exposed to potential Iranian retaliation.
Venezuela and Iran are also organised very differently. Although both are authoritarian regimes, the ultimate political and spiritual authority in Iran lies with an Ayatollah, appointed for life, together with his religious Guardian Council, which again holds influence over the Revolutionary Guard. Beneath this sits an elected government and parliament (though only within the limits set by the Guardian Council). These institutions are often in conflict, yet they present a more united front when it comes to resisting external military intervention.
Iran has long been under sanctions from the UN, the EU and the United States because of its nuclear programme. In 2018, President Trump intensified these measures by pulling the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). More recently, the EU placed the Revolutionary Guard on its terrorist list, citing its use of force and the killing of perhaps as many as 20,000 civilians during nationwide anti‑government protests in early 2026.
In the summer of 2025, the United States and Israel carried out military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities and assassinated key military leaders. There have also been attacks on Iranian‑backed militias in the region, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, in an effort to weaken their influence.
One factor weighing against a broader military operation is the vulnerability of US forces in the region. The United States maintains air and military bases with between 30,000 and 40,000 troops in countries such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. Israel, which has previously been targeted by Iranian rocket attacks, is also exposed. Key US partners including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Turkey have strongly advised against military action.
An attack could also disrupt the region’s oil and gas sector and increase the risk of wider regional conflict and fragmentation. Large groups such as the Kurds (in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey) and the Baloch (in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan) might see an opportunity to push for their own statehood goals.
An Agreement About What?
As with Venezuela, it is unclear what exactly the United States wants to negotiate with Iran and whether this includes gaining influence over Iranian oil or preventing Iran from selling oil to Russia and China. According to The New York Times, on 28 January the United States put forward three main demands, while the issue of protecting demonstrators from government abuses was downplayed:
- a permanent end to uranium enrichment, and the elimination of all existing enriched material,
- limits on the range and number of ballistic missiles,
- an end to all support for Iranian “proxy groups” in the Middle East, including Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.
All of these demands are difficult for the Iranian leadership to accept, as they would weaken Iran’s ability to deter military threats and defend itself against external attack. At the same time, Iran may have noticed that President Trump places relatively little emphasis on democratic reforms or human‑rights protections and that the United States previously refrained from intervening when nationwide demonstrations were violently suppressed.
Scenario
Given the many different factors at play, and the fact that the goals of President Trump and the United States remain unclear, it is difficult to predict what will happen next, or how willing Washington will be to use military force or to coordinate such actions with Israel.
Another element is how closely Trump intends to follow the US National Security Strategy published in November 2025. This strategy emphasises an “America First” approach and prioritises control over the Western Hemisphere - and therefore Venezuela. Its stated ambitions in the Middle East are far more limited: the goal is to prevent China from dominating the region and its energy supplies, while avoiding “endless wars” that drain resources. The US also says it will not try to force countries to change their political systems but will “encourage and applaud reforms when they arise organically, without attempting to impose them from outside.”
A Full‑Scale Military Strike
There is reason to believe that President Trump -partly to avoid criticism from his MAGA supporters - will be reluctant to launch a military operation that could lead to heavy casualties and long‑term presence and costs. The case for such a strike would have to be that it could eliminate Iranian influence in the region and prevent further attacks on Israel. The security strategy also notes that Iran is already weakened: it has lost some influence in Syria; Hamas military power has been reduced; and both the Houthis and Hezbollah have been pushed back. These groups could also be targeted through limited missile or air strikes.
But it is hard to predict what kind of government would remain after a full‑scale attack, or who might take over. If the United States attempted to install a replacement government, or perhaps support the son of the former Shah, it could face strong public resistance. According to The New York Times, US Secretary of State Rubio recently said there is no simple answer to what would follow if the regime collapsed: “it is completely open, and no one knows who would take over.”
This, too, is something Washington will need to weigh carefully.
A Limited Military Operation
A more limited use of force, similar to the approach taken in Venezuela, therefore appears more likely. If successful, it would demonstrate that the United States is willing and able to project military power beyond its immediate sphere and to set boundaries on China’s growing influence in the region.
Such an operation could target Iran’s nuclear programme — potentially including ground forces to ensure complete destruction, as well as key military leaders, missile sites, and naval units if they pose a threat to US forces. This could be combined with strikes on Iran’s “proxy groups”.
If Iran’s religious and military institutions were weakened enough, the aim might be an internally driven change of power. However, given the strength of the Revolutionary Guard, this is far from guaranteed. Long‑term stability in both Iran and the wider region would require some parts of the state apparatus to cooperate with the United States.
This makes the situation high‑risk both for the US and for neighbouring countries.
A Negotiated Solution
The last of the more foreseeable outcomes is a negotiated agreement between the United States and parts of Iran’s leadership. Both sides have referred to ongoing discussions and the possibility of a framework for talks. On 6 February, representatives met directly in Oman, more recently in Switzerland. Aside from presenting their respective positions, there has reportedly been limited progress. Meanwhile, the United States has increased military pressure by sending yet another aircraft carrier towards Iran and repeating threats of possible strikes.
Regarding uranium enrichment, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme - which Trump withdrew the US from - are back on the table. This allows Washington to set its own terms in direct talks with Tehran. The room for negotiation on the missile programme and Iran’s support for regional groups is less clear; much depends on what the Iranian leadership can accept without “losing face and power”.
Promises of sanctions relief for Iranian oil exports, similar to the arrangement in Venezuela, combined with monitoring mechanisms to prevent sales to China and Russia, could help improve Iran’s economy and serve as a possible bargaining chip.
Yet the underlying threat remains the same: follow US demands or face increased military force.
As in the Venezuelan case, this approach would place issues of democracy and human rights protection further down the priority list in favour of short‑term stability and safeguarding American commercial interests. This is difficult for European countries and the Iranian diaspora to accept, but not necessarily for Washington’s regional partners.
This blog post is an adapted version of a commentary written by senior researcher Arne Strand for Panorama nyheter.
