PIDS journal

This article examines Lebanon’s informal, often opaque, migration governance in response to the Syrian refugee crisis (2012–2024), shaped significantly by EU external migration policies. Lebanon’s approach relies on elite bargains and back-door agreements, sidestepping formal policy processes within its sectarian, consociational political system. The EU’s influence, grounded in extensive financial aid, aims to contain refugee movements within Lebanon, aligning with its broader migration control objectives. However, Lebanon’s fragmented political structure enables it to selectively implement policies, leveraging its strategic position to secure funding without committing to strict compliance as a part of the country’s informal migration diplomacy. The result is a highly informalized, ad hoc governance model in which NGOs play a critical role, but where elite corruption and clientelism continue to hinder effective policy. This dynamic underscores the power asymmetry between the EU and Lebanon, and reveals the limitations of externally driven governance models in contexts marked by political division and elite capture.

Are John Knudsen

Research Professor, Coordinator HUMIG research group

Nadia Nameh

Project coordinator
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI)

Effects of Externalisation

Nov 2020 - Dec 2024

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