When saying no to war becomes a liability: Diaspora and civilian polarization in Sudan’s war
A glaring and disturbing reality of the war in Sudan is that it is increasingly difficult to say no to it.
For both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), continued fighting is a rational strategy to preserve power and impunity. Peace would threaten their political and economic dominance, given the military’s long and deeply entrenched role in Sudanese politics. While SAF and RSF have clear incentives to continue fighting, civilians face a different reality altogether. With public employees being told to go back to work or risk losing their salaries, and with the livelihoods collapsed for countless others, many simply have no choice but to go along with the war. Antiwar voices are attacked, and the very idea of peace is stigmatized. War has become normalized, and the political and social costs of calling for peace grow higher.
This polarization is not confined to Sudan; it is increasingly mirrored among Sudanese communities abroad where it undermines the possibility of constructive dialogue that could push for a peaceful settlement to the war. Instead of fostering solidarity and critical reflection, this fragmentation reinforces SAF and RSF’s narratives. Within this context, the Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces’, better known as Somoud[1] (meaning steadfastness or resilience in Arabic), calls for peaceful settlement are framed not as an important and necessary intervention, but as a liability.
The diaspora’s role in intensifying polarization
The war has intensified long-standing ethnic and regional divisions among Sudanese diasporas. In Europe, diaspora communities are sharply split between pro and antiwar positions, with the largest communities in the UK and France particularly polarized. A further division is one between SAF and RSF supporters. In November 2024, a delegation led by Former Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, held a seminar at Chatham House in London. Outside, protesters from the UK-based Sudanese diaspora opposed to civilian opposition to the war demonstrated, chanting slogans in support of SAF. In response, antiwar groups in the UK organized counterdemonstrations, denouncing the UAE and Egypt. Somoud leaders have increasingly become targets of harassment in this polarized environment. Stalking them during visits to Europe has evolved into a deliberate tactic to discredit them. The method is simple: one person films while one, or more others, shout accusations and slogans against Somoud. The video is then circulated on social media where it can quickly go viral. This strategy was evident during Somoud’s delegation visit to France and the Netherlands in January 2026.
Somoud leaders have increasingly become targets of harassment in this polarized environment.
These incidents draw the Sudanese diaspora into focus and make scrutinizing its role in both conflict and peace imperative. There is no doubt that Sudanese abroad provide vital financial lifelines, particularly since the outbreak of war in 2023. Remittances sustain families and relatives inside Sudan and in neighboring countries hosting Sudanese refugees. In addition to individual support, there are organized initiatives, from medical associations, professional networks, and charitable groups across the world, that collectively mobilize medical aid and humanitarian relief for refugees and internally displaced persons. At the same time, parts of the diaspora may be actively mobilizing support for the SAF and the RSF not only politically as noted, but also financially. This dual role has clear policy implications: harmful diaspora engagement must be curtailed or moderated. One avenue to counteract the destructive diaspora engagement is to establish inclusive diaspora dialogue platforms where Sudanese abroad can debate pathways to a democratic transition and genuine civilian rule and develop shared norms against financing or legitimizing the war. There is a stark paradox at the heart of diaspora politics: many left Sudan to escape war, yet some now advocate for its continuation. It is bewildering to justify positions that call for prolonging a war whose primary victims are civilians.
A narrative of civilian culpability
Beyond and above diaspora fragmentation, hostility toward calls for peace rests on a sustained, yet deeply flawed, narrative of civilian culpability. Astonishingly, some of the calls for the continuity of war come from those who championed the political change in 2019 including some resistance committees’ members and prodemocracy groups. They claim that civilians who entered into partnership with the military during the transition betrayed the young women and men who toppled the Islamist dictatorship. This narrative conveniently shifts blame away from SAF and the RSF and redirects it onto civilian leaders, who are themselves victims of the war, subject to politically motivated prosecutions, and deprived of basic rights such as obtaining passports and identity papers. In this way, the space for civilian-led peace is systematically eroded, and the war is allowed to entrench itself as the normal status of Sudanese political life. Calls by Somoud and broader civil society to end the war are met with a coordinated smear campaign led by SAF and its allies: Somoud leaders and others who challenge the narrative that supports the continuity of war are intimidated and arrested.
How polarization manifests inside Sudan
Within Sudan, polarization is actively engineered by the de facto authorities, the SAF and the RSF. In areas under SAF control, dissent against the war is criminalized. Anyone who protests the war risks being branded a traitor or an RSF collaborator, accusations that can lead to a death penalty or life imprisonment. On 31 January 2026, for example, a teacher in El-Obeid was arrested over antiwar posts. In RSF-held areas, limited demonstrations against the war are sometimes allowed, though these protests are often orchestrated and managed by the RSF. Criticism of RSF abuse, the harsh treatment of civilians, or lack of basic services is not tolerated. Both SAF and the RSF only allow demonstrations that serve their own narratives and interests.
Multilateral organizations and the diplomatic community reinforce the narrative of fragmentation by repeating that Sudanese civilians are divided. The African Union and IGAD regularly blame civilian disarray for the lack of effective interventions, yet they provide little explanation of this claim. Such reductionist assumptions about the role and responsibility of civilians reinforce dynamics that prolong the war. But the question no one seems to ask is: What is dividing them? The answer is simple: The war itself. The longer it continues, the deeper the fractures become. The greater risk is partition. Sudan may not come out of this war as one country.
Multilateral organizations and the diplomatic community reinforce the narrative of fragmentation by repeating that Sudanese civilians are divided.
The implication for policy is clear: strong pressure must be exerted on SAF and the RSF to stop the war, because it is the war, not some inherent flaw in Sudanese society or antiwar groups, that is driving polarization among civilians. Calling for an end to the fighting should be the starting point of any serious engagement with Sudan. This is a matter of common sense, but in current diplomatic practice, common sense appears to be in short supply or is not common anymore.
No war is dignified
On their 2026 tour to several European capitals, Somoud leaders delivered their core messages to the diplomatic community: the need to intensify diplomatic pressure to stop the fighting, the importance of supporting a Sudanese-led political process, and the central responsibility of the Islamist actors in igniting and sustaining the war. They also called for expanding the UN arms embargo and broadening the jurisdiction of the ICC to cover all of Sudan, not only Darfur. It’s unclear whether these proposals will get any real support from European governments, given how little attention Sudan receives and how slow the quad’s (the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) initiative has been. But an even larger question is: can any approach that is largely rooted in liberal peace frameworks solve Sudan’s crisis?
There are no moral grounds for why the war in Sudan should continue. While SAF and those behind it claim the war is one of dignity, there is no dignity in a war that is killing and displacing millions. Equally, the RSF’s rhetoric about a new and just Sudan cannot justify the war and the heinous crimes committed by the RSF and its allies. It is indefensible to support armed actors whose conduct has become increasingly lawless and predatory, with women and children being primary victims. Instead of using the dire humanitarian catastrophe to argue for an immediate end to the fighting, prowar constituencies instrumentalize suffering to continue the war. This instrumentalization deepens polarization and incites hatred. The only viable path forward is sustained and coordinated pressure on SAF and the RSF to agree to a credible and verifiable ceasefire. Only when the fighting stops can Somoud and other civilian forces begin to chart a peaceful political trajectory for Sudan and lay the foundation for an inclusive civilian-led transition.
This Sudanese Perspectives blog post is written by Munzoul Assal. Assal holds a PhD in social anthropology from the University of Bergen, Norway. Prior to joining CMI as Senior Researcher he was Professor of social anthropology at the University of Khartoum, Director of the Peace Research Institute, and Dean of Scientific Research.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the SNAC project or CMI.
[1] Somoud split from the former coalition Taqaddum, of which some members joined the parallel government that was established by the RSF and its allies in July 2025. It justified the split by arguing that a parallel government would pave the way for partition.
