The accountability function of the courts in Tanzania and Zambia
This comparative analysis of the judiciaries in Tanzania and Zambia, finds that neither has developed a strong accountability function vis-à-vis their government. It goes on to address why judges in the two countries rarely have restrained the government in politically significant cases, identifying three sets of factors that may explain why the judges perform as they do: the legal culture; the institutional structure; and the social legitimacy of the courts. The article concludes that there are signs in the Tanzanian judiciary of a certain willingness to hold the government accountable in politically salient cases, but that their opportunity to do so is limited, due to institutional, social and political factors restricting the flow of constitutional cases. The Zambian courts have more political cases and opportunities for fulfilling an accountability function vis-à-vis the executive, but are reluctant to assert such authority. This is attributed to the legal culture and to political pressure.
Democratization and the judiciary. The accountability function of courts in new democracies
Gloppen, Siri, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (eds.)
Also in this volume:
- Introduction : The accountability function of the courts in new democracies
Gloppen, Siri, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar
VAT receipt lotteries: Can they increase tax revenues in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, George Hellar, Ephraim Mdee, Ingrid Hoem Sjursen, Vincent Somville
Citizens’ preferences for taxation of internationally mobile corporations: Evidence from Tanzania
Ivar Kolstad, Arne Wiig & Odd-Helge Fjeldstad
Review of Development Economics
Understanding the resource curse: A large-scale experiment on corruption in Tanzania
Alexander Cappelen, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Donald Mmari, Ingrid Hoem Sjursen and Bertil Tungodden
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization