The Effects on Agrarian Contracts of a Governmental Intervention into Bonded Labor in the Western Terai of Nepal
We study an effective intervention into a specific form of bonded labor. The intervention led to a shift in agrarian contracts, from bonded labor to sharecropping. By comparing the pre- and post-liberation contracts we evaluate theoretical models of agrarian contracts. We suggest three mechanisms that jointly explain why landlords offered bonded labor contracts pre-liberation. One mechanism we apply to define bonded labor in contrast to tied labor. The mechanism, where the outside option as casual labor is endogenously determined by the choice of long-term contract, implies a trade-off for the landlord between efficiency and redistribution of surplus.
Interim Governance Arrangements in Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings
Incubating change-makers. Youth-driven innovative approaches to accountability in Nepal
Jenny Bentley, Saul Mullard
Social accountability and water integrity: Learning from experiences with participatory and transparent budgeting in Ethiopia and Nepal
Birke Otto, Floriane Clement, Binayak Das, Hari Dhungana, Lotte Feuerstein, Girma Senbeta, Jasmina Van Driel