Elite behaviour and citizen mobilization
This paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998-2014. For well-functioning democracies, we find a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout, suggesting that self-serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilization rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.
Understanding Inequality Within Households
Ingvild Almås, Charlotte Ringdal and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen
Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics
Depression and labor supply: Evidence from the Netherlands
Charlotte Ringdal, Frank Rootjes
Journal of Economics and Human Biology