Elite behaviour and citizen mobilization
This paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998-2014. For well-functioning democracies, we find a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout, suggesting that self-serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilization rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.
Protected tax havens: Cornering the market through international reform?
How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania
Ivar Kolstad, Arne Wiig
Non-resource taxation in a resource rich setting: A broader tax base will enhance tax compliance in Tanzania
What does it mean to be poor? Investigating the qualitative-quantitative divide in Mozambique
Sam Jones and Inge Tvedten