This paper presents three propositions about tax collection in local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, the "balance of power" between elected councillors and the local government administration is important. Third, the presence of donors in a local authority may be crucial by changing the "balance of power" with implications for accountability and democratic development. These results may explain why we observe widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities.
Chinese Buddhism in Africa: The Entanglement of Religion, Politics and Diaspora
Xuefei Shi, Hangwei Li
Formalization of sand mining in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Bert Suykens and Christina Shitima
Towards harmonised financing of frontline health service providers in Tanzania
Ottar Mæstad, Peter Binyaruka