This paper presents three propositions about tax collection in local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, the "balance of power" between elected councillors and the local government administration is important. Third, the presence of donors in a local authority may be crucial by changing the "balance of power" with implications for accountability and democratic development. These results may explain why we observe widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities.
Doing global investments the Nordic way. The 'business case' for Equinor’s support to union work among its employees in Tanzania
Focaal: Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology
Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania
Charlotte Ringdal and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen
Does an economics education produce technocratic paternalists? Experimental evidence from Tanzania
Ivar Kolstad, Arne Wiig and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad
Journal of Development Studies