Summary

• Restrictive legal reforms and increased judicial control have significantly narrowed the operational space for civil society and human rights activists in Zimbabwe.

• Shifts in international donor strategies and reduced funding for rights-based work have further weakened civil society capacity and sustainability.

• Many civil society organisations have adapted to this constrained environment by avoiding confrontational advocacy and politically sensitive issues.

Background

The removal of Mugabe in November 2017 demonstrated the importance of the military in Zimbabwean politics. Following the transition, there has been an increased militarisation of the state, with several former army generals appointed to cabinet positions. This consolidated the conflation of party, military and state. This increased role of the military became evident in the aftermath of the contested July 30, 2018, elections, when the military joined the police and used live fire to disperse protesters demanding the release of the election results. Six people died from gun shots, and 35 were injured during the clampdown. Since then, violence has been regularly used to deal with rights activists and curtail freedom of association and expression.

In parallel, a pattern of weaponisation of the law and the judiciary emerged. The Mnangagwa administration amended the constitution to give the president excessive powers over the judiciary and parliament, introduced laws to curtail freedom of expression and control the civil and political space. A Constitutional Amendment adopted in April 2021, further concentrated powers in the presidency, threatening constitutionalism and democratic processes. Furthermore, to displace civil society, government aligned organisations were established in different sectors. Currently, 14 party-aligned livelihood and economic empowerment programmes and businesses (cartels), among them the First Lady’s Angel of Hope Foundation, concentrate economic power in their hands, stifling the space and role for civil society.

Over time, the consolidation of political, military, and economic power has been reinforced through an expanding body of legislation, systematically narrowing the space for civic engagement. Although some laws from the Mugabe era restricting freedoms and civic liberties were removed, their underlying architecture of control has largely been preserved and intensified. Public order legislation continues to grant broad police powers over gatherings and meetings, in effect making it a criminal offense to exercise the right of freedom, peaceful assembly, and association. More recent legal reforms have introduced broadly defined national security and sovereignty offences that effectively criminalise criticism of the government. This has been accompanied by the state’s acquisition of sweeping powers to interfere in the internal operations of NGOs.

At the same time, donor funding for civil society has been drastically reduced.

After the 2013 elections, where ZANU PF won a two thirds parliamentary majority, major international partners, such as the EU, shifted from confrontation to re engagement with the government. Fatigue with the long-drawn reform agenda in Zimbabwe, combined with a belief that greater change might be achieved by engaging reform minded factions within the ruling party rather than continuing to support opposition forces, underpinned this shift. As a result, donor support for civil society declined significantly.

Other donors diverted funding away from human rights related work towards less political issues such as climate justice and just transition. A new funding architecture involving bidding, consortium building amongst civil society emerged as a requirement for support. Following shifts in donor priorities, a general reduction in aid from Western donors, and the restrictive legal environment, funding to civil society and rights activism dwindled. Faced with an environment where protests are ‘illegal’, regional and international networks criminalised, media spaces limited, recourse to the courts restricted and donor funding disappearing, it has become almost impossible to work on “political” issues. Civil society and rights activists had to quickly adapt and adjust their mandates, priorities and strategies to survive.

Five coping strategies

1: Re-engagement with Government

The main response to the increased repression and withdrawal of international support for Zimbabwe's civil society has been de-politisation and re-engagement with the state. Several CSOs bought into the international community’s strategy of engaging with perceived reformers within the ruling party and Government, and in the state bureaucracy. This was aided by the various platforms for stakeholder consultations that were established such as the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF), the Structured Dialogue Platform on Arrears Clearance and Debt Resolution, as well as personal relationships cultivated over time. They found that there was more openness for dialogue on livelihood, socio-economic and labour issues than on issues concerning civil and political rights, including elections.

Some CSOs, particularly in the health sector (including HIV aids) reported that the relationship with government had improved somewhat compared to the Mugabe era, recognising that “HIV is a major fundraiser”. Gender rights associations, despite a more competitive and challenging funding situation, reported that the working environment was somewhat more conducive under the new political leadership. Especially LGBT+ organisations felt that their situation was better than under Mugabe as their issues were less politicised (for now), making it easier to work with government and with civil society organisations.

For the media, some developments offered better prospects for working with the state. Most importantly, the 2020 Freedom of Information Act was seen as an improvement on the former legislation. It allowed citizens to access information held by public and private entities to ensure public accountability and protect rights, in line with Section 62 of the Constitution.

The re-engagement strategy was actively facilitated by the government through the deliberate creation of structures for social dialogue such as the Political Actors Dialogue and, the Presidential Advisory Council, (both launched in January 2019, the Matabeleland Collective (March, 2019), and the Structured Dialogue Platform on ‘Arrears Clearance and Debt Resolution’ (December 2022) which the Government established in conjunction with international development partners, to institutionalize dialogue on economic and governance reforms. There is also the pre-existing National Economic Consultative Forum and the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, which was transformed into a statutory body in 2019. As highlighted above, issues around livelihood, health and socio-economic rights, including LGBT easily gained traction compared to civil and political rights (governance) and electoral reforms.

2: Localisation and self-reliance

Faced with shrinking donor support, a recurring theme amongst organisations, especially the larger and membership-based CSOs, is the importance of self-reliance and generating local resources, through their membership base or informal support networks. Part of this strategy is cost-cutting measures and ‘doing more with less’. This includes restructuring towards leaner organisations, with a small core of permanent staff, remote working arrangements, online training or relying on cheaper training venues. Some external partners also supported capacity building initiatives towards greater self-reliance and sustainable funding options before departing.

The strategy aims to create a more robust resource base, but also to strengthen local agendas, and foster deeper legitimacy, and possibly also make the organisations less visible and vulnerable to state repression. Some CSOs discussed innovative approaches such as “hybridisation” where rights advocacy is combined with social entrepreneurship or service provision to create more resilient funding streams and help insulate organisations from dependency on foreign aid.

Some also expressed that their strategy was to “keep calm and carry on”. This was expressed by activists engaged in court-centred strategies—despite realistic assessments that the efforts may not produce immediate results, but in the hope that they can maintain visibility, create a paper trail to document abuses, and offer symbolic victories that sustain morale.

3: Going regional

Another strategy contemplated by some media associations and CSOs was to move the organisations and main activities to South Africa and Zambia and to mobilise the diaspora in the region through regional networks, both for material and political support. To illustrate; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC), a network of over 80 civil society organisations advocating for democracy and human rights since 2001, at its 16th Annual General Meeting on January 21, 2026, announced the dissolution of its organisational structure with immediate effect, marking the end of a 25-year-old civil society project. The coalition framed this move as a “strategic repositioning” rather than a total retreat, aiming to adapt to the hostile environment. Some networks' member organisations discussed the possibilities of creating a regional boomerang effect by using regional governments to pressure the regime in Zimbabwe.

4: Shifting field and depoliticisation

A noticeable strategy adopted by Zimbabwean CSOs is to shift towards less overtly political issues, such as social and economic rights, and environmental rights, which are aligned with donor priorities. Some have indicated the intention to step in to provide essential services in areas where public services fall short, especially in health, education, and social welfare. Local associations reported that they were in dialogue with the ZANU-PF government arguing that they would be more knowledgeable about development needs than local governments.

A local association that had worked on political engagement among youth for a long time is deliberately moving away from electoral programs to livelihood issues. They were explicit that they made the decision to refocus to livelihood themes that are meaningful for the youth and not deemed to be political, due to the decline in engagement in and funding for work on governance, democracy and human rights.

Others have adopted new activist strategies such as online activism, arts and satire, and flash demonstrations.

5: New partnerships to meet new funding requirements

Many Zimbabwean NGOs have decades long experience with collaborations with international organisations, foreign governments, and multilateral institutions. For example, CARE Zimbabwe, World Vision, and Plan International have worked with partners such as the European Union, USAID, UN agencies, and various embassies to implement development and humanitarian projects over decades. However, the combined decline in international donor funding, new funding requirements and international donors being concerned with the Patriot Act and its implications, have led to major shifts and uncertainty even among the largest and most experienced NGOs. The 2025 PVO Amendment Act, requires CSOs that were registered as Trusts to reregister as PVOs and the prolonged uncertainty around reregistration has resulted in donors being hesitant to support organisations that have not reregistered. The uncertainty is particularly high amongst civic and political rights organisations.

New donor requirements (bidding, consortium-building) are increasingly forcing CSOs into competitive partnerships and while the more complex bidding structures demand more administrative capacity, few international donors are willing to provide support for core activities and local priorities.

Conclusion

The context in which rights activists operate in Zimbabwe, and in much of the global south has changed profoundly and is increasingly characterised by democratic regression and autocratic repression. Heightened geo-political tensions and the rise of right-wing governments in the global north have weakened international cooperation, solidarity and support. As donors disengage or redirect funding towards new priorities such as climate change and the environment, a new aid architecture based on bidding and consortia is emerging, with declining attention to civil society and rights activism in the global south.

The case of Zimbabwe offers valuable lessons on how human rights organisations adapt their advocacy strategies under shifting political conditions. Facing shrinking civic space, reduced funding and limited access to transnational networks, many CSOs are avoiding confrontational advocacy to preserve operational space. Instead, they are re engaging with the state, reshaping policy advocacy, and distancing themselves from issues related to elections, human rights and citizen engagement.

Key insights for stakeholders

The experiences of right activists and CSOs operating in a context of shrinking civil society spaces and dwindling external funding in Zimbabwe offer lessons that can be adapted to other contexts. These lessons include the following:

For activists

• Undertake a power analysis to identify individuals or elements within the state that can be engaged to advance your cause and advocacy issue(s);
• Explore possibilities for localisation and self-reliance, especially relevant for larger, membership-based organisations;
• Relocate to operate from regional bases and seek support from regional governments and other key stakeholders to apply pressure to your home Government;
• Shift towards less overtly political issues that are aligned with donor priorities
• Create new partnerships for joint bidding and networking to meet new funding requirements.

For international partners and donors

• Invest in in-depth analysis of the political context, including government-internal dynamics, civil society strength, and the legal, political and economic conditions they operate within.
• Provide flexible and core funding to CSOs and support to allow for transition strategies.
• Participatory redetermination of priority funding areas and requirements

Timeline: Key laws restricting civic space in Zimbabwe