Iran: A “no rule” war - where might that lead?
The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of CMI.
Israel and the United States (US) jointly attacked Iran killed Iran’s Supreme Leader but this did not lead to an immediate regime collapse. Instead, Iran launched a massive regional retaliation far beyond US and Israeli targets. A week into the war, there are still few indications of what the military campaign or regime-change ambitions might achieve, apart from widespread destruction and displacement.
In a previous blog, I outlined three potential scenarios for a war in Iran, comparing it to the US military intervention in Venezuela. The three scenarios were: a full-scale military strike, a more limited military operation, or a negotiated solution. What unfolded was a joint Israeli-US military strike on the morning of Saturday, 1 March, which killed Iran’s religious and military leadership, though it has not yet escalated into a full scale military invasion as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite losing its religious and military leaders, Iran initiated a maximalist retaliation, launching missile and drone attacks on civilian and industrial targets across the Gulf region. Such an extreme response is a gamble; it may backfire if these countries begin military counteroffensives.
Arguments made for the military attack
The US and Israel justified the attack by claiming it was necessary to eliminate an immediate threat from the Iranian regime. They argued Iran could not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of striking Israel, and even Europe and the US. The attack was also framed as a call for regime change, with President Trump placing responsibility on Iranians to seize the opportunity to “take over your government”.
Others in the US administration, such as Defence Secretary Hegseth, has downplayed the ambition for regime change. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rubio indicated that the US was aware Israel was about to attack, and therefore joined in. President Trump signalled willingness to resume talks or collaborate with elements within the Iranian government, similar to the Venezuelan model, if they chose a Supreme Leader he could accept. If not, he warned that the leader “won’t last long”, implying the Iranian regime would have to come up with a new alternative
The Pentagon has stated there is no clear timeline for the military campaign, but has promised that that it will not become another endless war. Yet, Trump and Hegseth repeatedly suggest that the US is about to scale up its attacks.
It remains unclear whether these partly conflicting statements reflect internal disagreements, lack of strategy, deliberate ambiguity, or disinformation. It might, however, influence Iran’s strategy and responses.
Iran’s response
The large number of Iranian leaders killed that first morning, as many as 48 according to President Trump, did not stop Iran from initiating an extensive military counteroffensive. This suggests Iran was prepared for such an attack and had alternative command structures ready, along with contingency strategies.
Some observers refer to the Iranians having instituted a decentralised Mosaic Defence doctrine, with a command function distributed across 31 regional units. These units are equipped, staffed and trained to operate independently against technologically superior forces. This doctrine means that the selection of military targets (which may also be preset) may currently be handled by local commanders, making the responses more unpredictable.
This decentralised model does not rule out a continued top-level leadership, or a set of alternative command lines, capable of adjusting their responses as the conflict develops.
Beyond the region?
Iran has continued attacking infrastructure, hotels, airfields and even oil/gas fields and production plants in Gulf countries and even Saudi Arabia. It, or groups supporting the country, has even attacked beyond the region, with drones targeting UK bases in Cyprus, and more recently Azerbaijan and Turkey. In doing so, Iran is challenging the Gulf countries’ entire business model.
Why does Iran choose an approach that seems so strategically unwise?
One explanation is the potential of crippling the international energy market. This seems a likely explanation considering that Iran has also threatened to close the important Hormuz strait and initiated attacks on oil carrying vessels, and even harbours in Oman. With increasing oil and gas prices the conflict has become internationalised.
Some observers believe Iran’s strategy reflects the decentralised Mosaic approach, with different units just continuing their preprogrammed targeting. Others point to a possible Iranian calculation that fear of financial losses may push Gulf states to withdraw their support to the US-Israel alliance, or at least not retaliate against Iran. A similar but more sinister analysis is that the Iranian leadership knows it is cornered and therefore deliberately raises the regional and global costs of any attempt to overthrow the regime. Neither of these theories are necessarily correct, but it is evident that Iran does not have fixed limits when it comes to whom they attack or what means they apply – possibly beyond the Middle East.
A different explanation is that Iran’s regional influence has been severely limited over the past year. Syria is no longer under their direct influence, and the military capacity of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been weakened. Iran’s toolbox of conventional influence has shrunk.
Israel, that appears emboldened by the US support, has seized the opportunity to expand their control over the West Bank and initiated a large military offensive inside Lebanon, including strikes on Beirut.
The US has reminded Iran, and the world, that they neither are bound by international rules when they torpedoed an Iranian naval ship in international waters outside Sri Lanka.
The war has moved beyond the region, but we don’t yet know where and how it might develop further – even if the Iranian government is militarily defeated.
Regime change or stability
Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth at a Pentagon news conference insisted that the war has just begun and that Iran cannot outlast the United States’ ability to intercept strikes. Yet neither he nor other US leaders offer any clear answer for what follows. Parts of the Iranian diaspora expect and advocate for a regime change, but it remains unclear whether the Iranian regime is sufficiently weakened to collapse or if it strong enough to deal with an internal opposition. It is equally uncertain whether anyone in the leadership is willing, or allowed, to seek a negotiated solution with the US.
A major question is whether the US and/or Israel is willing to deploy large military forces on Iranian soil. President Trump has not ruled out this option, though it would potentially involve high numbers of casualties and prospects of a sustained military presence. There are reports suggesting that the US has approached Iranian Kurdish groups to attack the Iranian regime from the northwest. Iran has certainly taken notice, as they have targeted Kurdish groups in Iraq. There is also a potential for the US support to other Iranian minority groups, and even speculation that the Islamic State could be tempted to strike the Iranian regime, but such isolated attacks are unlikely to overthrow the Iranian regime.
Battle on, or?
The Iranian regime has appointed Mojtaba Khamenei, son of Ali Khamenei, as their Supreme leader. This indicates a continuation of present policies for the time being, at least. It is uncertain how long Iran can sustain its attacks in the region and block the Hormuz strait, though it has demonstrated larger capacity than anticipated, placing significant strain on regional countries’ defence capabilities. The GCC states are not unified, nor necessarily in agreement, in their approaches to Iran and Israel. The GCC is further characterized by some internal rivalry and different approaches to foreign policy. They will therefore likely carefully weigh their alternatives, keeping their options open.
Meanwhile, the war is equally questioned in the US, including from within the MAGA movement. This may - especially in light of the upcoming midterm elections – limit the US appetite for war unless it is not quickly brought to what might be termed a “successful outcome”.
One can hope that some communication channels remain open. Yet while resumed negotiations may (at least temporarily) end the warfare and reestablish energy flows, the question of who should govern Iran and the region, remains open.
This CMI blog post is written by Arne Strand, senior researcher at CMI.
