War on Iran, Turmoil in Sudan: Geopolitics at the Red Sea Frontier

Sudan is often treated as peripheral to the Middle East, but in geopolitical terms it is anything but. Sudan sits at its strategic core. The war with Iran that erupted on 28 February has dominated attention in the Gulf, the Levant, and Israel. However, the conflict’s ripple effects radiate intensely toward Sudan, a state positioned at a critical intersection of regional rivalries. Its long and entangled history with Iran ensures that even shocks originating at the “center” of the confrontation reverberate powerfully across Sudan’s political landscape.

Sudan’s shifting alliances and complicated history with Iran
Sudan has a long history of shifting alliances. In recent years, following the Islamists’ rise to power in 1989, and due to American sanctions, Sudan has maneuvered complex, oscillating relationships with Iran and the Gulf monarchies.

During the 1990s, Sudan maintained close ties with Iran, since the Iranian revolution of 1979 was an inspiration for Sudanese Islamists. This resulted in security cooperation where Iran trained Sudanese security agents during the early 1990. Iran also contributed to the establishment of Sudan’s Military-Industrial Complex (MIC). For example, the Yarmouk military factory, which produced weapons to meet defense needs in Sudan, was part-owned, staffed, and supported by Iran in the 1990s and 2000s.This external help facilitated the creation of MIC,a powerful and corrupt ecosystem linking Sudan’s military with defense industries and Islamist political elites.

Israeli concerns about Iranian weapons further being funnelled through Sudan to Hamas led to Israeli strikes on targets in Sudan, including the killing of an alleged smuggler in Port Sudan in 2012.

Sudan was in a state of acute economic vulnerability by the mid‑2010s as Sudan’s economy was collapsing following the 2011 secession of South Sudan which removed over 70% of Sudan’s oil production and 50% of its fiscal revenues. The loss triggered spiralling inflation, chronic foreign‑exchange shortages, declining reserves, and an urgent need for external financial support. At the same time, American sanctions severely restricted Sudan’s access to international lending, investment, and debt relief, leaving the Gulf monarchies among the few actors capable of providing immediate cash injections, fuel assistance, and deposits into Sudan’s central bank. These difficulties pushed Sudan to realign itself with the Gulf countries, and, as a consequence, Sudan came under pressure to cut ties with Iran. This included Saudi Arabia blocking Bashir’s flight in 2013. Sudan further secured Saudi and Emirati economic support by sending troops to Yemen in 2015 to support Saudi Arabia and UAE’s war against the Houthis; a rebel-movement backed by Iran. Khartoum then went on to sever its relationship with Iran in 2016, and Sudan aligned itself more closely with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In short, Sudan’s need for Gulf funding ultimately outweighed its earlier political and ideological ties to Iran.

Sudan’s evolving, but incomplete, normalization process with Israel under the Abraham Accords framework complicates Sudan’s balancing act further although normalization has been mostly used rhetorically as a tool to lift economic sanctions and reintegrate Sudan into the international economy. This was made clear following the eruption of war in 2023, and given SAF’s need for arms, Sudan restored its diplomatic ties with Iran and exchanged ambassadors in July 2024, ending eight years of rupture. Reports indicate that Iran supplied SAF with weapons, including drones, that allowed it to pushback against the RSF.

In summary, Sudan’s relationship with Iran has fluctuated over the years, from periods of close military and ideological cooperation to phase of distancing and rupture under pressure from Gulf states and Western governments.

The impact of war on Sudan’s foreign policy
The U.S/Israeli war on Iran has sharply narrowed Sudan’s room for maneuver in its renewed relationship with Tehran. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly condemned Iran’s attacks on Gulf states while pointedly avoiding any reference to U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran—an attempt to signal neutrality toward Washington and the Gulf while not provoking Tehran. The Islamist movement, a key political backer of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), echoed this carefully calibrated position, condemning Iran’s attacks on Gulf targets and insisting that its primary focus remained the war inside Sudan.

SAF depends heavily on Iranian‑supplied weaponry, especially drones, for battlefield gains. At the same time, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is acutely aware of the risks of appearing aligned with Iran. His warning against openly supporting Tehran came after the al‑Baraa Bin Malik Brigade - an armed faction linked to Sudan’s Islamist movement - publicly expressed solidarity with Iran. Their statement threatened to pull Sudan into a geopolitical confrontation it cannot afford.

The U.S. responded decisively. Washington designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood which it views as encompassing both the Sudanese Islamist Movement and the al‑Baraa Bin Malik Brigade as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization, with a formal Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) listing set to take effect on March 16, 2026. The U.S. accuses the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood of mass executions, ethnically targeted killings, and receiving training and support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The designation significantly raises the stakes for SAF: any tolerance of, or cooperation with, the SMB exposes the army to sanctions, loss of external support, and heightened international isolation.

The Gulf states, especially the UAE, strongly welcomed Washington’s move. Saudi Arabia also welcomed Washington’s decision. Their longstanding hostility toward Muslim Brotherhood–aligned actors in the region aligns with U.S. concerns, placing Sudan in an even tighter strategic bind. The designation risks deepening fragmentation within Sudan’s Islamist movement and adds pressure on Burhan.

For now, SAF is attempting to leverage the situation to its advantage by calling on the U.S. to apply the same terrorist designation to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Whether this strategy succeeds remains uncertain, but what is clear is that the Iran–U.S./Israel war has exposed the fragility of Sudan’s balancing act - caught between its dependence on Iranian arms, its need for Gulf political and financial support, and its vulnerability to U.S. sanctions. SAF is also vulnerable to its dependence on Islamist militias as ground troops and with US sanctioning these militias it is unclear what SAF’s next step is.

Weakening of SAF and Islamist fragmentation
Regardless of Sudan’s position on the war on Iran, the crisis in the Middle East has enormous consequences for Sudan. It could potentially weaken SAF and its allies and embolden its foes. The consequences of the war can be explained through its effects on the internal dynamics in Sudan.

The war on Iran interacts dangerously with Sudan’s already fragile internal security landscape. Mounting international pressure on Sudan to distance itself from Iran threatens to cut off access to the weapon supplies and ideological support that parts of the security apparatus still rely on. Islamist elements who see Iran as an ally against Western influence may interpret the war against Iran as a broader campaign against Islam. This dynamic is already visible with the al‑Baraa Bin Malik Brigadeas’s declared support for Iran. The episode illustrates deeper internal fractures: Sudan’s political and military elites are not monolithic, and the escalating pressure on Iran risks intensifying internal blame‑shifting and accusations of jeopardizing Sudan’s national interest.

Sudan’s rapid diplomatic repositioning - particularly its early condemnation of Iran - may alienate parts of the Islamist base that view the Iranian revolution as a symbol of resistance to imperialism. For these groups, any break with Iran could be framed as betrayal or moral capitulation. Such narratives can fuel further radicalization, widen ideological divides inside the Islamist movement, and weaken the cohesion of the political networks that SAF still depends upon.

Even before the war on Iran, Sudan was a proxy arena. Now that Sudan is caught between rival blocs, it could prompt arms flows through Sudan, which will lead to further internal destabilization.

Humanitarian and economic pressures
The wider regional conflict is already imposing severe humanitarian and economic costs on Sudan. The closure of airspace, disruptions to shipping routes, and damage to port infrastructure are constraining the passage of humanitarian aid at a moment when Sudan faces one of the world’s worst displacement and hunger crises. Increased insurance costs, rerouting of vessels, and surcharges further delay lifesaving cargo. The consequences are immediate: malnutrition, rising mortality, and compromised disease‑control efforts across besieged urban centers and rural areas.

Economically, Sudan - already deeply import‑dependent - faces tightening supplies and rising prices for fuel and essential goods. Officials have warned that global oil price spikes will widen Sudan’s budget deficit, further depress the Sudanese pound, and amplify inflationary shocks. While gold revenues might appear to offer a cushion, they overwhelmingly benefit the belligerents and armed networks that control mines and smuggling routes. The result is more resources for war and fewer for civilians.

An opportunity to re-brand?
Iran is currently at war and politically isolated. By distancing itself from Iran, Sudan presents itself as a responsible partner to Western and Gulf states and audiences. Sudan’s position may appeal to the Gulf countries concerned with Red Sea security, counterterrorism, and regional instability although not all Gulf states are on the same page when it comes to these issues- certainly not Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But the distancing from Iran could support Sudan’s pitch for reintegration into the global system.

Burhan, SAF’s leader, is walking a tight rope in his relationship with the Islamists. He may portray Islamists with links to Iran as risky, justifying crackdowns or political sidelining in the name of security and international credibility. This may allow a rebranding of the de facto government and redefine its Islamist allies as moderate or national in outlook although this is less likely and depends on the outcome of the war on Iran. Aligning with the Gulf countries does not provide a blank check for the government, given the grave violations of international humanitarian law and grotesque atrocities due to the ongoing war in Sudan. Additionally, given the economic repercussions of the Iran war, it is less likely that funds will be forthcoming from Gulf countries to Sudan in the immediate future or even if the war on Iran comes to an end soon. As the conflict with Iran intensifies, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two key backers of the belligerents, will focus on their own security. This may translate into slower arms and cash pipelines and a thinning of diplomatic support or patronage that the warring parties relied on to survive. This, nonetheless, could be a good thing. Fewer external resources can reduce the oxygen that fuels proxy escalation. At the same time, local actors may simultaneously try to reshape conditions on the ground, producing sudden shifts and unpredictable spikes in violence.

Increased geopolitical tensions and risk of proxy war
The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz is reshaping Red Sea geopolitics and elevating the strategic relevance of Port Sudan. With Hormuz largely shut down, global and regional powers are rapidly reassessing alternative maritime footholds, amplifying interest in Sudan’s Red Sea coastline. Iran has long sought a naval presence in Port Sudan, and its renewed arms transfers to SAF underscore its ambition to re-establish a strategic position along the Red Sea frontier. At the same time, Gulf states, Egypt, Turkey, and Russia have all courted Khartoum for port access or basing rights, reflecting intensifying competition for influence along this critical corridor. The risk of proxy escalation is further heightened by the Houthis - one of Iran’s most active regional proxies - who have announced the resumption of attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in direct response to the U.S.-Israel military campaign against Iran. Their reactivation transforms the Red Sea into a second chokepoint, creating a volatile environment in which Sudan’s ports, especially Port Sudan, are either viable alternatives or military targets.

Safe to say, Sudan while seemingly peripheral sits uncomfortably at the intersection of Iranian ambitions, Gulf anxieties, and great‑power maritime competition. Beyond statements of solidarity with Gulf monarchies and condemnation of Iranian attacks, there is little that Sudan could contribute. The U.S. sanction of the Sudanese Islamist movement and its armed brigade is a new chapter in the country’s troubles and may lead to isolation it experienced during the thirty-year reign of the Islamists. In the meantime, the war in Sudan will be ignored even more.

This Sudanese Perspectives blog post is written by Munzoul Assal, professor and senior researcher at CMI, and Liv Tønnessen, research professor at CMI. 

The views expressed in this post are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the SNAC project or CMI.