When capitals clash, borderlands burn: The case for soft borders in Sudan and Ethiopia
In the early morning of 1 August 2026, gunfire erupted again in Ethiopia as clashes resumed between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and Tigray forces in the Shererina area, which borders Sudan. Later, on 11 August 2026, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, seized Geisan and Kurmuk from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the southern Blue Nile Region, near the Ethiopian border. These developments risk triggering a new cycle of forced displacement, insecurity, and disruption to the economic and social activities on which border communities in both countries rely. The most pressing question remains: What price are Sudanese border communities paying, already burdened by chronic vulnerability, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and a severe lack of basic services?
The challenging diplomatic relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia
The diplomatic relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia is characterised by deep historical and geographical complexities, which manifest in protracted border disputes and mutual accusations of supporting rebel groups. This dynamic reflects a recurring pattern in the policies of both countries, each of which has, at various times, adopted a strategy of "mutual harm" across their shared border, exploiting each other's internal conflicts to achieve strategic objectives. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ethiopia supported Southern Sudanese insurgents with arms, training, and political backing in retaliation for Sudan aiding Eritrean rebels fighting the Ethiopian government. Historically, Sudan supported Eritrea politically and militarily, which contributed to Eritrea's independence in 1992. Conversely, Ethiopia supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army, which played a pivotal role in South Sudan's secession in 2011. Each country has thus reproduced the crisis within its neighbour, creating a cycle of conflict that leaves behind new states and unstable borders.
The diplomatic relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia is characterised by deep historical and geographical complexities, which manifest in protracted border disputes and mutual accusations of supporting rebel groups.
Currently, this vicious cycle continues, with renewed mutual accusations. Sudan accuses Ethiopia of supporting the Rapid Support Forces and allowing incursions into areas of Blue Nile State bordering Ethiopia. In turn, Ethiopia accuses Sudan of supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front and permitting incursions into the Western Tigray region, which borders Sudan. Each side continues to leverage the border issue and the other's internal conflicts in a diplomatic game that perpetuates tension, deepens fragility, and transforms their shared border into an arena for proxy wars that threaten the stability of the entire region. This diplomatic complexity extends beyond direct bilateral disputes. It is fuelled by overlapping regional and international interests in the Horn of Africa, where major powers compete for influence and exploit border conflicts to bolster their strategic presence. Furthermore, the absence of independent mechanisms to investigate mutual accusations allows each side to operate according to its own narrative, transforming any limited border incident into a full-blown diplomatic crisis that can quickly escalate into border closures, exchanges of accusations, and media mobilisation. This dynamic reinforces hostility and fuels extremist nationalist rhetoric on both sides.
The impact of complex diplomatic relations on the daily lives of border communities
Amid tense diplomatic manoeuvres between Sudan and Ethiopia, border communities emerge as the biggest losers. Important decisions that affect their lives are made in the capitals, with little to no input from the communities themselves, even though they bear the least responsibility for the conflicts and are the most committed to peaceful coexistence. These communities, which have enduring economic and social ties, suffer the direct consequences of violence. For instance, in Sharareena, clashes led some residents of Gudima village to be forced to flee to Al-Hashaba, while some farmers abandoned their farms. Similarly, in the Blue Nile Region, more than 12,000 people were displaced from Geisan and neighbouring villages between August 11 and 18, 2026, due to the worsening security situation, highlighting the extent of the ongoing humanitarian crisis.
These communities, which have enduring economic and social ties, suffer the direct consequences of violence.
When conflicts escalate, border communities in both countries pay a high price, especially since farmers depend on specific agricultural seasons. Any delay in planting or harvesting due to insecurity or border closures can result in total crop loss, threatening their primary food source and annual income. Pastoralists, who migrate seasonally with their herds in search of pasture and water, encounter blocked or dangerous traditional routes due to armed groups, leading to livestock deaths, theft, and a collapse of their main sources of income, which are vital to their subsistence economy.
Within this challenging context, individual stories illustrate the daily suffering of these communities. For example, an Ethiopian restaurant owner from Matamma, Ethiopia, wishes to operate her business in Gallabat, Sudan, while a Sudanese peanut vendor from Gallabat, Sudan, wants to sell her goods in the Matamma, Ethiopia market. Both women exemplify border traders whose movements are disrupted and whose livelihoods are jeopardised by security restrictions. Traders who depend on temporary border markets, such as those in Birakat Nureen and Jabal Halawa in Sudan, face restricted movement, which interferes with their ability to sell their goods, leading to dwindling daily incomes and making the struggle to provide for their families increasingly difficult. If Khartoum and Addis Ababa decide to close border crossings in response to rising tensions, as occurred with the Lukdi and Hamdayet crossing points in November 2020, these crossings may transform from vital lifelines, such as transporting food, medicine, and goods and connecting families, into front lines. In such cases, smuggling becomes more prevalent, prices soar, risks increase, and the population loses control over their daily lives.
Soft borders: A humanitarian solution to a complex diplomatic crisis
The ongoing diplomatic tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia, marked by mutual accusations of supporting rebel groups, require solutions that go beyond traditional approaches. These efforts have been hindered by overlapping regional interests, rising nationalist sentiments, and the involvement of local non-state actors with their own agendas. To effectively address the issue, we must focus on practical measures that protect populations living along the border, irrespective of military confrontations. The daily lives of people, like farmers needing access to their land, herders seeking their pastures, traders aiming for their markets, families wishing to connect with relatives, and seasonal workers looking for jobs, highlight the importance of establishing border peace as a humanitarian necessity that transcends political agendas.
To prevent the border from becoming a battleground in a proxy war and to break the cycle of escalating mutual accusations, we need to separate the three interconnected issues: the border dispute, the Sudanese civil war, and the Ethiopian internal conflict. This can be accomplished through independent investigative mechanisms. Additionally, it is essential to activate security committees at both state and regional levels, along with community mediation teams consisting of traditional leaders, women, and youth from both countries. These teams would be empowered to resolve local conflicts swiftly before they escalate into larger crises between Sudan and Ethiopia.
International funding should be directed to border communities to ensure the continuity of economic activities during times of crisis. Furthermore, we must redefine border sovereignty from a humanitarian perspective, focusing on the protection of citizens and the maintenance of their daily lives. Implementing "soft border" arrangements would allow the free movement of people, goods, and seasonal workers, regulated through designated crossing points overseen jointly by communities.
Despite the challenges, it is clear that both Sudan and Ethiopia have a shared interest in maintaining a secure and stable relationship. This is evident in the continued exchange of trade, the movement of people despite some restrictions, and the ongoing operation of the Gallabat-Matmma border crossing, temporary markets, and diplomatic missions. These realities provide a valuable opportunity for serious dialogue aimed at bridging gaps in perspectives and fostering genuine peace and stability. Such dialogue must consider the interests of neighbouring countries to the north and across the Red Sea. Given the geographical proximity, shared interests, and a long history of social interaction, it is crucial to recognise the importance of transforming borders from zones of conflict into areas of cooperation and development. The stability of this region is a shared responsibility that goes beyond narrow self-interests and fosters broader regional integration. While regional and international powers vie for influence and resources in the Horn of Africa, an ethical question persists: Can we transcend political divisions and artificial borders to acknowledge that the true cost of war is borne by ordinary people - the displaced, refugees, farmers, herders, and traders - who simply wish for safety and stability in their lives?
The answer hangs in the balance between conflicting political interests and human conscience, awaiting a collective realisation that the boundaries of security are not drawn on maps, but rather built in the hearts and minds of people.
This Sudanese Perspectives blog post is written by Adam Babekir, University of Gedaref.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the SNAC project or CMI.
