Journal Article | 2005
Altruistic donors face common good problem which calls for cooperation and policy integration. On the other hand, the more united and responsible donors act towards the poor in the country that receives aid, the less domestic support does the poor get. I study these two countervailing effects of donor cooperation in different settings. Cooperation is always beneficial if donors can enforce contingent aid contracts. If contracts cannot be used, I show that cooperation can be harmful. I find that the negative effect of mutual aid policy is reduced if the donors face Samaritan's dilemma.
U4 Practitioner Experience Note | Mar 2020
Twenty years with anti-corruption. Part 2. Fighting the ‘seven deadly thins’ – starting the DFID journey
Phil Mason OBE
CMI Working Paper | Feb 2020
The UAE’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Claiming State Sovereignty, Regional Leverage and International Recognition