CMI Working Paper
| 2003
The evolution of social norms
Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2003:1) 13 p.
How to cite this publication:
Ivar Kolstad (2003). The evolution of social norms. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI Working Paper WP 2003:1)
Evolutionary game theory provides the tools to analyze
which strategies, or patterns of behaviour, emerge over
time through a process of adaptation. Social norms can
be defined as patterns of behaviour with certain
characteristics. Evolutionary game theory thus provides
one perspective on how social norms are formed and
maintained. Prisoner's dilemma games can be used to
study the conditions under which cooperative norms
emerge. Bargaining games can be used to address the
formation of fairness norms. However, being more
congenial to analyzing norms that somehow focus on
material payoffs, it is not a given that evolutionary
game theory can adequately address norms focusing on
rights or virtues.
